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UNITED SERVICE

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CONTENTS OF VOLUME VIII.

THIRD SERIES.

Page.

ANDRÉ'S RIDE. By T. H. Farnham 255

ANGLO-JAPANESE FLEETS IN ALLIANCE. By Archibald Hurd . . . 604

ART OF WAR IN '62 (THE). By F. A. Shoup 67

BATTLE OF THE SEA OF JAPAN (THE). By Archibald S. Hurd . . . 117

BENHAM, DANIEL W., BRIGADIER GENERAL U. S. ARMY 199

BRITISH NAVAL POLICY AND GERMAN ASPIRATIONS. By Archibald S. Hurd 347

CAPTAIN PIERRI DE LANDIS, COMMANDER CONTINENTAL FRIGATE "ALLIANCE."

By H. D. Smith, Captain U. S. Revenue Cutter Service . . 214

CONTEST FOR SEA POWER (THE). GERMANY'S OPPORTUNITY. By Archibald S. Hurd 229

DIARY OF A CANOE EXPEDITION INTO THE EVERGLADES AND INTERIOR OF SOUTHERN FLORIDA IN 1842 (THE). By the late George Henry Preble, Rear Admiral U. S. Navy. 26

DRAPER, W. F., BRIGADIER GENERAL U. S. VOLS. 399

EDITORIALS 500, 615

EIGHTEENTH CENTURY EPISODE IN VIENNESE COURT LIFE (AN). By S. I. De Zuylen De Nyevelt 437

EUROPEAN THEORY BAFFLED IN THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR. Translated from the *Militar-Wochenblatt*, by Captain Cecil Stewart, U. S. Army 573

FEW REMARKS UPON THE NEW MILITIA LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (A). By George Nestler Tricoche 471

FIRST MARCH OF THE FIFTH INFANTRY IN MONTANA (THE). By Henry Romeyn, Major U. S. Army (retired) 113

FISKE, BRADLEY ALLEN, Commander U. S. Navy 99

Page.

HESSIAN AUXILIARIES IN NORTH AMERICAN WAR (THE). Translated from the German by Lieut.-Col. William Gerlach 1

HILL-SIDE FARM. By Jos. B. Rowell 146

JACK HILTON'S LOVE AFFAIR. By T. H. Farnham 322

MILITARY REMINISCENCES OF THE REBELLION (SOME). By T. J. Jordan, Brigadier General U. S. Vols. 375

MODOC WAR (THE). Its Origin, Incidents and Peculiarities. By Colonel James Jackson 242

OFFICIAL AND SOCIAL MILITARY ETIQUETTE. By W. R. Hamilton, Major, U. S. A. 537

OLD FRANCE AND YOUNG AMERICA. Campaign of Vice-Admiral D'Estaing in 1778. By G. Lacour-Gayet 301

OUR CONTEMPORARIES. By John P. Wisser, Major, U. S. A., 81, 158, 260, 582

PAULDING, TATTNALL, COLONEL 299

PECK, GEORGE. Medical Director, U. S. Navy 623

PEKING, AUGUST, 1900. By Colonel G. K. Scott Montcrieff, C. I. E., R. E. 523

PERSONAL NARRATIVE OF THE WRECK OF THE VANDALIA AT SAMOA, MARCH 16, 1889, (A). By Harrie Webster, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy. 407

REGULATION COMBAT TACTICS OF THE JAPANESE AND RUSSIAN INFANTRY (THE). Translated from the German, by Herbert Z. Krumm, Second Lieutenant, U. S. Army 101

RETRIBUTION OF DONA CLARA (THE). By R. Moncton Dene 132

SERVICE SALAD 95, 195, 281, 392, 503, 620

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE PACIFIC OCEAN (THE). By J. P. Wisser, Major, U. S. Army 401

STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR. By John P. Wisser, Major, U. S. Army 201, 361, 455, 513

TIMES HISTORY IN THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA (THE). By Militarist. 47

WARREN, LUCIUS HENRY, GENERAL 512

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VOL. VIII.—JULY, 1905.—NO. 1.

CONTENTS

		Page.
I.	The Hessian Auxiliaries in North American War. Translated from the German by Lieut.-Colonel WILLIAM GERLACH	1
II.	The Diary of a Canoe Expedition into the Everglades and Interior of Southern Florida in 1842. By the late GEORGE HENRY PREBLE, Rear Admiral, U. S. N.	26
III.	The *Times* History in the War in South Africa. By MILITARIST	47
IV.	The Art of War in '62—Shiloh. By F. A. SHOUP	67
V.	Our Contemporaries. By JOHN P. WISSER, Major U. S. A.	81
VI.	Service Salad	95
VII.	BRADLEY ALLEN FISKE, Commander U. S. Navy	99

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THE
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JULY, 1905.

THE HESSIAN AUXILIARIES IN NORTH AMERICAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.

1776-1783.*

HISTORY took offense thereat that England was assisted with auxiliaries by German rulers in the struggle with her rebellious colonies in North America. For this reason many historians launched forth into moral disquisitions about the treaties of subsidy and into accusations against those princes of alleged trading in human beings, but they neglected to describe the actions of the troops in the subsequent military expeditions.

I wish to do the opposite, and I indulge only in this moral contemplation, viz., that these troops, not simply "human beings," but well organized and trained bodies of soldiers with a liberal complement of excellent officers, obeyed the orders of their war lord and ruler, and proceeded to distant parts of the world, to face a thousand dangers, more or less willingly, but true to their oath to the colors.

Therefore the question is well founded: What have they learned and accomplished out there, what have they experienced and suffered? This is the object of my lecture, although the limited time allotted, permits me to describe events only hastily and in great outlines. There is nothing in them of much interest to the cavalryman, except that it shows us how a campaign must progress when no cavalry or only a small body of it is present.

It is a fact, that with the exception of a few mounts for officers, the Hessians took not a single horse; on the English side only a weak

*Lecture delivered November 23, 1894, in the Officers' Club of the Hussar Regiment, Hessen-Homburg, by Freiherr v. Werthern, Colonel Commanding the Regiment. Translated from the German for the Second Division, General Staff, U. S. Army, by Lieutenant-Colonel William Gerlach.

dragoon regiment participated with a total of 40—50,000 other troops. As a substitute for much-needed cavalry, Hessian Jägers were at times temporarily mounted on American horses, and so performed good patrol service; on one occasion they almost captured the hostile commander.

The 13 English provinces in North America; or, as they called themselves, the "United Colonies," extended along the east coast of this continent, the remainder of which was then inhabited by numberless Indian tribes. These colonies actually in 1775—formally by the celebrated Declaration of Independence of the 4th of July in the following year—renounced their allegiance to the mother country, and so completed the rupture, which the discords of the preceding decade, which may be properly called a customs war, had made unavoidable.

But England could not voluntarily give up these rich sources of wealth, upon the development of which she had already expended millions; she must rather concentrate all her resources for a struggle for life and death. There was no lack of money, but soldiers were scarce. For the fleet of 76 men-of-war there were available the necessary 28,000 sailors, but for the land army, the needed strength of which for the approaching war, was calculated, at the best, as 26,000 men, hardly 11,000 could be raised, and these were already opposed at the beginning of the campaign by 14,000 enemies, certainly poorly armed and almost without any organization; of different nationality and divided by separate interests, but all united by a burning desire for independence and common hatred of England.

So the latter was forced to procure auxiliaries at any price, through treaties with countries on the (European) continent. The negotiations for this purpose extended through the year 1775.

Meanwhile the war had already broken out and took the following course up to the fall of 1776.

The English, with their native allies, the Royalist Americans and part of the Indians, who were driven to the English colors by their hatred of the Colonists, were scattered over the tremendous distance of 200 geographical miles; the right wing under General Carleton in Canada, the centre under General Gage, who was soon superseded by the Commander-in-Chief, General William Howe, in Boston; the left wing under General Clinton, supported by the English fleet in the Carolinas.

The first blood was shed in the engagement of Lexington April 18, 1775. A congress of the rebellious government of Massachusetts had assembled in Concord, a small city, about 100 kilometers from Boston, where the representatives of the colony—in English eyes "rebel lead-

ers"—met, to deliberate upon the next step against England. The background of these deliberations was formed by an accumulation of war supplies. This was a welcome object for a surprise. General Gage sent a detachment of 800 men to accomplish this. These troops met, however, with well prepared resistance, and were turned back with bloody heads.

The fury of war was now unfettered; through all the colonies sounded the call to arms, and armed cohorts appeared, as if they had risen out of the ground, in every direction. Washington was commissioned to organize a "Continental Army" of 20,000 men for the period of one year, and appointed its commander-in-chief.

This selection can in its consequences be already likened to a victory. For Washington, then 44 years old, was a wisely calculating, energetically acting man, a noble, distinguished character, of independent integrity and never faltering courage. Of all the personalities which this war has placed in the light of universal history, he is the most eminent. The more we learn of him, the more are we compelled to turn to him our esteem and sympathy.

After he had assumed supreme command he turned against Boston, and at the same time sent a corps, under General Montgomery, against Canada. The latter drove the English out of Montreal and crowded them back upon Quebec, but then it suffered a defeat on the last day of the year 1775, when 500 men, among them their able leader Montgomery were killed. A beautiful picture by the English painter Trumbull represents his death, as he sinks down in the midst of a group of the fallen, supported by friends, who lay him down gently at the foot of waving colors, a pendant to the picture of the English General Wolfe, who had fallen 16 years before at the same place during the struggle for Canada.

The English garrison at Quebec was, however, besieged by the Americans until May, 1776, and would probably have been lost, had not the first German auxiliaries, 5,000 men from Brunswick, under General v. Riedesel, arrived in time.

Now the scale turned, and the banks of the St. Lawrence were soon cleared of the enemy. But these events go beyond the range of my lecture. We will meet this army again at a decisive turning point of the war.

Meanwhile famine forced the garrison of Boston to evacuate the place, and it sailed for Halifax. Washington occupied Boston. A tragic misunderstanding soon after sent an English man-of-war with 700 men and valuable supplies into the arms of the enemy, it having

sailed into Boston harbor, not knowing that the city had been evacuated by the English.

When the English Commander-in-Chief General Howe received, at the beginning of June, 1776, advice of the approach of the English fleet with the Hessian auxiliaries, he set sail with 9,000 men, and landed before New York on Staten Island, where he took post in a fortified camp. Opposite Staten Island, separated from it by the entrance to New York—the "Narrows"—lay Long Island, upon which Brooklyn is situated. Washington had occupied the latter meanwhile with 5,000 men, while his best troops, 8,000 men, under command of General Nathaniel Green, had been pushed forward into a fortified camp near Flatbush. The English fleet, too, had already returned to the height of New York and brought along such of the troops as had not been disbanded in Carolina, where nothing was to be accomplished.

In this manner the forces of the English—with exception of the troops in Canada—stood united before New York, closely opposite the rebels, both preparing for the coming battle, the English anxiously awaiting the arrival of the auxiliaries. Finally on August 17, 1776, a gallant fleet of 150 ships, coming from England, cast anchor at Sandy Hook, on the eastern point of Staten Island, and brought besides the English reinforcements also the first Hessians, 7,400 men, under Lieutenant-General v. Heister.

How did these troops get there?

Brunswick first responded, as already mentioned, to the urgent request to furnish auxiliaries, which were seconded personally by King George III. of England; then the Landgraf of Hessen-Cassel, his son the ruling Count of Hanau, the Prince of Waldeck, the Prince of Anhalt Zerbst, and finally the Prince of Ansbach Bayreuth. In Hessen about 12,500 men were mobilized in the winter of 1775-76, and placed in two divisions under the command of the old, tried, General v. Heister (born in Homburg, 1716). These comprised 15 regiments infantry, 4 grenadier battalions (elite troops), 2 companies Jägers and 3 companies field artillery. These, excepting the body-guard regiment and the 7 cavalry regiments, were nearly the entire Hessian army. Even the body-guard regiment gave one wing grenadier company each from its second and third battalions to the field army. (The Ordre de Bataille is given in appendix). We should, however, remark with regard thereto that it changed frequently, and had no value for any length of time, because, leaving out the changes in their grouping, the regiments, named after their honorary chiefs, changed names, too, as they changed chiefs. These unfortunate arrangements, which brought it about that half the regiments returned, bearing names

different from the ones under which they started out, make it extremely difficult to follow the fortunes of any one regiment, the more so, as it is often designated in official papers by the name of the commander for the time being.

From the figures given in the appendix it will appear that the regiment then was only of the strength of one of our present battalions (about 623 men) on a peace footing, and then it had as a rule only 4 companies, so that a battalion commander may be looked upon as identical with that of a regiment. These shortcomings were remedied soon after the war. Even if it is not possible now to enter into the subject more closely, I will here say that the further history of the regiments, although in a somewhat complicated succession, may be brought down to the present German regiments 80, 81, 82, 83, who were consolidated with and represent now the Kur-Hessian regiments existing before 1866.

The British government paid for every man in an organization properly equipped for war, a premium of 30 thalers ($22.50), and guaranteed full pay for all for two years after the conclusion of peace. For every man killed or invalided, a like sum was assured, which would be used for care of those left behind, or men disabled in service. This was barely sufficient for this purpose. The, at first, very small corps of invalids, at Carlshafen was increased during the war to 8 companies. England is said to have paid to the Landgraf of Hesse-Cassel in the 8 war years the round sum of 21 million thalers (15¾ million dollars). To this should be added the savings made at home, by not having to maintain this army during said period. In other respects the Landgraf kept the troops under his own jurisdiction, the promotion of officers was left in his hands. Even if the distance was great, all returns and reports from the troops, as well as the orders and promotions by the Landgraf, the bestowing of decorations and other decisions went back and forth with regularity. The division Heister with part of the division Knyphausen marched first from Cassel, where it had been drilling diligently during the winter on the "Forst" (Cassel Drill Ground), sometime with the snow a foot deep. The march out, which took place in February, 1776, was preceded by a parade on the Bowling-green.

The balance of the division Knyphausen with a Waldeck regiment followed in May.

The march of the first echelon was along the river Weser; March 10th, the city of Bremen, then inundated, was passed on wagons; March 22d, the first muster took place by the English Colonel Faucit, who, during the entire war, conducted affairs on the continent under

the subsidy treaties. On the following day the embarkation of the troops on the transports commenced. As the latter arrived very slowly the embarkation consumed fully three weeks, and it was not until April 17th that the fleet of 44 vessels with their 7,400 Hessians raised their anchors. Twelve days later, they reached Plymouth, where they were solemnly received and hospitably entertained. They had to remain here 8 days, until the fleet with the English reinforcements was ready to go to sea.

After a long and hard voyage, the fleet, as we already know, reached Sandy Hook on Staten Island, August 17, 1776. After this the offensive campaign to get possession of New York was immediately inaugurated.

This necessitated the re-embarkation of the troops detailed for the attack. Fifteen thousand men, among them from the Hessians the first and third brigades, were transported by echelons to Long Island between the 19th and 25th of August, 1776. The first minor engagements with the American garrison were successfully conducted. The positon, as mentioned, was occupied by 8,000 men and protected by a series of advanced works of the heights of Flatbush. It was of first importance therefore to take these. The position rested with the right wing on the Narrows, with the left on the East River. The village of Flatbush was on the highest point in the centre. There a road crossed the ridge, another south of it near the coast, a third to the north near the East River.

According to the plan of General Howe the Hessians under Heister should take the middle road and attempt to hold the enemy firmly near Flatbush, until an English column under Clinton, to which Howe had attached himself, would, advancing to the north from there, be able to gain the rear of the opponent. Another column should draw the attention of the hostile right wing upon itself.

The attack was made August 27th, but turned out otherwise than planned. The Hessians ascended the heights with music sounding and colors flying, while the men panting, pulled up the guns behind them. Under the enemy's fire the troops were assembled on top and dressed, as if on their home drill ground, then they dashed, with their favorite battle cry "Schurri," for the first time, upon the abattis and ramparts occupied by the enemy. The enemy suffered serious losses through the well aimed fire of the Hessian Jägers and did not hold his ground long. The thin lines were soon broken through in various places by the bayonet attack, and streamed back on the main position of Brooklyn. The right English column crossed the ridge, without meeting resistance, but came, on further advance, into position to fire

on the flank of the retreating enemy. This may explain why the Americans suffered the surprisingly heavy loss of 2,500 men in killed, wounded, and prisoners; while the English lost 250, the Hessians but 30 men. Among the prisoners were 3 generals and 63 other officers. The Hessians had taken 7 guns, the English the same number; 15 more were found in the works. Out of this superficial description of the first engagement it becomes plain why the Americans had terrible respect for the impetuosity of the Hessians, and that this impressed even the English, although such a bold advance had not been part of their plan. It is true the main success of the day did not materialize, for as the Hessians were preparing to attack the main fortification in Brooklyn, they were stopped by the positive order of General Howe, to defer this attack until the following day. General v. Heister was of the opinion that the delay was unnecessary and injurious, and he made so little concealment of this towards the commander-in-chief that a tension between both arose which could never be entirely removed afterwards. The attack, too, had to be omitted next day on account of heavy rain, and this was followed by a dense fog, under the protection of which the Americans voluntarily decamped. In the night of August 30th they crossed the East River, under the personal and skillful direction of Washington and left the works with valuable supplies and many guns at the mercy of the enemy. The latter most strangely remained 14 days longer in the captured position, and then crossed likewise to Manhattan Island, where a few fortunate engagements led to the occupation of the city of New York. It remained during the entire war in the possession of the English. But the garrison never could enjoy life, because the outlying country was frequently overrun by hostile corps, who made repeated attempts to gain possession of the city by surprise. It is impracticable to enter here into the details of these enterprises. At times they gave the city, which had gradually been protected on the land side by a series of fortifications, the aspect of a beleaguered fortress. Numerous enterprises by both parties, some to gather subsistence, others to destroy supplies accumulated by the opponent, or to effect surprises, remind us vividly of our garrison peace exercises, and give rise to the belief that they have been imported from there into our service.

These enterprises were undoubtedly an excellent school for minor war, as it was then still unknown to our tactical forms. For here the point was the expert use of the terrain, with utilization of the fire arm by the individual rifle man, as well as larger bodies. The latter were thereby forced to use the extended order, and unconsciously they reached tactical forms, which were destined in natural sequence to

change the whole art of war. The Hessians, too, much to their regret —many lamentations found their way into reports and diaries—had to accommodate themselves to these new forms. Fortunately they were already well prepared for this; their men were thoroughly drilled in musketry, and the Jägers were all excellent rifle shots. Important, too, was the fact, for the Hessians troops, that being children of the country they served, they could be trusted in the extended order, much more than mercenaries always inclined to desertion. As a matter of fact, remarkably few desertions are recorded among the Hessians, although strong inducements were offered them, even officially on the part of the hostile government. * * *

Let us now return to New York. It should be mentioned that the greater portion of the inhabitants was hostile to the English, and that repeated attempts were made to burn the city. Some fires occurred, which could only, with great difficulty, be confined to certain quarters of the town.

October 18th the vessels with the remainder of the auxiliaries arrived at New York. General Howe reviewed them October 24th, and then followed the enemy, who was entrenched to the north of the city, at White Plains. Here it came to a sharp engagement on October 28th, when the Hessians again gave proof of great bravery. They had to wade through the little river Brunx, which covered the front of the hostile position, under the fire of the enemy. Arrived on the other side, the assailants climbed a steep height, and then stood on top once more, as at Flatbush, opposite the hostile lines. Colonel Rall, who here commanded the brigade Mirbach, succeeded in bringing a few guns upon a height unoccupied by the enemy. These engaged the American artillery so effectively, that it could not interfere with the frontal attack. The English under Clinton fought on the right, the Hessians under v. Heister on the left wing. Night interrupted the combat, the enemy withdrew voluntarily, crossing the Hudson further up, and took the direction to Philadelphia.

General Howe was next obliged to take two important forts, which situated on both banks of the Hudson above New York and strongly garrisoned, blocked the river traffic. These were "Fort Washington" on the left, "Fort Lee" on the right bank. According to descriptions, the former, situated on the rocky heights, reminds one almost of "Ehrenbreitenstein" (Rhine fortress opposite Coblenz trans). It had a garrison of 3,000 men and 38 heavy guns. General v. Knyphausen was charged with the attack. It was quickly and elegantly executed. The fort capitulated November 16th, and was called henceforth "Fort Knyphausen. At the same time a detachment was transferred to the

right rank, in order to take also Fort Lee. Its garrison of 2,000 men, however, voluntarily avoided the attack, and under the protection of the night, moved off quietly towards Philadelphia. Valuable supplies fell into the assailants hands in the fort; of guns, so many, that the number taken by the allies now amounted already to 100.

After these successes General Howe proceeded to catch up with the retreating opponent. Leaving the necessary garrison in New York, he crossed the Hudson and turned via Princeton and Brunswick towards the Delaware. When he reached this river near Trenton on the 8th of December the rear of the hostile forces, with whom Washington had marched, had just crossed the river; 37 guns, the last he had, were already in position on the other side and thundered to General Howe a "So far and no farther."

Another enemy, winter, meanwhile appeared. The snowfall is said to have covered the camp of the allies in a single night a foot deep. A crossing of the Delaware, too, was found impossible, as it was covered with heavy floating ice, and all means for crossing had been secured by the Americans. So, although the enemy according to all appearances was very near complete dissolution, Howe was forced to give up the pursuit, and allow his troops to go into winter quarters. Upon his own request the Hessian, Colonel Rall, remained in Trenton with his own regiment; with it the regiments v. Knyphausen, v. Lossberg, 50 Jägers, under Lieutenant v. Grethusen, 20 English dragoons and 6 guns, altogether at little more than 1,000 men. His position was decidedly dangerous, as the enemy remained not far from there on the right bank of the Delaware. The nearest Hessian cantonment was, under Colonel v. Donop, some miles to the rear.

The balance of the corps had marched back to New York. Only a good sized detachment of 6,500 men, among them the regiments Prince Carl, Ditfurth, the Guard and two Jäger companies, were embarked for a special enterprise in Rhode Island, and remained there exposed to many vicissitudes to the end of 1779, when the island had to be abandoned, principally on account of the scarcity of wood. A part of these troops had returned, however, to the main army already in the summer of 1777.

Up to this Colonel Rall had distinguished himself greatly in all engagements. But here he showed himself unequal to his charge. Criminally underestimating his opponent, he neglected the necessary measures of security. Serious warnings were not wanting to show that the enemy had grave designs upon him. His subordinates, especially Lieutenant-Colonel Scheffer, next in command, were placed in a most annoying position. Representations of the latter were treated

with contemptuous scorn. Nothing was left to him but to report the state of affairs in writing; but by the time the report reached headquarters, the misfortune had already happened.

Washington kept up steady communication with the inhabitants of Trenton; he was therefore not long left in ignorance that Colonel Rapp was addicted to drink, and that he paid little attention to the security of his detachment; also, that during the night he was usually unfit for duty. American officers in civilian dress did even frequent Rall's quarters, and it is said that occasionally they even took part in his nightly drinking bouts.

Upon this Washington built his plan, by which he hoped to raise again by a single blow the deeply sunken courage of his men. Christmas night he crossed the Delaware with 2,500 men in four columns; they reached their positions over well guarded wood roads on December 25th, and carried out the surprise of Trenton in the morning hours of December 26th with three columns, while the fourth was to fall simultaneously upon the cantonment of Colonel v. Donop. The latter move did not succeed, as this detachment was upon its guard; but it prevented aid reaching Colonel Rall's corps. So the latter was doomed.. It was surrounded on all sides, made some resistance, but was forced to surrender to the superior force. A merciful bullet ended the life of Rall, which was already forfeited by his guilty neglect. Besides him fell 4 officers and 17 men. About 100 officers and men were wounded. The Jägers under Lieutenant v. Grothusen, as well as about 400 men of the other regiments and the English dragoons, succeeded in cutting their way out. The remainder, 84 officers, 748 men, with 15 colors and 6 guns fell into the hands of the victors. The prisoners were given a considerate. almost comrade-like reception; the fallen were buried with military honors; Washington took great pains to secure the welfare of the wounded and prisoners and gave many proofs of his noble character. Still the lot of the prisoners became gradually a most deplorable one; for they were dragged about the country for two years, and only exchanged at New York near the close of 1778.

The moral effect of this victory was immeasurable. The war which would probably have ended very soon, now took a new start in all the colonies. In France, too, some of the heroes of liberty joined in the jubilation over the victory, and hastened to offer their services to the victor of Trenton.

A cry of horror resounded through all Hessenland when the mournful tidings were received, the more so, as they were much exaggerated at first. The Landgrave just then sojourned in Rome and

may have been reminded of the lament of Augustus over his legions. An investigation of the case by a military court afterwards filled volumes of records, but the result remained, that the only guilty one had fallen. Upon receiving the report of the misfortune General Howe at once sent General Cornwallis forward to Trenton so as to cover New York. An engagement was actually fought close to Trenton on February 2, 1777, in which the Americans got into a difficult situation, but came happily out of it, thanks to the skill of Washington. He succeeded even in passing his opponent and taking the direction upon New York, and Cornwallis had to make haste, to prevent his being cut off. The Americans now followed him closely, and in the following weeks a number of minor engagements were fought, which gave to the Hessian troops a new opportunity to prove their excellence in war, even in the most severe winter.

Howe did not feel strong enough for a great undertaking, and awaited the arrival of reinforcements in New York, in order to execute then a decisive blow against Philadelphia, the centre of the rebellion.

The reinforcements came in the beginning of June, 1777. Among them were two new Hessian Jäger companies (many of them volunteers out of the cavalry regiments), with which Major v. Pruschenk had left Cassel on the 9th of March, also 500 Jägers out of the earldom of Hanau, under the afterwards very celebrated Colonel Kreutzburger, and other troops from Waldeck and Anspach. June 12, 1777, the new arrivals were reviewed on Staten Island, and on the following day the army, 24,700 men, started en route to Philadelphia. After several marches executed in two columns, during which the troops suffered from the heat, the army struck the strongly fortified position of the enemy, which could neither be attacked or turned.

Having waited a few days, General Howe had recourse to a stratagem of Cæsar's, which consisted in his suddenly retreating, and thereby inducing the opponent to leave his position. But Washington was cautious enough to hold back his main force, and to send but a part of the troops after him. The latter were overtaken by fatality, for Howe suddenly made a halt and attacked the Americans so energetically in front and flank, that they were almost annihilated with a loss of 260 killed and wounded. This was the engagement of Woodbridge, June 26, 1777, where both sides fought bitterly from 3 A. M. till noon. On the Hessian side the Grenadier Battalion v. Minnigervde, especially distinguished itself. General Howe nevertheless felt it necessary to return to New York, and resolved, as the enterprise against Philadelphia, overland, had miscarried, to repeat the

same by water. He sailed from Sandy Hook, July 23, 1777, with 16,000 men, among them 4,000 Hessians, and after some stormy weeks entered Chesapeake Bay and landed, August 26th, on the north end of the same. A number of very interesting engagements were now fought, in which the Americans were crowded back from position to position with heavy losses.

To these belongs the battle on the Brandywine, September 11, 1777, which is especially noteworthy by reason of the fact, that several European officers were present, who had only recently arrived, to offer their services to Washington. These were the Prussians Baron v. Steuben, and v. Wodtke; the Frenchmen Marquis Lafayette, then only 19 years old, Chevalier Fleury, Maudit; and the Poles Kosciusko, and Paulawski.

The battle of Germantown, not far from Philadelphia, followed October 4th, after which Howe occupied the city without fighting.

Traffic on the Delaware to the sea, which was important for communication with New York, was blocked by "Fort Redbank," which had been but recently constructed and occupied by the Americans. Without knowing rightly the strength of this fort, General Howe charged Colonel v. Donop with a weak detachment, to capture it. The request of this officer for more guns to use in this undertaking was dismissed with the reply, "If you think you cannot accomplish it, English troops will be sent." This ended the matter, but Colonel v. Donop's concern proved well founded. The fort was much stronger than had been supposed, and the attack of the Hessians, who by a stratagem of the hostile commander were led into the most effective fire zone, failed. Colonel v. Donop, who heretofore had always shown himself a most able leader, fell with full 200 men. The last wish of the dying commander was to be buried with his fallen Jägers. The Americans buried him with military honors and his adjutant marked the grave with a stone cross with the inscription, "Multis flebilis occidit." (He fell to the sorrow of many.)

But General Howe must have the fort, so he sent out from Staten Island a fleet of 40 vessels. An overpowering attack with numerous artillery followed now, which after an immense expenditure of ammunition, in the night of November 15th to 16th, forced Fort Redbank with some outlying works to capitulate. A part of the American fleet was also near there, but the vessels were set on fire by the Americans themselves and destroyed.

The allies now formed a junction in Philadelphia and remained there, harrassed from the hostile camp not far off, until June, 1778. (In a Hessian diary appears the entry: "The view from my window

here, reminds me of the prospect from my house in the Waldao towards the Sohre.")

In the time of the seizure of Philadelphia, falls an event on the northern theatre of war, which in a still greater measure than the catastrophe of Trenton, destroyed the English chances of the war. This was the convention of Saratoga of October 16th, 1777.

In the spring the British government had ordered a co-operative movement of the armies of Canada and New York along the Hudson, in such a manner, that both corps would unite at Albany and crush the rebellion. General Burgoyne had forced himself in Canada into the place of Carleton as Commander in Chief, and entered full of hope upon the march to the south at the beginning of June from Montreal with a corps of 8,000 men, half of them Germans, 250 Canadians and 400 savages. Under untold difficulties he had to break his road from station to station, and conquer the blockade forts, remaining there since the French-English war, which the Americans had hastened to occupy, among them, viz.: Fort Crown Point, Forts Ticonderoga and Edward. Not far from the latter place he crossed the Hudson, and without a secure line of supply from the north, he was now dependent on an early junction with the corps advancing from the south, but he received but scant advices, transmitted by Indian runners.

With his corps was General v. Riedesel with his Brunswick troops. This was not a happy combination, for Riedesel was intellectually and in his qualifications as a commander, greatly the superior of Burgoyne, who complacently listened to his sensible suggestions, but took care not to follow them.

An odd circumstance deserves mention here, viz.: that General v. Riedesel was accompanied by his wife, who with noble self-denial and courageously vanquishing all difficulties, had followed him with their three little daughters, from Brunswick to Canada; a fourth was born to them in the new world and received its name. The experiences of the trip are given in her "Professional Trip to America." (See also in Eelking, "Life and Work of General v. Riedesel.") Besides Mrs. v. Riedesel the wives of three English officers participated in this adventuresome march, Lady Harriett Awkland, Mrs. Harnage and Mrs. Reynell.

The first heavy engagement took place near Stillwater (or Freeman's farm) against a far superior force under General Gates. Here the English were badly worsted with heavy loss, but the timely arrival of v. Riedesel, who had marched towards the sound of the cannon, prevented a catastrophe. The victorious Americans were

not only stopped, but thrown back on their camp. The English and the honor of the day were saved.

In this battle the above mentioned four ladies took an important part, as they engaged in the care of the wounded at a farm close behind the front, probably the first case of the kind in war history. Mrs. Reynell had to deplore the death of her husband, and Major Harnage was severely wounded.

Imagine the fate of the combatants, wounded in such engagements in the wilderness, for whose care no provision whatever had been made, and who were exposed irretrievably to the torments of thirst, heat and cold.

After the battle of Stillwater the two armies laid quietly opposite each other for several days, but the situation of the English rapidly grew worse, as supplies became less, and sickness increased. Finally Burgoyne resolved to turn back. But as he neared the crossing of the Hudson, he was completely surrounded by the opponent and robbed of all prospect to save himself. Out of respect for the brave troops of the allies, they were spared the disgrace of a formal capitulation. A convention was concluded under which arms were surrendered, and the troops thereafter named "Troops of the Convention" were marched off to Boston. In reality it was a capitulation, by which 5,800 men, among them 2,400 Germans, with 30 guns and 7,000 muskets, fell into the enemy's hands. Up to this time 1,400 English, 1,000 Brunswickers and 100 Hessians had fallen in action or died.

The Convention of Saratoga had the momentous consequence that France openly espoused the cause of the Americans and soon supported them effectively with her fleet, an army of 8,000 men, and ample funds.

The English corps, which was to have joined hands with Burgoyne near Albany, consisted of 4,000 men under Clinton. Of Hessians there were the regiment Trumbach and a recently arrived Jäger company. The corps had only left New York at the beginning of October, had made slow progress up the Hudson, and received the news of the catastrophe of Saratoga, when it was yet over 100 miles from there, and over 80 from Albany. It naturally returned quickly to New York. The only success which attended the march was the taking of two blockade posts on the Hudson, Forts Montgomery and Clinton.

This was a bold deed of arms similar to the assault upon Fort Washington. Both places almost impregnable on account of their situation, and protected by abatis, were simultaneously attacked and stormed, but Fort Montgomery was only taken in the darkness of the

night. The defenders, Generals George and James Clinton, (brothers) escaped with a few men, the rest were cut down; 100 guns fell into the victors' hands. It is worthy of note that Captain v. Eckert, who commanded the Amsbach Grenadier Company, and who had already frequently distinguished himself, died here a hero's death; although badly wounded he would not leave the head of his company. The Hessians, too, received honorable mention.

In the summer of 1777 the Hessian General v. Heister was relieved from his command, principally, because he did not stand well, as already mentioned, with the English Commander in Chief. He returned with high marks of military honor, but sick at heart, to Cassel; he arrived in the middle of October, but died about four weeks later, November 19, 1777. One heavy reproach he must carry into the grave: "Not to have prevented that so important a post as Trenton, was intrusted to such an incapable commander as Colonel v. Rall. Bitter, but not entirely unjustifiable logic indeed."

In the spring of 1778 Howe, too, was recalled and replaced by Clinton. Shortly before this he held a great review, when he addressed to the Hessians words expressing his highest recognition. On May 20th a great fete was given in honor of the departing general and the city was illuminated. Washington was near by, fully advised of all that was going on, and naturally eager to glorify the feast by a surprise. But this time the Hessian outposts were watchful; they delayed him long enough, until the entire garrison coming up in three columns threatened to surround him. But Washington managed again to draw out of the noose and went back to his camp.

But the war situation had become decidedly threatening for the English by the affair of Saratoga. The French fleet approached the mouth of the Delaware, and in conjunction with the land forces, threatened to isolate the garrison of Philadelphia. The place must therefore be evacuated as soon as possible. This was the immediate task of the Commander in Chief. In the early days of June the evacuation commenced by the sending off of the baggage, which is said to have formed a column over 12 miles in length. It was followed by 13,000 men in two columns, one under Cornwallis, the other under Knyphausen; 3,000 men had been sent off by ship, and just managed to get through. The march became a most difficult one, so that it might well be compared with the retreat of Xenophon and his 10,000 Greeks. Hardly had they left Philadelphia, when the enemy followed after, swarming around the flanks too. Daily a number of men fell victims to the intense heat, and the road through the endless, waterless wilderness could only be passed over by short marches.

Here again the Hessian Jägers, two hundred of whom had been mounted, stood well the test, as masters of outpost and security service, although they were opposed by the most expert troops of the enemy, the noted riflemen, who were feared on account of their excellent marksmanship.

On the hostile side, Washington himself was in command, with his "Moltke" the Baron v. Steuben. At one time the latter was nearly taken prisoner: General v. Knyphausen, who personally knew Steuben in earlier days, recognized the latter, when he, with a small escort, came unexpectedly near his lines reconnoitering. Knyphausen quickly started out a troop of mounted Jägers to capture him, but called after them not to harm him. But Steuben was not to be captured; he charged back to his own people, a few Jägers, probably on runaway steeds, came too, and were themselves taken prisoners. Steuben asked one of them: "You fellows, why did you not fire at me?" The reply is: "Herr General Knyphausen forbid us to do so." The latter got only Steuben's hat, which he had lost in his hurry, and brought it home as a trophy. It is preserved to this day by his descendants.

An important battle was fought June 28th at Monmouth, which Clinton was forced to engage in, so as to gain a start for his baggage. It ended with a defeat of the Americans, who lost 400 men; the allies lost 300, 70 of them by sunstroke. Under the Hessian Jägers a volunteer, who had only recently arrived with the reinforcements especially distinguished himself: his name was Ochs, the same who afterwards rose to the rank of general, and whose son served in our regiment, 1836-50, and finally became its commander.

It is noteworthy that on these marches it was first observed how expedient it is to use on the completion of the day's march the advance or rear guard, respectively, directly as outposts, and to relieve them on the following morning. The Hessians had the advance guard in the start; but when the direction of the march had to be changed, they became rear guard, and kept this dangerous post until the corps finally reached Sandy Hook, July 5th. But the enemy had come along too, and his bold strokes in the vicinity of the city did not cease until winter set in. The soul of the small war on the other side was a Frenchman, Armand Marquis de la Rouerie, on the Hessian side Colonel Emmerich, the same who was shot by the French on the "Forst," in consequence of the rising of Dornberg, in 1809, and is buried there under the old oak.

With the setting in of winter, all operations ceased in the north, where the snow is said to have covered the ground to the depth of 5

feet, and as in the years following, to the close of hostilities, the theatre of war was transferred to the southern colonies, we may herewith bid adieu to the northern ones. It must not be neglected to mention here, however, that Hessian troops were also sent to Canada, viz.: the regiment v. Knyphausen under Colonel v. Bork, and the regiment of v. Lossberg under Colonel v. Loos. They were first embarked together with 44th British regiment at Sandy Hook, September 8, 1778. But the sea voyage, mostly in poor ships, was frustrated by storms. Of the 24 vessels which left port the majority returned after a few weeks of great suffering in a most deplorable condition to Sandy Hook. One (Adamant) with two companies of the regiment v. Lossberg had become a prey of the waves, with them, Major v. Houstein, Captains Steding, v. Wurmb, Lieutenant Maller. Two vessels (Triton and Molley) with half the regiment Knyphausen, (mostly prisoners at Trenton, which had just been exchanged) fell into the hands of hostile privateers, being in a perfectly defenseless condition. Another (the Badger) with the company of Captain v. Altenbockum, had a like fate, but was liberated next day by a British frigate.

The remains of both regiments recruited as far as possible, were embarked once more, May 15, 1779, and reached Quebec after a very stormy voyage of 6 weeks.

The troops had no further chance there to distinguish themselves in action, but were made very useful in the British interest under the command of General v. Riedesel, and, together with the Hanau and Brunswick contingent, contributed to it that on the conclusion of peace, and to this day, Canada has remained a British possession.

We will now turn to events in the south. At the end of November, 1778, Clinton sent a fleet with 3,500 men under General Campbell to Georgia, in order to seize Savannah.

To this corps belonged, from the Hessian side, the regiments v. Wissenback and v. Trumbach. These were the first troops too, who after a dangerous sea voyage, landed, on December 29, 1778, not far from Savannah. The city and the heights before it on the side of the sea, were occupied by the enemy. General Campbell at once proceeded to the attack with the first troops. They overthrew the Americans after a stubborn resistance, and the regiment Trumbach by energetic pursuit, earned the merit of crowding the Americans from their line of retreat leading into the city, where all preparation had been made to burn the town. In this way this misfortune was averted. As a reward a barrack in the city was assigned to the Hessians, while the

rest of the troops went into camp outside. About 100 of the enemy had fallen; 38 officers, 415 men were prisoners; 71 guns, 10 vessels in the harbor, and one color were taken.

The fall of Savannah decided the fate of Georgia. A number of horses found in the vicinity, again gave an opportunity to mount infantry men and to use them for patrol duties. Soon the approach of an American army under the very efficient General Lincoln was discovered. The two forces met on the Savannah river, where the English gained a victory, March 3, 1779. In consequence of this General Prevost, who had meanwhile come up from eastern Florida and assumed supreme command, marched upon Charleston. This important seaport city lies on a small tongue of land which was strongly fortified by earthworks on the land side. The siege was hindered more by thunder storms and heavy rains, than hostile fire, so that Prevost soon found himself obliged to withdraw. The Americans erroneously interpreted this as a glorious victory, and started in pursuit. Prevost occupied a position on Johns Island, which was separated from the mainland by a narrow arm of the sea, Stono River Here a peculiar combat was enacted, at Stono Ferry, which must be described for the honor of the Hessian arms. The regiment Trumbach held a position, a sort of tete de pont, on the mainland, while the regiment Wissenbach, with four guns, had been posted in support on the island. On the 20th of June the former was suddenly attacked by a much superior force, but defended itself so successfully by a steady, well aimed fire, that the enemy fell back again into the woods with a loss of about 500 men. Meanwhile an American man of war, the Rattlesnake, with sixteen guns, had entered Stono River, in order to take the Hessians in rear. But it got under the fire of the 4 guns of the regiment Wissenbach and was sunk in shallow water. As the ebb tide set in now, the regiment managed to take the ship by assault. Who can describe their agreeable surprise, when among the guns were found 4 lost at Trenton, and in addition thereto some Hessian colors, also some of the sacrifices of that unlucky affair. The regiment kept the guns, the colors were sent home on the first opportunity.

The scorching heat prevented further enterprises. Prevost left a garrison in Fort Beaufort, near by, and returned with the remainder to Savannah. The capture of Charleston was accomplished later by another expedition. First it was necessary to protect Savannah. For on September 4, 1779, the French fleet suddenly appeared there, and landed a corps of 5,000 French with 53 heavy guns and 14 mortars, with which the bombardment was commenced on October 4th; at the same time Lincoln appeared again on the land, and united his equally

strong army with the French. Both made desperate efforts to get possession of the city. The English were opposed by the Americans, the Hessians by the French. The hostile commander, Count d'Estaing, ordered a general assault on October 9th, which met, however, with a bloody repulse. The besiegers fled back into their camp with a loss of 900 men, and quarreling over the responsibility for this disaster, they raised the siege. Savannah was saved.

Soon after this Clinton sent from Staten Island a fresh corps of 7,500 men on 133 vessels with orders to take Charleston. Of all the awful sea voyages which are recorded during the American campaign, this was doubtless the worst. At times the vessels were completely scattered, and it is a wonder that finally all, with exception of 4, which foundered, and one driven out of her course, came together again on the last of January, 1780, at the mouth of the Savannah River. A small vessel (Anna) with 250 Hessian Jägers was driven to the Irish coast, where it stranded. The men were saved, however, and landed a second time in New York on October 17, 1780.

February 12th the troops were landed upon James Island south of Charleston. Of the Hessians there were here the regiments Prince Carl, Ditfurth and Huyne and some Grenadiers and Jägers. In Charleston there were 5,000 Americans and with them 5 frigates (1 French) in port. The city had 14,000 inhabitants, half of them negroes. As several distinguished members of Congress stayed there, the defense was energetically supported and carried through. The siege progressed very slowly. April 1st the trenches were staked out, after 5 weeks the first parallel was opened; 8 days later on May 12th the garrison surrendered: 2 generals, 400 officers, 6,600 men, inclusive of 1,000 sailors.

In his report General Clinton praises most highly the merits of the Hessian Jägers and Grenadiers. Of the officers, the Colonels v. Huyne and v. Kospoth, distinguished themselves. Of the Hessian Jägers it is told, that especially good shots posted in the trenches hit single men on the hostile ramparts at the distance of 500 paces with ease.

On May 31st a part of the troops was sent back to New York. The command, over those who stayed back, was given to the excellent General Cornwallis, whom we must now accompany to the end of the war. To his corps belonged the Hessian regiments Ditfurth, Trümbach and Huyne. He remained in Charleston to the end of 1780. From there he undertook an expedition into the interior, which ended in the fortunate engagement near Camden, on August 16th. Here fell the German General Kalb, 60 years old, who had entered the American service. The Americans lost 12 colors and 12 guns.

Near the end of the year 1780 Cornwallis was reinforced by a corps of 1,500 men, among them the Hessian regiment v. Bose and one company Jägers under Captain v. Roeder. General Leslie commanded this corps. He joined Cornwallis January 18, 1781, and both now started upon a most laborious march to North Carolina, during which the troops are said to have bridged in a few months 150 water courses, among them the rapid Catawba, their route lay through deserts and swamps, in which the inhabitants of the country often believed them to be lost, but these obstacles were always happily overcome.

On March 15th, 1781, General Green disputed their progress at Guildford's Hall (now called Greensborough in honor of the American Commander). It came to a very bitter engagement, which took a decidedly interesting course. While the English advance guard opened the fight, Cornwallis assembled his troops; upon the right wing the Hessians and Scotch, (an often tried and proved combination), in the center the English guard and the artillery, on the left two English regiments. Green posted his troops on a broad front, three lines behind each other, each protected by hedges and embankments. At the first assault all three lines were successfully broken through and dispersed, but the different parts soon collected again and fired on the victoriously advancing enemies from the rear and the flanks so effectively, that they became most seriously disorganized. Here it was the Hessian regiment v. Bose, under command of Lieutenant Colonel Du Puy, whose courageous action saved the honor of the day. Under the greatest pressure it held out manfully. When the enemy appeared in the rear, the second rank faced about, and steadily continued the fire. It repulsed every attack, and became the rallying point for the other dispersed bodies. It lost a great part of its officers and men. Among its killed were Captain v. Wilmowski and Lieutenant v. Strott. Captain Eigenbrod and Lieutenants Schwaner and Teyse were severely wounded.

The enemy withdrew, but the strength of the allies was exhausted too by the engagement.

Cornwallis went into camp in the interior of Virginia and awaited the arrival of reinforcements, which were approaching under General Arnold, a leader of doubtful worth, who had gone over to the English from the American service. With him was a company of Hessian Jägers under Captain Ewald, who became known at a later period as the author of a very interesting book concerning the experiences of the war, "Treatise on Minor War," Cassel, 1785.

In time Cornwallis marched towards the coast, and while en route occurred the last engagement in which the Hessians participated in

the open field during the war. It was on July 6th, 1781, when Cornwallis intended to cross the James River near Williamsburg. General Lafayette was there at his heels, and believed that the greater part of the enemy had already crossed the river and that he had only its rear guard in his front. But this was not so. Cornwallis was yet able to oppose the attack with three English regiments and the regiment v. Bose, and put the French to flight. They lost 200 men and two guns, and did not disturb the march any farther.

About this time Washington for the last time, but with most decisive results, carried out a stratagem. He caused the false news to be spread that he intended to turn with all his forces upon New York, in order to get possession of the city. Even fictitious orders of this import were played into the hands of English spies, who sent them as important news to headquarters. Clinton never doubted the truth of these advices, particularly as Washington allowed himself to be seen repeatedly on reconnoitering rides before the city, and made every possible preparation against attack. The Hessian Colonel Wurmb, who commanded the outposts, had gathered information, which led him to disbelieve the rumors scattered broadcast everywhere, and he warned General Clinton, but he was not listened to. The latter, therefore, concentrated all available troops around himself, and did not allow the departure of the reinforcements which Cornwallis was anxiously awaiting in the South. This was exactly what Washington desired. Instead of assaulting New York, he turned off suddenly to the right, and proceeded by forced marches to Virginia, in order to destroy the corps of General Cornwallis. We already know the latter to be en route to the coast. He marched with his diminished little army from Portsmouth to Yorktown in the hope to be able to await further events in this fortified seaport town.

But this choice became fatal to him. For hardly had he occupied the town, when the French fleet under Rochambeau appeared from the sea, and on the land side came Washington, with his generals, Gates, Greene and Wayne, and an army of 13,000 men; with them Lafayette with 8,000 French.

The siege commenced October 1, 1781, under the personal direction of Steuben. Ruin could no longer be averted. After a heavy cannonade Cornwallis was forced to leave the city. He attempted yet to cross his troops over the York River, but a heavy thunderstorm thwarted this last effort. After an honorable defense he capitulated on October 18, 1781, with the weak garrison. This consisted of round 7,400 men; among these the Hessian regiments Erbprinz, v. Bose,

two regiments from Franconia and 125 Hessian Jägers. With the garrison, 91 guns and 83 warships and transports were lost.

The prisoners were brought to Frederickstown, in Maryland, and remained there to the conclusion of peace. Three days after the capitulation, Clinton with 24 vessels and 6,000 men entered Chesapeake Bay, where he received the mournful tidings of the fall of Yorktown, which caused him to turn back at once.

The fall of Yorktown was of decisive importance for the war. England had enough. After six years of war it possessed, outside of Canada, only New York, Charleston and Savannah. Even if the army was still 42,000 men strong, all supplies for it and the 30,000 armed royalists, had to be brought over from the mother country. The war had already cost England 115,000,000 pounds sterling; the public burdens were annually increased by 4½ millions. The other states were exhausted, too. America had long been without money to pay her troops and they were kept together with difficulty. Enlisted for a short term, they generally went away when their time was up. France, the main support of the rebellion, had already given so much that a repetition of the sacrifices through the influences of sympathetic enthusiasts for liberty, could hardly be expected. Besides affairs at home in France were assuming such a shape that the longer absence of ships and troops was not advisable. It is hard to judge if England, in view of all this, did not give in too soon; but this is certain, there was an urgent need of peace on all sides. Yet once more recruits came over from Germany. This was the eighth Hessian transport, to which belonged Colonel v. Hätzfeld with 900 men. They left Cassel April 10, 1782, and reached Halifax on the 13th of August following.

In expectation of the negotiations for peace, Clinton had been replaced by the more accomplished Carleton, as commander-in-chief, and the latter ordered that all special enterprises be suspended; the garrisons of Savannah and Charleston were ordered to New York. It will give an idea of the distances, and the communications of the time, if we learn that eight months passed between the sending of these orders from New York, and the return there of the troops.

General v. Knyphausen now left the troops; General v. Lossberg stepped in his place. The departure of the former caused much regret; the troops and population both loved him and showed this in a pronounced manner when he bid them farewell.

Rumors of peace were now heard on all sides in the quiet month which followed, the troops drilled and maneuvered everywhere as in

times of peace. But not till April 8, 1783, was an armistice officially announced, and then came the peace of Versailles of November 3, 1783.

November 23, 1783, General v. Lossberg left the American soil with the last Hessians. They were sent home, as they had come, by echelons. The first detachment embarked August 5th and reached Hessen in the beginning of November, 1783; the last party came home in May, 1784. The troops upon entering Cassel were received with great enthusiasm. A parade and review before the Langrave on Bowling Green closed the campaign, as it had preceded it.

Of the 12,500 Hessians which had gone forth in 1776 and about 5,000 which had followed in the next seven years, about 11,000 returned safe and sound. Of the missing number, 6,500, 2,000 at least are said to have remained voluntarily in America, which they were fully authorized to do upon the return of the troops. Many a prisoner of war, with or against his will, also remained in the country. We may, therefore, accept 4,500 as the number lost, which includes all killed in battle, swallowed by the waves, or who died from wounds or disease.

The returning ones did not wear the laurel of the victor, but no just critic can diminish the honor that they did their duty as becomes true soldiers.

With few exceptions, the Hessians were victorious, in all the combats of the six years of war; not infrequently their bravery brought about the decision. By this they earned for themselves in a high degree the appreciation of the English commanders which found often most honorable expression.

Of special interest are the tactical lessons of this peculiar war. It has, as already mentioned, brought into the foreground the value of the individual man, and out of this theory, the tactics of our day have developed.

War history erroneously names the Napoleonic wars as the starting point of modern tactics. It hardly admits of a doubt that the French officers, who fought in America, felt very perceptibly this innovation, and promoted its application in their own army. And we certainly have a right to surmise that Napoleon himself observed closely these manifestations, and turned them to good account, for it is a matter of fact, that he evidently imitated General Washington in many points. The Hessian officers, too, brought home their experiences and tried to turn them to account to the best of their ability, under the peace conditions. But the sphere of their work was a too limited one for the gain to be felt beyond their own country. The

prejudice which had formed against the campaign was, unjustly too, transferred to the troops.

In the wars against France, 1792-94, the Hessian troops attracted well deserved attention on account of their war experienced training and good discipline. In our field service regulations we find still many a regulation, which owes its first application and development to the pressure of circumstances in the American war. It was the school of minor war, of outpost and advance guard duty, a theatre of bold enterprises, where the troops are dependent upon the ingenuity, presence of mind and energy of the commander; and where the sharp eye, the bold heart and the sure aim of the individual soldier are of decisive moment.

These experiences generally known to-day came down from the American War of Independence.

The work of the fleet and its co-operation with the land troops; which was made uncommonly difficult by distance and the state of naval technics of that day, gives rise to interesting reflections.

There is, therefore, due to this war and the meritorious action of the Hessian troops in the same much more consideration than has been given to it so far in war history.

ORDRE DE BATAILLE OF THE HESSIAN AUXILIARY TROOPS WHEN MOBILIZED.

Commander-in-Chief,

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL V. HEISTER.

FIRST DIVISION.

The same.

FIRST BRIGADE.

Major-General v. Marbach, commander.
Infantry Regiment v. Marbach (1), Colonel v. Romrodt.
Infantry Regiment v. Donop, Colonel v. Gosen.
Infantry Regiment v. Wutgrau (2), Colonel v. Kospoth.
Infantry Regiment v. Erbprinz, Colonel v. Hachenberg.
Grenadier Battalion (3), Lieutenant-Colonel v. Block.

SECOND BRIGADE.

Regiment Guards, Colonel v. Wurmb.
Infantry Regiment Prince Carl, Colonel v. Schreiber.
Infantry Regiment v. Ditfurth, Colonel v. Bose.
Infantry Regiment v. Grumbach (4), Colonel v. Bischoffshausen.

Grenadier Battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel v. Minnigerode.
1. Since 1780; Joung Lossberg.
2. Since 1779; Landgraf, later Kospoth.
3. These were always called after the commander.
4. Since 1778; v. Bose.

SECOND DIVISION.

Lieutenant-General v. Knyphausen.

THIRD BRIGADE.

Colonel v. Lossberg, commander.
Garrison Regiment v. Huyne (5), Colonel v. Huyne.
Garrison Regiment v. Stein, Colonel Seitz.
Infantry Regiment v. Knyphausen, Colonel v. Borke.
Grenadier Battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel Kohler.

FOURTH BRIGADE.

Major-General Schmidt, commander.
Infantry Regiment v. Lossberg (6), Colonel v. Loos.
Garrison Regiment v. Wissenbach (7), Colonel v. Horn.
Garrison Regiment v. Bunau (8), Colonel v. Bunau.
Land Grenadier Regiment Rall, Colonel Rall.
Grenadier Battalion, Colonel v. Lisingen.
2 (later 6) companies Jäger, Colonel v. Donop.
3 Companies Field Artillery (38 guns), Colonel v. Eitel.
5. Since 1780; v. Benning.
6. Since 1780; v. Borbeck.
7. Since 1780; v. Knobloch.
8. Since 1778; v. Schreiber.

Total—4 Grenadier Battalions, 1 Land Grenadier Regiment, 10 Infantry Regiments, 4 Garrison Regiments, 2 Jäger Companies (later increased to 6), 3 Companies Field Artillery.

Total—Round numbers, 12,000.

The regiments consisted originally of 5, the grenadier battalions, each of 4 companies.

To a regiment belonged 21 officers and 60 non-commissioned officers, 22 musicians, 530 privates.

A grenadier battalion had 16 officers, 44 non-commissioned officers, 20 musicians and 424 privates.

A Jäger company had 4 officers, 12 non-commissioned officers, 3 musicians and 105 Jägers.

THE DIARY OF A CANOE EXPEDITION INTO THE EVERGLADES AND INTERIOR OF SOUTHERN FLORIDA IN 1842.

BY THE LATE GEO. HENRY PREBLE, REAR ADMIRAL, U. S. N.

THE following pages are a verbatim transcript of a penciled memorandum of events made by me from day to day while on an expedition across the Everglades, around Lake Okeechobee, and up and down the connecting rivers and lakes, in 1842. Now that it is proposed to drain the Everglades and open them to cultivation, and a dredge-boat is actually at work excavating a navigable outlet into Lake Okeechobee, this diary, which preserves some of the features of the country forty years ago, may have more or less historical interest. A New Orleans newspaper (The Times Democrat) describing the route of the party of surveyors, who had recently gone over very much the same routes as this expedition of 1842, only in reverse, states that it is the first time these regions have been traversed by white men,—evidently a mistake, as even this expedition of forty years previous was not the first that had visited Lake Okeechobee. General Taylor's battle was fought on the shores of that lake in 1837, and the Everglades had been traversed and retraversed by the expeditions of the army and navy before that.

Sprague's "History of the Florida War," published in 1848, is the only work that mentions the services of the navy in that connection, and in its appendix there are tables exhibiting the casualties of the officers, seamen, and marines of the United States navy operating against the Indians in Florida, and of the officers and marines who were brevetted. Cooper, in the continuation of his "History of the United States Navy," to 1856, makes no mention whatever of the Florida War, though the navy constantly shared in its hardships from 1836 to 1842, and its losses were proportionate to those of the army. Later writers of our naval history, taking Cooper's work as a standard authority, have been equally remiss. The naval history of the Florida war has yet to be written.

The expedition, my diary of which follows, was commanded by Lieutenant John Rogers, who died a rear-admiral. The second officer in seniority, Lieutenant William L. Herndon, the father-in-law of President Arthur, as is well known, went down in the steamer Central America, preferring "certain death to the abandonment of his post," and of the remaining officers, only myself and Passed Midshipman Samuel Chase Barney (who is no longer in the service) are living. It is to be presumed that all, or nearly all of the seamen, and rank and file of marines, have passed away.

The "dug-out" canoes which formed our homes for the sixty days the expedition lasted were hollowed cypress logs, about thirty feet long and four feet wide, propelled by paddles, and steered by a broad rudder. At the stern was a locker about six feet long, which held our stores and ammunition, the latter sealed in glass bottles for preservation from dampness. On the top of this locker the officer spread his blankets, and it formed his bed at night; the men sleeping on their paddles and thwarts,—a hard life at the best. Each canoe was provided with a tent, a small square-sail made of ordinary cotton sheeting, and an awning.

The following is Lieutenant John Rodger's official report of the expedition, which this diary records and supplements:

"UNITED STATES BRIG JEFFERSON, INDIAN KEY, April 12, 1842.

"SIR,—In obedience to your orders to proceed to the Okeechobee and thoroughly examine the country adjacent, I have the honor to report that on the 15th of February I left Key Bicayne with a detachment of men from the Madison, under Lieutenant Commanding Herndon; from the Jefferson, under Passed Midshipman Preble; and of the marines, under Second Lieutenant Taylor. The examination was made, but, unfortunately, without any success. The Indian towns deserted, camps abandoned, and fields uncultivated, but only once did we get near the Indians. This was on Lake Tohopkeliga; but no sooner had the first canoe emerged from its outlet than a large fire sprung up on the opposite side of the lake. Thinking it impossible that we could have been discovered, the boats were carefully concealed, and at night we made the circuit of the lake, hoping to find the fires of the Indians. Failing in this, I went around by daylight, closely examining every nook upon the lake; but we had been seen.

"The Thlo-thlo-pop-ka, or Fish-Eating Creek, runs through an open prairie, to which it serves as a drain. As might be expected, it gives evidence of being in the wet season a large stream, but when

I examined it the volume of water it discharged was very small. This stream is very tortuous, and sometimes swells into a river, and then dwindles into a brook. Its head is in a marshy prairie, where a number of streamlets run together about twenty miles in a straight line, due east to the Okeechobee, but following the course of the creek about twice that distance. The banks of Fish-Eating Creek are covered with game, and its waters filled with fish.

"The Kissimmee is a deep, rapid stream, generally running through a marshy plain, but sometimes the pine land approaches its borders, and sometimes beautiful live-oak hummocks fringe its banks. The In-to-kee-tah, or Deer-Driving Place, is a pretty little lake, with an island of perhaps one hundred acres of very fine land. 'There,' said the guide, 'the Indians once lived in very great numbers, and many may yet remain;' so our boats were concealed, and we waited for night to make an examination, when the fires would point out the exact position of any party; but though appearances proved the first part of our guide's assertion, we found the town had been long deserted.

"The Kissimmee is, I think, the natural drain of the immense plains which form this part of the country; but though deep and rapid it is quite narrow. It is something strange that very often the surface of the river is covered by floating grass and weeds so strongly matted together that the men stood upon the mass and hauled the boats over it as over shoals. The Kissimmee runs into the Okeechobee, which filters its spongy sides into the Everglades, whose waters finally, by many streams, empty into the ocean.

"On the 11th of April we returned to Key Biscayne, having been living in our canoes fifty-eight days, with less rest, fewer luxuries, and harder work than fall to the lot of that estimable class of citizens who dig our canals. At Key Biscayne the various detachments were disbanded, and returned to their several commands.

"Very respectfully,
"Your obedient servant,

(Signed) "JOHN RODGERS,
"Lieutenant Commanding.

"LIEUTENANT J. T. MCLAUGHLIN,
"Commanding Florida Expedition."

THE DIARY OF A CANOE EXPEDITION INTO THE EVERGLADES OF FLORIDA IN 1842.

Feb. 4, 1842.—At Indian Key, preparing for an Expedition into the Everglades; also rigging and fitting ship, having stepped a new foremast.

Feb. 12.—Left the Brig Jefferson at Key Biscayne at 4 P. M., in command of five canoes and twenty-two men; arrived at Fort Dallas at 7 P. M., and camped for the night on the left-hand bank of the river opposite. At 8 P. M. a detachment of canoes from the Madison came up, and camped on our right.

Feb. 13, Sunday.—Capt. Rodgers came up at daylight and assumed command of the scout, arranged as follows: Staff Lieut. John Rodgers commanding the scout; Rob. Tansall, 2d Lt. of marines, adjutant; Negro John, wife, and child, and John Tigertail, Indian guide. 3 canoes, 4 sailors, 7 marines.

1st Division, U. S. Sch. Madison: Lieut. Wm. L. Herndon commanding; Passed Mid. S. C. Barney; Asst. Surgeon A. A. Henderson. 6 canoes, 29 men.

2d Division, U. S. Brigantine Jefferson: Passed Mid. Geo. H. Preble commanding; Midshipman C. Benham. 4 canoes, 18 men.

3d Division, marines: 2d Lieut. R. D. Taylor commanding. 3 canoes, 17 men.

Recapitulation: 16 canoes, 2 lieuts., 2 passed mid., 1 mid., 1 asst. surgeon, 2 lts. of marines, 51 sailors, 24 marines, 1 Indian, 1 negro, 1 squaw, 1 papoose. Total, 87 souls.

At 8 A. M. the expedition started up the bay to the Nd.; at noon entered the Rio Ratones, and followed its very winding course to the Everglades. Both banks of the river lined with mangroves. At 2 P. M. came to in the grass and dined. At sundown camped in the canoes under the lee of some bushes.

Monday, Feb. 14.—Valentine's day; under way at daylight. At 8 A. M. entered New river at its source; followed it down, and reached Fort Lauderdale at 11 A. M., in season to see it abandoned by the army. Procured an Indian guide, and at 1 P. M. started up river. At 4.30, came to on the left-hand bank, and pitched our tents in an open pine barren with palmetto undergrowth.

Tuesday, Feb. 15.—En route again at daylight. At 8 A. M. entered the Everglades and stood to the Nd. and Wd., through a generally broad and open trail. At 2 P. M. hauled into the grass and dined. The guide lost the trail several times, and put back to find it. At 7.30 P. M. hauled into the grass and camped in the canoes for the

night. Observed the light of a fire in the S. E., and supposed it at our last night's camp.

Wednesday, Feb. 16.—Underway at 6.30 A. M.; traversed an open trail; saw only two islets. Examined the first, and found that it had been cultivated. Dined under the shade of the second island. Weather disagreeable and rainy. At 5 P. M. came to under the lee of a small clump of bushes, where we procured a quantity of crane's eggs, and camped in the canoes for the night. Course during the day to the Nd. and Wd. The night silence broken by the screaming of Everglade hens and cranes, the bellowings of frogs, and the hooting of owls.

Thursday, Feb. 17.—A cold morning, wind N. E. The word passed to follow on at sunrise. Course to the Nd. and Ed. through a bad trail, most of which we broke for ourselves through the saw-grass. At 10 A. M., saw high trees bearing per compass N. E. by E. Probably a part of the Alpatioka, or Cypress Swamp, bordering the pine barrens along the coast. Very few bushes in sight during the day. Lat. obs'd at noon 26° 16′ N. At sundown camped in the canoes around a small clump of bushes, and posted sentry as usual.

Friday, Feb. 18.—Warm and pleasant. Light airs from the S. E. At 7 A. M. got the canoes under way, and followed a northerly course during the day, but very winding. Our guides caught five Terrapins, and the men obtained several hats full of crane's eggs. Had to break our trail most of the day, the men walking the canoes along. Our route through a portion of the glades plentifully besprinkled with bushes. Camped at sundown in the canoes under the shelter of some bushes, and made my supper off of some trout which had jumped into my canoe as we pushed along.

Saturday, Feb. 19.—Warm and pleasant. Started at sunrise, course N. N. W., through an open and generally deep trail, the plain covered with short grass, fields of water-lilies, and low bushes. The Cypress in sight to the right N. E. Came to at sundown at a small island showing traces of an old Indian encampment; pitched my tent under a tall cabbage-tree, and had a tall sleep. Lat. at noon 26° 38′ N.

Sunday, Feb. 20.—Warm and pleasant; wind S. S. E. Passed through open Everglades, no bushes. Cypress to the right. Tracked the canoes all day, and at times forced them through the mud and grass with the assistance of the crews of four canoes to each one. Lat. 26° 27′; course N. W. Our guides say the water in the Everglades is unusually low. Camped in the canoes in the grass; no fires allowed, and night rainy. To-day officers as well as men have been compelled

to wade in the mud, saw-grass, and water, and assist the sailors in dragging the canoes. Saw large flocks of white curlew.

Monday, Feb. 21.—Morning thick and misty; underway with canoes at 7½ A. M. Course generally N. W. to W. Thick, cloudy weather, with heavy showers of rain. Country an open prairie, with the Cypress on our right. Killed a black moccasin-snake and saw others; they are very numerous. Passed the remains of an old clinker-built canoe, probably an army-boat; broke it up for firewood. At sundown nearly surrounded by woods on the horizon, our course taking us along those to the N. E. The woods bordering Lake Okeechobee in sight in the N. W. Wind during the day N. E., but shifted about sundown to the N. W., bringing clear and cool weather. Camped in our canoes in the open grass. Saw during the day numerous flocks of wild birds,—curlew, cranes, blue-winged teal, crow blackbirds, swallows, etc.

Tuesday, Feb. 22.—Washington's birthday. Morning air clear, and cold enough to show our breath. Wind N. N. E. At 4.30 P. M. left the Everglades, passed through a narrow belt of cypress swamp, hauled over a sandy ridge, and launched our canoes in the waters of Lake Okeechobee, or "the Bigwater." Camped under what was once Fort Dulany, a cabbage-tree log fortress. The lake spread out before us, and to the Wd. when the sun went down no land visible.

Wednesday, Feb. 23.—Launched our canoes upon the lake through a rough surf and heavy swell. One of my canoes was swamped, and capsized, losing everything,—provisions, arms, clothing, and ammunition. Turned back and assisted the canoe to land, bailed her out, and started with her again; the other commands ahead; followed them along the coast of the Lake, and landed with them about two miles to the Sd. and Ed. Was ordered by Captain Rodgers to remain in charge of the provisions with the boats of my command, and twelve men and one canoe and five marines, while the remainder of the Expedition, taking provisions for six days, continued their cruise along shore. At 9 A. M. the Expedition departed with twelve boats and fifty-eight men, leaving me Midm. Benham and four boats, with seventeen men. Commenced securing the provisions from the weather and devising means for our defence.

Thursday, Feb. 24.—Organized our camp, inspected the arms, and exercised the men. Commenced building a log fort of cabbage-trees, and had it three logs high when the Expedition unexpectedly hove in sight and suspended our labors. Before sundown it arrived at our camp, when I restored the marines to their proper commander and

took my own division again. Benham shot a crow blackbird and a woodpecker, and with their assistance we made a sumptuous dinner.

Friday, Feb. 25.—My birthday. The canoes underway at daylight. Stood to the Nd. and Wd., coasting the Lake under sail. The guide's boat swamped; hauled into the grass and dined while waiting for the guide's boat to come up. At 4 P. M. discovered eight hogs on the beach; sent the guide in to shoot one. Heard a noise like wood-chopping (probably a hog rooting); sent the boats in, landed and armed the men, and dispatched each command on a scout. The Madison's men going across the country, the marines along the shore interiorly, and my command up the beach to the N. W. in search of Indian canoes. Discovered an old Indian encampment, apparently many months deserted. The guide shot one large hog and wounded another, a sow, which our officers ran down afterwards and captured. On the return of the scouts, Tansall, with twelve marines, was sent out again with orders to scour the country to the Everglades. He returned at 7 P. M., after a fatiguing march through mud and water, but without having effected his object. He reported the Everglades as approaching this portion of the Lake, and his discovery of a stream or river about a mile and a half north of us, and leading apparently into the Everglades. We are to explore it to-morrow. Camped for the night, and pitched our tents under a grove of cypress, maple, bay, and cabbage-trees. The beautiful moonlight contrasting with the dark recesses of the forest, and our camp-fires' glare upon the gray mossy beards which draped the trees, and our rough and rugged men in their careless costumes and still more careless attitudes, combined to make our bivouac a scene which Salvator Rosa would have been glad to have copied. Regaled on fried pork. Our men went the whole hog, and dispatched both animals to the skin and hoof. Punished one of my men, John Bath, with eighteen lashes for drunkenness and insubordination, and for endangering the safety of the whole command by his noise.

Saturday, Feb. 26.—Underway at 6.30 A. M. After refreshing with a "pot of coffee," stood along the Lake to the Nd. and Wd. About a mile up entered "Tansall's River," bordered on both sides with large cypress and a young growth of maple and bay-trees; about one-quarter of a mile up reached its head. The Madisons and Jeffersons were ordered to march; and we waded through cypress and willows up to our waists in water and mud about 200 yards, and came to a belt of saw-grass which was at least 15 feet high; waded 50 yards farther and reached the dry land,—a wide plain dotted with cabbage-tree and

pine hummocks and a palmetto scrub; dense woods surrounding the entire horizon. Saw ten parroquets. On emerging from the grass the Madisons went off in a S. Easterly direction; the Jeffersons with me to the N. W. Marched six or eight miles over the plain. Examined several hummocks, discovered two long-abandoned encampments; found numerous trails of horse-tracks and footprints,—none of which, our guide said, were newer than three weeks. On our march started four deer; they stood at gaze and looked at us. How tantalizing not to be allowed to shoot them! Returned to our canoes about one P. M. Turned down river and resumed our course along the coast of the Lake. The Madisons on their march discovered an old encampment. During the afternoon explored five creeks in search of canoes and Indians; discovered nothing to repay our trouble. Passed six or eight large Indian encampments, of old-standing, like those we visited in the forenoon. Our guides are of opinion they were all abandoned at the time the Indians entered the Everglades in 1837. Found the coast this afternoon gradually bending to the Sd. and Wd. Crossed a deep bay in the Lake, making to the Nd. and Wd. At dark came to in the bulrushes and camped in our canoes; night rainy, coast low and swampy, mosquitos plenty. Oh, Lord!

Sunday, Feb. 27.—Warm and pleasant, with light airs from the N. W. Underway at sunrise to Sd. and S. W. to S. Saw many alligators basking on the water, and immense flocks of white curlew and other birds. The coast of the Lake low and marshy, and bordered with sedges. Lat. at noon 27° 2′ N. Camped in our canoes around some small lumps of floating land, just enough to swear by and make a fire on. During the night saw the reflection of a large fire N. N. W. of us; supposed it the prairie fired by army scouts in that direction.

Monday, Feb. 28.—Pleasant and warm, wind S. E. to E. Coasted the Lake to the Sd. and Ed. between isolated patches of marsh-grass. Land low and fringed with bulrushes. Lieutenant Taylor, in the afternoon, discovered an old Indian canoe in shore, and broke it up. Made sail at sundown and stood E. N. E. about three miles; hauled well into the grass, and camped in the canoes. Killed a moccasin-snake. Made our supper on a "stewzee" of young cranes, water-turkeys, and fried eggs. Lat. at noon 26° 50′ N.

Tuesday, March 1.—Warm and pleasant, wind E. S. E.; underway at sunrise; paddled until 10 A. M. to the E. S. E., and landed on a small sand beach. At 10 A. M. made sail and stood to the Nd. and Wd. on a return trail. Lat. at noon 26° 55′ N. At 4.30 P. M. reached our camp of night before last, passed it, and entered a creek to the Nd. and

Wd. Were soon stopped by floating weeds similar to heads of lettuce, and came to with the canoes. The Madisons were sent on a march to the Sd. and Wd. in search of Fish-Eating Creek, and the marines in pursuit of a fire sent to the N. N. W. Sent five of my men to build a fire to guide their return. After a fatiguing march through saw-grass and water, both parties returned to camp about 9, entirely unsuccessful. At 9.30 heard the report of three muskets west of us; supposed them fired by the guides, who have not yet come up.

Wednesday, March 2.—Marines ordered to prepare for a three days' march to the Nd. and Wd. in search of a fire seen in that direction. Myself, with six men, ordered to trace out a supposed creek. Captain Rodgers accompanied me. Started, middle-deep, in mud and water, and commenced our wade through the saw-grass towards an island about quarter of a mile distant. Reached it, puffing and blowing with our exertions. Climbed a tree and looked about for the creek; could discover none, though a line of bushes S. E. of us seemed to point one out. Heard the report of one musket, then another, and soon a third. Was ordered by Captain R. to return and prepare for a push along the coast in the direction of the firing. Glad to escape a damp and tiresome march, turned about and reached the canoes about 9 A. M., and started down the creek, and to the Sd. and Ed. picked up our guide about three miles down, and turned back, pushing into all the bays and inlets to discover the creek. Captain R. ordered me to follow up an inlet and examine it; followed it out, pushing through fields of broad-leaved lilies and spatter-docks, and came into the Lake again about a mile to the Sd. Made sail to return. Met Captain Herndon with the Madisons near an "old cypress," and was informed by him of the discovery of the creek, and that I was to go to the rendezvous and take charge of the marines' canoes, the marines being off on their march. Joined my boats about 5 P. M.

Thursday, March 3.—Still camping in our canoes in the grass and weeds, no dry land neighborly. Read, smoked, and slept. At 11.30 received orders to join the remainder of the scout, and bring them marines' boats along, men being sent me to man them. Got underway and stood up the Fish-Eating Creek to Fort Centre. The creek winding and deep. Arrived at 1 P. M. and found all the canoes there. The large fire still to be seen N. N. W. of us. Sent a canoe and four men to the Island to wait the return of the marines.

Friday, March 4.—Pleasant, fresh breezes from S. E. Appointed Supt. of repairs, and ordered to fill up gaps and put the Fort (a cabbage-tree stockade) in a state of defence. Cut trees and stuck them

up like the others. Went to the mouth of the creek, 6 miles west, and observed the Lat., 27° 04′ N. On my return found the marines at the Fort, they having marched there. Sent for my boat. The coxswain on his return reported having found on the island several old houses, some pumpkins, and parts of half a dozen saddles, but no signs of recent habitation.

Saturday, March 5.—Warm and pleasant. Left the Fort at daylight. Doct. Henderson, with fifteen men and marines, and John Tigertail, sick, remaining behind. Proceeded up the creek with great difficulty, pushing the canoes through the weeds, the creek for a space spreading out into a wide swamp. Saturday night remembered absent friends.

Sunday, March 6.—After hauling the canoes over two troublesome places re-entered the creek,—a beautiful stream, clear, with a beautiful white sandy bottom. Pulled against the current to the Sd. and Wd. Saw immense flocks of cranes, pink spoonbills, curlew, and wild turkeys in plenty. Also, a large number of alligators killed; killed two small ones and cut off their tails for eating; caught a soft-shelled and a hard-shelled turtle and had them cooked for supper, with a fry of some little fish that foolishly jumped into one of the canoes. Our camping-ground the prettiest by far that we have had. Two veteran cypress stretched their scraggy arms over our camp, draped in moss to the very ground. The day was rendered harmonious by the warblings of multitudes of feathered choristers, and the night hideous with the splash of alligators, hooting of owls, and screamings of a variety of unquiet night-birds.

Monday, March 7.—Warm and pleasant. Left our beautiful camp at sunrise, pursuing the windings of the creek, which occasionally spread out to the appearance of quite a large river, but soon returns to narrow bounds. At 11 A. M. reached the head of the stream, which loses itself in a swamp. Dined and turned back. Permission to shoot was granted, and bang, bang, bang went guns and pistols in every direction. At sundown landed and pitched our tents under a cypress grove, and feasted sumptuously on wild turkey, broiled and fried curlew, plover, and teal, stewed crane, grecian ladies and fried fish, our spoils of the day. The Astor House could not have supplied such a dinner on such appetites. Invited Capts. Rodgers and Herndon to our feast, and illuminated our camp with three halves of spermaceti candles. Lat. 27° 5′ N.

Tuesday, March 8.—Warm and pleasant; wind S. E. Breakfasted off the remains of our "Tarkey," as my coxswain called it, and un-

derway at daylight. Passed both haulovers with little trouble, leaving one to the left and the other to the right. Dined in the canoes in the grass. Passed an extent of prairie which had been burnt over since we passed up, and in places yet burning, which accounts for the dense smoke seen yesterday. After dining hauled the canoes through a narrow streamlet into a lily swamp; tracked them across it, and bothered about until after dark searching for the creek; finally struck it and reached Fort Center, where only three boats had as yet arrived. Garrison well.

Wednesday, March 9.—Pleasant and warm. The marines, canoes, and adjutants did not come in until this morning. Served out thirty days' provisions to the men, and exercised them at target-shooting. Discovered all hands were plaguey poor shots.

Thursday, March 10.—Warm and pleasant. At morning muster and inspection discovered that Silas Soule and Jas. Gamble had deserted during the night, taking with them a musket, twelve cartridges, a quantity of provisions, and a bag of clothing. At 9 A. M. left the Fort in the canoes and stood down the creek. Passed Mid. S. C. Barney was left at the Fort with a garrison of twenty men, comprising all the sick, lame, and lazy. As we left the creek made sail and stood to the Nd. and Ed. At 4.30 P. M. entered the Kissimmee river, and stood up it. At 5.30 camped on the left bank in our canoes. The ground swampy. Transferred Mid. Benham to Capt. Herndon's division temporarily. At night very much annoyed by the mosquitos. Benham's canoe swamped during the night and set him afloat in his bed, besides damaging all his provender.

Friday, March 11.—Weather good. Started sun half an hour high up river. Saw large flocks of green parroquets, and the prairie to the Wd. on fire. The river rapid and deep, with banks or "levees" thrown up by floods on each side, and crowned with willow and mangrove bushes. Marshy fields beyond this narrow belt of banking. Paddled along until sundown, and camped on the left-hand bank. Supper, a "grecian lady" stewed; horrible cannibal that I am, found the "lady" a very good morsel. Mem. grecian lady, a water-fowl, sometimes called "a water-turkey."

Saturday, March 12.—Pleasant. Pulled up-stream against a strong current; the banks continue marshy, with here and there a live-oak hummock. Passed beautiful magnolia-trees in full blossom. The pine barrens to-day approach both banks to within a quarter of a mile, and every minute the winding of the stream would appear to be leading us into them. At 11 stopped at a live-oak hummock, formerly full of

Indians. We landed the marines about a quarter of a mile downstream to attack it in the rear, and pulled up cautiously with the remainder of the force; found it deserted, with no recent signs of habitation. Waited for the marines to come up; dined, and continued on up river. At 2 P. M. came to a pine-log stockade, one of the numerous posts held by the army in times gone by. The enclosure was choked with weeds; logs had fallen out, and those yet standing were partially burnt down. Continued our route until sundown, and camped in a beautiful live-oak hummock. Supper, catfish, chowder and molasses candy.

Sunday, March 13.—During the morning a dense fog settled over the country and debarred progress. At 10 A. M., cleared off pleasant. Paddled all day against an increasing rapid current. The banks of the river lined with marshy weeds and tall canebrakes, with here and there a live-oak hummock draped with moss. Passed several old encampments. At 8 P. M. camped in the tall and rank grass under venerable live oaks and maples. Supper, a stew made of three fledgling herons, purloined by our doctor from a nest.

Monday, March 14.—Warm and pleasant. Commenced our route with the sun. Country much the same as yesterday, but the mangroves and willows seen more abundant. Saw immense flocks of curlew flying in two irregular columns, each apparently miles in length. Evening a very heavy rain, which continued at intervals all night. Camped in a maple grove. Hauled over several places during the day where the bottom had fallen out, or, as one of our men remarked, where the grass was made before the land. Our men dragged the canoes of the whole command over grass and roots that choked the river in places where a fifteen-foot pole (the canoe's sprit) failed to touch bottom.

Tuesday, March 15.—Cool and cloudy, wind N. E.; at 9 A. M. landed and examined a live-oak hummock where Indians had been dressing deer-skins not more than two weeks back. At 9.30 landed at another hummock where was a large mound, out of which Fanny, the Indian wife of our Guide, assured us she had seen money, breastplates, and beads dug. Set the men to work with their paddles, promising them good current money for all they found in the mound; excavated quite a trench, but found nothing but a few bones and blue glass beads. At 10.30 landed on another hummock at the end of a pine barren, and found recent traces of a large encampment, with horse and cow-tracks, etc. The guide killed a large raccoon. Halted half an hour and continued on up the river, which is bound chiefly

by willows and tall rushes; tide and wind in our teeth and hard to combat. At 8 P. M. halted the canoes in the grass and camped in them, there being no solid camping-place to be found. The river coquetted with us all the afternoon, leading nearly up to the hummock and then branching off again. No fires allowed, consequently no coffee.

Wednesday, March 16.—A cool morning, but clear and pleasant. Up and away with the sun. At 10 A. M. camped in a live-oak hummock, where was once an Indian village; feasted on blackberries. One of our men killed a large rattlesnake with eight rattles; he was skinned, cooked, and eaten; I partook of a bit, just to be able to say I had eaten rattlesnake; found the meat very good indeed, and would have enjoyed a larger portion, but as it was the men's titbit, did not like to deprive them of it. At midnight we got underway and proceeded to an island on a lake, hoping to discover something to repay us for our night's work, as it once was a famous resort for the Indians. We reached the island at 2 A. M., and sent off two scouting-parties to surprise the enemy. At 3 A. M. the scouts returned without making any wonderful discovery. They found old encampments abundant. Punished Wm. Harding with twenty-four lashes by Capt. Rodgers's order for quarrelling, and Antonio Cruize with six for laziness on my own responsibility.

Thursday, March 17.—Pleasant. At daylight discovered on the opposite shore of the Lake something resembling two canoes; shoved out our canoes and gave chase. The canoes proved phantoms, the erection of the lively imagination of a boatswain's mate of the Madison. Returned to the island, and camped for the day on the shore of the Lake neighboring it. Lieut. Tansall with twenty-four men explored the island, and returned at 8 P. M. with an Indian's knife and skull, which he had found in a grave. The island is called by the Indians In-to-ke-tala, or Deer-Driving.

Friday, March 18.—Easterly wind and foggy morning. At 8 A. M. crossed the Lake to its eastern shore. At 10 A. M. reached the marsh bordering the edge of the Lake and hauled the canoes into the grass. Started on a march with six of my own command and twelve marines. Marched across a fine grass prairie for a couple of miles as we judged, and examined four live-oak hummocks. On all four discovered traces of old encampments, and through one the appearance of a wagon-trail; no recent signs. Started a bear and gave him chase, but Mr. Bruin ran too fast for us (not being permitted to fire at him) and lodged in a palmetto scrub three or four hundred yards off. Surrounded and closed in upon it with the men and endeavored to beat

him up, but our shaggy-coated gent managed to elope unseen. Got back to the canoes about 1 P. M. Camped in the grass at sundown. Punished Meade by Capt. R.'s order for making a fire without permission. Lat., noon, 27° 51′ N.

Saturday, March 19.—Pleasant; underway at sunrise; pulled or paddled around the bend in the Lake, and entered the Kissimmee on its N. W. shore at 9 A. M. Paddled two hours more. The pine barrens shaking hands with the banks of the river. Came up with the remains of a large stockade (Fort Gardner) in a live-oak hummock and mostly burnt down. At noon the creek spread out into another Lake, surrounded by piney woods and live-oak hummocks; dined under the shadow of one of the latter, and resumed our route across the Lake. At 4 P. M. entered the grass on the opposite shore in search of the river. At 4.30 hauled up the canoes and camped in the pine barren. Went with ten men to the Wd. on a scout in search of the stream. Benham sent on a similar scout to the Ed. Returned to our camp at sundown, having marched about four miles, over pine barrens and through swamps up to our waists in water, but no stream. Benham was fortunate enough to find the object of our search. During the evening a lone "chuck-a-will's widow" informed me many times and very distinctly whose relict she was, and a saucy owl was very impertinent with his "who-who-who are you?" Started two beautiful spotted fawns on my march. Read for light reading and to pass the hours the Books of Ezra, Nehemiah, and Job!

Sunday, March 20.—Thirty-six days out. Started at 6 A. M. through the grass in search of Benham's stream; entered, pulled a few miles, crossed another small Lake, and entered the stream once more from its N. E. extremity. The stream winding, narrow, and rapid. Dined under a moss-drooping cypress. Afternoon: stream winding through tangled bushes, interlaced from either bank; cut our way through with our Roman swords and axes. At 4 P. M. reached the outlet of Lake Tohopeteliga; found there fresh moccasin tracks and roots newly dug, the ground still freshly turned as if hastily abandoned; pieces of orange-peel were strewed about. A short distance down-stream we passed an Indian hut and pumpkin-field. The moccasin tracks appeared those of a man, wife, and child,—a little child had evidently been playing with the sand. Saw horse-tracks up the beach, and found several old houses. Hauled into the shore by advice of our guide in the outlet, and maintained perfect silence. At 4.30 saw a fire kindled on the opposite shore of the Lake, took its bearings, and after dark put out upon the Lake and stole cautiously up towards

the fire, in the vain hope of capturing Indians. Landed the marines and marched them through the prairies to the fire; pulled ahead with the canoes and waited for their coming up, prepared to assist them on hearing any firing. At 12 midnight re-embarked the marines and continued our course around the Lake until 3 A. M., when we hauled in shore and camped in the canoes, tired out with our night's work and bound to sleep sound for the few hours allowed us to.

Monday, March 21.—Warm and pleasant. At 10 A. M. got underway and pulled to an island in the centre of the Lake and camped. The Madisons separated and camped at an island two miles distant. Our camping-place was quite a sizable island, having the ribs and remains of two Indian villages, with corn-fields and watermelon-patches, and tobacco-growing, and a number of bitter and sour orange-trees in full fruit; filled our boats with the latter. At sundown the Madisons joined us, and at 10 P. M. we got underway and stood over to the shore, and finished the circumnavigation of the Lake at 2 P. M. Camped again at the outlet.

Tuesday, March 22.—In camp all day at the outlet of Lake Tohopeteliga. Did up a quantity of sleep to make amends for last night's unrest. Caught a quantity of catfish, and had them served up both fried and stewed. Allowed the men to bathe.

Wednesday, March 23.—Cloudy morning, afternoon clear and pleasant. At sunrise started to circumnavigate the Lake. Capt. R. and my division with the marines going around to the right. Capt. Herndon with the Madisons to the left. Lat. at noon 28° 11′ N., one hundred and fifty-one miles north of Fort Dallas, at the mouth of the Miami, whence we started. At 4 P. M. our divisions were reunited opposite the island where we camped two days back, and we made sail in company to cross the Lake. Reached the outlet a few minutes after dark and camped. Dined at a live-oak hummock, where we found an old saddle (probably the saddle of some express-rider) and the remains of two oxen. Robbed the birds' nests as we paddled along of sixteen young cranes. Each of the canoes equally well supplied. Capt. Herndon in his journey saw the remains of another Indian village. Our supper, a stew, broil, and fry, as usual of late.

Thursday, March 24.—Left the outlet of Lake Tohopeteliga to return down the Kissimmee. Morning overcast with premonitory symptoms of rain. Noon pleasant and hot; dined where we dined on the 19th. Camped on the S. W. shore of Lake Intokeetalah, near Fanny's island; a fine, dry sand beach. Killed a small rattlesnake which crawled up to our fire. Our supper, fried fish and

fried hard-tack. The sunset very beautiful, dark-purple clouds piled up and tinged with gold. The sun's lower disk, just before it reached the horizon, appeared below the lower edge of a large dark cloud, and shot up its brilliant rays far above it; the ruddy sky beneath, and the dark pines reflected in the placid Lake, and a light fleecy cloud soaring above all, invested by our fancies with the shape of our eagle emblem, completed a beautiful scene.

Friday, March 25.—Underway at sunrise. The morning air deliciously fragrant. Camped at early sundown in one of the live-oak hummocks which we passed on the 14th. All hands permitted to bathe. Supper, bird-stew as usual. Killed a rattlesnake with four rattles.

Saturday, March 26.—Pleasant. Started sun half an hour high. Passed most of the bad places going up. The current takes us along full two days' journey in one. Robbed the nests of over thirty young birds, and had a famous stew of cranes' livers. Camped under bushes on the right-hand bank. Our camp surrounded by beautiful and fragrant flowers. Found a snake-cast on top of a tree; it was over six feet in length. Landed at the Indian mound, and resumed our diggings. Found a few glass beads and abundance of human bones, but none of the needful.

Sunday, March 27.—Morning slightly overcast. Underway, sun an hour high. Dined at the old Fort, where we killed a rattlesnake as large around as my arm and five feet long; it had twelve rattles. The guide said, "big enough to kill a deer instantly." My division captured forty cranes and water-turkeys, and three young alligators. Supper as usual. Camped under moss-hung maples.

Monday, March 28.—Pleasant. Underway at sunrise. At 1 P. M. entered Lake Okeechobee, having been eighteen days on the river and lakes. Dined in the grass along shore. Made sail to a stiff breeze, and from being the rearmost boat passed ahead and reached Port Center before sundown, where but four of the canoes arrived before me. The others had to camp on the Lake. All well at the garrison, with plenty to eat. Supped on venison-steak and salmon "kipper."

Tuesday, March 29.—Pleasant. The rest of the canoes arrived about 9 A. M. Exercised the men at target-shooting; no good shots. Benham went with the guide on a shooting excursion, and set fire to the prairie with flint and steel. To-night it is burning for miles around; a grand spectacle. During our absence from the Fort, the guide's Indian wife, Fanny, went into the woods and gave birth to a

still-born infant; buried it herself and returned to camp, and resumed her usual duties.

Wednesday, March 30.—Pleasant; evening cool. Benham and Taylor are to remain at Fort Center with the provisions until sent for, and keep garrison with twenty men. Glad it is not me,—want my letters. The prairie still on fire. Was much edified with Fanny's Indian method of preparing deer-skins for moccasins with a stick.

Thursday, March 31.—Left Fort Center at sunrise to return, leaving behind Taylor, Benham, twelve marines, and eight sailors. Provisioned our canoes for twenty days. Made sail on the Lake; explored a bay at its N. W. angle, and Live-Oak Creek, so called. Camped under the cypress. Mosquitos thick, and no sleeping for them. Willis, one of my men, very sick; had my tent pitched for his accommodation and did without. The Lake very rough.

Friday, April 1.—Underway at sunrise. Heavy showers of rain and wind, and S. Easterly weather. Examined four creeks, and reached Fort Delany at 4 P. M. Hauled up the canoes high and dry and camped in them. To-morrow we are to try the Everglades again. Bathed in the Okeechobee for the last time I hope. One of my men made me a cigar of some chewing tobacco, which I smoked with a gusto.

Saturday, April 2.—Thick and cloudy morning. Heavy rain during the day. Launched our canoes through the cypress, and commenced dragging them along. At 4 hauled in to a pine barren and camped. A wet night. Killed another rattlesnake.

Sunday, April 3.—Morning cloudy; day April-like. Dragged our canoes the whole day through mud, water, and saw-grass. John Tigertail, the guide, off shooting. Lost the trail about noon, and frittered away the while afternoon finding it. Camped in the canoes in the grass, about four miles from our last night's camp, and near the northern part of the Alpatioka Swamp, the favorite resort of Sam Jones and Bill Bowlegs.

Monday, April 4.—Pleasant. Killed two moccasin snakes. Our guide shot two Everglade hens. Saw two deer. They stood gazing at us some time, and then loped off, stopping to gaze and wonder who we were. My Division captured twenty blue cranes, almost full grown, one hard-shell turtle, one terrapin, and a small alligator. Lots of grub for all hands. Lat. at noon 26° 52′ N. Our course about S. E. Saw a large smoke in the cypress bearing East. Dragged the canoes along by main force all day. Camped in the canoes at sundown.

Tuesday, April 5.—Pleasant. Underway at sunrise. Dragged the canoes, and in several places with fifteen men to each canoe, officers assisting. Captured a boat-load of cranes and other young birds. Lat. observed 26° 46′. Camped in the canoes in the grass. Killed a large black moccasin snake. Supper, turtle-stew.

Wednesday, April 6.—Pleasant morning. Underway at 6.30 A. M. to S. E., dragging the boats. Clumps of bushes abundant in place of the naked prairie. At noon shipped my rudder, and we commenced paddling for the first time since leaving the Okeechobee, pushing, dragging, and paddling by turns all day. At sundown camped with Tansall's two boats around a small clump of bushes and dry land. Madisons and Capt. H. camping around a similar one. Supper, fried bread, fish, and crane's eggs, and stewed crane.

Thursday, April 7.—Underway with the sun. Course S. Easterly all day. Country plentifully sprinkled with bushes. Passed several large "Keys," crowded with white cranes, their nests and eggs. Pushed or paddled ahead as occasion required. Several trout jumped into our canoes, and were transferred to our frying-pans,—foolish fish. Speared several large alligator-gars. Camped in our canoes around bushes at sundown. Night showery; anything but pleasant; wet blankets and their surroundings.

Friday, April 8.—Paddled all day; course about S. E. Captured forty white cranes, and might have taken a thousand had I wanted, and hats full of eggs; also a dozen water-turkeys and some fish. The Cypress in sight, extending from N. E. to S. W. Camped in the Cypress; sun an hour high; slept in my canoe.

Saturday, April 9.—Pleasant. Underway at sunrise, dragging the canoes along the edge of the cypress swamp. Water extremely low. At 10 A. M. lost Tansall and his division, and at early sundown camped in the young cypress. Saw a smoke about four miles west of us; probably our lost boats.

Sunday, April 10.—Pleasant. Underway at sunrise, dragging the canoes over dry land and saw-grass, at times using "all hands" to a single canoe. Tansall's canoes came up about 8 A. M., after being lost all night. At 12 entered the creek which forms the source of "New River." Dined. Passed down the north branch, and at 4 P. M. camped at Fort Lauderdale for the night.

Monday, April 11.—Left Fort Lauderdale at 8. Passed over the bar at the entrance of New River without damage, and stood along the coast under sail twenty-five miles. Passed outside Bear's Cut and inside Key Biscayne, and arrived on board the Brig early in the after-

noon. Glad to get back and to receive letters and news from home. My boat the first to get alongside; most of the canoes grounded and had to wait the rising of the waters. Thus ended our expedition of fifty-eight days in canoes after Sam Jones, during which Lieut. Rodgers says in his official report we had "less rest, fewer luxuries, and harder work than fall to the lot of that estimable class of citizens who dig our canals."

Tuesday, April 12.—Got underway, ran down the reef, and anchored at Indian Key. Lat. Key Biscayne 25° 41′ N.

On the 16th of April I find noted in my diary, "On the sick-list, foot badly inflamed and legs ulcerated; poisoned by the saw grass of the Everglades and exposure to the mud, through which we dragged our canoes, and the effects of the sun." "April 20, moved on shore at Indian Key to the officers' quarters for medical attendance." I will here state that the doctors at one time thought that the amputation of both limbs would become necessary, and it was more than two years before all the sores were healed, and for years after I felt the effects of these sixty days in a dug-out canoe in Florida.

This expedition into the Everglades was the last in which I participated. I had been on others of shorter duration previously. On the 11th of May Captain Rodgers left on another scout, taking his first lieutenant, Johnston Blakely Carter, with him, leaving me in command of the brig during his absence. The expedition returned on the 17th. On the 4th of June the schooners Wave and Flirt arrived from Havana, bringing us news that the President of the United States had proclaimed the "Florida War" at an end. On the 9th of July McLaughlin's "Mosquito Fleet," consisting of the Flirt (flag), Madison, Jefferson and Van Buren, sailed for Norfolk, Virginia, leaving the schooners Phenix, Acting Lieutenant Commanding C. R. P. Rodgers, and Wave, Acting Lieutenant Commanding J. C. Henry, to follow, after settling all outstanding matters.

Previous to the departure of the squadron the following General Order was read to the officers and crews:

"GENERAL ORDER.

"The commendation and appreciation of the services of the Florida Squadron embodied in the annexed extract from the official communication of Col. Worth to the adjutant-general of the army is of so exalted a character, when the source in which it emanated is considered, that the commanding officer cannot withhold it from the officers he has commanded.

"'CEDAR KEYS, June 20, 1842.

"'I trust I may be permitted on this occasion to express my respectful and grateful sense of the cordial and efficient co-operation rendered on all occasions and under all circumstances from Captain McLaughlin and the gallant and accomplished officers, who have ever aimed at rivalling the zeal and devotion of their admirable commander, and I feel assured that the general-in-chief will learn with gratification that the utmost cordiality and confidence has prevailed between both branches of the common service, whether united on the land or on the water. I am most happy on this occasion to express my personal obligations.

"'Very respectfully,
"'Your obedient Serv't,
(Signed) "'W. J. WORTH,
"'Col. Commanding.

"'To the Adjutant-General U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.'

"To Lt.-Com'dg JOHN RODGERS,
"Com'g U. S. Brig Jefferson,
"Indian Key. "July 2, 1842.

"SIR,—In compliance with the request of Col. Worth, I have the pleasure to communicate to you, for your information and that of your officers and men, the annexed extract from his letter of June 21, 1842,

"Respectfully,
"JOHN T. MCLAUGHLIN.

"'HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA,
"'CEDAR KEYS, June 21, 1842.

"'On parting with your young and accomplished comrades, I beg you to convey and make acceptable to them the high professional and personal respect I have the honor to entertain for each. The commendation of an old soldier can do no harm, and it is for me only to regret the humbleness which gives no warrant for a more decided expression of all that is due to their gallant and uncalculating devotion in a service as painful as thankless. May God protect you and your country promote you is the sincere prayer of

"'Most Truly Your Friend,
"'WM. J. WORTH.

"'CAPT. MCLAUGHLIN,
"'Com'dg, &c.,
"'Naval Forces, Coast of Florida.'"

The night after leaving for the North, when off Cope Canaveral the Jefferson was struck by a heavy squall from the westward, which carried away the foretop-mast in the cap, and also under the eyes of the topmast rigging, the maintop-mast at the same moment going with it a few feet above the lower cap. All hands were at once called to "clear wreck." The Madison, Lieutenant Commanding Herndon, seeing our disabled condition and thinking we had been struck by lightning, bore down within hail to our assistance. Being near-sighted, he misjudged the distance, and ran into our starboard waist, carrying away the main-chains, waist-boat, hammock-rail, and wheel, and crushing in our bulwarks down to the water-ways, and, as afterwards ascertained at Norfolk, breaking twelve frame timbers. The Madison's bowsprit was carried away by the collision. We fired a gun as a signal of distress to the Flirt, and employed the remainder of the night in clearing away the wreck, and getting sail on the ship. The night was Egyptian in its darkness, which was enlivened with sheets of ragged pink lightning. The squall must have been limited in extent, as none of the other vessels in company were at all injured by it. Without further mishap or adventure the squadron anchored in Hampton Roads on the 18th of July, 1842.

When we were dismasted off Cape Canaveral I was below and on the sick-list from the effects of my recent canoe expedition, but when I heard the collision with the Madison I scrambled on deck, but was immediately sent into the cabin by Lieutenant Rodgers, who told me I could only be injured and of no use where I was. Very soon he came down into the cabin, bringing with him the deck time-piece, which had been knocked into a cocked hat, so to speak, by the collision. Cool as he ever was in time of danger, and without the least sign of excitement, he commenced putting the clock together, and, turning to me, said, humorously, "Preble, I don't mind being dismasted, for that may happen to every one who goes to sea, but to be kicked in the stern by my friend afterwards is too bad." No doubt the collision was caused by Lieutenant Herndon being near-sighted, and thinking the vessel had way on when she had not. His intent was good, but the result was disastrous to both vessels.

*"THE TIMES" HISTORY OF THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.**

THE third volume of "The Times" history of the Boer War, edited by Mr. L. S. Amery, and published under the *ægis* of Printing House Square, fulfills all the expectations which were formed by the public when the first two installments of the history made their appearance. The volume now issued takes up the narrative of the campaign from December 16th, 1899, the day following the disastrous defeat of Sir Redvers Buller's army at Colenso, to March 13th, 1900, the day on which Lord Roberts entered Bloemfontein. These dates cover the most dramatic period of the war, including the siege and relief both of Ladysmith and Kimberley, the defeat and surrender of Cronje's force, and the subsequent operations which led to the occupation of the capital of the Orange Free State.

As a writer of military history Mr. Amery is gifted with literary powers of a very high order. Combining all Napier's dramatic sense of the heroic side of the war with Kinglake's incisive and picturesque powers of descriptive language, he has succeeded in marshalling the facts of his narrative with proportionate regard for their relative importance, and in just sufficient detail to satisfy all the purposes of the military student, as well as of the general public. A marked feature of the volume is the care with which the enormous amount of material placed at the editor's disposal has been sifted with the intention of establishing all facts of minor, as well as salient, interest beyond possibility of contradiction. The pains taken to elucidate the truth is everyhere observable, and stamps Mr. Amery's work with the seal of authority, which is the deserved reward of diligent labor.

In relating contemporary history, and particularly contemporary military history, points of disagreement between writer and reader must often occur. In the present case one such point requires special preliminary notice on account of its strong bearing on the line of argument adopted by Mr. Amery in his deductive teaching from the lessons of the war. Lord Robert's natural abhorrence of bloodshed—

*Reprinted from the London *Fortnightly Review* by permission of the Leonard Scott Co., American publishers of the *Fortnightly Review*.

an abhorrence which was an even more marked trait of the Duke of Wellington's nature*—is described as a flaw in the military character of the veteran soldier, who is continuously criticised throughout "The Times" history for refusing to let his troops come to close quarters with their Boer enemies in order to strike terror by inflicting punishment. "Killing," Mr. Amery asserts, with undeniable courage of opinion, "is the primary method of compassing the great objects of strategy," and upon this assumption—wholly fallacious when judged by the laws and customs of civilized warfare—he builds an argument tending to show that Lord Roberts's disinclination to accept this view of the functions of a British commander in the field was the cause of the eventual prolongation of the guerilla war.

So far as this criticism affects the military reputation of Lord Roberts, it is sufficient to say that the veteran Field-Marshal has been a fighting soldier all his life, and it is as such that he is best known to his countrymen. Apart, however, from these considerations, Mr. Amery's conclusions indicate a certain misconception on his part in regard to the supreme functions of international warfare. The primary object of war is not destruction of life and property, but the achievement, with a minimum of necessary bloodshed, of the political purpose for which the war was undertaken. So, also, the primary object of the strategist is not to kill, but to bring an overwhelming superiority of force to bear at a given time and place in the theatre of war with the purpose of rendering useless the physical resistance of the opposing enemy. This has always been the first postulate of scientific warfare. The tactician begins his work where the strategist leaves off. Necessity is the only justification for destruction. "Killing" is the last, not the first, resource of a commander. "Bludgeon work," to use a favorite expression of the Duke of Wellington, was never resorted to by that great Captain till all the resources of strategy had failed to secure his purpose. His powers of generalship were never better exemplified than when he refused to

*Mr. Gleig's account of the Duke's grief on the morning after the battle of Waterloo, when receiving the report of his chief medical officer, is an indication of this well-known abhorrence, which he frequently showed during the Peninsular War.

"The tears were running from the Duke's eyes, making furrows and channels for themseves through the grime caused by the dust and powder of the battle still remaining on his cheeks. 'Go on,' he said, 'go on, for God's sake, go on. Let me hear it all. This is terrible. Surgeon Hume finished his paper, and withdrew, leaving his great chief in an agony of distress."—*Life of the Duke of Wellington,* by the Rev. G. R. Gleig.

give battle to Massena in 1810, allowed Ciudad-Rodrigo and Almeida to fall under the eyes of his army, and in spite of popular clamor, and the murmurs of his own troops, adhered to his Fabian determination to retreat behind the lines of Torres Vedras.* The military student has been rightly taught to understand that the greatest achievement of Napoleon's military career was when he secretly surrounded Ulm with an army of 100,000 men, and compelled General Mack to capitulate.† Von Moltke's claim to belligerant eminence is based less on the blood-spilling encounters of Spicheren, Mars-le-Tour, and Gravelotte, than on the capitulation of Napoleon the Third with MacMahon's army at Sedan, and the surrender of Metz with 170,000 prisoners of war. Successful strategy is the determining factor in war, and has a quicker peace-bringing influence than a series of hard-won tactical victories.

Mr. Amery's conception of the qualities necessary for effective command is naturally influenced by the misapprehension into which his mind has fallen regarding the principles which govern the functions of the scientific strategist. In his brilliant character sketch of Lord Kitchener he alludes to his "instinct to destroy," and his "indifference to life," as indicating his fighting superiority over his more humanely disposed chief. If Lord Kitchener's character is honestly depicted in the description given he would assuredly forfeit any further claim to public confidence. Civilized war is not the trade of the butcher, but the high calling of the Christian soldier. It is the imperative duty of a chosen commander to show scrupulous regard for the lives of his own soldiers as well as chivalrous consideration for those of his enemies. To waste the lives of those placed under him for a

*"I should be neglectful of my duty to the King," wrote Wellington about this time, "to the Prince Regent, and to the common cause, if I could permit myself to be influenced by popular clamor, or by fear, so as to modify the system of operations, which I have adopted after mature deliberation, and which daily experience proves to be the only one which can bring the matter to a successful issue."

†In announcing the capitulation of his army, Napoleon proudly described the feat which he had accomplished as "a most astounding result, and one which is unexampled in the history of nations."

Bignon relates the extraordinary enthusiasm which this bloodless victory excited, not only among the French population when the news of Mack's surrender reached Paris, but among the soldiers of the Grand Army, by whose exertions Napoleon was able to give effect to his plan for surrounding the Austrian commander. "The Little Corporal"—to quote the language used in Napoleon's camp at the time—"has discovered a new method of carrying on war; he fights with our legs instead of our bayonets."

specific purpose is not only a moral crime, but a military blunder, since his object should always be to keep as large a force as possible effective for accomplishing the duty with which he has been charged. It is fair to Lord Kitchener to say that, except at Paardeberg, where his reckless conduct certainly gave cause for Mr. Amery's doubtful compliments, his military career has been marked by the same regard for human life, which the country has always exacted from British commanders in the field.

It is not proposed in this article to attempt to review the whole of the narrative operations, which are included in the volume, and which are spread out in such comprehensive detail. All that can be done is to direct attention to certain salient matters, which have hitherto been clothed with uncertainty, but with regard to which Mr. Amery's efforts have now elucidated the truth.

The siege of Ladysmith comes first in chronological seniority, a considerable amount of fresh light having been thrown on the circumstances connected with the doings both of the garrison and relieving force.

During the early days of the Natal Campaign, public opinion, uninstructed, disappointed, and impatient, was nearly unanimous in condemning Sir George White's decision to retain his hold of Ladysmith instead of retiring behind the Tugela. Many high military authorities, who had approved the original occupation of Ladysmith as an obvious point of strategical vantage in Northern Natal, argued against its retention when White's comparatively small containing force of 12,000 men was threatened by the numerically superior force of 22,000 Boers, who invaded the Colony under General Joubert's leadership. There was only one course which, according to their judgment, was correctly open to Sir George White in the situation confronting him, viz., to evacuate Northern Natal, abandon Ladysmith, after destroying all the stores which could not be taken away, and, retreating before the Boer advance, take up the best tactical position which could be found south of the Tugela, to cover the defence of Maritzburg. The opinions of the leading experts, notable among whom was Lord Wolseley,* were quickly caught up by the public,

*In his evidence before the Royal Commission on the War, Lord Wolseley gave the following answer to a question (No. 8903) by Lord Elgin:—"If I had been in command of such a force as was then (October 31, 1899) in Natal, and having at that time fully realized that there was a large force of the enemy coming for me, nothing in the world would have induced me to stay in Ladysmith. I would have burnt my supplies sooner than have stayed there, and I would have fallen back behind the next line, which is at Colenso, and behind the river."

and turned to use by politicians anxious to shield the Government from blame, and throw responsibility for failure on the generals in the field. Mr. Balfour himself did not hesitate to adopt this view, and in a speech to his constituents at Manchester in January, 1900, attributed the breakdown of General Buller's campaign in Natal to the "entanglement" created by Sir George White's occupation of Ladysmith.

Mr. Amery's narrative bears witness to the erroneous character of this criticism. Far from being a military blunder, the occupation of Ladysmith realized all the expectations of those who originally perceived its strategical worth as a *point d'appui* for a containing force guarding the railway approaches to Natal from the Transvaal and Orange Free State. As long as a British division of 12,000 men, well provided with cavalry and artillery, held on to Ladysmith, Natal was safe from invasion. The presence in such a locality of such a force, able to supply itself with everything required from the well-stocked *depôts* of the town, compelled the Boers to concentrate for its investment, and prevented the incursion south of any considerable force of the enemy till Ladysmith had been disposed of. Had Sir George White retreated after the actions of Glencoe and Elandslaagte, he could not have done so without the loss of the bulk of his supplies and ammunition, which could not have been destroyed in the short time available, and would have fallen into the enemy's hands. The Boers are more susceptible to moral influences than trained European troops, and the sight of their hated enemies retiring before them at the outset of the campaign would have given them the necessary stimulus to enable their leaders to count on their services for the invasion of Lower Natal. A river is the most unreliable of strategical barriers, and has never proved even a temporary obstacle to an invading army. Had Sir George White retired behind the Tugela on October 31st, it seems certain that Joubert would have followed close on his heels with the whole Boer army, and passing by Estcourt, where his incursion of November 13th actually stopped, would have moved on Maritzburg. There the same "entanglement," as occurred at Ladysmith might have taken place with much greater inconvenience to the political situation than was caused by the actual turn of events.

In taking his decision Sir George White* justifiably counted on

*Sir George White's own reasons for holding on to Ladysmith are set forth in his despatch of March 23, 1900:—"Ladysmith is the most important town in Northern Natal, and there was reason to believe that the enemy attached very

the early tactical co-operation of a relieving force, as also on the strategical relief, which might be expected as soon as General Buller's intended advance to Bloemfontein should begin to draw off the Free State troops for the defence of their capital. That he was unable to foresee the "entanglement" which arose from General Buller's incapable direction of the operations for his relief, must not be allowed to influence the public in criticising a decision which, under all the circumstances of the case, was creditable both to his wisdom and courage, and will assuredly be approved by the verdict of history.

Contrary to general outside belief at the time of the siege, the Ladysmith position proved to be well suited for purposes of tactical defence, being protected by a girdle of self-supporting hills covering a fairly manageable perimeter of about fourteen miles circumference. It is true that on the east the British lines of circumvallation were commanded by Lombard's Kop and Bulwana Mountain, which, towering 400 feet above the Klip river bed, dominated the whole south-eastern portion of the Ladysmith valley; but the ranges—5,000 and 7,000 yards respectively—from these hills to the nearest British batteries were too distant for effective artillery fire, and the material results of the Boer gun bombardment during the siege were insignificant.

On the north side, to which the Boer positions approximated nearer than elsewhere, the line of defence taken up was soon rendered impregnable to frontal assault by the exertions of Colonel W. G. Knox,* who was at Plevna with the Turks in 1877, and there learnt the value of artificial defence.

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great importance to gaining possession of it. It was suspected then, and the suspicion has since been confirmed, that the occupation of the town by the Boer forces had been decided on by the disloyal Dutch in both Colonies as the signal for a general rising. Our withdrawal would, therefore, have brought about an insurrection so widespread as to have materially increased our difficulties. Strategically, the town was important as being the junction of the railways which enter Natal from the Transvaal and Orange Free State, and until the Republics could gain possession of that junction their necessarily divergent lines of supply prevented them enjoying to the full the advantages of combined action. Tactically, the place was already partially prepared for defence, and offered a natural position of some strength, and, although the perimeter which must be occupied was very great for the number of troops available, yet it afforded a possibility of maintaining a protracted defence against superior numbers. On the other hand, the mere fact of a retirement behind the Tugela would have a moral effect at least equal to a serious defeat, and would have involved the abandonment to the enemy of a large town full of an English population, and of a mass of stores and munitions of war."

*Now Major-General Sir W. G. Knox, K. C. B.

"Under his vigorous direction, and by the willing exertions of officers and men, the open stone breastworks already in existence were improved, connected with a curtain of stone wall, and made accessible by covered ways, till eventually the whole section became one continuous fortification, the scrub on the plain in front of the eastern portion of the line of works being cut down and converted into three parallel lines of abattis about a hundred yards apart."

On the west—the least exposed side of the beleaguered position—the defenses were not sparse; and on the east the river, winding through a flat plain, afforded the means of natural defense. On the south the flat-topped ridge, three miles long, known as Cæsar's Camp (300 feet high), with its extension to Wagon Hill, from which it was separated by a narrow neck, flanked the railway from Colenso, and barred the approaches from the south. Colonel Ian Hamilton* had charge of this section of the defenses, and having only 1,000 men available, he did not attempt to construct a continuous line of entrenchments, but placed redoubts at intervals along the northern crest of the plateau.

The course of the siege is a striking proof of the tactical skill with which Sir George White and his subordinates arranged the defence of the perimeter occupied. During the whole four months of the investment the security of the town was never seriously threatened. Once only was a general combined attack decided on by the Boer leaders, and even this was never put into full execution. It was originally intended on the night of January 5th, 1900, under cover of a demonstration against the whole of the British positions, for a combined force of 2,000 Boers to make an attack on the Platrand, which was the name given to the heights comprised by Cæsar's Camp and Wagon Hill. The attack was a failure from start to finish. Not more than 200 men of the Pretoria commando could be mustered for the demonstration against the northern side of the defences, while the operations against the Platrand were half-hearted, and nowhere pushed home. Of the 2,000 men detailed to storm Cæsar's Camp and Wagon Hill, it is doubtful if one-third of that number came into action. Some 250 Free State burghers, under General C. J. de Villiers, one of the stormers of Majuba, succeeded under cover of the night in establishing themselves among the boulders on the southwestern shoulder of Wagon Hill, and obstinately remained in this position, though unsupported by their reserves, till sundown on the 6th, when they were withdrawn. About an equal number of Transvaalers climbed

*Now Lieut.-General Sir Ian Hamilton, K. C. B.

the southeastern slopes of Cæsar's Camp, and there sought cover without trying to push their attack across the top of the plateau. Had it not been for the bold attempt* of a small party of Free Staters to seize a gun emplacement on Wagon Point, and later in the day for the gallant but unsuccessful charge of the 1st Battalion Devonshire Regiment, in order to dislodge De Villiers and his men from their position, there would have been little to record concerning the events of the day. Sir George White's heliograph message,† which kept people at home in a state of agonized suspense for upwards of thirty-six hours, was prevented by a violent storm from being completed, and supplemented by further news, which would have removed all cause for anxiety.

"The legend of Ladysmith at the last gasp, its fate trembling in the balance, and saved only by throwing the last dismounted cavalryman into the firing line, and by a desperate charge of the last three companies of infantry, soon established itself in Ladysmith, and without, and will not easily be shaken. As a matter of fact Ladysmith was never actually in any serious danger, whatever might have been the case if the storming parties had been up to their original strength, and the supports had done their duty—in other words if the Boers had been other than what they were. But of leading there was none. The senior generals, Joubert, Schalk Burger, and Prinsloo, seem to have been mere spectators of the struggle. The splendid courage and

*The story of this dramatic episode, in which Sir Ian Hamilton was personally engaged, is told by Mr. Amery with true Homeric spirit:—"A dozen Boers had leapt on to the summit. But in the teeth of a hail of bullets from the Imperial Light Horse Fort, 200 yards away, all but three hung back. The three, De Villiers, De Jager, and Gert Wessel, rushed forward. There was a wild race for the gun-pits. Ian Hamilton reached the 4.7 emplacement, and, leaning his arm on the sand-bag parapet, fired his revolver at the nearest Boer. Almost immediately Albrecht (a trooper in the Imperial Light Horse) fired from outside the pit, while, at the same moment, from the other gun-pit rose the head and shoulders of Digby Jones and of Corporal Hockaday, R. E., each firing at his man. De Villiers and De Jager fell dead against the wall of the 4.7 gun-pit; Wessel at the lower emplacement. Miller-Wallnut fell, shot through the head, as he reached the 4.7 gun-pit; the brave Albrecht a second later. Within five minutes from the first surprise all was over. The Boers bolted down the hill, and the British re-occupied the summit."

†"Attack renewed; very hard pressed."

This message was despatched by Sir George White soon after receiving Sir Ian Hamilton's report of the above-described episode, which erroneously conveyed the impression of a desperate struggle for the Platrand, whereas, in reality, the affair reported was only a fight between a few picked combatants, and had no tactical bearing on the fortunes of the day..

dogged determination of a few hundred men could avail nothing in the face of incompetent leadership, and of the negligence and cowardice of the mass of the burghers."*

The verified narrative of the siege, as now related, wholly disproves the charge so recklessly made by Sir Redvers Buller, during the pressure of his cross-examination by the War Commission, against Sir George White, of want of fighting initiative.† Never was there a more cruel charge brought by a British general against a subordinate, and never a more baseless one. The history of the siege of Ladysmith is the history of sustained activity on the part both of commander and garrison, of repeatedly successful sorties, of fights and counter-fights, and of preparations to support the expected operations of the relieving force. No beleaguered garrison ever showed greater fighting spirit under the most depressing conditions than that of Ladysmith during its four months' investment by the Boer army. General Buller's charge comes with special unfitness, seeing that it was by his orders the mounted force, which after Lord Dundonald's entry into Ladysmith had been sent out to pursue the retreating Boers, was recalled, and the best opportunity afforded during the whole campaign for successful pursuit thereby lost. It was only when supplies began to fail, requiring the troops to be placed on short rations, that the physical strength of the garrison became weakened, and their fighting powers impaired. During the first fortnight in December Sir George White had organized a strong flying column, which he had arranged to take out himself to co-operate with General Buller, who had fixed December 17th as the date for his attack on Colenso. It was through no fault of Sir George White that the attack was delivered on the 15th instead of the 17th, without the change of date having been communicated to him. When Sir Redvers Buller, unnerved by his defeat at Colenso, despatched his pusillanimous heliogram‡ urging the commander of the Ladysmith Garrison to make the

*_The Times' History of the War in South Africa._ Volume III., Chapter VII.

†"I did consider that Sir George White was a man who would never give up Ladysmith if he could possibly help it; but I did not consider that he had much initiative for active fighting."

Minutes of Evidence, Royal Commission on the War in South Africa.

Q. 15366. General the Right Hon. Sir Redvers Buller, V. C., G. C. B., G. C. M. G.

‡This heliogram, as corrected by General Buller, is here reproduced for purposes of reference:—From General Sir R. Buller to General Sir G. White.—"Clear the line, No. 18, 16th December. I tried Colenso yesterday, but failed.

best terms he could with his enemies, and then surrender, Sir George White, after verifying this shameful message, instantly flashed back to his chief the only answer possible for a British general to give—the point-blank refusal: "We must not think of it."

Turning from inside to outside Ladysmith there is no more painful reading in Mr. Amery's volume than Chapters IX., X., and XI., containing the account of General Buller's operations on the Upper Tugela, between January 10th, 1900, when Sir Charles Warren started on his march to Potgeiter's Drift, and February 7th following, when Sir Redvers Buller drew off his troops from Vaal Krantz. The facts, as they stand recorded, speak for themselves, and are capable neither of excuse nor of explanation. Owing to the moral breakdown of its leader, the fighting strength of one of the finest and best-equipped armies ever despatched from English shores was reduced to humiliating impotence. Physically fearless in danger, General Buller lacked the necessary moral strength of character to enable him either to secure victory or sustain defeat. The events of Colenso unstrung his nerves to such an extent that when during the further progress of the campaign he was subsequently confronted with a situation requiring an effort of decision he could not make up his mind to act, either rightly or wrongly, till it was too late to act at all. Having no further confidence in his own powers, as soon as the flank march to the Upper Tugela had been arranged, he handed over the executive command of the troops to Sir Charles Warren, while he himself stood out as an onlooker. In the memorandum, which he prepared for the Royal Commission on the War, General Buller suggests that the Boers were afraid of him.* Fear, if it ever existed, would have been changed to compassion could they have seen the English Commander seated on Spearman's Kop, mortified, downcast, inactive, the sullen spectator and captious critic of his lieutenant's difficulties. Mr. Amery states that General Buller "could scarcely conceal his satisfaction" at Sir Charles Warren's discomfiture, his spirits becoming so elated after the abandonment of Spion Kop that he de-

The enemy is too strong for my force, except with siege operations, and these will take one full month to prepare. Can you last so long? How many days can you hold out? After which I suggest your firing away as much ammunition as you can, and making the best terms you can. I can remain here if you have alternative suggestion, but unaided I cannot break in."

*"I knew that the Boers were afraid of me—I will not pause to discuss whether I deserved the compliment, but I knew it—and I should have failed in my duty if I had neglected to take the fact into account."—Royal Commission on the War in South Africa, Minutes of Evidence, Volume II., page 175.

cided to take back the command into his own hands. If this be so, his satisfaction must have been short-lived, for Vaal Krantz, which was "Buller, and Buller alone," proved to be a second Colenso, won by the Boers and lost by the English, owing to the nervous disinclination of the Commander to carry through his plan of attack with the necessary resolution to ensure victory.

Sir Charles Warren's conduct of the operations which were delegated to his direction, is severely criticized by "The Times" history, although the initial conditions under which he was required to carry out his task are admitted to have tied his hands, and prevented free scope for his powers of generalship. It is always easy to criticise the management of military operations, and especially so when they have been unsuccessful; but an impartial view of the facts as recorded ought to exonerate General Warren from the censure which has been so unsparingly dealt out to him.

"Whatever Warren's defects as a general, it is only just to acknowledge at the outset that his position was difficult and awkward in the extreme. In command of a large force, without a staff to direct it, responsible for the main operations of the army, and yet not free to choose his own course, thrown upon his own resources, and yet liable to constant interference, he would have had to be a soldier of the first rank to have been certain of compassing success."*

Yet success was within his grasp, and was only snatched from his hands by the unaccountable action of a subordinate. Colonel Thorneycroft, who had been specially placed in command on Spion Kop with the rank of Brigadier-General, in defiance of the orders, which Sir Charles Warren had repeatedly sent, directing him to hold on to the position "at all costs," evacuated Spion Kop at nightfall, and personally reported having done so to his general at 2.30 A. M. It still remains to be explained why Colonel Thorneycroft was not instantly ordered back to the position which he had evacuated. By acquiescing in his subordinate's disobedience of orders Sir Charles Warren assumed full responsibility for the failure of the operations, which with prompt decision on his part might yet have been brought to a successful issue. The Boers had given up Spion Kop for lost after fighting on January 24th, and with the exception of Botha and a few stalwarts, had fled from the neighborhood.

"An instant message to reoccupy the hill with all troops available might even now have saved the situation. But to do that required the courage and quick resolution of a Louis Botha. Warren accepted the

*The Times' History of the War in South Africa. Vol. III., Chapter IX.

situation. In the grey dawn Botha and his scanty following reoccupied the summit. As they gazed down upon the British Army lying inactive in their bivouacs, and then looked back at the great plain, dotted as far as the eye could reach with the débris of their own fugitive commandos, the simple burghers may well have ascribed their deliverance to a Higher Power, which had rewarded their steadfastness by smiting their enemy with a deadly palsy."*

It is refreshing to turn from the depressing associations connected with General Buller's Natal campaign, with its weary record of continuous mismanagement, to the preparations which were being made at the time in Cape Colony for the invasion of the Orange Free State. Since January 10th, 1900, when he landed at Cape Town, Lord Roberts had been laboriously at work on his strategical plan of campaign. Handing over to Lord Kitchener the duty of organizing the administrative departments of the army in process of mobilization, the Commander-in-Chief reserved for his own unaided and confidential consideration the strategical dispositions necessary to accomplish the subjugation of the two rebel Republics.

From the opening of the campaign, with true Napoleonic vision, Lord Roberts kept his eye fixed on Bloemfontein and Pretoria as the two strategical points which dominated the whole theatre of war. Concentrating his attention on these objectives, the Field-Marshal refused to allow his strategy to be dictated by his opponents. The situations at Ladysmith, Mafeking, and Kimberley did not suggest themselves to his mind as requiring special treatment, since they would become automatically "disentangled" under the influence of the strategical strokes which he was preparing to deliver. With the capitals of the two Republics in British possession, hostilities might not immediately end, the Boer commandos might, as they did, break up into small guerilla bands, and "fight to a finish," as long as leaders and followers remained together; but politically the war would be terminated, and peace could only be a matter of time.

How to get to Bloemfontein with a minimum loss of time and life was the first problem to be solved. Two courses were open for adoption by the Commander-in-Chief: either a direct advance into the Free State across the Orange River, or a concentration by means of the Cape Town-De Aar-Kimberley railway at Modder River, followed by a flank march to Bloemfontein. The adoption of the first alternative involved forcing a passage over the Orange River either at Bethulie or Norval's Pont, since the railway bridges at both these

**The Times' History of the War in South Africa.* Vol. III., Chapter IX.

points were in possession of the Boers. By adopting the second alternative the obstacle of the Orange River would be turned, while it could not be passed at the passages named without hard fighting, and heavy initial losses, at the opening of the campaign.

Though Lord Roberts never lost sight of his main strategical objective—the occupation of Bloemfontein—other considerations may doubtless have influenced his mind in choosing his line of invasion. The largest Boer force in the field outside Natal was concentrated near Kimberley, and it was desirable to come to close quarters with this force with the least delay. The methods of strategy are dictated by the necessities of the opportunist. If on his way to Bloemfontein Lord Roberts could compel Cronje to fight, so much the better for his further plans of campaign, and so much the worse for the Boers. Moreover, after dealing with Cronje the relief of Kimberley would follow automatically, and that town would then become a secondary base for the ulterior purposes of invasion.

Looking back at the military situation at this juncture, it is impossible not to feel a strong sense of satisfaction at the open alliance between the two Republics. Had the Government of the Orange Free State, after mobilizing the forces at its disposal, remained at first neutral, its territory would have been denied to British troops, and a situation of enormous strategical embarrassment would have been created. The Transvaal must either have been attacked from Natal across the Drakensberg barrier, or from the side of Bechuanaland, which could only be approached by a long railway line flanked throughout its course by Free State territory. No one can contemplate without apprehension the consequences which might have resulted had Mr. Steyn taken advantage of a situation which placed it in his power to profess neutrality as long as convenient, and choose his own time for declaring war. By rushing into the struggle when President Kruger launched his ultimatum, he played into the hands of his enemies, and deprived his own military commanders of the initial strategical advantages which the geographical position of the Orange Free State conferred on them, had not the war been prematurely precipitated.

The account of the operations undertaken in accordance with Lord Roberts's plans is admirably told in Chapters XIII. and XIV. of Mr. Amery's volume. The sudden arrival of the Commander-in-Chief at Modder River, the concentration at Ram Dam, the flank march round Cronje's left to regain the river at Klip Drift, the cavalry dash on Kimberley, Cronje's desperate attempt to escape between French's cavalry and the Sixth Infantry Division, Kelly-Kenny's pur-

suit, French's forced march from Kimberley to Kameelfontein, the investment of Cronje's laager at Wolve Kraal, Kitchener's attack on the laager on February 18th, and Cronje's surrender on the anniversary of Majuba. Each incident is described in proper sequence, the whole of the events forming a connected and graphic story of one of the most fascinating episodes of English military history.

Chapter XIV., containing the narrative of the battle which raged round Cronje's laager on February 18th, 1900, is the most disputable part of the volume under review. Though Mr. Amery states the facts of the day's fighting with his habitual honesty, he fails to be convincing when he temporarily abandons his impartial *rôle* of historian to act as advocate for the defence of Lord Kitchener. In this chapter, more than elsewhere in the volume, the editor allows his generally sound judgment to come under the influence of those misconceived ideas of war to which attention has been directed in the early part of this article. Lord Kitchener is held up to public admiration as if he were a kind of British Nana Sahib devoured by an insatiable passion for human slaughter. Cronje's army was at his mercy. *Væ victis.* What a chance for "killing"! "To waste this chance"—the quotation is from "The Times" history—"was imbecility. To seize it, to annihilate Cronje's forc ,eand then, with the terror of his dripping sword preceding him, to march straight to Bloemfontein, was to Kitchener's mind the only policy of a soldier." Whatever apparent justification there may have been for the above description of Lord Kitchener's mental condition, owing to his conduct of the battle of Paardeberg, there was none after his confession to Captain Slocum, the American military attaché, the day following the battle:—

"If I had known yesterday morning what I know to-day, I would not have attacked the Boers in the river valley: it is impossible against the modern rifle." Few men have probably experienced deeper regret on account of mistakes for which they have been responsible than Lord Kitchener for the errors committed during the fighting round Cronje's laager on the day in question.

The initial error at Paardeberg was that of General Kelly-Kenny when he allowed himself to be superseded by Lord Kitchener. The presence of the Chief of the Staff with the Sixth Division was not due to design, but to the accident of Lord Roberts's illness, which kept the Commander-in-Chief at Jacobsdal while Cronje was being pursued. Unable to take the field himself, Lord Roberts sent Lord Kitchener to join General Kelly-Kenny for the purpose of maintaining communication between himself and his Divisional General, and as the channel

for conveying his orders. It was never the intention of Lord Roberts* that Lord Kitchener should take command over the heads of Generals French and Kelly-Kenny, both of whom were his seniors in rank, and though the wording of the Field Marshal's letter of the 17th of February was somewhat ambiguous it hardly seemed capable of the interpretation which General Kelly-Kenny gave to its contents.† Early in the morning of the 18th, according to *The Times* history, General Kelly-Kenny was explaining his proposed dispositions for surrounding Cronje, when Lord Kitchener interrupted in an "excited and peremptory manner," and "impatiently pressed for an immediate attack." By gratuitously acquiescing in what was after all only a forcibly expressed suggestion by the Chief of the Staff in his capacity as amicus curiæ, General Kelly-Kenny surrendered the command, which was forthwith assumed by Lord Kitchener with the unfortunate consequences which ensued.

The salient facts of the battle are recorded with remorseless accuracy in Mr. Amery's narrative. "It is now seven o'clock. We shall be in the laager by half-past ten. I will then load up French, and send him on to Bloemfontein at once." So spake Lord Kitchener, counting without his host. Instead of directing the Boer position to be reconnoitered in order to discover the best points for attack, he galloped about the field of battle, ordering first one assault to be made, then another, without any considered plan for the mutual co-operation of the various corps engaged. In his feverish desire to capture the laager, he chose to disregard the most elementary rules of tactical conduct. Orders were given direct to battalions, and sometimes to company commanders, without being passed through the divisional and brigade generals, with the inevitable consequence that counter orders were being constantly received by all concerned, no one knowing what was actually intended, where to go, or how to act. Officers and men got mixed together in hopeless confusion in all directions. Batteries came into action when and where they pleased, being often fired upon from two, and even three directions at a time. One battalion of the 19th Brigade—the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry—

*In answer to Question 13131 before the Royal Commission on the War, Lord Roberts said:—"I never intended Lord Kitchener to take command. He went to the Sixth Division as my representative."

†The following is an extract from Lord Roberts's letter to General Kelly-Kenny, dated Jacobsdal, February 17, 1900:—"I hope to join you to-morrow. Meanwhile, please consider that Lord Kitchener is with you for the purpose of communicating to you my orders, so that there may be no delay, such as reference to and fro would entail."

was ordered to charge the laager under the eyes of its Brigadier, without his having been informed of the intended movement. "The laager must be rushed at all costs. Gallop up if necessary, and fire into it," was Lord Kitchener's reply to a message from Colonel Hannay, who reported his inability to advance with mounted men over the open ground on the east of Cronje's position. Hannay did as he was bid, and galloped up to within 350 yards of the laager, when he fell riddled with bullets.* Towards evening the confusion was increased by the sudden appearance of De Wet on Kitchener's Kopje, the hill which General Kelly-Kenny was arranging to occupy when the Chief of the Staff so peremptorily dispossessed him of his command. After reading Mr. Amery's narrative it is difficult to reconcile his record of facts with his final conclusion that the battle was the "best conducted and most successful engagement on a large scale in the whole war."

The truth is the battle should never have been fought. Necessity for fighting had been removed by Lord Roberts's successful strategy. By their energetic pursuit Generals French and Kelly-Kenny had sealed the fate of Cronje. On the morning of the 18th of February he was a beaten man, overtaken in his flight, baffled, surrounded by superior numbers, and unable to escape. It only remained to secure his surrender by drawing the cordon of investment tight round his laager, and by guarding against counter attack. General French realized this, and so did General Kelly-Kenny: Lord Kitchener did not. The hard-headed organizer is not always the equally cool-headed tactician. Lord Kitchener's experience of fighting had been small. Like others before him, his judgment temporarily went astray, and in the excitement of the situation he lost that self-control which never leaves

*Mr. Amery's narrative states that Colonel Hannay fell "right inside the enemy's line." This seems to be an unintentional slip of the pen, since Colonel Hannay never got nearer than 350 yards from the northeast corner of the laager. The fact is important, because Mr. Amery builds an argument upon his statement to show that the laager "could have been carried by a really determined assault." As a matter of fact, the ground over which Hannay was ordered to gallop in order to fire into the laager was impossible for mounted men against modern rifle-fire, and Hannay knew this when he sent away his staff, and rode to his certain death. Of his gallant band of followers only two came back to tell the tale of the charge. The others were slain with their leader—a noble example of devotion to duty, and one which will be remembered for all time. "It was as fine a death," wrote an officer who knew Hannay well, "as any soldier could die, and none but the bravest would have attempted such a deed." The heroism of the fact does not relieve Lord Kitchener from responsibility for sending the order to charge against the judgment of the brave men on the spot.

Lord Roberts during the most trying times of a campaign. Instead of turning to account the strategical success, which had been gained, he played into the hands of his adversary, acting as though the British troops, and not the Boers, had been driven into a corner from which they could only escape by the desperate methods resorted to.

The conduct of the battle was as faulty as its conception. Instead of being concentrated at decisive points, the attacking troops were dispersed in every direction. The frontal attack was pushed home before either of the flank attacks up the river bed had been given time to develop. From dawn to dusk the battle raged in fitful spasms, with no coherence of purpose, and no co-operation of effort. Commanders were ordered, one after the other, to lead a succession of forlorn hopes, without being given any choice of action. In this way brave lives were tragically lost with no compensating results. The situation at nightfall remained the same as at dawn. Ground had neither been lost nor won, and the only result of 12 hours' fighting was the memory of many noble deeds of valor, and a long casualty roll of more than 1,200 killed and wounded soldiers. Lord Kitchener has outlived the errors for which he was responsible on the day of the battle of Paardeberg, but none the less must he accept the censure, which all generals incur when they neglect the rules of war, and sacrifice the lives of their men without necessity arising, and without advantage being gained.

Lord Roberts arrived at Paardeberg at 10 A. M. on the morning following the battle, and after personally reconnoitering the position of the two forces, decided, against Lord Kitchener's advice, not to renew the attack. This decision* was taken on grounds of sheer military expediency. The Boers were strengthening their entrenchments with the evident resolve to stay where they were. A second assault, even if successful, meant a second casualty roll, probably longer than the first. The care of the previous day's wounded was already straining the carrying capacity of the transport department to the utmost limits of efficiency. Any further strain might be the cause of a complete breakdown. The army was *en l'air,* away from the railway. There was no immediate necessity for occupying Bloemfontein, and if there had been, it was impossible to advance till the

*In criticising this decision, Mr. Amery imperceptibly allows himself to be carried away by his own strong conviction of what ought to have been done when he suggests that Lord Roberts was influenced by sentimental considerations which, judging from his acts and words, never entered his mind. The veteran Field-Marshal was too good a soldier to be "appalled by the loss of life" when such loss was required for the objects of the campaign.

supply convoy of 180 wagons, which had been captured by De Wet on the 15th, had been replaced. The risk of attempts being made to relieve Cronje was precisely what Lord Roberts wished the Boers to incur. His force was strong enough to maintain the investment as well as beat off any relieving attack. When he began to invade the Free State he hoped to relieve the pressure on Ladysmith by drawing off some of the besieging troops.* The investment of Cronje's force half-way to the capital would bring about this result as definitely as an immediate advance to Bloemfontein. If Cronje continued to hold out after the army was ready to move there would then be time enough to think about a second assault; but for the moment the interests of the campaign would be better served by starving him out. These were the Field-Marshal's considered reasons for refusing to adopt Lord Kitchener's advice, and they were justified by the events which followed the decision.†

Time and space do not permit even a cursory examination to be made of the concluding chapters of the volume, dealing on the west with the surrender of Cronje, the advance from Paardeberg, the actions of Poplar Grove and Dreifontein, and Lord Roberts's arrival at Bloemfontein, and on the east with General Buller's further fighting round Colenso and Pieter's Hill. The events which these chapters describe are the final phases on the one side of a short, brilliant, and decisive struggle for the occupation of Bloemfontein—the first of Lord Roberts's objectives—and on the other side with the long, disappointing, and ineffective‡ campaign for the relief of Ladysmith. The chapters will be read to the end by the general public with the historical interest due to the events described, and by the military student with special regard to the numerous tactical lessons, which, as the war progressed, gradually made themselves clear. Those whose business it becomes to make a professional study of the various operations described will find their work facilitated by the military maps and diagrams, which accompany the text, and which have been prepared under the able direction of Mr. Lionel James, who represented "The

*About 2,000 Free Staters were detached from the Upper Tugela to Poplar Grove, where the force relieving Cronje concentrated.

†Lord Roberts had less necessity for attacking Cronje at Paardeberg than Napoleon had for assaulting Ulm, when he patiently waited for Mack to surrender, although the Russian Army under Kutusoff was advancing by forced marches to join the Austrians.

‡Ineffective because of the opportunity thrown away by General Buller to gather the fruits of victory by a determined pursuit of the retreating Boers.

Times" throughout the campaign as the senior war correspondent on Mr. Buckle's staff.

The results of the Natal campaign are summed up by Mr. Amery with correct appreciation of all the circumstances attending its progress, and with generous regard for the position in which Sir Redvers Buller was placed by those who sent him to South Africa. Great as was his personal failure, he was after all the chosen representative of a peace system, which raised him to the highest place in his profession without any suspicion of incapacity. Like many others, he owed his rise not to professional capacity as judged by modern war requirements, but to personal qualities, which were mistakenly supposed to indicate power of command, which satisfied the peace conditions of military organization before the Boer campaign, but which counted for nothing when put to the supreme test of modern war. Had the requirements of this test been understood when the war broke out, neither General Buller, nor others of the same type would have been sent to South Africa. All this is admirably brought out in the comments of "The Times" historian.

"In an army where generalship was neither theoretically studied nor tested in practice, it is not surprising that men should attain to the highest offices, and command the fullest confidence of others in much the same plight as themselves without preserving the slightest trace of that quality. When the circumstances are dispassionately considered it becomes clear that there really was no conceivable reason why Buller should have shown himself a general. And, if he failed, the blame must rest, not with him, but with the system which made him what he was, with the nation which confidently bade him undertake a task of overwhelming difficulty, for which he was fitted neither by experience, nor by training, nor by disposition. The man himself, baffled, bewildered, distracted, disheartened, at times even unnerved, by the terrible responsibility thrust upon him, is a figure which calls for sympathy and regret, not for reprobation."*

Critical as Mr. Amery is of Lord Roberts's tactical methods of fighting, he does unqualified justice to the Field-Marshal's strategy, which in the short space of two months changed defeat into victory, and restored its lost prestige to the army. Considering the magnitude of the results achieved—Kimberley and Ladysmith relieved, the besieging armies dispersed, Cronje and 4,000 of his followers prisoners of war, the capital of the Orange Free State in British possession,

**The Times' History of the War in South Africa.* Volume III., Chapter XVII.

railway communication restored with Table Bay, the frontiers of Cape Colony cleared of invasion—criticism of this or that tactical method adopted can only have an academical interest for the military student. "A la guerre les trois quarts sont des affaires morales. La balance des forces réelles n'est que pour un quart."* The moral effect of such striking successes, coming after a succession of military disasters, restored confidence throughout the country, and was the answer which Lord Roberts sent from South Africa to those who thought the British Empire had undertaken a task which was beyond its belligerent power to accomplish. Thenceforward the history of the campaign, broken only by occasional untoward incidents, which had no abiding effect on the final result, shows a continuous record of progressive successes which, though followed by a long period of desultory guerilla fighting, eventually paved the way for a durable peace.

"This was Lord Roberts's work. To him, and to no one else, England owed this result. Circumstances may seem to have favored him. Each one of his successes owed much to the skill or determination of his subordinates. But it was he, the man himself, who seized the favoring chance, and directed it to his ends, whose bold designs furnished skill with meet occasion, whose quick spirit kindled a responsive fire. Boldness of conception, singleness of aim, fervor in execution, fearlessness of responsibility—these were the great qualities which Roberts brought to bear upon a situation fatally compromised and entangled by original unpreparedness, and subsequent failure."†

**Napoleon's Correspondence.* Vol. IX.

†*The Times' History of the War in South Africa.* Volume III., Chapter XVII.

MILITARIST.

THE ART OF WAR IN '62—SHILOH.

THE United States Military Academy is an admirable institution, and a credit to the country. There are many excellent things about it,—altogether too many to admit of even mention here. Tone good, teaching thorough, in its way; but I have often wondered why it is that, after all these years, it has never set itself to teach something of what one would think is its special business,—namely, the Art of War. Not that the subject is altogether ignored, nor that the young men are not practically taught how to shoulder arms, keep step, and—some of them—to command a company, or even a battalion; but it will hardly be seriously contended that the little manuals on outpost duty and grand tactics, with the obsolete "forty days and forty nights" attack and defense, with all varieties of drill thrown in, really more than touch the immense subject of military science.

I do not write in an unfriendly spirit. On the contrary, I love the dear old tread-mill, though it does grind "exceeding small," in a certain sense. I am not unmindful of the grand men it has sent out, and I fully recognize the tone and character they have given the service and the country; but, still, in the light of some experience, I must take leave to say that there seems to me "scope and verge enough" for large improvements in the present course, or, to put it in a more general way, in the military education of our young officers. Take just one point, for example: what does a young man fresh from West Point know critically—or, perhaps, in any way—of the great campaigns of the world? Of course, nothing under this title or any other could be wedged into the present already overcrowded course; but why not cut off say two years from the lower end of the present curriculum and put them on the other end, at the same time pushing up the age for admission? Mathematics, chemistry, French, and all that can be learned anywhere; and there would be just as many applicants ready to meet the new standard, I fancy, as there are with it where it is.

I dare say there is nothing now in all this. It may have been fully discussed in this journal, for aught I know. In any event, the facts I am about to relate with regard to the battle of Shiloh

will be found, I think, tolerable proof that war was a blind sort of business to the generals of either army in that engagement, though they were West Point men. We have been glorifying ourselves, North and South, a long time; and now I hope it will not be amiss to hold up the seamy side of things a little in a good-natured sort of way. To do it I must be allowed to speak in the first person singular and to be as egotistical as I like.

Kentucky and Tennessee had been lost to the Confederate arms. The Federal Generals had kindly permitted General Sydney Johnston to move the remnant of his army from Murfreesboro to Corinth without the slightest molestation. It was no inconsiderable favor. Even a few shots along the way would have distressed him very much; a little enterprise would have, perhaps, defeated altogether what he himself called "a hazardous experiment." He was quite deliberate and open about it; took a whole month, in the face of a successful and much superior force, to execute the movement. If it had been prevented, the history of the war in the West would have been very short, with the saving of much blood. But let that pass. He was successful because there were none to molest or make him afraid.

This movement was part of a plan to concentrate all the available Confederate forces in the West at Corinth, and move them against the enemy with the least possible delay. Bragg was brought up from Pensacola with such troops as could be spared from New Orleans; Polk fell back from Columbus, and some other scattered forces were gathered in,—making in all, with Johnston's command, about forty thousand men of all arms.

General Grant had established himself with a heavy force on the Corinth side of the Tennessee River, in very convenient proximity to us. General Buell, with his army (thirty-seven thousand strong), was in march from Nashville to join Grant at Pittsburg Landing. Our chief men talked it all over and came to the very sensible conclusion that it would be a good thing to strike Grant before Buell could get to him. Things were hurried up, and in three weeks we were actually in march. It was our deliberate purpose to surprise Grant, and we did it! If it were not for the awful carnage which followed, one could laugh at the expectation and its extraordinary accomplishment. We had only a little over twenty miles to march. It was not until the fourth day that we struck the Federal encampments; and, although we had waked the echoes all along our march,—captured and carried off pickets, lost some of our own, driven back and killed Federal troops, firing

big guns and little, and all within four or five miles of this great encampment,—we nevertheless did walk in upon Sherman, greatly to his surprise, while he was quietly at breakfast on Sunday morning, the 6th of April.

But I must go somewhat into detail about this curious business. Hardee's corps began the movement from Corinth on the 3d of April. Bragg, a little later, moved out on another and more direct road lying to the east. Polk's corps followed Hardee's on the same road; and Breckenridge on a third road, still farther to the right. These all converged near Mickey's House, five or six miles from where the enemy lay on the Tenessee River. The Federal forces were not entirely ignorant nor indifferent to what was going on; for on the evening of the 4th, while Hardee's corps lay huddled together some distance in advance of Mickey's, without the slightest misgivings as to any possible visit from our neighbors over on the river, some Federal cavalry came dashing wildly into us. They were in pursuit of a detachment of our cavalry who had been over fighting the enemy's pickets by way of keeping things quiet for our intended surprise. This sudden apparition rather startled us for a moment. No preparations had been made to provide against such a rudeness, no advance guards, no light troops in front, although we were within something like four miles of about fifty thousand "Boys in Blue." Our people sprang to arms, two regiments of infantry opened fire, and I got one of my batteries into action before this squadron of cavalry could get out of sight. They left one poor fellow, I think, on the ground. When this cavalry got back, and told Sherman about it all,—they belonged to his command,—one would think that our little plan of surprising the enemy would have had a sudden collapse. General Sherman had himself heard the artillery fire, and he seems to have thought, before the cavalry reported to him, that there was something rather irregular about it; for he went out some distance with two regiments of infantry and took position until the cavalry came back. He told General Grant all about it: said, "I infer that the enemy is in some considerable force at Pea Ridge; that yesterday morning they crossed a brigade of two regiments of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, and one battery of field artillery, to the ridge on which the Corinth road lays (sic!). They halted the infantry and artillery at a point about five miles in my front, and sent a detachment to the lane of General Meeks, on the north of Owl Creek, and the cavalry down towards our camp. The cavalry captured a part of our advanced pickets, and afterwards engaged

the two companies of Colonel Buckland's regiment, as described by him in his report herewith inclosed. Our cavalry drove them back upon their artillery and infantry, killing many and bringing off ten prisoners, whom I sent to you."

Not much chance of surprising Grant or Sherman with that artillery and infantry! So some of us thought; but we did not know how much gunpowder it took, at that stage of the war, to serve a caveat on the army. This little circumstance seems to have dropped out of the minds of these distinguished officers entirely. Sherman was busy readjusting encampments, and Grant was doubtless bothered to death with quartermasters and commissaries; and yet it seems queer that they did not at least feel curious to know what the rebels meant by trying to look over into their preserves, and how long they intended to keep it up. Perhaps Sherman thought that that cavalry charge had discouraged those who had not been killed so that they had gone home, or that he had sufficiently done his duty when he got the cavalry back and had reported the interesting circumstance to the commanding general. Whatever he may have thought, certain it is we heard nothing whatever from him or anybody else all the next day, and, what is almost equally amazing, we seem not to have had the least notion that the enemy was called upon to seek any further interview with us, made no preparations for such an event, but went quietly along about our business of surprising him!

Accordingly, next morning we set out to execute the next step in our plan with all the simplicity and confidence of a well-ordered militia marching to a general rendezvous. We moved in one thread-like column—if a flank formation by fours can be called a column at all—on a winding woods-road, the corps commander and his staff at the head. We didn't expect anybody to question our right to see that road, and our confidence was not misplaced; we did not encounter a human soul—no; I mistake. We did meet one man in an uncommon sort of way. As our snake-like procession moved along the sinuosities of this narrow road through the woods, preceded by the general and a glittering array of staff-officers, somebody about a hundred yards in advance sang out "Halt!"

Well, what were we to do? Manifestly, since the stranger was good enough to make the request, abrupt though it was, there was nothing to do but halt and see what he wanted. Being sensible people, we did it, and then commenced a parley. The man was

partly hid in the bushes, but we could see that he was mounted, and we could see further that he held his carbine sloping towards us in a very suggestive way. Here was an unexpected obstacle to our further advance, and we did not like to go back. So some of us sang out, "Who are you?"

The unknown seemed to be rather non-committal, and so simply returned, "Who are you?"

We answered back, "This is Hardee's corps."

"Well, advance and give the word."

This was awkward, because by some oversight we had not been furnished with any "word."

I felt sure it was not General Grant nor any evil-minded person, chiefly because I could see his butternut breeches, so I had the temerity to say, "All right! meet me half-way," and started toward him. He advanced a few paces on his part, and when I came up to him I explained to him that he was halting an army, and that he ought not to do it. He hesitated a little, but finally said, "I suppose you can go on; but it's agin orders."

The head of the army moved on without further hindrance. I ventured to suggest to the general (a capital corps commander he was, or, rather, became after his experience at Shiloh—none better) that it might be well to cover our advance with a line of skirmishers. He said, "Yes, it was almost time to do it; would do it as soon as we began to deploy into line."

So we moved on, perhaps as much as a mile farther, and then the head of the column filed to the right, and the great snake extended itself for Lick Creek to Owl Creek, said to be nearly three miles! Hardee had to borrow a brigade to make his line reach. We were little more than a mile from the Federal camps!

This was a surprising business, sure enough. The character of the line would have surprised any of the generals engaged in spinning it out at a later period of the war; the manner of getting into it would have been still more surprising; and our simplicity in expecting the enemy to lie perfectly quiet and allow us to encircle him with a wall of men three miles long and almost touching him, and that we actually did it, and lay there from ten o'clock in the morning until sunrise the next morning, without the slightest knowledge of our presence on his part, is—Well, surprising is too feeble a word—it is amazing, astounding, incredible! Where were the outposts and grand guards? Had they been drawn in, so that the "artillery and infantry" which had been burning gunpowder so freely down on Pea Ridge the day before might not discover

where they were kept? It wears the air of absurdity. If General Sherman had ridden out with a small posse and simply read the riot act, we never could have formed that line; and as things in the rear were in a very muddled condition, if he had appeared with a few regiments, our attempt at a surprise might have been very sad indeed.

But, as it was, we got comfortably into line without the slightest confusion or anxiety early in the day, expecting to move on at once and take possession of Grant and the few things he had collected there on the bank of the river. But there was trouble in the rear. Bragg's corps was to form a second line, and the right wing got into position in good time, some eight hundred yards in rear of Hardee; but where was the left? It was not to be seen, and nobody had heard of it. The day was fast going, the sun had already passed the meridian, but that left wing did not make a flutter. General Johnston grew impatient, and at last, exclaiming "This is not war," he rode to the rear until he "found the missing column standing stock-still, with its head out in an open field. General Polk's reserves were ahead of it with their wagons and artillery blocking up the road." Johnston soon cleared the way and had the troops in motion. Polk and Breckenridge was to form a third line, and finally got into position; but too late. The day was almost gone. There seemed nothing for it but to wait until the next day to surprise the enemy.

We of the advanced line, in the mean time, lay all day, some stretched out upon the ground, looking up at the blue sky or at the beautiful white blooms of the dogwood; some gathered in groups, counting pulses, growling at the delay, or listening to the various sounds which came to us from the enemy's camps. We had marched with five day's cooked provisions, and the men kept munching away on them until they were about gone in these three days. This excellent appetite of the men came very near working a serious change in our plans. In the words of General Bragg: "During the afternoon of the 5th, as the last of our troops were taking position, a casual and partly accidental meeting of general officers occured just in rear of our second line, near the bivouac of General Bragg. The commander-in-chief, General Beauregard, General Polk, General Bragg, and General Breckenridge are remembered as present. In a discussion of the causes of the delay and its incidents, it was mentioned that some of the troops, now in their third day only, were entirely out of food, though having marched with five days' rations. General Beauregard, confident

our movement had been discovered by the enemy, urged its abandonment, a return to our camps for supplies, and a general change of programme. In this opinion no other seemed fully to concur; and when it was suggested that 'the enemy's supplies were much nearer and could be had for the taking,' General Johnston quietly remarked, 'Gentlemen, we shall attack at daylight to-morrow.' The meeting then dispersed upon an invitation of the commanding general to meet at his tent that evening. At that meeting a further discussion elicited the same views and the same firm, decided determination. The next morning, about dawn of day (the 6th), as the troops were being put in motion, several generals again met at the camp-fire of the general-in-chief. The discussion was renewed, General Beauregard again expressing his dissent, when, rapid firing in front indicating that the attack had commenced, General Johnston closed the discussion by remarking, 'The battle has opened, gentlemen; it is too late to change our dispositions.' He prepared to move to the front, and his subordinates promptly joined their respective commands, inspired by his coolness, confidence and determination."

So it seems General Beauregard thought that, after all the fuss we had made and all the time we had taken about it, we could hardly hope to lie that day and all night almost in contact with the enemy, without his getting some inkling of it; but the general was not well, and so naturally took rather pessimistic veiws of things.

To us of the advanced line, expecting every moment the order to move forward, the day wore on slowly, but at last set in. We could hear the enemy's drums distinctly, and they seemed to beat all night. It was a great puzzle to us what all that din could be about; and as some of us did not more than half relish what seemed to be the enemy's care not to let a single picket or advanced guard come in contact with us, we began to ask ourselves what, after all, if the enemy knows all about us, and is just keeping up that music as a blind! Who will be surprised, then? But, no; I have since been told that it was only the innumerable bands serenading their favorite officers. It was a good thing we did not have to lie there another day, because next morning, as our skirmish-line moved forward, they were met by a detachment of the enemy coming out to investigate something that had attracted attention. The firing which followed was the first notice Sherman, whose camps lay next us, had of our proximity. He did not think much of it, even then; looked upon it as a piece of rebel impertinence, perhaps. It was not until our lines fully struck his encampments that he com-

prehended what was going on. He says in his report, "About eight o'clock A.M. I saw the glistening bayonets of heavy masses of infantry to our left front in the woods, . . . and became satisfied for the first time that the enemy designed a determined attack on our whole camp."

It must be said, however, to General Sherman's credit, that he acted with great promptness upon the very first alarm. He got his own division out of their camps and in line with the greatest rapidity, and sent requests to the other division commanders to cooperate with him, which they did with alacrity. I say "requests," because it will be remembered that the commander-in-chief was not on the field. His quarters were some two miles down the river. The firing, which was heard by him, was the first intimation he had of what had become of that artillery and infantry General Sherman had written him about two days before. Of course, he made all haste to get to the scene of action, but he did not arrive until long after the armies were hotly engaged.

The Federal arms deserve great credit for the rapidity with which they prepared to meet this terrible onslaught, and for the firm countenance, all things considered, which they maintained. General Sherman, by his promptness, had saved the enemy from an overwhelming disaster.

I have no purpose to describe the battle. There was not much to describe. It was little more than a fearful *mêlée* at best. From the nature of the Confederate formation, no corps commander could have any real control over his own troops. All that could be done, and about all that was attempted, was to encourage the men, look out for weak places, and patch them up by begging somebody to come to the relief. The firing was furious and almost incessant, largely at nothing,—ten shots to where there would have been one towards the close of the war. I doubt if there ever was a field upon which more gunpowder was burnt. There was, however, much honest hard fighting, very creditable for troops who up to that time had been under little, most of them no fire at all.

The greatest calamity which befell the Confederate arms was the death of the commander-in-chief, General Albert Sydney Johnston, about half-past two o'clock. He fell just at the moment when his great soul had won its emancipation from old army routine and the trammels of a too generous regard for the opinions and claims of others. If he had lived beyond Shiloh, he would have entered upon the career he was entitled to from his native greatness. It does certainly seem, from the fall of this man in the mo-

ment of his newly-found power, and from other extraordinary disasters at turning-points throughout the history of the war, that the presiding genius of the republic stood ever ready at critical moments to touch the balance of our national existence.

General Beauregard succeeded to the command. He had long been in infirm health, and was hardly in condition to exercise the weighty functions of his new position. He did little more than allow the battle to go on in the hands of his subordinates. The whole line had already fought its way well into—almost through—the great encampment. The right wing now met a stubborn resistance, while the left swept forward, pushing Sherman back, so that our line formed a decided angle near the centre.

I cannot resist the temptation to illustrate how little a new hand, with a very fair opinion of himself, knew of his profession, by describing one feature of the action in which I was the inspiring genius. I hesitate to try the reader's patience further; but if he has not been made already too indignant to go on, he will understand the absurdity of the thing.

As Hardee's chief of artillery, I had pretty large powers. The batteries had done good service, and had suffered serious losses in men and horses. Pieces, sections, and whole batteries had fallen to the rear. During a lull along in the afternoon, General Hardee directed me to look up those broken batteries, and also to make an effort to move back the artillery we had captured,—a lot of it there was. I found this last business easy enough. There were plenty of people ready to work at it, and the farther the guns were to be carried to the rear the better they liked it.

In returning to the front, after discharging this duty and having found a number of batteries or fragments of batteries ready for further action, I happened to strike our lines just at the angle already spoken of. The enemy, under General Prentiss, held a little eminence immediately to the right of this salient, and there was a small open field to the left of the angle, and thus on his right flank. I found a considerable gap in our lines at this point. I was looking about for something to be at, and it struck me at once that I could fill this gap with artillery, and at the same time get a beautiful flank fire on the position held by Prentiss. I set to work instantly, and, with the help of some staff-officers I borrowed from a general officer at hand, I soon had a magnificent battery—some twenty guns—massed in the woods on the farther edge of the old field. I had given careful instructions that not a piece should show itself until all was ready, and the signal to move forward and com-

mence firing was to come from the movement of the battery on the left. All was soon ready. I moved the left pieces forward, and almost at the same instant the whole front opened fire. It was beautiful; and I was just entering upon a royal barbaric joy, when, to my great vexation, the troops we were pouring this furious flank fire into showed unusual commotion. Those farthest to the rear broke and fled; those in front showed white flags on their bayonets. I had to cease firing, and I remember well my deep chagrin that I had not got at them sooner; not that I felt so bloodthirsty, but that I might have done some good. It was too bad. After all my trouble, I had not fired a half-dozen rounds before it was all over! Prentiss had surrendered. Not until long after, when I found myself under a sweeping flank fire, did it dawn upon me why those people did not like to stay there and be enfiladed by twenty pieces of artillery. I knew, if I had only had time, I could have made them feel it; but as it was, I thought I had got to work too late. It never occurred to me, therefore, that I had helped to render Prentiss uncomfortable, or to claim any credit for massing these guns,—a brilliant idea, which I have recently found another has claimed for himself as a stroke of genius!

After Prentiss was got out of the way, our right made a sweep forward, and we soon took up the last position which fell to our fortune that day. I advanced at a gallop with this artillery (some of it thought good to remain behind), and came into action on the road leading to the landing. Breckenridge was soon formed solidly here in two lines. As we were going into battery against the woods and the tips of some standards we could catch glimpses of down the road, he said, "Hold on; I'm going to charge." "Very well," I replied; "I'll just shake them up for you with a few rounds while you are getting ready."

We thundered away I should say at least twenty minutes, hoping our fire would find something or somebody. We were rich in ammunition; had been using the enemy's a good part of the day. It fitted exactly, and there happened to be fine pile of it just behind us at this point. It was rather better than ours, anyway.

At last Breckenridge said, "Cease firing now; I'm ready." We did so, and he moved forward fifty yards or so, and halted, I never knew why. We lay there a long time, fully an hour, a fatal or a lucky hour, I know not which,— and then, all at once, the lines began to melt away to the rear. Nobody, so far as I know, has ever been able to give any sufficient explanation of what that delay meant. There had been oceans of time, before General Beaure-

gard's order to retire arrived, in which to reach the landing or take the consequences of an honest effort. I have indeed heard one explanation which has a plausible air; it is that a distinguished corps commander, who, for the special emergencies of the battle had been vested with additional dignity of chief of staff, was trying to end the battle *en règle* by following up the enemy with the Texas cavalry; but whether it was that those caballeros did not know how to charge, or that charging with any sort of cavalry in the woods is never very effective, the effort was not a brilliant success. At any rate, whatever may have been the cause of this extraordinary delay, the commander-in-chief, who had not much believed in the action from the beginning, was not in position to see how things stood in front. He perhaps knew that the thing must stop somewhere, and, being of a humane disposition, said gracefully to his staff, as I have been told by one who heard him, "The victory is sufficiently complete. There is no need to expose the men to the fire from the gunboats. Order the firing to cease, and the troops to retire."

Well, they did retire; and what a mess they made of it! Everybody seemed to get word simultaneously, and they "stood not upon the order of their going." Some went back by one flank and some by the other, some through the woods and some by the roads, any way and any how. I kept the artillery with me together as well as I could, and after we had gone back what I thought a sufficient distance, came into park; but the infantry kept moving on and on, until I found I was about to be entirely uncovered. I had to limber up and move back beyond where some of the infantry had "lit."

In consequence of the unfortunate order of battle in the beginning, commands were necessarily badly mixed before this extraordinary retirement; after it the regiment was lucky which had all of its own companies together. Camps were selected according to fancy and with little regard to organizations, and "some faced east and some faced west and some faced towards the——" Well, if I exaggerate about this it is because I did not see all the field. Words could hardly make the thing worse than it was in the part I did see.

Darkness came on rapidly. I was separated from my chief and knew not in what direction to look for him. I confidently expected that orderlies would be sent out to give information as to where general headquarters had been established and to summon a conference of general officers in order to know what was to be done

on the morrow. I waited and waited. Nobody came into our quarter of the field. At last—I should say between ten and eleven o'clock—I mounted my horse, determined to find somebody in authority. I wandered up and down through the camps, inquiring everywhere, until at last I came upon my dear friend Pat Cleburne sitting on a stump drinking coffee out of a bucket. Said he did not know where anybody was; hardly knew where he was himself. Had a few of his own men, and a good many of—he didn't know whose. I asked him if he had any idea where I could find our corps commander. Said he had not; hadn't been summoned to any council; hadn't heard of any. Good reason; nobody had. There was no such thing as a conference or consultation that night. There was no plan for the morrow. Time enough. The victory had been sufficiently complete.

In the meantime we were enjoying a luxury in the way of quarters which we had not been accustomed to. Our camps—late the enemy's—were simply beautiful. I doubt if there ever was a better-equipped or more handsomely-ordered encampment. Long lines of white canvas, smooth parade-grounds, perfectly level. Our rebel eyes had never looked upon the like before. We were almost too tired to discover all the esoteric wonders of these magnificent camps; but not a few of our poor fellows managed to pick up an odd trinket as a keepsake or a bit of something strong to cheer the inner man. They fully intended to look further into the wonderful merits of these admirable camps in the morning. And then the rain came on, and we thought of the poor fellows who had no comfortable tents.

Our satisfaction was great, but, alas! the too fleeting joys of this uncertain life. The morning came, and with it the most disagreeable sound I think I ever heard, disagreeable at any time when one is where one can hear it to advantage, but infinitely disagreeable that morning. It was the whizzing of rifle-shot through our camps. General Buell had got a large part of his command across the river in the night, and Lew Wallace had been found. This latter officer was not a soldier by profession, though all his life he had been playing the *dilettante* at soldiership. He must be let off, so far as the object of this paper goes; but there is something supremely touching in the fate of a poor fellow, lost, with an army of nine or ten thousand men, a whole day within four miles of a great battle.

When the shot came plowing through us, front, flank, and rear that morning—for we faced in every conceivable direction—the

pleasing delusion that we had gained a great victory was rudely disturbed. The scattered and disjointed commands on the left were blown into some sort of line, much as the wind blows leaves against a fence. It is a wonder that ranks were formed at all. We were in worse case that morning than the enemy had been in twenty-four hours before. We not only did not expect any further fight, but we positively objected; and then we had no time to get together the few "things" we had taken a fancy to. It was really sad; but we did not stop to think about it very long. Our motions in getting back with neither graceful nor deliberate; but some sort of order was soon brought out of chaos. The fighting on the second day was admirable, all things considered.

General Beauregard and staff I found near the little meeting-house, and, just as I was about to inquire in what part of the field I might expect to find General Hardee, one of his staff-officers—Major Pickett, I think—rode up with some communication for the commanding general. A curious colloquy followed between this officer and the general as to Hardee's whereabouts. After a good deal of wrangling the general was made to understand. I joined Pickett, and we soon found General Hardee under heavy fire, doing all a man could do to meet the advance of the enemy, and he did it with effect. We lost almost no ground after the battle was fairly joined.

So the day wore on, generals commanding whatever troops they happened to fall in with. It was a hopeless case, of course. We knew the other side had received heavy reinforcements, but we held the field, notwithstanding.

About two o'clock General Beauregard gave orders to withdraw from the action. The enemy seemed to have no objections; made it very easy for us by retiring himself. I do not know whether it was out of consideration for us, or what made him so obliging. Certain it is that he disappeared from our front entirely, and we moved off the field without the slightest molestation.

I must not omit to describe the closing scene of this memorable and bloody battle. I had the honor of closing it myself with a splendid salute of artillery. I doubt if there ever was another battle ended with such a fine flourish by the disappointed army. The circumstances were these: We were afraid, if the enemy should find out that we were anxious to go, he might not like it, and come back upon us suddenly while we were trying to get across some rather ugly sloughs in our rear. The brilliant idea was therefore conceived that, if we should keep up a thundering noise, he would be satisfied that we were still fighting away, and rest content,

wherever he might happen to be. I was therefore ordered to remain behind with several light batteries, and keep up a clatter till the infantry could get away. This seemed to me an excellent arrangement at first, and we had a regular Fourth of July or it, retiring by echelon, prolongs fixed,—a movement dear to an artillerist's heart, but one he rarely has the leisure to execute to his satisfaction. I was so much taken up with this safe and beautiful performance that I did not take due heed of what was going on in my rear, so that when I came back upon the ravines and looked about for some supporting force to help me across the sloughs, there was none to be seen. Worse than that, I did not know which road to take, for there were several narrow crossings leading off into diverging roads. I put my horse at full speed down the most likely-looking one, and sent my orderly and bugler to the right and left to find the infantry. After a short ride of a few minutes, winding about in the dense forest, to my consternation I found myself crossing back over the same miserable slough, not far from where I started. The awful sensation of that moment, I hope, falls to few in this world. There was all that artillery, absolutely abandoned by the army; and I did not know in what moment the enemy might take a fancy to stroll back that way to see how we were getting on. There was no time to study topography then; so I rushed everything across as fast as I could, and took the principal road,—the one I had tried,—taking care to avoid turn-offs. After a considerable time—it seemed years to me—we overtook some infantry, which, as well as I could make out in my dazed condition, were rebels; but whether they were the people Hardee had carried off or not I did not know, and could not find out for some time, because they did not know themselves. I shall ever have a kindly feeling towards General Grant for leaving us to our own devices that day.

Thus the battle of Shiloh ended, as it had begun, with equal absurdity on either side, and we were left to pursue our melancholy way back to Corinth. Lack of experience will cover a multitude of faults, even where human life is at stake; but it can hardly be denied that there was great lack of theoretical knowledge as well, all through this action, on the part of the brave and intelligent officers charged with the conduct of these armies. Valuable lessons are to be learned from it all; and I can only hope that the distinguished men whose names I have made free use of, from this point of view, will pardon the little raillery in which I have been tempted to indulge.

F. A. Shoup.

OUR CONTEMPORARIES.

AN analysis of the contents of the principal military periodicals, systematically classified under a few general heads for the convenience of the reader and student, comprising extracts and comments, in which special attention is given to the most important and valuable articles.

ORGANIZATION, ADMINISTRATION AND MOBILIZATION.

1. The United States Army.—*Jour. R. V. S. I.*, April.
2. A National Reserve.—*Unit. Ser. Mag.*, March.
3. Recruiting and Discharge: How to get good soldiers.—*Same*, May.
4. The Volunteers on a Sounder Basis.—*Same.*
5. Organization of the Royal Engineers in an Infantry Division. —*Royal Engrs. Jour.*, April.
6. A Chat about the Bulgarian Army.—*Unit. Ser. Mag.*, May.
7. Six Guns or Four?—*Same.*
8. Changes in the World's Armies and Navies.—*Jour. R. V. S. I.*, April; *Mar. Rund.*, May.

The *first* of these articles is a paper read by Colonel Sir Howard Vincent, before the Royal United Service Institution. It is a very good account of our army, and has some interesting comments, a few of which are here quoted:

"*Military Spirit in the United States.*—To what can one attribute this desire to enter the United States Army, despite the extraordinary pecuniary superiority of civil life? The only explanation I can suggest is the immense growth of the military spirit in the States. It has long been there, ever since the War of Independence. The Civil War gave it immense impetus, and every other man had a military designation. Martial titles are now on the decline; but the Spanish War rekindled militarism, and it is now observable from the elementary school to the Senate. The children of all classes are taught military exercises and marching, to sing national songs, and to do honor to the national flag. 'Preparatory schools for young gentlemen' pride themselves on adding 'Minor Tactics and Military Drill' to the usual curriculum.

"Over 80 army officers are lent to private schools and colleges as

professors of military science and tactics. They graduated last year some 2,000 students, and in 77 institutions in 1903 there were in the military departments over 16,000 cadets trained in an organization similar to that of the Regular Army, a large proportion going through practice marches and target practice. It will be readily gathered how valuable is this course in providing officers for volunteer corps. On the 24th of August, 1903, the President announced that he would annually award a commission in the Regular Army to one honor graduate of the six educational establishments showing the best work upon inspection.

"Nor is this all. Every excuse is seized to hang out flags, to fire guns, to march in military formation, to don uniform, and to erect equestrian and martial statues. Even that dullest of all civil functions, a political meeting, is often enlivened by the introduction of a military element. Instead of the notabilities for the platform entering a side door and groping up dark stairways, they sometimes meet their partisans in a central place and march to the hall, headed by the Star-Spangled Banner, and perhaps afterwards the champion is re-escorted home. It all adds fuel to the enthusiasm; it all promotes national feeling, and very rarely leads to disorder or reprisal. People are too well educated for horse-play, and there is no drunkenness.

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"There is little military swagger about American Regulars. They rarely even wear moustaches or any hair on the face, and look like sailors. Nor are they less handy. The greatest precision in drill is insisted upon. The ceremonial of 'the evening parade' is a complicated 'trooping of the color,' dating from Louis XIV., George III., or Napoleon the Great. Crowds flock to see it. There was no greater attraction to the multitude at the St. Louis Exhibition, where on the encampment regiment succeeded regiment, than the morning parade at 10 A. M., and the evening parade at retreat; and the maneuver in which the crowd always took the greatest interest was the frequently practiced formation for street fighting against a mob. * * *

"*West Point.*—West Point furnishes rather over 50 per cent. of the officers. It is necessary to tarry for a time at this historical peninsula on the Hudson, belonging to the United States Government, not because of its having played a conspicuous part in the War of Independence, not by reason of the beauty of its situation, but because the Military Academy—which costs £126,000 a year—erected thereon is the centre point of American national pride, and gives the most complete and thorough military training of any similar institution."

The discussion of the paper also contains much interesting matter:

"Major-General Sir E. T. H. HUTTON, K. C. M. G., C. B.—I think all British soldiers owe Sir Howard Vincent much gratitude for a very instructive paper, and for so much useful information in connection with the army of that other great branch of the Anglo-Saxon race which we are so proud to claim as kinsmen. Having during the course of my service commanded in Canada, I have had especial opportunities of being conversant with the feelings and ideas of the United States Army, and I also think to a certain extent with the trend of the military developments of which Sir Howard Vincent has been speaking. I should like first of all, to refer to one or two points as regards the Regular Army. The United States Regular Army is one of unquestioned excellence in physique, discipline, and general military efficiency. It especially proved its value during the recent Cuban War; and I think if Sir Howard Vincent will allow me to say so, in a great measure its present popularity is due to the extremely gallant and excellent service which it rendered during that campaign in Cuba. It is a well-known fact to those who were present, that the success of the United States arms was almost entirely due to the steadiness and gallantry of the Regular troops which took part in that campaign, to which may be added the regiment of Roosevelt Rough Riders. The militia were not, on that occasion, a success. I do not think the popularity of the American soldier at the present moment is a question of his daily pay. There is unquestionably rising in the United States now a very strong feeling, which may almost be called militarism. It is nothing more than the instinctive martial feeling of the Anglo-Saxon showing itself. The real reason why the Regular Army is popular in the United States is that the Regular soldier is respected, and is now treated with the greatest possible consideration. He is very well fed, far better fed than we British officers have any idea of. His meals, above all, are served in a proper and satisfactory manner in large dining halls provided for the purpose. Secondly, he is well housed. He is not stationed in such quarters as those in out-lying districts in Ireland; he is not subjected to having to perform those menial offices which are so distasteful to the British soldier at the present day; and, perhaps what is the most important point of all, he is allowed to wear plain clothes in the evening."

The *second* article appears to be a well-considered essay on a national reserve for England. This paper also contains some remarks of more general application:

"Our South African experience, if we read it aright, teaches us

that it is very unsafe to presume on the supposed limitation to the number of troops which can operate on any particular line or in any particular theatre; that in war demands for armed forces arise which no strategical plans formulated in peace time can provide for; and that the extent of these demands increases with the size of the countries affected by the operations.

"The war in the Far East has already given emphasis to the lessons of South Africa. Theory placed a limit to the number of troops which a single and defective line of rail, 5,000 miles long, could support. Yet that limit has already been exceeded by probably more than 100 per cent., and still Russia continues to pour reinforcements into Manchuria without a thought of any difficulty of providing them with all the requirements of a modern fighting force. And whilst her railway is employed to the full extent of its capacity in carrying troops to the front, no trouble appears to have arisen by reason of the suspension of its proper function, the supply of the armies in the field. Both Japan and Russia are now employing far greater forces in the theatre of operations than either nation considered to be necessary when the war began, and yet, as far as can be judged at present, a definite issue to the campaign can only be reached by one or other side bringing large reinforcements into the field.

"But if we were so much at fault in our estimate of the force required to deal with the Boer Republics, how should we stand in the case of a war with a military power, or a combination of powers?

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"Finally, there remains to be considered the employment of a national reserve in war. If the nation is ever called upon to fight for its existence, the battle-ground, as we are often reminded, will in all probability be, not in Great Britain, but beyond the seas. It is sometimes maintained that a force raised on a compulsory system can be used only to defend its own territory and frontiers. There is, however, no law on this point but that of necessity, the *lex suprema* of the safety of the people. Each country must decide for itself what is necessary for its existence as a nation, and for the welfare of its people. Thus, Japan, recognizing that her national prosperity would be jeopardised by the presence of a military power in Korea or Manchuria, does not hesitate to despatch her national armies across the sea to those lands in order to drive back the invader. Again, Russia, impelled by the pressing need of navigable waters, sends her national troops from one end of Asia to the other in search of them. On the

other hand, Germany, aware that her imperial position is not dependent on the number of square miles of sand in Southwest Africa under the Kaiser's rule, does not dream of defending her colony with her compulsory raised troops."

The *third* paper is of value to all armies. The gist of the author's arguments appears to be contained in the following statement:

"In March of last year an attempt was made to raise the *morale* of the army, by demanding from every recruit satisfactory references as to previous character. This resulted in a temporary diminution in the number of enlistments; but as soon as the system got into working order, it proved satisfactory. The present need seems to be 'How to maintain, say, 300,000 men fit for foreign service, or service in the field, and how best to secure the highest possible efficiency in the men selected for the work?' What class of men should be recruited for our regular forces? For what term of service should they be enrolled? What pay and pension should be awarded them?

"During the last hundred years we have, roughly, increased our 'area of possessions' from 1½ millions of square miles to 12½ millions; our subject population has increased from 25 millions to 402 millions; whilst the revenue of the United Kingdom has expanded from £37,000,000 to £130,000,000 per annum. We cannot expect to cut roads from Capetown to Cairo, or 'protect' belts of country such as stretch from the gold coast to the Suez, without an increase in expenses, proportionate to our increment in income. Army efficiency, like all other national efficiency, must resolve itself into a question of *efficient expenditure.*

At the present time, 674 per thousand of the men who enlist are returned as 'laborers, servants, husbandmen,' etc. This should not be. Our specially selected Foreign Service Army should be an army of experts, consisting of engineers, mechanics, miners, draughtsmen, molders, pattern-makers, gunsmiths, coppersmiths, tinsmiths, engine-drivers, cyclists and motorists, carpenters and joiners, bricklayers, plumbers, bakers, butchers, brewers, drivers, grooms, saddlers and harness-makers, blacksmiths, coopers, and all other trades whose products figure upon the list of army stores and requisites. Not more than one-fourth, at most, of our army should consist of 'laborers;' and even these should be taught until they became classed as 'skilled.' Beyond the knowledge of his trade, every man should be trained in the arts of war, and should regard himself as a 'professional soldier,' holding the idea that the army is his life's destiny, with as

good prospects of pay, promotion, employment, and pension, as any could offer outside the ranks."

The only other article under this heading, which has sufficient general interest is the *seventh,* and from this we make a few extracts:

"It is difficult to imagine any occasion on which a battery commander would, even with six guns, attack a target with a frontage of more than 240 yards. The fire from six guns would no doubt be hotter, but the figures above show that a four-gun battery has the power to pour in a sufficiently effective fire against such a target. When used against a six-gun battery in action, with the usual intervals, the fire of a four-gun battery would be concentrated against a front of 100 yards. Theoretically, its fire would cover a front of 80 yards; so that practically it can be said that the whole of the opposing battery would be enveloped by a fire of 30 rounds a minute.

"It cannot be denied, of course, that when six guns are firing at the same rate as four guns, half as many shells again are projected by the former unit. But the fact that would seem to justify a four-gun battery is that though there is a theoretical advantage of three to two in favor of the six-gun battery, yet, when one comes to examine the question practically, the two rates of fire, being so rapid, tend to become equivalent in effect; that though one round in two minutes is a much more effective fire than one round in three minutes, yet a fire of thirty rounds a minute is as effective, for all practical purposes, as a fire of forty-five rounds a minute. Field Artillery is used against *personnel,* and as long as such an effect is produced that no living thing can stand up against its fire, the end in view has been gained; and beyond a certain limit, pouring in half as many more shells than are necessary becomes mere waste of ammunition.

"It is, perhaps, hardly needful to point out that with a possible rate of eighty rounds a minute, a four-gun battery would be as safe as Mount Everest against a cavalry attack.

"In the case of a target against which a six-gun battery would fire at a slower rate than its Rafale rate, the four-gun battery could fire at a slightly quicker rate; the expenditure of ammunition, and consequently the effect produced, would be exactly similar in each case.

"The contention, then, is that a four-gun battery can effectively cope with any target that a battery commander could ever have to deal with. * * *

"To sum up shortly the case for the four-gun battery.

"Its fire effect is likely to be adequate for all purposes.

"Its ammunition is made adequate by the allotment of three wagons per gun.

"There is no undue enlargement in the size of a battery, four guns and twelve wagons being substituted for six guns and nine wagons. The establishment of the battery in men would probably be about the same as that of the 15-pounder battery of the day; the only change being the substitution of a few drivers for a few gunners.

"There are also one or two minor and quite incidental advantages gained. There will be a subaltern in each battery set free for the superintendence of the signalling, patrolling, observing, and other duties. The four-gun battery also will be more mobile, easier to conceal, and will form a smaller target."

NOTE.—It seems to me that the artillery strength of an army, or other force in the field, depends upon the total number of guns, rather than upon the number of guns in a battery, and that Lieutenant Browning and other writers have proved that a six-gun battery, with three wagons per gun, would be a rather unwieldy unit. As regards the question of a four-gun battery being possibly overmatched by a six-gun battery, that difficulty is easily met, if the artillery strength is sufficient, by bringing up another battery, when there would be eight guns against six. Upon the other hand, supposing ninety-six guns to be in action, there would, in the case of six-gun batteries, be only sixteen battery commanders, whereas with four-gun batteries there would be twenty-four. Tactically, this obvious objection to the four-gun battery might be to some extent removed by increasing the Brigade Division to four batteries; but the result would be complications in time of peace in connection with the distribution of artillery for garrison duty. Financially, the four-gun batteries are open to objection owing to the larger proportion of majors and captains to guns and *personnel*. That a four-gun battery in action requires a captain as well as a major quite as much as a six-gun battery, is a fact that might not appeal successfully to some "Army Reformer" bent upon economy at any sacrifice of efficiency—and here we have, I think, an important factor of a rather difficult problem.—ED. U. S. M.

MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING.

1. The Best Method of Carrying out the Conjoint Practice of Embarkation and Disembarkation for War.—*Jour. R. V. S. I.*, April.

2. The Royal Military College, Sandhurst.—*Unit. Ser. Mag.*, May.

3. A Plea for Practical Musketry Training.—*Same.*
4. Training of Infantry for the Fire Combat.—*Same,* March.
5. The Foundations of a Volunteer Training.—*Same.*
6. The Training of Pioneers (Engineers).—*Kriegs. Zeit.,* 3.
7. Field Artillery Fire According to a Fixed Plan.—*Same.*
8. Camp Training of the Oudh Railway Volunteers.—*Royal Engrs. Jour.,* April.
9. Transforming the Military Academy.—*A. and N. Jour.,* May 13.
10. West Point and Its Real Friends.—*Same,* May 20.
11. The Value of Estimating Distances.—*Kriegs. Zeit.,* 4.
12. A New Kriegspiel Apparatus.—*Same.*

The *first* of these articles is the gold medal prize essay of the year, and constitutes a most interesting and valuable study of a most important subject to all nations which possess navies or coast lines.

The historical examples selected to illustrate the principles set forth are taken from the more remarkable operations of a combined naval and military character in the history of the last fifty years, and include:

The Landing of the Allied Armies in the Crimea in 1854.

The Disembarkation, Repulse, and Re-embarkation of British and French Forces at the Mouth of the Peiho River, China, 1859.

Combined British and French Expedition to North China in 1860.

Federal Expeditions to Roanoke Island in February, 1862.

Transport of the Russian Field Army from the Sea of Marmora and the Gulf of Burgas in 1878 and 1879.

Chilian Expedition from Antofagasta to Pisaqua in 1879.

French Landing at Sfax, Tunis, July, 1881.

British Expedition to Egypt in 1882.

War Between China and Japan in 1894-5.

Expedition of United States Troops from Tampa to Daiquiri, in Cuba, June, 1898.

War in South Africa, 1899 to 1902.

War Between Japan and Russia, 1904.

The *second* article is a criticism of the course of instruction of the British Military Academy for infantry and cavalry, and contains some lessons for all similar institutions:

"In 1900 the War Office came to the conclusion that the Royal Military College was over-staffed, and decided to abolish the post of Professor, and make the Senior Instructor in each branch per-

form the Professor's duties, in addition to his own. It should have been evident to any one acquainted in the slightest degree with the organization of the College that it was impossible for one officer to perform both duties satisfactorily. The appointment was by no means a sinecure, and in abolishing Professors the War Office deliberately did away with all supervision of the work done by the Instructors. As the classes were always at work at the same hours, 9 to 1, it was impossible for the Senior Instructor to perform this part of the Professor's duties without sacrificing his own class altogether. As it was, he frequently had to leave his class to look after itself, in order to attend to other work. Any one who has the slightest acquaintance with the gentlemen cadet knows how much work was done during his absence! In case of accident or sickness the Professor was available to take a class; but the cheese-paring policy of the War Office did not provide for such a contingency. It is to the credit of the College authorities that, so far from acquiescing, they protested strongly against the above arrangement. In fact, they were desirous of obtaining a few more Instructors, so as to reduce the size of the classes, and thus increase efficiency. * * *

"Under the old system the cadets were supposed to spend a year at the College; but, as the vacations lasted for three and a half months, they were actually in residence only eight and a half months. When the South African War broke out in 1899 there was a great demand for officers, and during the next two years a large number of cadets were passed out of the College in one term; that is to say, they received only about four months' tuition. It was, of course, impossible for them to learn much in such a short time, and it is very unfair to attribute their ignorance to the system of instruction and the incapacity of the Educational Staff of the College. * * *

"The late Captain W. E. Cairnes was of opinion that the cadets had too much work, and that they 'had no time to think.' The Education Committee also came to the conclusion that there was too much bookwork at the College, and as these views coincided with those of the Commandant, he was not slow to give effect to them. Consequently, there arose a tendency to sacrifice theoretical work indoors, in order to gain more time for outdoor work. It is, of course, essential that cadets should receive practical instruction in the field, in such subjects as Tactics, Engineering, and Topography; but it is no use teaching them 'to run before they can walk,' and until they have thoroughly mastered the groundwork of these subjects theoretically, they cannot reap the full benefits of outdoor work."

The *third* and *fourth* articles relate to small-arms target practice. We quote from the latter:

"The only way to train men in an effective manner for this most important part of their duty upon the modern battlefield is to supply them with a quantity of ball ammunition, at any rate approximating that which they should have to expend during an engagement of several hours' duration, and then to carry out a scheme of attack or defense through all its various stages, the enemy's infantry being represented by head and shoulder targets arranged in lines of varying density, according to the nature of the scheme, his guns and cavalry being represented as material and circumstances may permit; but there must be no large screens put up simply to catch bullets and so raise the percentage of hits.

"In this way only can men be trained to resist the extreme fatigue of keeping up an incessant and effective fire while advancing or retiring by rushes over long stretches of country. * * *

'The whole tendency of the range and miscellaneous practices, to which 140 rounds are allotted in the annual course, is to impress the soldier with the idea that his fire can only be effective when the mark can be clearly seen. The same idea seems to underlie the instructions for carrying out the field practices, as the above quoted par. 156, Musketry Regulations, states; that the greatest weight must be given to those practices in which a *separate* target is provided for each firer. All officers who have seen service know very well that in the earlier stages of an attack, when firing is taking place at long ranges (2,000 to 1,000 yards), a great deal of ammunition must be expended, first in getting the range of the enemy's positions by trial volleys and then in keeping down the enemy's fire by subjecting these positions to a constant rain of bullets. It would be quite hopeless to attempt to reserve your fire until your men had got close enough to 'draw a bead' on the head or shoulder of an enemy at each shot. Such a method would mean an advance over a zone 1,000 yards or more without any attempt to disturb the enemy's fire by raining bullets on all his visible positions. An attack so conducted would probably result in the complete stoppage of the assailants owing to paralyzing losses before they reached decisive ranges. * * *

"P. S.—Since writing the above article, I have seen the list of exercises by means of which Lord Kitchener proposes to test the efficiency of each infantry battalion in India.

"The first exercise on the list is a fifteen mile march, followed by an attack with ball ammunition on a prepared position—each man

to carry 100 rounds. It is thus evident that, in India at any rate, the necessity for giving our infantry some practice in carrying and using large quantities of ammunition is beginning to be recognized."

The *ninth* and *tenth* articles relate to our Military Academy at West Point, N. Y.:

The former appeared as an editorial, beginning as follows:

TRANSFORMING THE MILITARY ACADEMY.

"The announcement in our issue of April 8 that Paragraph 8 of the Regulations of the Military Academy has been altered so as to give the Superintendent three votes in determining any question coming before the Academic Board, has not failed to attract the attention which the importance of the subject deserves from those actively interested in the fortunes of the Academy. Protests gainst this radical change come to us from various quarters, and it is suggested that it has been adopted at Washington *pro forma,* on some *ex parte* statement, and without a due appreciation of the nature and tendency of this radical departure from the traditions of the Academy. We may be told that in adopting this new rule the War Department is simply following the precedent of the Naval Academy, where the Superintendent has two votes. But, aside from the question as to the value of the precedent, it has no application to conditions at the Military Academy, and we think it will be found that the judgment of those most familiar with matters at West Point is overwhelmingly against it."

The latter is a reply to a criticism of this editorial:

"The criticisms here referred to were not anonymous, as is stated in this article. They were published editorially and the editor of the Journal very willingly assumes full responsibility for them. They were not prompted nor suggested, directly or indirectly, by any one connected with the Academy except the Superintendent, whose action suggested them. It is reasonably to be inferred that he is in favor of the change made, but beyond that we have no knowledge as to whether any officer or professor at the Academy agrees with what we said or not. Certainly we have had no communication with any one of them on the subject, or any one representing them, before or since our article was written. It is obvious therefore that the information we gave is possessed by some one outside the Academy. Indeed, it is information open to any one familiar with the history of the Military Academy and who will take the trouble to revive his recollection, as we did, of the laws governing its organization.

"The principal fact in the controversy was not known, however, until it was announced in our columns. This is the proposition to give the Superintendent of the Academy three votes which was not submitted even to the General Staff. Our offense consists in bringing to open discussion a proposition which should have been subjected to discussion before it was adopted and which it is feared will not stand the test of criticism.

"The despatch we have quoted solemnly remarks that 'it would go hard with the officer who was discovered to be responsible for the latest expressions.' This must be meant as a serious warning to our able and genial Secretary of War. He is the guilty man, beyond doubt. It was he who published the order instituting the new voting schedule at West Point. All that we or anybody else did was simply to put two and two together by considering the order in relation to its logical bearing upon the Academy administration. We do not know, as we have already said, how the members of the Academic Board, or the other officers stationed at West Point, feel about the new order of things, though we and other friends of the institution should like to know."

MILITARY HISTORY, STRATEGY AND TACTICS.

1. The First Year of the (Russo-Japanese) War.—*Jour. R. V. S. I.*, April.

2. The Russo-Japanese War.—*Unit. Ser. Mag.*, March; *Mar. Rund.*, May.

3. Operations of the Artillery and Engineers at Port Arthur.—*Jour. Arty.*, March-April.

4. With the Allies in China, 1900-1901.—*Royal Engrs. Jour.*, May.

5. The Scientific Study of Military History.—*Same*, April.

6. Minor Expeditions of the British Army from 1803 to 1815.—*Unit. Serv. Mag.*, March, May.

7. Garrison Life in Malta Eighty Years Ago.—*Same*, May.

8. Tactical Employment of Field Artillery.—*Jour. Arty.*, March-April.

9. Fortress Warfare as Illustrated by Fighting Around Port Arthur.—*Royal Engrs. Jour.*, April.

10. The Strategic Effect of Fortresses.—*Same*, May.

11. Motor Batteries for Fortress Warfare.—*Same*.

The first *three* articles, relating to the present war in the Far East will be utilized in a separate article on that subject.

The *fourth* contains some interesting notes on the personal experiences of a captain of the Royal Engineers:

"The first point that impressed me, was the extreme readiness of the European soldier to let off his rifle; he seemed to prefer to shoot at nothing rather than not to shoot at all. The sentries furnished by the freshly landed European troops nearly always contrived to fire several rounds each night, even though they were posted well inside the Tiensin defences, sometimes even in the heart of the town.

"We were subjected to a most unpleasant form of this night-firing nuisance on New Year's eve, when each of the sentries of one of the contingents saluted the New Year with three shots. They should have of course been blank rounds, but apparently the majority were ball. The number of bullets that came over the West Village, in which some of our troops were quartered, was so great that our troops stood to arms. If the firing directed towards the other points of the compass was as heavy,—and why should we suppose that the said sentries pointed their rifles in our direction more than in any other,—there must next morning have been a considerable deficiency of ball ammunition among the troops of that contingent.

"One night, when I was encamped with a small detachment on the banks of the Peho, our camp was fired into by a European soldier on a passing junk. The junk was near enough for us to hear the man talking, but it was so dark that he could not have seen the camp and must merely have fired at a light outside my tent. I could give several other instances of the reckless way in which our allies wasted their ammunition. * * *

"I think we awaited the arrival of the German troops with more interest than we devoted to our other allies. The German army had always been held up to us as the ideal at which we should aim, and consequently we hoped to learn a good deal from closer acquaintance with it.

"Their contingent had no efficient means of locomotion, having landed in China with practically no transport. They had some large wagons, the wheel track of which was too broad for any Chinese country road. Also they had bought, at a high price, a large number of Australian horses, the majority of which did not survive long, as they had just got rid of their winter coats in preparation for the Australian summer and rapidly succumbed to neglect and the rigors of a Chinese winter. * * *

"The French staff work appeared to be very good. Their troops moved about from place to place without any fuss, and usually without their departure being anticipated by their allies. Along all the roads the French maintained sign posts, which not only gave the distance of the next station, but also information as to short cuts that could be taken in dry weather, and their suitability for wheeled traffic.

"We saw very little of the French engineers, but a good deal of their handiwork. If ever you meet a French engineer, take off your hat to him, for he is an artist. Their work, especially as exemplified in their bridges, was excellent. Their floating bridges were always in good repair, whereas bridges made by the other nations were soon allowed to degenerate into forlorn clusters of half-sunken junks.

"Many of the French engineers were artillery officers. The explanation of this anomaly is that artillery officers are all put through the same course as those of engineers; in the absence of an engineer officer, they are held responsible for the execution of engineer works, and therefore take command of any sappers who may be present at the station or post. One artillery officer informed me that he had been employed for several years in building barracks in Cochin China.

"I believe I am right in saying that the French Artillery, as such, favorably impressed our own artillery officers."

(To be continued.)

SERVICE SALAD.

Readers of the "United Service" are cordially invited to contribute to this department items of either fact or fancy, grave or gay, instructive or only entertaining; in short, any literary flotsam and jetsam likely to interest our subscribers.

A LETTER FROM MR. BRYAN.

LINCOLN, NEB., *April* 1, 1905.

EDITOR COLLIER'S, NEW YORK:

My dear Sir—Some one has called my attention to your issue of March 25, in which there is an editorial referring to my paper. You say that I have "frequently announced" my "unwillingness to print any advertisement of a corporation." This statement is not only false, but it is so purely a fabrication that I am surprised that even your paper would make it. I say *even* your paper, because this is not the first malicious misrepresentation of which your paper has been guilty. I called your attention some months ago to a baseless charge that your editor "rolled as a sweet morsel under his tongue," and I have noticed since then evidences of malice for which I have been unable to find an explanation. I do not know that I have ever done your paper a personal injury, and I have been pleased to quote from it whenever I have found anything in line with the work that "The Commoner" is trying to do. If you would take occasion to read "The Commoner's" advertisements, you would find that a very considerable number of its advertisements are advertisements of the products of corporations. For instance, I find upon my table an issue of the paper, and in looking over the list of advertisements I notice "The Empire Cream Separator Company," "The Berry Seed Company," "The Chicago House-Wrecking Company," "The Buckeye Incubator Company," "The People's Supply Company," "The Phœnix Nursery Company," "The United States Buggy and Cart Company," "The Ed. S. Cushman Company," and "The Coil Spring Fence Company."

I simply use these as an illustration. What I have said is that I do not publish any trust advertisements, and I have arbitrarily fixed the limit at fifty per cent. of the production; that is, if a corporation controls more than fifty per cent. of the consumption of the article (not patented or copyrighted), I regard it as a trust and do not accept advertising matter from it, the main reason being that I do not care to have to consider its influence on advertising when I write an article on the trust question. The refusal of trust advertisements means a considerable loss in advertising matter during the year, but "The Commoner" is self-supporting without such advertisements.

Referring to what you say about the Liquozone Company, I thank you for calling my attention to it, and I shall at once investigate it. As the question raised, however, has to be settled not by inquiring whether it is the advertisement of a corporation,

but by inquiring whether its representations are fraudulent, and the use of the medicine injurious, I do not see why you single "The Commoner" out from all the other papers that have run the advertisement. I take it for granted that all honestly conducted papers try to avoid the publication of advertisements that contain fraudulent representations or that present things which are hurtful. As a very large number of papers have published this advertisement, have you any other reason, except your personal dislike for the editor of "The Commoner," for mentioning no other publication that has used this advertisement?

Yours truly,

W. J. Bryan.

BOOK REVIEWS.

The Naval Annual, 1905. Edited by T. A. Brassey. Portsmouth: J. Griffin & Co., 2, The Hard. Pp. 525.

This most important annual makes its appearance in this its nineteenth year of publication at a time replete with interest for the world's navies. The history of the past year will probably prove more interesting to naval men than that of any year since the *Naval Annual* was first published.

The present volume contains much valuable information besides the usual accounts and descriptions of the war ships of the various nations, among which may be mentioned an excellent description of the German Navy; a masterly account of the Russo-Japanese Naval Campaign of 1904 by Admiral Sir C. Bridge; a classical article on Armor and Ordnance by Captain Tresidder, one of the highest authorities on the subject, and a suggestive article on Naval Tactics by Vice-Admiral Sir R. Custance, formerly Director of Naval Intelligence.

This publication has taken its place as the world's main authoritative book of reference on naval matters, in the course of its existence and has had a marked influence in shaping the naval policy of Great Britain. This is not surprising, for its contributors and editors have been among the highest authorities in the land, in their respective domains of naval science, and their views have generally been the accepted views of the ablest men in the service.

Considerable space is devoted to the navy of the United States in this volume, and we extract a few paragraphs which appear to be of special interest to us:

In the article on the Progress in Gunnery, we find:

"The United States have adopted a 12-inch of 45 calibres for the battleships of the Connecticut and New Hampshire classes, of about the same weight as the new French gun, but considerably more powerful, as its velocity of 3,000 foot-seconds will be obtained with a shot of 850 lbs. In medium guns they have nothing better than the 8-in. of 45 calibre which is a very inferior weapon to our present 9.2 in., especially at long range, and not even equal to our latest 7.5-in. The failure of several of their older guns, through high forward pressure and faulty material, has directed their attention to the merits of wire-wound guns, and two 6-in. guns on this system have been made, with which they expect a muzzle velocity of 3,540 foot-seconds."

In the section on United States Battleships we find the following noted:

"The two battleships of 13,000 tons displacement have not made much progress. The Idaho is building at

Cramp's, the Mississippi at Newport News. They carry the same armament as the Connecticut class, at a sacrifice of 1 knot in speed. They are very powerful ships.

"Last year we mentioned the passage of the Kearsarge across the Atlantic—from the Needles to Bar Harbor, at an average speed of 13.1 knots —as the most remarkable ever made by a battleship. Her performance has been eclipsed by the Kentucky, which made the passage from Madeira to New York at an average of 13.8 knots. It is probable, however, that she experienced finer weather than the Kearsarge. * * *

"There are now nine firms in the United States capable of undertaking the construction of battleships."

In the articles on armor are a number of references to United States manufacture, especially of the Bethlehem works, and among them the following may be of interest:

"In the United States capped projectiles are the rule for the acceptance trials of armor plates. * * *

"Lieut. Meigs, the Ordnance Engineer of the Bethlehem Company, states:

" 'Experiments have been continued from time to time with firings at inclined armor set at 45° to the line of fire, with a view of studying the effectiveness of capped armor-piercing projectiles against it, and of their tendency to bite or take hold at this angle. Out of some twenty large calibre capped projectiles, which were fired with striking velocities of 1,750 foot-seconds and over, all except three perforated the respective plates at which they were fired.' "

The most interesting article in this volume, at least to the general reader, is perhaps the account of the German Navy. It opens with a description of its present administration and an outline of its history, brief, but very entertaining, and continues with a detailed account of the modern navy, its composition, material, personnel, training and gunnery, recruiting, etc.

The most valuable article to the military student is the account of the Russo-Japanese Naval Campaign of 1904, describing the operations at sea up to the fall of Port Arthur, January 2, 1905. The comments on the campaign are very suggestive, and the lessons to be learned most important.

The technical article on armor contains some interesting notes on perforation formulae, on formulae for oblique impact, and on the function of the hard face of armor. The simple explanation of the action of the cap on the point of armor-piercing projectiles will be found very satisfactory.

The *Naval Annual* has become indispensable aboard ship and practically so for coast forts in time of war. The data it furnishes are reliable and accurate, and will be invaluable in action.

Every Fire Commander's Station of a coast fort, and, of course, every Artillery District Commander's or Battle Commander's, should be supplied with a copy of this work, in time of peace for study and reference, and in time of war for direct practical use. Experience in the maneuvers has shown that in the excitement of an action in fog or misty weather, etc., it is not always easy to distinguish quickly the different classes of ships, and yet it may be most important to assign the battleships to the heaviest guns and the mortars, the armored cruisers to the guns next in calibre, and so on. Consequently, the Coast artillery should continually study the different types, their armor protection, the arrangement of their batteries, their speed (for consideration in vessel tracking), etc. No bet-

ter work is available for this purpose than this publication, moreover, the articles on armor, guns, projectiles and powder, contained therein, will furnish excellent material for study and consideration by the more progressive and thoughtful of the officers. J. P. W.

History of the War in the Peninsula. Major-General Sir W. F. P. Napier, K. C. B. Kansas City, Mo.: Hudson-Kimberly Publishing Co. 1904. Three volumes.

This excellent study for military men is issued in three volumes, well printed, and substantially bound, and constitutes one of the best military histories in the English language.

As a history and a literary work it is accurate, instructive and readable.

Its accuracy was insured by the fact that the author himself was an eye-witness to the scenes described, and that Wellington himself assisted him not only by furnishing him with his own despatches and orders, but also by turning over to him Joseph Bonapart's correspondence, which had been captured at Vittoria. So far as material was available at the time the *History* was written, the author produced a conscientious account of the events political and military. Since then, however, Spanish documents have been unearthed, bearing more particularly on the *political* events, which modify Napier's statements considerably, but do not seriously affect the *military* events. Professor Oman, of Oxford University, England, who has been studying these documents, has begun a new history of this campaign, which it is well to consult in connection with Napier's *History*.

From a literary standpoint, however, this work stands unrivalled, and remains a classic of the English language.

The instructive element of the work is apparent throughout. Napier was a soldier of high repute, and himself took part in the war. He comes from a military family and is imbued with a strong military spirit. His comments on the various battles and operations are particularly keen and graphic, and display deep military insight.

The great attraction of the work, however, is the author's literary style, which makes the reading of the dryest details a delight and pleasure, and lights up what would otherwise be monotonous records of simple facts with flashes of natural eloquence and vivid imagination.

The descriptions of the battles are particularly happy, and the character sketches of the great men who figured in the war are still regarded as among the finest specimens of such work in the English language. His tribute to Sir John Moore has immortalized both hero and author.

The work is most valuable for the study of military history, because of the importance and variety of the military movements, and the great detail with which every battle and important event is described. In making the details attractive reading lies the author's great charm, as well as the intrinsic value of his work to the military student.

One of the valuable additions in this particular edition is the index, which is very complete and most useful.

The maps are numerous and adequate, and the volumes sufficiently small to be handy and convenient.

The entire work can be conscientiously recommended to the army, not only as a military history, but also as a model of good English, and a literary work of the highest class.

J. P. W.

COMMANDER BRADLEY ALLEN FISKE,

United States Navy.

Born at Lyons, N. Y., June 13, 1854. Appointed to U. S. Naval Academy, September 21, 1870. Was graduated, second in class, May 30, 1874.

Served in U. S. S. Saratoga, Constellation, Pensacola, Plymouth, Powhatan, Minnesota, Brooklyn, Atlanta, Yorktown, Petrel, Monadnock and Massachusetts.

In 1877, invented his detaching apparatus for lowering boats in a seaway, which is still in use in many ships.

In 1883, wrote "Electricity and Electrical Engineering," which is still (1905) selling, in its tenth edition.

In 1884, was a member of the First International Congress of Electricians.

In 1889, invented the naval telescope sight. It is rare that any invention has received such general condemnation as this received; it was declared not only impracticable, but incorrect in principle. Lieutenant Fiske succeeded, however, in convincing Commander Folger, the Chief of Bureau of Ordnance, that it was a great invention, and in having it put on board the U. S. S. Yorktown for trial. But when Lieutenant Fiske was ordered to the ship a year later he found that it had not been unpacked, and that all the officers, especially the captain, deemed it too foolish to waste time on. After the inventor's persistent requests, however, the captain finally permitted him to test it, but he became still more convinced of its worthlessness by the tests, reported against it officially, and refused to allow any more ammunition to be used to test it. The Chief of Bureau of Ordnance then gave orders that its test be continued nevertheless; and in Unalaska, Lieutenant Fiske in 1892 succeeded in making such an unparalleled record with it that its value was demonstrated beyond doubt. As no one else seemed disposed to report on it, however, he had to make the official report on it himself; and the Chief of Bureau of Ordnance accepted it, and began to consider seriously the adoption of the system in the Navy. In May, 1894, Lieutenant Fiske made a still more extraordinary record with his invention, and proved so conclusively that it abolished the principal error in naval gunnery, that the Department shortly after adopted it for the service. This invention is now in use in all the principal navies of the world; as the "Text Book of Ordnance and Gunnery," used at the U. S. Naval Academy, says: "The naval telescope sight is an improvement of such importance as to be ranked with the change from smooth bore to rifled cannon."

In 1892, Lieutenant Fiske invented the Stadimeter, a portable little optical instrument, by means of which the distance of a ship can be quickly measured, if the height of her mast be known. This instrument is supplied to all the ships of our Navy.

In 1894, Lieutenant Fiske was ordered by the Chief of Bureau of Ordnance to investigate the applicability of electricity to turning the turrets of battleships. After trying several plans, he reported that the Ward Leonard system was the most promising. After two years of testing various ways of applying this system, it was finally adapted perfectly to the work, the culminating invention for adapting it being made and patented by Lieutenant Fiske. In spite of the strenuous opposition of the Bureau of Construction, Lieutenant Fiske's recommendation that it be tested in competition with that Bureau's steam system on board a ship at sea was finally adopted, and the result of the test was

an overwhelming victory for the electric system. This system, with no important change of any kind, has been put into all the battle ships and armored cruisers constructed since that time, and marks a distinct advance in the application of science to naval needs.

In 1896, Lieutenant Fiske invented the electric warning whistle, by means of which the alarm is given in the various compartments below, when the water-tight doors are to be closed. This invention has been installed in practically all our war-ships constructed since that time.

In 1896, Lieutenant Fiske invented the naval electric semaphore. This was installed in the flagship New York of the North Atlantic fleet, and the inventor was immediately sent to Asia. The apparatus was shortly afterwards condemned, and put out of the ship. When Lieutenant Commander Fiske returned in 1900, he had another semaphore apparatus constructed, like the one in the New York, except that it was operated by mechanical means; he preferred the electrical means himself, but had to yield to the prejudice in the navy against electrical things. This apparatus has now been installed in several of the battle ships, and it has provided a means of day signaling far better than any used before, but its performance has been altogether eclipsed by the electric semaphore, like the one in the New York, which Commander Fiske put into the Kearsage in 1904, and by means of which the unparalleled record of forty-five displays per minute has been achieved.

In 1901, Lieut. Commander Fiske invented the "Naval Telescope and Mount," which renders it easy to use powerful telescopes on ship board.

In 1904, Commander Fiske invented the turret range-finder, an optical instrument, by means of which an observer can measure the distance of the enemy, while himself protected inside the turret.

Although devoting himself largely to the solving of naval problems by means of mechanism, Commander Fiske has been most fortunate in experiences of the military kind. In 1892 he was in Valparaiso, in the Yorktown, during the critical times following the Baltimore incident; and in 1894 he was in Rio, in Admiral Benham's flagship, when the fleet was cleared for action, and enforced neutral rights. At the Battle of Manila Bay he was navigator of the Petrel. With the permission of the captain, he arranged an observing station aloft, and there he stationed himself, above the smoke, with his stadimeter, and kept the captain continually informed of the distance of the enemy, and of all that was going on. His view of the battle was probably the clearest that any one got that day, and it was described by him in the November "Century" that followed. In the afternoon, after it was seen that the Spanish ships had ceased to fire, the Petrel was ordered by Dewey to go close in to the Cavite arsenal, and Lieutenant Fiske was sent ashore to the arsenal by the captain. He found the arsenal full of thousands of Spanish soldiers and sailors; and he spent a most interesting afternoon there, with half a dozen men of the Petrel, and finally towed off a lot of Spanish tugs and launches. He was reported to the department by the captain for "eminent and conspicuous conduct in battle" for his work that day.

Lieutenant Fiske was navigator of the Petrel at the capture of Manila City. He was also navigator of the monitor Monadnock during the first four months of the Filipino insurrection, when the Monadnock's light draught and heavy battery enabled her to support the flank of our army in its operations on the east side of Manila Bay. During this time, besides minor engagements, he took part in the bombardment of Parnaque and Malabon. As executive officer of the Yorktown, he took part in the bombardment of San Fernando.

Commander Fiske was member of the Naval Wireless Telegraph Board in 1904-05. He received the Elliott Cresson gold medal from the Franklin Institute in 1893; and the gold medal for the prize essay by the U. S. Naval Institute in 1905. He is the author of many papers on electrical and naval subjects, of which his series of articles in the United Service Magazine "Recollections of Manila," received the most attention.



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CONTENTS

Page.

I. The Regulation Combat Tactics of the Japanese and Russian Infantry. Translated from the German by HERBERT Z. KRUMM, Second Lieutenant First Cavalry 101

II. The First March of the Fifth Infantry in Montana. By HENRY ROMEYN, Major U. S. Army (retired) 113

III. The Battle of the Sea of Japan. By ARCHIBALD S. HURD 117

IV. The Retribution of Doña Clara. By R. MONCTON DENE 132

V. Hill-Side Farm. By JOS. B. ROWELL 146

VI. Our Contemporaries. By JOHN P. WISSER, Major U. S. A. 158

VII. Service Salad 195

VIII. DANIEL W. BENHAM, Brigadier-General U. S. Army 199

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UNITED STATES ARMY.

HARVARD COLLEGE
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AUGUST, 1905.

THE REGULATION COMBAT TACTICS OF THE JAPANESE AND RUSSIAN INFANTRY.

FROM THE "QUARTERLY OF THE GERMAN GREAT GENERAL STAFF" (1904).

By Captain Reichardt, Royal Saxon General Staff.

Translated for the Second Division, General Staff, U. S. A., by 2nd Lieut. Herbert Z. Krumm, 1st Cavalry.*

It is an historical and well known fact that every great war of the last century has brought along with it more or less important revolutions or changes in the domain of tactics. The campaigns of Napoleon's time brought a complete collapse of linear tactics, the campaign of 1866 simplified battle tactics, and finally, the Franco-Prussian war, 1870-1871, brought out, as the most important result bearing on the domain of tactics, a realization, which, in our case, to be sure, did not find its final recognition in regulations until 17 years later, namely, that henceforth the "Firing Group" must be the typical battle formation of the infantry.

Such a fundamental revolution, which, for example, happened in our tactics at the beginning of the past century, will hardly ever again take place. Likewise, even to-day our tactics are undergoing permanent changes—yes, it must be so, and dare not be avoided—out-of-date things are thrown overboard when they wish to remain permanently on top.

*This excellent translation of a valuable technical essay, was one of the last pieces of work performed by the translator for the General Staff of the Army. 2nd Lieutenant Herbert Z. Krumm, 1st U. S. Cavalry, died very suddenly at the General Hospital, Washington Barracks, D. C., April 20, 1905.

The uninterrupted instability of tactics even in our day is attributable to the steady, progressive improvement in our firearms, whose efficacy also involves the employment of other tactical formations than were formerly possible. It goes without saying, that the fundamental principles of tactics remain unchanged, only the "tactical organization," in which these principles find expression, is changed along with the weapon.

Since the last great wars of the past century a technique, developed with astonishing rapidity, has supplied all armies with a weapon, whose power and efficacy has grown in an extraordinary degree compared to its former growth. The Boer War offered the first opportunity to deduce tactical conclusions from the conflict of two combatants using modern weapons. Since the close of this war an entire literary work has been devoted to the question—whether and in what manner our present valuable regulation formations must undergo a change.

In fact it was possible—in spite of the singular circumstances under which this war took place, to deduce very important and interesting conclusions in tactical matters. The result permits it to be very readily perceived that the charge over a level battle field against the rapid fire of the small-calibred-smokeless magazine rifle and of the modern machine guns necessitates a technical formation entirely different from the irregular formation formerly applicable. For us, the observations made were all the more interesting because of the assertion that it was our identical regulation formations which, employed by the English in the battles of the first period of that campaign, led them to suffer permanent reverses. That this assertion was not justified, the Acting Colonel von Lindenau has already conclusively shown in his well known essay on the "Lessons of the Boer War."

The proclamation to the Army of June 5th, 1902, also brought therefrom only supplemental aspects, which were appended to our regulations; by no means modifications of already existing regulations. We are in a position of possessing, always, thoroughly modern regulations, because we proceeded from the wording of that part of the only correct principle which treats of battle, namely, that there is no fixed formation for the charge under all circumstances, that therefore every absolute scheme is to be avoided and the regulations for battle can and should give, as guides, only principles, which will retain their value under all circumstances; while in practice each individual case will require its particular treatment.

Again, there will occur in a short time, the conflict of two com-

batants possessing modern arms, who oppose each other, moreover, in considerably larger numbers, and—this time in a theater of military operations which is in almost every respect the converse of that of the Boer War. There, except for the river-valleys, the free open plain is almost entirely absent. The theater of operations of the coming battles bears much more the character of hill and mountain land almost throughout; indeed, here and there it is marked by mountain ranges. There also enters the peculiar conditions of climate and roads of the territory in question, which is not to be compared with our countries interwoven, as they are, with all kinds of highways.

While this must always be kept in view, this war can offer an abundance of instruction and experience in tactics which can be very profitably applied to our circumstances. Therefore, it is easily understood that military circles of all neutral states follow out the development of incidents and the progress of the battles in Eastern Asia with uninterrupted attentiveness.

In order to draw conclusions from this latter, it is by all means important to clearly understand, beforehand, the tactical formations into which the two combatants are organized—and with which they will presumably fight the first great battles.

There enters in, at this time, an incident peculiarly interesting to our Army, that it is asserted that the Japanese have adopted the German regulation formations almost bodily, and that their army is organized according to German principles.

Up to the present time we have been unable to gather any experience in this particular from the Japanese Army. To be sure, the battles in China gave the troops of the European contingents repeated opportunity to fight with portions of the Japanese Army against the Boxers. The peculiarity of these battles during the Chinese disorder made it impossible, however, to come to any definite conclusion as to the effectiveness of the Japanese troops and of their tactical organization—more especially. This much may well be taken as a fact, namely, that the Japanese soldier presents an excellent material, that he enjoys and loves his work, and that as far as outward appearance and individual training throughout, are concerned, he is without a superior. It is further certain that the Japanese have actually adopted German service regulations as a foundation for their own; indeed, that they have been adopted in part almost word for word, as for example, field service regulations and firing regulations. The outward appearance likewise resembles ours. Another question, however, is whether the young Japanese

army, and more especially the lower ranking officers of all grades, can aleady have reached such a degree of proficiency as to enter into the true spirit of our regulations. That must remain unanswered. The present war will not fail to clear up the matter. The schematic imitation of certain of our outward forms has not yet ceased, as the example of the English in the first part of the Boer War has well shown. We have many questions to be cleared up concerning the Japanese army so extraordinarily quickly developed, and whose efficiency and inner worth will now for the first time undergo a real test in a severe and decisive campaign. Of these questions, not the least interesting will be: "How far and in what manner the Japanese infantry, in battle, will put into practice our regulation formations." Meanwhile we may, perhaps, be able to gain valuable instruction for ourselves.

We are far more accurately informed concerning our great neighboring army—the Russian army—than we are concerning the Japanese army. And here the subject under discussion takes a shape particuarly interesting to us, in so far as the Russians with their battle tactics stand in direct contrast to us. The prescribed regulations according to which the Russian infantry is organized for battle, spring from most modern times. "The Infantry Drill Regulations" are dated 1900, the "Instructions for the Combat of Troops of all Arms"—a work by the well known Russian General Dragomirow—was written in 1901. At present the battle organization of the Russian army is also, in the main, based upon this scheme. He was shortly assigned to the troops until the autumn of the following year (1902), in order to try it during two field maneuvers. Apparently this time of probation was considered too short to give any definite conclusion as to the most important of all regulations, and it befell, on that account (by means of circulars of the General Staff, No. 93, 1903), that the scheme was to remain in force awaiting further orders upon the completion of the deliberations of a commission called to pass upon it. Likewise, he is even now framing the principles for the tactical handling of the Russian infantry in battle. It is not to be denied that the combat regulations as compared with the earlier of the modern regulations gives more adequate emphasis and sharper prominence to the effect of modern fire arms and to their decisive influence upon the battle formation of infantry. Nevertheless it still rests unmistakably upon the basis of "shock tactics." It clings to the ideas of the "Close Order" national Russian bayonet attack as the only force for delivering a blow in infantry combat.

With this, the regulations take in one of our own principal points of view.

One is well rewarded for taking the pains to enter somewhat more closely into the subject at the present time, in order to determine wherein these differences consist and in what manner they will be put into practice in battle. For, only in this way, will it be possible for us to acquire adequate tactical benefit from the results of the present war. A brief outline of the Russian infantry combat regulations, with reference to their bearing on the above named two regulations, contrasted with our regulations, as far as necessary, will perhaps best serve the purpose in hand. It may therefore be considered now.

General Principles: The Russian combat regulations put much sharper emphasis on ideas concerning the offensive. To strive for offensive tactics must be the guiding fundamental idea for all encounters with the enemy. Even the defensive is only considered when it concludes with a general counter attack. It cannot be denied that the constant emphasis of this idea of the offensive, and the education of the troops even in time of peace, in such a spirit, must be invaluable when it comes to being serious. The only question is—what tactical formation the offensive will take—whether the formation is suitable under all circumstances. Once, in a circular concerning an inspection of troops in Turkestan, in 1901, General Kuropatkin found opportunity to censure the troops on their disregard for the effect of the enemy's fire, and on their insufficient preparation for the attack while under fire. Major Baron von Tettau, of the Great General Staff, in his paper (whose description was received with unusual interest by the Russian army), on a two months' visit in Russia as a guest of the Russian army, says, practically, that the spirit of offense of the troops in the maneuvers has always manifested itself in a "Charging through to the front," as it were. This appearance can, without saying too much, be regarded as characteristic of the combat regulations of the Russian Infantry. But we shall see that it will be also brought about and more essential reasons, that it also cropped out in the defensive, even though in a manner somewhat different, and above all, that it is actually traceable from the prescribed Russian regulations and is in keeping with them.

The Russian regulations do not recognize the fundamental difference between "chance encounters" and the planned attack on a developed front prepared for resistance, as it is given in Part II, §§79 et seq. of the infantry regulations. "Chance encounter" is hardly

mentioned in Russian regulations. Consequently in Russia, when the regulations are put into practice by the solving of problems in greater and lesser troop maneuvers, it is confusing to try to determine who is on the defensive and who is on the offensive. All this, however, referred to a subject hereinbefore briefly touched upon—namely, the essential difference between our regulations and the Russian regulations—concerning the effect and meaning of rifle fire. In the Russian regulations the clearly enunciated principle, that "fire superiority" is a necessary preliminary to the "charge" is utterly lacking. (See German infantry regulations II, 82, par. 3 and 6, similar to French and Austrian regulations). Rifle fire is more than anything else, only the preparation for the organized bayonet-charge—the close of every fight. Not by rifle fire, but by the bayonet attack in mass (Russian Battle Tactics, Outline, §83) is the issue intended to be decided. That is also fundamentally different from out idea of deciding with the bayonet only the issue already prepared by rifle fire.

It is the spirit of the teachings of Szuvorow, which is here reflected in Russian regulations, and to which they consciously and consistently cling, the spirit of those ideas, which also in practice were so constantly employed and untiringly promoted above all, by General Dragomirow. It would be entirely wrong to believe, perchance, that the Russian army has not been engaged as exhaustively as we, with questions concerning the effectiveness of modern weapons and their influence on tactical formations. On the other hand, Russian military literature presents a list of very significant publications on this subject. And in spite of this contrast to our regulations. But the solution of the puzzle is made easy by the quotation of a few sentences from essays coming from the pens of Russian officers of higher rank and which are translated here. In one place there it says: "Military science is in closest union with the mental life of the people, on that account it must always be a national science. What is of advantage to the Germans can be the reverse and harmful for us." In another essay, in a similar spirit, the following appears: "On account of the distinctive character of our armies it is utterly impossible to transplant much of theirs to our soil, which has been engrafted so well, and grown so luxuriantly in the German army. The Szuvorow kind of drilling and training which is explained and developed with such eminent talent by General Dragomirow, is without doubt our national good—our own independent way. We must advance along this well-defined path!"

The view which this same writer takes of "chance encounter" is also interesting. He gets from it a doubtful, narrow-minded impression, he believes that this "chance encounter" is not the rule—but the exception.

The remarks quoted make it plain that the teachings from the effect of the close order bayonet charge, which they consider alone decisive, are looked upon as a sacred tradition, which may not be shaken; that it is to be considered and preserved as a national characteristic of the Russian army. This view cannot be denied a certain justification, especially when it is realized what other grounds may strengthen the authorities in the Russian army in such tenacious adherence to tradition.

It cannot be denied that, in general, the greater majority of Russian soldiers possess much less developed mental ability and stand on a far lower educational level than the West-European soldier. That is shown by a few figures on the education of recruits. Thus, for example, in the year 1898, the number of recruits who did not know the alphabet was:

In Germany	0.07 per cent.
In France	4.63 per cent.
In Russia	56.38 per cent.

An unquestioned fact is more to the point, namely, that fighting in extended order makes much higher demands on the mental ability of the individual soldier than the close order battle formation. (See German Inf. Reg. II, 16.) It requires not only an intelligent initiative on the part of the subordinate leaders, but also the greatest degree of self confidence, moral stability and judgment on the part of the individual soldier, in a word—the highest individualization of development.

However tenacious, preserving, brave and steadfast the Russian soldier may be, such great difficulties would nevertheless hinder development, if it were desired to give extended order fighting in Russia a similar extension to that given in Western European armies. In spite of the long term of active service (legally 5 years), it is not possible to drill the great majority of Russian infantrymen in sufficient numbers for extended order fighting of such kind that they could attain the "greatest battle efficiency of infantry." There they educate a special infantry in small numbers, the scout commandos, which, selected from the intelligent men of the troops, are expected to perform all tasks which make too great a demand on the mental

abilities of the great majority. On that account the instruction of the individual soldier in extended order fighting does not commence in the troops until a short time before the beginning of the summer term of service.

As a very natural result, all these matters of importance go further through Russian infantry maneuver regulations, to be sure, without being stated, showing a strong preference for the volley, the kind of fire habitual in close order; indeed, it is employed far too often on the firing line. This is a fact also often observed in practice by Major von Tettau.

Consequently we can now also explain the "Charging through to the front" by the decisive meaning which is given to the close order bayonet attack. For when one is once persuaded that he will never be able to overcome the enemy by rifle fire it is justifiable to endeavor to get as close as possible to the enemy, allowing only the shortest and fewest stops for firing, in order to reach his body in close order attack. That an attack over an open field, against a well organized enemy with modern weapons, can be delivered in such formation only with severest losses, if by chance it is not before then entirely shattered, is even a trifle more certain in the case of closely massed formations of the Russians than in other cases. But a prevailing level and entirely open bare tract of country is also comparatively seldom found in our theaters of war, and it has already been noted above that it is almost excluded for Russia, in the theater of war now coming into consideration. On that account, perhaps, there, the results arising from a close order bayonet attack against an enemy equal in strength, and not yet weakened by rifle fire, will not be as dazzling as might be the case elsewhere. It may also be remarked here that the Russians will perhaps have the advantage over the Japanese infantry in so far as they possess a superiority in artillery, presupposing, of course, that they make proper use of it, and that they may be able especially to assert this superiority in this particular country.

Extent and Organization: The company front on a peace strength should, according to the Russian regulations, be seventy (70) metres at most, war strength 140 metres, of the battalion 280 metres, of the regiment (of 4 battalions) 700 metres, of the brigade, one verst (1,067 metres), of the division, 2 versts, of the army corps, 3 versts. We see that for every tactical unit as a basis, a number is given beyond which it must not extend. On the other hand, our regulations have been content to give only two numbers, and these are

intended to give only an approximate estimate, namely, for the company and for the brigade (of 6 battalions). (See II, 25, par. 2 and 115, par. 2): the number for all intermediate or greater tactical units can be proportionately supplied. The organization—in the Russian regulations, likewise planned by stated numbers—is intended, as in ours, to be applicable to depth. The principles for this are likewise put in schematic form. The entire strength is divided into the "battle portion" of the general reserve. The relative strength of the two varies, and is dependent in each case on circumstances. They prescribe, then, a further subdivision of the "battle portion" into "sections." Each "section" again into battle portion and "special reserve." The duty of the "battle portion" is the preparation for the attack, by rifle fire and individual attack (Battle regulations, II, §13. It is plain to be seen how far their ideas of the individual on the offensive are carried. The duty of the general reserve is the execution of the final attack and the support of the "battle portion."

An offensive battle, according to Russian regulations, would take about the following course: Opening of the Battle. The development of the advance guard (which in Russia is always made particularly strong and independent), into battle order takes place out of range of the enemy's fire, but as near as possible to the enemy (from about two to four kilometers). Patrols of the scout commandos clear the way. The opening of the battle by the advance guard is expected to give the commander information as to the enemy's position. These ideas resemble somewhat the principles given in Part II of our drill regulations by Articles 22 and 63, par. 2. The further intent of our regulations, that it should be determined whether a decisive or only a delaying engagement is to be fought (11, 23) and to make dispositions accordingly, is entirely lacking in the Russian regulations.

The main body is now put in march under the protection of the advance guard and takes up a formation in close order under the orders of the commander. The direct change from the order of march to the order in battle follows only in exceptional cases. Then the commander, upon a basis of information and his own personal investigation, gives the order to attack, which must include the objective and the composition of the troops.

At the limit of the effective fire of the enemy (about 1,400 metres from the enemy), the leading companies send out sharpshooters. At this time the preparation of the bayonet attack is begun by rifle fire. It should be again remarked here, that the paragraph (372) of the

Russian battle regulations relating to this subject, indeed directs that "all possible endeavor should be made to attain superiority of fire, if not throughout the entire front, at least at the most important points of the enemy's positions." In this connection it is in no way stated that the attainment of superiority of fire is a condition preliminary to success (see German infantry drill regulations, II, 82, pars. 3 and 6). The sharpshooters now advance at first at quick time, later by rushes, halting from time to time at places from which effective fire can be delivered (battle regulations, §74), the company reserves in their movements conform to the firing line, at a distance not exceeding 210 metres, in the most suitable formation (line with extended or doubled files, company column—in line of platoons or half companies). Battalion and regimental reserves conform likewise; their distance from one another and from the company reserve should never exceed 210 metres. During the firing, the grouping of the troops chosen for the execution of the charge takes place opposite the decisive point. The reserves must be used sparingly; the commander-in-chief must, under all circumstances, keep back a reserve for the decisive moment. At the last halt for firing (213 to 284 metres—300 to 400 Russian paces from the enemy), the bayonet attack is prepared by rapid fire. The commander-in-chief gives the command to charge.

The bayonet attack is executed: By the firing line alone (see in this connection conclusions of Part II, 82, par. 7 our regulations), when the situation of the enemy promises success; as a rule, by the firing line in conjunction with the reserve. Borne on by them, the firing line goes forward, gradually closing in behind the platoon leaders and at from 100 to 50 paces, charges with cheers on the enemy. The special reserves follow, immediately, the line in front, the general reserve immediately behind the special reserve, so that the whole becomes an advancing wave (battle regulations, §83). The reserves are so formed that they charge in a close body.

The artillery supports the infantry from a short distance, by its fire, which is directed upon the enemy's reserve. In a similar manner we grasp the following picture of the "defensive action according to Russian regulations": Warning is given to prevent a premature taking up of the battle formation, and the infantry as well as the artillery are warned against over haste in opening fire. The latter pours its fire into the enemy "in order to make him unsteady and confused" (battle regulations, §92). Every possible opportunity offered by the advance of the enemy should be utilized for an attack by portions

of the force leaving the defensive position, without thereby being led into a pursuit of the repulsed enemy. Attacks by the more advanced lines, supported by special reserves under timely artillery and rifle fire, are intended to prepare the way for the general counter-attack. As soon as the enemy discloses the point at which his main attack is to be delivered, the special reserves approach the advanced lines, the general reserve is brought up to the place from which, with due reference to the terrain and battlefield, it can best advance to the attack. The counter-attack is delivered in exactly the same manner as the attack. The firing line and reserves, united, hurl themselves upon the enemy at charge bayonets, as soon as he arrives close to the position.

"In case of retreat, every position must be clung to tenaciously." Thus we see again how unusually far the idea of offensive is carried even in defense, in that there are prescribed attacks from the position by portions and at last the general counter attack by all portions of the defensive lines. Thus the advantage of the chosen defensive position is, at the decisive moment, surrendered to their desire for assuming the offensive. And this, again, brings with it the consequent clinging to the teachings of Szuvorow on the bayonet attack.

From this explanation it is evident that the Russian fighting methods differ considerably in important points, from ours. In the theater of war there will be opposed two combatants possessing tactical ideas considerably different. To form an opinion as to how far one or the other tactical organization in the present case will promise success, if such opinion is based merely on a study of the requirements of the regulations, a one-sided and incorrect picture would result, while no end of factors would not have been taken into account, which have a meaning at least as important as tactical organization. Nevertheless, in the end, it becomes a question of the spirit in which an army is trained. Only stern realities can throw light on the subject and clear up all doubts. Therefore, the tactical instruction which we wish to derive from the present battles can be obtained only by a thorough study of all attendant circumstances, for the critical examination of which this review merely wishes to make a small contribution.

REICHARDT,

Captain, Royal Saxon General Staff.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.

The Russian tactics, a tactics so different from other modern tactics, seems to be based upon the mental capabilities of the individual enlisted man, who is regarded by Russian officers, themselves, as not possessing sufficient mental ability to successfully execute operations in a formation of a more extended order than their present close order formation.

To know that Russia is at present using a tactics so entirely different from that of Japan should be of value in arriving at conclusions deduced from the results of their battles.

H. Z. KRUMM,

2nd Lieut., 1st Cavalry, Translator.

THE FIRST MARCH OF THE FIFTH INFANTRY IN MONTANA.

The campaigns against the Sioux and Cheyenne Indians in the valleys of the Upper Missouri and Yellowstone rivers after the disaster to the Seventh Cavalry in June, 1876, though continued till late in the autumn of that year, were nearly barren of results in the summer months, but by no means without stirring events, which at the time of their occurrence gave cause for rapid action, and furnished material for camp-fire stories for many days after their chief actors had dispersed.

When, after that fatal June day, the country had time to realize the state of affairs in the wilds of Montana, the cry for vengeance was heard all over the land, friends and former foes of the slain clamoring for it, and for the stain to be wiped from the flag thus trampled into the dust. Recruits were offered in numbers too great to be received; but enough were enlisted to fill the vacancies so sadly created; and steamer after steamer crowded with men and supplies, was pushed up the comparatively unknown stream; and early in August General Terry found himself at his camp at the mouth of the Rosebud, a small affluent of the Yellowstone, on its right bank, in command of a very well supplied force, composed largely of seasoned infantrymen, some of whom had been in Western Montana for some years, while others were just from the Panhandle of Texas and prairies of Indian Territory, where they had been for a year engaged in troubles with the wild tribes of that section.

On the eighth of August, under a temperature of over 100°, the march up the valley of the Rosebud began. A heavy wagon train, that obstacle to rapid movement, which ever rendered abortive a surprise of any Indian camp, was with the command, as was also an officer of the Engineer Corps of the Army, to whom was entrusted the preparation of the necessary roads, the trains themselves being under direct control of the wagon masters of each regiment. The first days' march was a little over eight miles, that of the second between ten and eleven miles. Old officers, fresh from the long distances of more southern campaign fields, began to growl, and one, the acknowledged

wit of his command, when he saw the whole column halted, while the engineer party carefully graded the banks of a "coulie," around the mouth of which, less than half a mile below, a wagon master passed his teams while the digging was in progress, gave as his private opinion that "Captain,——might be an excellent engineer, but he was a —— poor highwayman."

At the end of the third day we had marched thirty-seven miles. The extreme heat had given way to cold, freezing in its intensity. The officers and men on picket found frost on their beards and blankets. The movements were made with the utmost caution, and in such formation as to be thrown into fighting shape with the least possible delay. Friendly Indians, men and women, as hunters, scouts and guides, were with the column; passing at will through the lines of flankers. About noon of the fourth day, the flankers on the high grounds on the right of the column could see an immense cloud of dust, filling the valley three or four miles ahead, and before the character of its cause could be made out, a squaw, lashing her pony to its utmost speed, came in from the front shouting the battle-cry, "Heap Sioux! H-e-a-p Sioux!" and then, from behind a hill on the right, came an Arickaree warrior, on a nearly exhausted horse, repeating the cry with a whoop which rang in echoes from the opposite cliffs. Inside the line, he threw himself from his panting steed, and from among the wagons came his squaw, carrying the "parfleisch" bag containing his war paraphernalia and mounted bareback on his war pony. It was a transformation scene. By the time she had reached him and in less time than it has taken to describe it, he had stripped to breechcloth and moccasins, had daubed his cheeks with war paint, and assumed his gaudy war bonnet, while his helpmeet had changed his saddle to his fresh horse, and springing to his seat, he seized the rifle she handed him and was off to the front.

In the van four troops of the Second Cavalry deployed at a gallop as skirmishers; the wagon train was closed up and parked; the main body of the infantry moved up to the support of the cavalry, and the only piece of artillery with the column was moved out to an elevated spot and unlimbered for action.

A long irregular line of mounted Indians could now be made out not over a mile away, and behind them a large number of pack animals. "It's the whole Sioux Nation," was passed from one to another along the line, and it seemed that we had met the foe and were to have our opportunity to settle the issue of the war then and there; when suddenly, through the pack animals and the line of Indians,

three white men rode at a gallop, halting at our skirmishers only long enough for a hasty handshake; and in a moment our picture of anticipated battle faded away, and we knew that we had met General Crook's command from the Department of the Platte, which had been following the broad, well-defined trail of the Sioux from the upper valley of the Tongue river to the point where we had first discovered them, where it turned abruptly across the divide to the valleys of the Tongue and Powder rivers. They had at first thought General Terry's command was the foe of whom they were in search, though the trail which they had been following was several days old.

The command was moving with an immense pack-train, not a tent, or a wheel, except a light cart carrying an odometer for measuring distances marched. His Indians were two hundred Shoshones, enemies of the Sioux, employed as were those of General Terry's column, of whom they were old-time friends.

Of course the meeting of the columns changed the whole plan of campaign. Joining forces, the heavy wagon train was nearly dismantled, most of its mules and rations and all of General Terry's command, except the Fifth Infantry (six companies), taken to follow the trail wherever it might lead, while Colonel Miles was to make all possible haste back to the Yellowstone, convoying the wagon train, and taking possession of any or all steamers found on the river, patrol it as far down as the mouth of Powder river, and, if possible, prevent any crossing by the Indians. Only time enough for briefest greetings between comrades of the different columns was allowed. General Terry's command had already marched seventeen miles that day, but at 5 P. M., leaving two companies to bring forward the train, the remaining four took up the march for the river.

It was one to be long remembered. Outside the trail made by the wagons on the outward march, cactus of large growth and ferocious species made any night travel impossible, and, deeply worn by hoof and wheel, the improvised roadway was ankle deep with sand; and often I could not see through the dust the third man in my rear, though the moon was at the full. In the column were old soldiers, men who had seen The Halls of the Montezumas under Scott, and had followed Indian trails in New Mexico and Texas, and later in Kansas and Indian Territory; with men fresh from the East, who were having their first taste of what Indian campaigning, under the indefatigable Miles, meant. Not a man straggled or fell out in that locality, it probably meant death. A 4 A. M. when the trail passed near the stream and the ground was free from cactus, a halt was ordered for

breakfast. Stacking arms, the tired men dropped where they stood, and in a moment were locked in slumber; too exhausted even to eat when roused. An hour later the march was resumed. Mounted officers gave up their horses to wearied men and carried rifles for others, urged up and cheered the raw recruits, and at 2 P. M., footsore and exhausted, but intact in numbers, the gallant little command halted and dropped down to rest on the banks of the Yellowstone. Since 4 A. M. of the previous day (34 hours) it had marched fifty-four miles, fully equal to seventy over a good road. Big-hearted Marsh with the Far West was at the opposite bank and soon came across and ashore, carrying a big demijohn, and commencing at the right of the line gave every one, officers and enlisted alike, a drink of stimulant which, for that occasion at least, was well placed. Two hours later, having loaded most of the supplies found at the landing and the piece of artillery, we steamed off down the river, one company to be landed at Buffalo Rapids, another opposite the mouth of Powder river, forty miles further down the Yellowstone.

HENRY ROMEYN,

Major U. S. Army (retired).

*THE BATTLE OF THE SEA OF JAPAN.**

To the British people the achievement of the Japanese Fleet in the great battle in the Sea of Japan is of peculiar and intimate interest. An admiral who received his early professional training in England, and who served afloat in British men-of-war, has won the greatest naval victory in history—not excepting Trafalgar—with men-of-war constructed almost exclusively in British shipyards, and using as weapons of offence guns and torpedoes similar to those employed by the British fleets and squadrons. Admiral Togo's chief of staff, Captain Shimamura, like many of his colleagues, served in the British Fleet, and he had the good fortune to be one of Rear-Admiral Percy Scott's pupils in gunnery. Years ago, when Japan was adopting Western methods, she was the pupil in naval matters of Admiral Sir Archibald Douglas, now Commander-in-Chief at Portsmouth, who was director of the Imperial Naval College at Yeddo, and had round him a devoted band of British naval officers and men. In later years, in fact almost down to the opening of the war with China, Rear-Admiral John Ingles was lent by the Admiralty to the Japanese Government as naval adviser. While the Japanese authorities were shaping their systems of training and administration on British models, orders were despatched to British shipbuilding yards for men-of-war, and in every respect the young Navy was given the hall-mark "made in Great Britain." The triumph of the Mikado's Fleet—small, but homogeneous—surely reflects some lustre upon the British Fleet.

Admiral Togo handled his ships in the Sea of Japan with such complete success that what the best opinion thought would be a hard-fought battle resolved inself into a battue. In the long story of sea warfare there is no parallel to the series of events which culminated in this fight. With a fleet far inferior in battleships, but with a superiority in armored cruisers and torpedo craft, the Japanese swept practically out of existence, in a period of about

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forty hours, the forces under the control of the Russian Commander-in-Chief. In thirty-seven minutes Admiral Togo tells us, the issue was decided, and the remainder of the time was devoted to "rounding off" victory. If any importance could be attached to those elaborate "paper comparisons" which are used to indicate the standard of strength of the great naval Powers, the result of the action of May 27-28th should have been a draw, with the advantage slightly in favor of Admiral Togo. The history of the naval struggle since the dramatic opening of February 28th of last year has served to completely unmask the virtue of those mechanical comparisons between the strength of rival fleets which it is so easy to make and which events are so swift to expose. Russia began the war with a fleet thrice as strong as that of Japan, but it was widely distributed, while Japan's forces were concentrated. On the eve of the war the present writer, examining the basis on which Russian naval prestige rested, concluded that "under the circumstances in which the Russian Fleet has been created, there is consequently good cause to wonder whether it will prove in action as formidable as it appears on paper."* This skepticism has been more than completely justified, although eighteen months ago those who held that the Japenese Navy could sweep the Russian Fleet off the seas were very few in number, and most observers pointed to the "might of Russia" which was in reserve. Public opinion had been impressed by the measures taken by Russia to increase the number of her ships in the Pacific, and had failed to divine the essential truth that with the advance in the application of science to naval warfare the personal element, instead of being eliminated, has gained added importance. Neither battleship, cruiser, nor torpedo vessel is an automatic machine for dealing out death or destruction. Naval power does not consist in the mere investment of treasure in mobile sea fortresses, and victory at sea does not necessarily lie with the country which has the longest purse, the greatest number of able-bodied males in the population, or even the highest financial credit. Sea power is a delicate combination of forces which cannot be purchased with money alone; it consists in the provision of the best-tried weapons, and the patient training in their efficient use of officers and men who have the three essential characteristics—the fighting edge, an aptitude for technique, and the sea habit.

Japan entered upon this war with one of the smallest fleets in the world. At no time has Admiral Togo had at his command

*Cassier's Magazine, February, 1904.

half as many battleships as answer to the slightest word of Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson in the English Channel, nor as many as are under Vice-Admiral Sir W. H. May with his Atlantic Fleet based upon Gibraltar, or Lord Charles Beresford with his two squadrons of battleships in the Mediterranean. Japan began the struggle with a fleet about one-fourth the size of the navy of Italy, and ridiculously small in comparison with the navies of France, Russia and Germany. With six battleships and eight armored cruisers the officers and men of the Japanest Fleet, supported by torpedo craft and scouts, have swept from off the Far Eastern seas every single vessel flying the Russian ensign. It was Nelson's dictum that "numbers only can annihilate." These words were written in the old sailing days, when ships fought side by side, and the crews engaged in hand-to-hand contests; and if there is one moral more than another to be drawn from the great victories won by the Japanese, it is that this saying of the great British sea captain is no longer applicable to modern conditions. If numbers could have annihilated, Japan at this moment should be under the heel of the Tsar.

The battle of the Sea of Japan, as Admiral Togo has officially styled it, occurred after a period of many months of anticipation and speculation. From August 14th, when Admiral Rojdestvensky hoisted his flag in the Kniaz Suvaroff, down to the opening of the fight in the Tsushima Straits, the progress of his squadron from the Far West to the Far East fascinated the world. It straggled out in detachments, and when, early in May, the last instalment of the outgoing fleet, under Admiral Niebogatoff, effected its junction with the main body under Admiral Rojdestvensky off the coast of Indo-China, naval opinion, irrespective of its sympathies with the one or the other belligerent, acclaimed in terms of high praise the achievement of the Russian Admiral in taking his great heterogeneous and unruly armada within strategical touch of the Japanese forces. Never had an admiral been entrusted with a task of the kind fraught with so many difficulties, and whatever epitaph history may write on the Russian admiral as a war commander, nothing can rob him of the credit due to his unparalleled success as a leader of men and a resourceful and dogged sailor. Attended by nearly fifty steamships, including an immense number of transports and other auxiliaries, and a curious assortment of obsolescent and obsolete men-of-war, Admiral Rojdestvensky steamed past Formosa to a point not far distant from Shanghai,

where he detached a portion of his auxiliaries, and in high hope of victory because he had the "numbers" with which to "annihilate," turned to make a dash for Vladivostock through the Straits of Tsushima. He may or may not have known that Admiral Togo had lost one of his best battleships a year previously, and that the number of units of this class at his command was only four in addition to eight armored cruisers. It is certain that the Russian admiral over-estimated the fighting value of the material which constituted his fleet, and failed to understand the subtle combination of the human element and the gun and torpedo which constitutes naval power. There seems no doubt that Admiral Rojdestvensky and his officers entered on the final contest with high hopes. He made the fatal mistake of valuing too highly his own strength in ships, of under-estimating the strength of his foe, and he appears to have attributed to Admiral Togo the false strategy of dividing his force so as to guard the other straits through the Japanese archipelago leading to Vladivostock. As the Japanese had the interior line it was unnecessary for Admiral Togo to change the disposition he had already made until by the actual movements of the enemy he was assured that Admiral Rojdestvensky had decided not to take the short cut to Vladivostock by way of the Tsushima Straits.

The story of the battle is incomplete in some details, but the main outline has been revealed in Admiral Togo's despatches, supplemented as these have been by the unique series of graphic reports cabled immediately after the battle to the Daily Telegraph by its correspondents in Japan; by Admiral Enquist's story of the fight, and by an excellent message received by the Times from its Tokio correspondent on June 10th. Early on the morning of Saturday, May 27th, the Russian Fleet approached the Straits of Tsushima, lying between Korea and the island of Kiusiu. Admiral Rojdestvensky was still under the impression that Admiral Togo had so divided his forces that only a small squadron would be on guard at this point. He seems to have sent out no scouts to "feel" for the enemy, but steamed ahead in two columns, his cruisers on the right and his battleships on the left, with his auxiliaries between and tailing off in the rear. He had got his head well into the danger zone before he realized his mistake. A small force of Japanese cruisers appeared ahead of him, and opened the fight with a desultory fire, and aparently the Russian admiral believed that this small decoy force comprised the only Japanese

men-of-war in the vicinity. Undismayed, he pressed forward, the Japanese cruisers flying before him. Meantime Admiral Togo with his main fleets, lay hidden from view among the islands, which bestrew the Korean littoral. His whereabouts were not known even to most of the officers in the subsidiary squadrons, much less to the people of Japan. In Japan, at least, it is recognized that a surprise is the essential factor in success, and that, therefore, success depends on secrecy. Admiral Togo had issued his orders to his subordinate admirals, and kept in wireless communication with them, but his exact place of hiding was known, outside the main fleets, to only a small circle of officers. When the Russians had entered the battle zone which he had prepared for them with such patience and self-constraint in the weary months of waiting, the scheme was dramatically developed. The whole fleet of Japan, as though by the ringing up of a curtain, revealed itself in fighting trim, and the greatest sea battle ever fought had commenced. When the Russians were well in the Channel between Tsushima Island and Japan, with the "decoy" squadron ahead, Admiral Togo, with four battleships and two armored cruisers, appeared round the northern end of the island followed by Admiral Kamimura with the other six armored cruisers. After a feint, the whole twelve armored ships steered diagonally across the face of the enemy so as to bring their broadside to bear in a concentrated fire on the leading Russian ships. When by this maneuver the preliminary demoralization had been produced—the Russian battleship Oslabia taking fire—Admiral Kamimura raced to the rear of the enemy, while three light cruiser divisions worried his flanks, and in a special degree attacked the transports. Thus were the Russians hemmed in owing to Admiral Togo's bold tactics—"Demoralization and then destruction," might have been the Japanese motto. They were determined to have a fight to a finish, and they acted on Nelson's dictum, "out-maneuver a Russian."

In this wise did the battle open. Could Admiral Togo win? Those who care to read again the anticipations of qualified writers may see that even to the last it was held that though the odds were in favor of Admiral Togo the outcome of a set battle was uncertain to this extent, that the fighting might prove so desperate, the losses on both sides be so great that the victor, to whichever side the laurels fell, would be so shattered and even decimated that he might emerge from the conflict with a fleet only in a complimentary

sense ruling the Far Eastern seas. Assessed by every tangible fighting asset the comparative strength of the two fleets approached something of an equality. In guns and torpedo equipment they contrasted thus:

	—Number of guns.—			
Calibre of guns.	Russian.		Japanese.	
12 inch	26		23	
10 inch	7		3	
9 inch	12	32	4	41
8 inch	13		34	
6 inch	147		196	
Number of torpedo tubes (about)	124		200	

Judged on this basis, there was no reason why the two fleets should not emerge in something of the condition of the Kilkenny cats after their famous encounter. How completely were all prognostications falsified in a matter of thirty-seven fateful minutes. While still about eight miles distant, the Russian ships opened a quite ineffective fire. The Japanese waited in patience. At a range of three and three-quarter miles, so as to give full play to the main armaments of his battleships and armored cruisers. Admiral Togo began a terrific cannonade and rained shells with diabolic accuracy upon the leading ships of the Russian Fleet. Suddenly brought face to face with the enemy in full power, Admiral Rojdestvensky hesitated, his fleet became confused, Admiral Kamimura raced to cut off his retreat, and the issue was decided. "The enemy," says Admiral Togo, "opened fire at 2.8," and later on in his despatch he records that "the result of the battle was decided at 2.45"—thirty-seven minutes. What followed was merely a battue.

The fight began at Okinoshima and continued over a width of seventy miles for a distance of two hundred and thirty miles before the destruction was complete. The Russian gunners forming the crews of the 6-inch guns could do nothing at so great a distance, under the rain of shells which fell upon them, and the efficiency of the men who manned the 10-, 12-, and 8-inch weapons of the Russian ships was also unequal to engaging in battle with rough seas causing their vessels to pitch and roll. The gunner's difficulty in a long-range sea fight is not direction, but elevation, and only those who have watched maneuvering fleets firing in a heavy seaway can fully appreciate the immense difficulties which naval seamen must combat in their attempts to fire accurately as well as

straight. Not until the Japanese were satisfied that the long-range fire had reduced the Russian Fleet to a disordered mass did their men-of-war draw in to a shorter range. The gateway by which the foe had entered the stage prepared by Admiral Togo had been sealed owing to the superior speed of Admiral Kamimura's armored cruisers. "At twilight," Admiral Togo states, "our destroyer and torpedo flotillas gradually closed in upon the enemy from east, north, and south, and let loose their horde of torpedoes." Little of the Russian Fleet survived this terrible night's work.

Thanks to the better steaming ability of his ships, the Japanese admiral was able to send forward a strong squadron to get across the face of the Russian Fleet. The Daily Telegraph's correspondent states: "Now the superior speed of the Japanese Fleet proved a tremendous factor. With every ship doing her best, Admiral Togo went full speed ahead. It was a short, but exciting race. When the Japanese had obtained a sufficient lead they turned, and formed a barrier right in front of Admiral Rojdestvensky, whose position from this moment onwards was hopeless. This new Japanese formation was like a crescent, or nearly a half circle, and pressing down from the north it formed an impassible barrier on the road to Vladivostock." Admiral Enquist again records: "The enemy's tactics were directed to preventing us from getting through to Vladivostock. Every time our squadron attempted to steer northwards the Japanese, thanks to their superior speed, headed off our columns, their battleships concentrating their fire on our leading battleship." Again, describing the manner in which the Japanese encircled them, the Russian admiral says: "Owing to the low speed of our ships it was difficult to escape from this position."

Of the great armada which Russia had fitted out with so much boasting and parade there remained by Monday morning only four cruisers and two destroyers which escaped, apart from the two battleships and the two coast defence ships which were forthwith taken to Japanese ports as prizes. It is calculated that in the battle about 14,000 Russians were drowned, and Admiral Togo claims to have secured over 3,000 prisoners. Admiral Togo's tactics were marvellously successful. In achieving his great task of wiping the Russian Fleet off Far Eastern seas he lost only three torpedo boats, while the casualties in the whole of his fleet were merely 113 officers and men killed, and 424 officers and men wounded.

Apart from the important lesson which the destruction of the Russian Fleet supplies—that paper estimates of material strength are no true guide to fighting power—can any other deductions be drawn from this complete annihilation of Admiral Rojdestvensky's force? Without embarking on matters of detail, even at this early date it is possible to draw profitable conclusions on broad lines from the battle.

(1) THE "LLAMAS" IN BATTLE.

What did it profit Admiral Rojdestvensky that he had at his command a large number of obsolescent and obsolete men-of-war? In face of the bold elimination from the British war fleet of vessels of small or minus fighting value, a great deal has been heard of the probability that in time of war officers would take to sea "anything on which they could fly the ensign." This sounds heroic, but is really imbecility. Every ship in the fleet which is not of real fighting value is an embarrassment to an admiral and not an acquisition of strength. Coal strategy in these days governs the movements of men-of-war, and as a rule it is true that the elder the ship the more coal she consumes, and consequently the supply of fuel available for veritable men-of-war is depleted. Admiral Rojdestvensky had under his command a wonderful assortment of ships similar in characteristics to those which in the British Navy have been relegated to the "llama" list or the "obsolete" list. He appreciated so little the truth which underlies the policy of the British Admiralty that he waited in order that Admiral Niebogatoff might join him off the Cochin China coast. This officer had with him the second-class battleship Nicholas I., an old armored cruiser, the Vladimir Monomach, and the three coast defence ships Admiral Seniavin, Admiral Oushakoff, and Admiral Apraxine. These last four vessels were so old, so unsuited to the battle line in all respects, that in the great struggle they could neither fight effectively nor run away; two of them were sunk and the other two, with the Nicholas I., surrendered. When we get the full story of the battle it will probably be found that these vessels, owing to their poverty in fighting power and in mobility, not only added nothing to the strength of the Russian Fleet, but contributed materially to the disorder and demoralization. He will be indeed a courageous critic of Admiralty policy who will now join Sir William White in defence of the obsolete and inefficient, or express agreement with the anonymous writer

in Blackwood in the claim "that the work (of the Fleet) will be so multifarious that place will always be found for every ship which carries a gun." In judging the efficiency of this mythical and typical ship we should want to know something of the "gun" and its power, of the engines and boilers, and the quality of the armor, if it has any. The British men-of-war which have been struck off the "war list" have been weighed in this way, one by one, and condemned, and the lesson which Admiral Rojdestvensky's debacle conveys is that in this policy the Admiralty have been right. We cannot afford to send British officers and men, highly trained at great expense, and therefore valuable national assets, to sea in a ship the only justification for which is that it "carries a gun." Such action would be inhuman, apart from its imbecility.

(2) THE VALUE OF SPEED.

What advantage did Japan gain from the possession of superior speed? Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge and Rear-Admiral Sir R. N. Custance have no belief in speed. In the Naval Annual for the present year, the former Commander-in-Chief of the British China Squadron condemns the big armored cruiser, holding that "a true conception of cruiser tactics indicates that multiplicity rather than a small number of powerful individual ships would be needed." Again, "that no great value as a factor in tactics could be assigned to speed superiority had long been suspected by officers who had made a close study of tactical questions." And Sir Cyprian even minimises the strategical importance of high speed; he holds that "speed is of small tactical or strategical value." No one can read the story of the battle of the Sea of Japan and fail to recognize how completely Sir Cyprian Bridge's conclusions have been belied by events. When the Japanese set themselves to create a navy they attached the greatest importance to speed, far greater than was attached to it by any of the great Powers. This conclusion led them to the creation of a navy which in its main fighting units was swifter than that of any other nation. They built six battleships ranging in speed from eighteen to nineteen knots, and a similar number of armored cruisers able to steam at from twenty to twenty-three knots. No other navy contained at that time anything approaching this proportion of armored cruisers to battleships, for, in agreement with Sir Cyprian Bridge, the naval authorities of the world believed in "multiplicity" of weak ships. At a

time when the British Admiralty was still building slow ships without armored belts, Japan led the way in the construction of big cruisers with thick belts, a heavy armament of guns, and great speed—in fact, vessels such as are now being added to the British Fleet by the present Board, which, we are told, is a "retrograde Admiralty." So far as the result of gun fire was concerned in the late action the victory lay with the Japanese because they possessed these swift ships of great offensive power, and Admiral Togo was able to pursue the successful tactics already revealed in broad outline because he had under his command a fleet immensely superior to that of Russia in speed. Owing to their superior speed the Japanese, to use a colloquialism, were able to make rings round the Russians, and almost completely to cut off the avenues of escape. If the Russians had had the advantage of speed, the action would have been indecisive, and they might have got through with a considerable portion of the armada.

(3) THE ROLE OF THE TORPEDO.

What part in the battle did the torpedo take? The most casual observer of the trend of naval policy in Great Britain must have observed that increased importance has been given to the torpedo as an offensive and defensive arm. According to Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge, again writing on the naval actions of the war, "perhaps nothing stands out more clearly in the campaign than the insignificance of the results effected by the locomotive torpedo. . . . The conclusion should be that it is a weapon of limited efficiency to be depended upon only in special circumstances of infrequent occurrence." The facts prior to the last battle do not support Admiral Bridge's conclusion as to the inefficiency of the torpedo. It was owing to the effective use of this weapon and not to the gun that the Japanese first crippled the Russians off Port Arthur in February, 1904. Admiral Togo was acting under exceptional limitations in that he was not permitted to risk any of his big ships. He relied in the initial attacks upon the Russian Fleet almost entirely upon torpedo craft supported by cruisers. His first operations were so completely successful that from the date of his first attack by torpedoes the Russian Fleet was demoralized, and so seriously crippled that it was practically useless. Far from the torpedo having proved inefficient, three of the main ships of the Russian squadron were seriously damaged even while anchored under the shore guns at Port

Arthur, and would probably have been completely destroyed but for the protection afforded by the land defences and the close proximity of the harbor of Port Arthur, into which they were able to limp for repairs. So long as the Port Arthur squadron was a fleet in being, it was the torpedo, adequately supported by the gun, which rendered it ineffective. That the Russian ships injured by torpedo attack were patched up, thanks to the resourcefulness of a Scotsman, and were able subsequently to put to sea was merely due to the good fortune which enabled them to creep into the neighboring port. The Russian squadron in Port Arthur, however, never recovered in morale the effects of the torpedo attacks. The Battle of the Sea of Japan supplies even more conclusive evidence as to the falseness of the conclusion that the torpedo is ineffective. The battle was opened by long-range firing by the Japanese which seems to have completely unnerved the Russian sailors. Then as darkness fell the torpedo craft, again supported by the gun-ships, well in the rear, swarmed round the disordered fleet, and practically completed its destruction. How many ships were actually sunk by the action of the torpedo we do not know, but the inference to be drawn from Admiral Togo's despatches and other information is that this weapon was responsible for the sinking of several of the battleships and cruisers. One moral to be drawn from the battle is that the policy of the Admiralty in regarding the gun and torpedo as complementary weapons, each having its place in the battle tactics of a fleet, is well founded. If the Japanese had accepted Admiral Bridge's conclusion that the torpedo is a weapon of limited usefulness and only to be infrequently employed, they would not have provided themselves with one hundred torpedo craft, and the battle of the Sea of Japan would have had quite another ending.

(4) THE IMPORTANCE OF GUNNERY.

A feature of the fight which stands out in the most striking manner is the accuracy with which the Japanese gunners must have shot. A man-of-war is not a yacht, and the Japanese, while attaching due importance to cleanliness and order on board ship, have never made paint and polish their idol. The Japanese ships were built to fight, and the main preoccupation of officers and men has been persistent training in the use of the gun as well as the torpedo. The manner in which both these weapons were employed points to long and persistent training in which officers and

men profited by all the assistance to be obtained from the mechanical contrivances of Rear-Adimral Percy Scott; they adopted the "spotter," the loading-tray, and other appliances before even the British Admiralty had done so. They have their reward in the most complete naval victory recorded in history. This unique success was achieved by the use of instruments made in England on the same principles as those mounted in the British Fleet, and, in view of the recent "scare" as to British guns, the battle of the Sea of Japan must be consolatory to the British public. The Japanese by their triumph have given a testimonial to the heavy guns of the British Fleet which should set at rest any fears which may have been aroused.

(5) THE PERSONAL ELEMENT.

The completeness of the Japanese victory may be traced in large measure to the different characters of the crews of the two fleets. If we read between the lines of the story of the battle it will be realized that the Russians were demoralized almost from the first brush with the enemy. Brave though they are in close contests, they seem to have lost all ability to defend themselves when fired at by a determined foe three or four miles away, and to have been reduced to human pulp—without power of thought, initiative, or action. Only on this assumption can the extraordinary absence of Japanese casualties be explained, for Russian sailors, however deficient their war training, have never lacked courage—a courage without intelligence, such as a bull shows when he is at bay in the ring after the matador has driven him to frenzy. Courage of this character in the hand-to-hand fighting of the old sailing days was an asset of immense value as ships lay broadside to broadside, and the men swarmed over the bulwarks and fought hand-to-hand. But to-day the fight is between weapons which operate at a distance, and the destruction which they can effect depends not on brute courage, but on a clear eye, steady hand, and cool head, trained to act in mechanical unison. The modern sailor who loses his nerve is a danger to his country, because "jumpiness" spreads like an infection. The Russian sailors had the guns, but we cannot doubt that they lost the coolness requisite to their use even had they been adequately trained. Indeed, the armament of the "lost fleet" was in no way incomparable to that mounted in the Japanese ships, because at least half a dozen of the Russian vessels carried guns of the very latest types, while most of the

Japanese weapons were of older design. The essential difference between the fleets did not lie in the gun or torpedo equipment, nor in any numerical deficiencies to be discovered by "paper" contrasts, but it lay mainly in the crews—in the training which the Japanese had undergone under fair and foul weather conditions, and in the absence of training in the poor fellows who were sent, willy-nilly, to the Russian ships; many of them were dragged from the plough in inland provinces and ordered to become naval gunners and torpedo men. Even an autocrat cannot work miracles, and the Tsar and his advisers failed.

THE JAPANESE NAVY AFTER THE WAR.

Japan entered upon this war as the smallest of the seven naval Powers of the world, and she will emerge with a naval force which will be well able to dictate peace in Far Eastern waters. Her navy on the day when peace is signed will in any event be nearly twice as powerful as that with which she began the struggle. Never did any nation in modern warfare acquire such valuable prizes as have fallen to Admiral Togo and his colleagues. In the course of the fifteen months he has lost two battleships—though efforts to raise the Yashima are being made, it is said—and two effective cruisers, besides a few torpedo craft and many merchant ships. This is one side of the account, and on the other we have a long list of trophies, even if we exclude for the moment the Russian vessels which have been interned. The credit side of the Japanese war ledger, showing the Russian men-of-war which she has actually obtained already, reads as follows:—

BATTLESHIPS.

	Displacement. Tons.	Port.	Remarks.
Orel	13,560	Taken to Maisuru	Captured on May 28.
Nicolas I.	9,700	Taken to Sasebo.	Captured on May 28.
Peresviet	12,674	Port Arthur	Both these ships, which were sunk in shallow water, are being raised.
Poltava	10,950	Port Arthur	
Retvizan	12,700	Port Arthur	These two vessels, it is feared, cannot be salved; they are, at least, doubtful.
Pobieda	12,674	Port Arthur	

		COAST DEFENCE SHIPS.	
Gen. Adm. Apraxine	4,126	Taken to Sasebo.	Captured on May 28.
Adm. Seniavin ..	4,126	Taken to Sasebo.	Captured on May 28.
		CRUISERS.	
Bayan (armored),	7,800	Port Arthur	Sunk in shallow water, and will be salved.
Variag	6,500	Chemulpo	Will be, it is reported, raised and repaired.
Pallada	6,630	Port Arthur	This swift ship is being salved.
		DESTROYER.	
Bedovy	300	Sasebo	Captured on May 29.

Japan, consequently, has every prospect, even if we eliminate such doubtful ships as the Retvizan and Pobieda, which were very badly damaged, of repairing and adding to her fighting fleet four battleships, two coast defence ships, and three cruisers.

Then there are the interned ships of the Russian fleet. They are under the shelter of neutral flags, and when the war closes will, in ordinary circumstances, be handed back to the Tsar's Government, but under the treaty of peace the Japanese may insist on these men-of-war being ceded to them, since they escaped Admiral Togo's meshes only by flying within the sanctuary of neutral waters. These vessels, therefore, may possibly be added to the Mikado's Fleet. They include the following men-of-war:—

Type.	Name.	Displacement.	Port of internment.
Battleship	Tzarevitch	13,100	Kiao-chau.
Cruiser	Askold	6,500	Shanghai.
Cruiser	Diana	6,630	Saigon.
Cruiser	Aurora	6,630	Manila.
Cruiser	Oleg	6,675	Manila.
Cruiser	Jemchug	3,100	Manila.
Gunboat	Mandjour	1,416	Shanghai.
Destroyers	Smely, Boiki, Bespochtchadni, Beschumni, Bestrachtni	240 to 300	Kiao-chau.
Destroyers	Grosovoi	....	Shanghai.
Destroyers	Skory, Stratni, Serdity, Vlastni	....	Chefoo.

But the story of Japan's Fleet as it will exist after peace is declared is not fully revealed. While war has been in progress she has been busy fortifying herself to protect all she may gain by the strength of her arms. Apart from a large number of torpedo craft,

which have been built in native yards since the war commenced, she has under construction, and approaching completion, the following powerful ships:—

	Displacement in tons.	Where building.
Battleship Kashima	16,400	Elswick.
Battleship Katori	15,940	Barrow.
Two armored cruisers....	13,500	Kuré (Japan).

Both the amored cruisers building in Japan have been launched, and on one the armor belt has been placed. Russia emerges from the war practically without a fleet, while, deducting the Hatsuse and Yashima, lost at sea, but including the interned ships and those now building, Japan will be stronger by five battleships, two coast defense ships, three armored cruisers (including the Bayan), seven protected cruisers, a gunboat, and eleven destroyers. Such a triumph is the most extraordinary in the world's history.

ARCHIBALD S. HURD.

THE RETRIBUTION OF DOÑA CLARA.

I.

This occurred in Luzon long years before the drawl of the Yankee was heard in the land given by the adventurous genius of Magellan to the sovereignty of Spain.

Don Esteban de Santa Aña was the son of a Spanish grandee whose claims to distinction may be said to have been superlative, inasmuch as he combined the longest lineages with the narrowest of incomes.

When his illustrious progenitor had been gathered to his fathers, Don Esteban found himself, at the age of twenty-three, in possession of the family estate, which consisted principally of a ruined castle and a mortgage. Wherefore, determining to seek his fortune in the colonial empire beyond the seas, he shook the dust of the ruined castle from his feet, snapped his fingers at the mortgage, and, like another Jason, set forth in search of a golden fleece.

Robust health, a light heart, an unequalled facility in playing the guitar, and a few thousand pesetas, represented the sum total of Don Esteban's assets. A well-knit, superlatively handsome fellow was then, this lithe young gallant of Spain. His clean-cut, aristocratic face glowed with health and a keen enjoyment of life, yet, to a close observer, the handsome features were marred by a strange light that lurked in the deep gray luminous depths of his splendid eyes—an indefinable expression that suggested an underlying trait of savagery in his nature—a sleeping devil which, if once aroused, would convert him from an ardent friend into a vindictive and remorseless enemy. A physiognomist would have marked him as embodying in his personality the extremes of human passion—impetuosity in love, implacability in hate.

Life was pleasant then down there in that dreamy, sunny land of mañana, where Nature's richest gifts are poured out in such lavish profusion. At least, so thought Don Esteban, who, like

Tityrus, sat beneath the shade of his own fig tree, with nothing of graver import to occupy his leisure than to evolve light improvisations from the softly resonant strings of his guitar, until such time as the cocoanut trees he had planted upon his small domain bore fruit and brought him an income. And those days of waiting were truly halcyon days, for Don Esteban loved the daughter of the superintendente of the Hacienda Ortega, upon the confines of which vast estate his own modest plantation was adjacent.

Ah! who shall describe the eternal loveliness of the fair daughter of the superintendente, the Doña Clara Vestuñio? How Don Esteban followed with ardent glance the unconscious grace of her every movement as she strolled about the spacious grounds of the hacienda. Could he forbear admiring the tiny feet peeping out beneath the sweeping dress; the slender blue-veined hands, with their pink taper nails; the alabaster throat, swelling into firm budding globes of ivory that lay, half revealed, beneath the dainty low-cut camiseta? The luxuriant raven tresses that rolled in rippling waves from her broad, white brow, gleamed with the glossy sheen that glints upon the crow's wing in the sunshine, and her eyes! what soft, dark, gazelle-like orbs were they! Seeming to say, "Love me," as they glanced up at him from beneath the ebon lashes that swept the roseleaf bloom upon the perfect contour of her face.

And Don Esteban was happy in those far off days. Had not the Doña Clara told him that she loved him? And when he looked down into her entrancing eyes and pressed his lips to hers, he staked his whole soul upon the ingenuous faith and purity that seemed to dwell within them. There was nothing in those clear depths to indicate that this exquisite child of the orient was heartless and conscienceless as a statue, and animated only by a sordid soul that was worldly, frivolous and vain. Nothing to show that her one absorbing passion was an insatiable desire for wealth, the more acute in that her life was a daily contrast between comparative poverty and " a potentiality of riches beyond the dreams of avarice."

In the absence of Don Luis de Toledo y Ortega y Valdez, the multi-millionaire owner of the hacienda, the superintendente and his daughter lived in the mansion, whose wide corridors and spacious salons were crowded with priceless objects of art and vertu and all the evidences of limitless wealth. Oh! if such riches

as these were only hers! The contemplation of them filled her mind with day dreams of wealth and all that wealth can buy—jewels, rich attire, adulation aud power. She would sell her very soul for these. She knew that she was supernally lovely. When dallying at the toilet ere retiring to rest, and the long cheval glass revealed the voluptuous lines of a form more gracious than that of Venus stripped before Paris for the palm of beauty, she ground her white teeth and clinched her delicate hands in impotent rage and mortification at the fate that consigned her to an existence in a land of slaves and peons, instead of great world centers where such beauty as hers had a market value, and with it the realization of her heart's desire. Yet beneath this sordid spirit that possessed her there lay dormant a store of inflammable human nature that needed but the touch of kindred fire to kindle within her bosom a flame of fierce intensity. And lo! one day the kindred fire came in the person of Don Esteban, and it was then the Doña Clara learned that there were other things in life than jewels and rich attire to furnish pabulum for her romantic day dreams.

Her life had been spent among the Chinese coolies and half-naked Tagals who worked upon the vast plantation, and these puny, toil-worn specimens of humanity served only to accentuate the handsome face and superb physique of Don Esteban, who moved among the men with all the grace of an Adonis, like a being of different clay.

And Doña Clara loved him for his beauty; loved him wildly, passionately, from the crown of his curly, superbly poised head, moulded like that of a Greek god, to the soles of his finely formed feet. For she was but a magnificent animal, this radiant daughter of the tropics; and in Don Esteban's handsome presence the rich, red blood of her warm Castillian nature pulsated with a sensuous vigor, a new-found emotion that overwhelmed for a time the dominant desire of her life.

Then came delicious dreamy days in the gorgeous tropic splendor of the umbrageous grounds, where, as they whispered mutual vows of love, the Doña Clara promised to be Don Esteban's wife; and calm, cool, starlit nights when they would sit for hours beneath the shadow of the giant mango trees hardby the shore, while Don Esteban, with a master hand, drew forth from his guitar bewitching strains of music that echoed in the leafy aisles of the grove, and, borne upon ambrosial zephyrs, floated across the sil-

ver-crested sea like unto woodland melodies from the mellow pipes of Pan.

Brief halcyon time, destined all too soon to change! One day a courier from Manila arrived at the hacienda with orders to prepare the mansion for its master. Shortly afterwards to his splendid inheritance came Don Luis de Toledo y Ortoga y Valdez. A white-haired, prematurely aged man of sixty was this same Don Luis, a weary, worn-out, satiated old voluptuary, who had drained life's cup of vice and pleasure to its dregs. But when he looked upon the wondrous beauty of the daughter of the superintendente his withered heart was thrilled by an emotion it had never known before, and all the fiery ardor of his youth stirred his pulses once more.

The Doña Clara, sensible of the impression she had made upon the old roué, and confident in the power of her matchless charms, saw here the opportunity of her life. She would marry him, and then—and then unbounded wealth with all its soveign power was hers. What a vista it opened to her enraptured soul. Riches beyond compute, superb jewels, servants, horses, elegant equipages, and all the luxuries of life, with the conquests her beauty would achieve in Manila and the greater world centers beyond the sea. Hers this unlimited freedom and power! Hers this boundless store of wealth to spend and scatter broadcast as she chose, while all the élite of earth should bend the knee at the shrine of her loveliness.

But what of Don Esteban and the vows she had pledged to him? Bah! that was but a summer day's romance, pleasant enough while it lasted, and it had served its purpose in mitigating the ennui of a few empty hours. True, she loved him with an erotic emotion, but this passion, strong though it was, vanished like the morning mist in the fierce heat of the rising sun of her ambition.

Yet she trembled when she thought of Don Esteban. In the gray depths of his strange eyes she had read the fierce implacable nature that slumbered in his soul, and she knew the penalty of trifling in affairs of the heart always exacted by the vengeful jealousy of his race. And so the Doña Clara found herself in a difficult dilemma. If Don Luis should discover her intimacy with Don Esteban, it might mean the deathblow to all her worldly hopes. On the other hand, she dared not imagine what would happen should Don Esteban even suspect her contemplated treachery. Thus she lived a life of daily subterfuge and deception, haunted by a constant dread of discovery, until at length there fell a day

when she breathed freely again, for Don Esteban came not at his accustomed hour to the trysting tree, nor was he seen again upon his plantation, and the place thereof knew him no more.

II.

The first snow of the season was falling in Paris, and already the earth was covered with a soft fleecy mantle that deadened the roar of incessant traffic in the streets.

A continuous stream of carriages rolled silently toward the porte cochere of one of the stateliest mansions in the most exclusive quarters of the French metropolis.

Beneath the brilliantly lighted portico a broad carpet of crimson velvet, its deep sanguine tint sharply defined by the dazzling crystalline purity of the circumjacent snow, led up to a broad flight of marble steps, and across its soft pile trooped a succession of strangely attired votaries of pleasure into the black of light that flooded the vast hall beyond. There was a bal masque at the Hotel de Valdez, the residence of the Senora de Toledo y Ortega y Valdez, a youthful Spanish matron who, meteorlike, had lately flashed athwart the social sky, paling, by her superior splendor, all the glittering constellations of wealth, rank, beauty and fashion in the gay beau monde of Paris.

At her first entree into society members of the vielle noblesse and the ultra-exclusive set had shrugged their shoulders and held aloof, but so daring were her social tours de force, so costly her entertainments in their lavish magnificence, so universal the admiration aroused by her marvellous beauty, that, ere long, all prejudices were silenced, and fashionable Paris crowded her gorgeous salons to do homage to the regnant social queen. After all, said the worldly-wise among these arbiters of caste, is not her husband a grandee of Spain, and is he not worth two hundred millions of francs? Sterling qualities these, and amply sufficient to atone for the strain of plebian birth in the mistress of such vast wealth. Mistress indeed she was, Don Luis, her husband, being a decrepit old wreck of seventy whose mental powers were fast fading in the gathering gloom of senility.

Revenues of vast Philippine plantations and rich quicksilver mines of Spain were at her entire disposal, and she scattered them with a prodigal hand. And on this opening evening of her second season she determined to eclipse the brilliance of the first. Her

gilded halls were crowded with the haut ton of birth and rank, wealth and fashion in two hemispheres. It was a tableau vivant of the centuries. In that glittering assemblage masked Charlemagnes whisered soft nothings to giddy Marie Antoinettes, and Catherines of Russia, petite and plump of form—unlike their severe prototype—ogled elderly Don Juans of Falstaffian proportions, with perfect security in their temporary loss of identity. Semiramis conversed amicably with Henry VIII., while an obvious entente cordiale existed between Montezuma and Madame de Pompadour. Richard Coeur de Lion and Timour the Tartar were rivals for the smiles of Zenobia, and Julius Caesar laughed at the sallies of the Empress Josephine. All this amid a kaleidoscope throng of thirteenth-century troubadours, Moorish houris, Chinese mandarins, Napoleon Bonapartes, Roman matrons, Second empire belles, Appenine bandits, Austrian chasseurs, court beauties of the time of Louis Quinze, and all that was novel and picturesque in the costumes of all times.

Among this gay galaxy moved one statelier than the imperious Tudor queen she portrayed, a majestic Junoesque figure of regal mien and gracious presence, clad in a wondrous robe of royal purple, scintillant with precious gems and cloth of gold. The huge Elizabethan ruff, encrusted with priceless pearls, gleamed with lambent lustre in the thousand lights of the pendant chandeliers, and her stomacher flashed coruscant, chameleon fires from concentric rows of diamonds, sapphires and emeralds, surrounding a fabulous ruby that flamed upon her breast. A mask of blue velvet edged with silver concealed her face, but there was no question as to her identity.

"Incessu patuit vera dea."

And a goddess, indeed, she looked as she moved, resplendent in the rythmic measures of the dance, borne upon the arm of a tall masquerader clad as Mephistopheles, in black silk hose, velvet doublet and scarlet mask. Everyone recognized the señora, but who was the sombre cavalier whose persistent attentions had claimed her during the entire evening? Some Romeo of former days? Some new and favored lover perhaps? Everyone surmised, but no one knew, and when, during a waltz, a misstep brought them into collision with a huge thorn-studded cactus among the arm a thin red streak of blood and displacing her partner's mask, the guests beheld a stranger to their set, a man whose active and

vigorous frame of thirty-five contrasted oddly with the patriarchal locks of seventy. For his crisp, curly hair and close-trimmed Vandyke beard were white as the snow on the pavement outside.

The señora gazed at her cavalier in astonishment. He was unknown to her.

"From his apparent knowledge of my family affairs and the fact that he spoke my native tongue, I was led to believe the señor to be Don Pablo Ortega, a relative of my husband's," she said stiffly in Spanish.

"I regret I have not that honor," said the stranger, in a low, musical tone, "but if the señora will permit me, I will endeavor to show that I have an equal claim upon her consideration."

Offering her his arm he led the way to a raised carpeted dais embowered in palms and rare exotics, whence, without being themselves seen, a full view of the grand salon could be obtained. Here the señora removed her mask for a clearer contemplation of her unknown vis-a-vis. Unknown, and yet how familiar his presence seemed. There was an indefinable something in the turn of that nobly poised Grecian head and in the cold, unfathomable depths of those luminous gray eyes that filled her soul with fleeting adumbrations. Where and when had she seen this man before? As one who racks his brain for a particular word he knows full well, yet cannot recall to express his meaning, so did the señora's mind grasp a faint, elusive memory that ever evaded reality—a shadow without substance, like the evanescent outline of some phantasmal dream.

But later, when her eye rested upon a livid crescentic scar that disfigured the back of one of his long white hands, all that had been vague and dim before became illumined with a flash of vivid reminiscence.

She started violently. "Esteban," she gasped, with a hoarse, sibillant inhalation of the breath, as one who receives the sudden shock of a cold douche.

"I come after ten years," said Don Esteban, in a low, even monotone, "to see and speak to the señora once more before our ways part for ever. To be clear, it will be best to begin at the beginning—"

"The señor will pardon me," interrupted the señora, with frigid hauteur, "if I fail to understand how a former slight acquaintance warrants his intrusion in this house."

Her loss of self-control had been but momentary in the shock

of surprise, and she now regarded her unbidden guest with cold and disdainful composure. The love affair of her youth had long been a buried episode in her life that she did not care to resurrect, and now the unlooked-for presence of Don Esteban awoke old memories she would fain forget and filled her mind with vague forebodings of evil.

"Let the señora listen," said Don Esteban. "It was for the purpose of enlightening her upon this point that I procured admission here this evening."

There was a faintly perceptible inflection of insistence in his tone that jarred unpleasantly upon her ears, long accustomed to the suave accents of obsequious deference and adulation. She looked at him, and in his wonderful eyes there shone a menacing light, like the malign and baleful gleam that plays in the eyes of snakes coiled to strike, or tigers crouched to spring. It was a look of implacable malevolence, curiously at variance with the even passionless tones of his voice—a look of such strange intensity that it seemed to dominate her will with hypnotic fascination, compelling her to listen in spite of herself.

"Call your lackeys to expel me if you will," said Don Esteban, reading a half-formed resolution in her eyes. "It matters not; my mission is almost accomplished, and other means can be found to communicate that which you must know to complete it."

The señora lay back in her chair regarding him with mingled fear and aversion, and composed herself to listen.

"If you remember," said Don Esteban, speaking in cold, metallic tones, and with incisive slowness of utterance, "ten years ago tonight you were to have met me for the last time before our marriage. Perhaps this recollection is more deeply graven upon my memory than upon yours. I can recall that night with such vivid distinctness, even amid all this pomp and glare, that were it not for the long vista of horrors that crowds the intervening years, it might have been but yesterday. I was happy and light-hearted then, for on the morrow you had promised to be mine. I was about to leave the house to meet you when an officer and ten soldiers entered. The officer presented a warrant for my arrest.. I tried to argue with him, but without avail; then, doubly desperate at the thought of separation from you and the knowledge of my absolute innocence, I resisted arrest and was struck down, bound and carried aboard the steamer for Manila.

"There I was arraigned before a military tribunal on a charge of

aiding and abetting the insurrectionary movement. The evidence consisted of letters purporting to be written by me, but which were forgeries. The witnesses against me were Jose de los Reyes and Juan Tandeco, both of whom lived near my plantation. The former, to whom, I had extended many kindnesses, swore that he had delivered these letters by my order to an insurgent agent, and the latter that I had frequently held meetings at my house with men supposed to be members of the rebel junta.

"It was then that I knew that I was the victim of some foul treachery, and that the men who uttered these vile perjuries against my life and honor were but agents of some unknown and deadlier enemy.

"My passionate plea of innocence fell upon deaf ears. I was sentenced to life imprisonment on the plantation.

"Words of mine cannot describe the unspeakable horrors of the penal settlement. I was cast among the vilest of humanity, loaded with irons and compelled to perform the most laborious and revolting tasks. If my spirit rebelled at this brutal degradation by even so much as a look, I was savagely flogged and beaten. Night brought no respite from days of torture in the scorching cane brakes, for I was locked in a noisome cell where light and air came not, and there was nothing between the bare stones and my bruised and bleeding flesh. The blessed forgetfulness of sleep was even denied to me in that Plutonian dungeon reeking with pestilential odors and alive with foul creeping things. And yet the accumulated miseries of that time were as nothing to the agony of the thought that you, ignorant of the cause of my absence, must always believe I had basely betrayed and deserted you.

"The guards, inhuman in their treatment of all prisoners, were especially brutal towards me. My back is seamed with scars from savage scourgings with the lash, and one day I was stricken down by a blow from the butt of a gun which broke my arm. If, as it seemed, their object was to kill me, they so nearly succeeded that I was sent to the hospital from which, it was said, no one ever came out alive. This circumstance was my salvation. The medical officer proved to be a university student I had known and befriended in Spain. His influence obtained my relief from the chain gang and secured my permanent detail as his orderly in the hospital. There, in the laboratory, I devoted myself to the study of medicine, that I might find forgetfulness from the hideous nightmare of the past. But no occupation could stifle the fierce craving

for vengeance that possessed me. Vengeance upon the perjurers whose lying lips had condemned me to this frightful place. Vengeance two-fold upon those who had suborned them. This thirst for vengeance was the absorbing passion of my being, and became so much a part of my daily life and thought that I dreamed of it in the long sultry tropic nights, dreamed of frightful tortures and fantastic horrors to be visited upon those who had wronged me when the day of my deliverance should come. For know that the medical officer, after many failures, at last succeeded in obtaining a commutation of my sentence from life imprisonment to confinement for ten years. Ten years! Who can picture the misery of this period in such a place? The four already gone seemed centuries, and the very remembrance of them filled my soul with dread. With one year remitted for good conduct, there were five yet to come. Five long, dreary years of wretchedness, with nothing to sustain my leaden heart but the abiding hope of vengeance. I spent all my time in devising schemes to this end, with death as the punishment to be meted out, the central idea in all my plans. Bah! only fools commit murder for revenge. He who selects death as the instrument of his vengeance cheats himself of the supreme gratification of knowing that his victim is aware of the avengers identity. In this knowledge lies the sweet savor and the sharp sting of revenge.

"Ah! surely no human passion is half so sweet as revenge. Love of woman, lust of power, thirst for gold are potent levers to move the human mind, but they are swept away in the whirlwind tempest that fans the furnace blast of revenge. A woman scorned will trample her affections in the dust and murder the man she loves for revenge. For revenge pride of power is cast aside; for revenge the miser will part with his hoarded gold; for revenge I will give my hopes of salvation. And the revenge to satisfy the craving of my soul must take the form of a punishment that shall endure while sentience lasts, making of life a living death, a ghastly horror from which there is no respite, no escape.

"I was soon to know upon whom that vengeance must fall. One day a sick convict was brought into the wards. It was Juan Tandeco. He had been convicted of some offence and sentenced to the plantations for a long term. He did not recognize me, so changed was my appearance by the prison garb and the sufferings I had endured. His time on earth was short, but I was resolved he should not wholly escape me. At night I came to him, clad as a priest and played upon his spiritual fears, painting frightful pictures of the torments of the

world to come for those who, like himself, were beyond the pale of religion, until his tortured soul cried out in anguish and the sweat of abject terror bedewed his pallid face. I urged him to confession that I might learn the name of his suborner, and during his last hours on earth he poured out all his iniquities to me and made confession. And what a confession! A confession that forever blasted all my faith in human honor and truth. He swore upon the crucifix I held to his dying lips that you—*O Madre de Dios*—you had paid him and his accomplice Jose de los Reyes, a large sum of money to swear my life and freedom away. That you, loving wealth rather than honor and truth, and dazzled by the glamor of gold, had, while plighted to me, sold yourself to a diseased and decrepit debauchee; that you, knowing discovery by me of this hideous infamy would mar your sordid plans, had removed me from your path by representing to your aged lover that I was an annoying and unwelcome suitor, and, through his wealth and influence, had secured my condemnation to a living death. This unexpected shock struck me like a bolt of lightning. It was weeks ere I awoke from the delirium of fever that ensued, a feeble emaciated wreck with hair as white as snow.

"What vengeance could adequately punish such treachery as this, or make amends for the sufferings of mind and body I had undergone?

"One day I was walking aimlessly about the infirmary grounds, pondering upon this, when I came upon a lonely hut near the prison stockade and shut off from the world by a broad leafy thicket of bamboo. It was tenanted by one of whom I had often heard but had never seen, and now, when I saw him basking there in the sun in front of his *nipa* shelter, I could have clasped his ghastly grewsome form to my heart for very joy, for at the sight of him there came to me, like a flash, an inspiration of revenge that would have satisfied a fiend.

"For years this wretched being, shunned as a pestilence by his fellow men, had dwelt here alone awaiting the slow coming of a merciful death. One side of his body was white, and wrinkled and shrivelled like parchment scorched by fire; the other, swollen and bloated almost to bursting, was yellow and covered with slimy black excrescences like the skin of a toad. His mouth was a shapeless rent with turgid lips contorted into a sardonic grin that exposed four rotting fangs, and where his nose had been were two jagged holes in the plain surface of his face. One eye was gone, and the other, a bloodshot protruding ball from which the lids had rotted away, rolled tremulously in its socket with a vacant glassy stare. When this poor

creature saw me he uttered an inarticulate cry. I was the first human being he had seen in years, and he hungered for companionship. He could not come to me—he had no feet—but he stretched out his gnarled mis-shaped arms in an agony of supplication, and when I went to him and spoke words of sympathy he wept and sobbed in a dreadful convulsion that was horrible to see, uttering strange sounds, for he could not speak—his vocal chords were gone.

"Thereafter, day by day until he died, I came to him that he might have the companionship for which his soul craved, and that I might repay the debt of gratitude I owed him for the idea with which he had inspired me.

"Upon the development of that idea I worked daily in the laboratory, with many a test and experiment, until the day of my deliverance came.

"A competency had been left me during my imprisonment, and I had ample means to go whithersoever I pleased. I followed you to Paris, and made myself fully cognizant of every detail of your daily life. At first I intended to include your child in my scheme of revenge, and to that end made his acquaintance by bribing his attendant as they took daily exercise in the Bois, and I have walked and talked with him many times. But I found you were a mother to him in name only, and that no maternal affection warmed your heart towards him; that he was, in reality, a lonely motherless little waif, left to the care of hirelings, and deserving of pity rather than hate. To blight his life would not punish you, so I spared your child."

The senora raised her eyes to Don Esteban's face and interrupted him for the first time.

"*Your* child," she said, in a low tone.

"Ah!" said Don Esteban: "it was paternal instinct then that filled me with compassionate yearning for the boy; that drew me towards him and saved him from the vengeance I had planned."

"By a strange coincidence, just at that moment the curtains behind them were parted and a dark-haired, handsome child appeared, leading by the hand a feeble, tottering old man, dressed in the costume of the Emperor Charles V., whom Don Esteban took to be Don Luis. The old grandee took no notice of his wife or Don Esteban, but sat down and gazed out upon the salon with filmy eyes, while the boy stood by his side and bowed and smiled to Don Esteban.

"But for you," continued Don Esteban, turning again to the senora, "for you there is no pity and can be no escape. Your punishment shall be, like that of Cain, greater than you can bear.

"Steeped to the lips in luxury, you can no longer enjoy, the wealth you sold yourself to gain shall avail you nothing, and the adulations of fools and flatterers your shallow soul craves shall be yours no longer."

The woman looked up at him with eyes of fear. She knew the implacable nature of the man whose eyes blazed down into hers with pent-up hate and fury, and a terrible dread of some horror to come held her spellbound. A silver gong rang out with musical chime. It was the hour of unmasking, and it had been pre-arranged that, at this signal, the guests should advance to the dais, *en masse,* to do mock homage to their host and hostess, who were to receive them in character as the Emperor Charles V., and Queen Elizabeth. Don Esteban heard the chime and saw the movement.

"Behold," he cried, rising to his full height; and he took from his finger a ring in which a huge carbuncle gleamed with sullen fire. He pressed his finger upon the stone, and from a sharp point on the outer rim of the ring, opposite the jewel, a drop of viscid liquid oozed. "In the last waltz," continued Don Esteban, "the misstep I made was intentional and designed to deceive you for a time. You were not scratched by the thorns of the cactus as you imgained, but by this ring, which contains a virus whose deadly potency has been previously tested upon your perjured agent, Jose de los Reyes. Know, then, that you are inoculated with a foul disease from which no science or skill can save you. Under its slow but certain ravages the siren beauty that makes all men your lovers shall perish, that wealth of raven hair shall wither and fade, and those glorious eyes grow lack-lustre, bleared and sightless. The velvet softness of that creamy skin shall become mottled with hideous leprous sores and scars; those shapely limbs shall be twisted and distorted with frightful deformities, and you shall be such a thing of horror and loathing in the eyes of your fellow creatures that you will hide yourself from the light of heaven and pray for the death that shall be slow in coming to release you."

The variegated throng of masqueraders crowding about the dais beheld a strange scene upon which they gazed in mute astonishment.

A Queen Elizabeth, bereft of her imperial mien, cowering upon her throne in an attitude of overwhelming fear; a Mephistopheles standing above her, his eyes blazing with wrath, and pointing at her with minatory finger upon which a red stone gleamed with baleful light; a handsome boy of nine, whose eyes were wide with wonder; an aged Emperor who laughed uproariously and rubbed his hands with glee, as though in the enjoyment of some screaming comedy. He had

heard and understood. And as these erstwhile gay revellers looked, this abject queen put out her hands with a gesture of repellant horror. Her eyes dilated, and the rich color fled from her cheeks leaving on her face the cadaverous hue of old ivory. She tried to speak, but no sound came from her twitching lips. A thin foam flecked the corners of her mouth, and with a faint moan, she slipped forward among them in a glittering, senseless heap upon the floor.

"Come little one," said Don Esteban to the child. who smiled and took his hand; and lifting the heavy silken portieres, he drew the boy towards him, and they passed out together into the corridors beyond.

R. MONCTON DENE.

HILL-SIDE FARM.

"GOOD-NIGHT, lieutenant, and many thanks for your courtesy."

"Good-night, Mr. Brooks. Remember and send me a paper."

And with these words, Lieutenant Barr, officer of the main guard of the brigade of —— State Militia, encamped upon the reservation at Fressingfield, shook hands with the reporter of the *Daily Planet*, and returned to his quarters with the guard, while the reporter, his recent guest, disappeared in the darkness.

Hugh Brooks, the reporter, had spent the hours from tattoo to midnight in collecting material for a characteristic sketch of a militia encampment, which was to appear in the *Daily Planet* under the caption of "A Night with the Guard." Provided with a pass from head-quarters, which served as introduction and credentials, he had made the acquaintance of the officer of the guard, by whose permission and assistance he had been able to witness the full details of night duty, including the arrest of two drunken civilians, a party of soldiers whom the provost guard had found outside the lines, and three or four of the caterer's colored assistants who had been "shooting craps" in a mess-tent and adding thereto the heinous offense of burning a light after taps; and now that the camp had settled down to sleep after midnight, he was returning to the reporters' building at brigade head-quarters to grind out copy before getting a little sleep.

Head-quarters were situated in an angle of the field formed by two roads, one of which ran south to Fressingfield, two miles away, and north, beyond its junction with the other road, to Normansburg, a small manufacturing village, between which and the town of Fressingfield lay some five miles of country dotted with farms interspersed with tracts of woodland. On the sides next the roads the head-quarters buildings were guarded by a strong and high fence which formed two sides of a square, the opposite sides being formed by a line of sentries.

The principles of guard duty had been zealously inculcated at this camp on account of an unusually large proportion of new recruits; and it was for this reason that Brooks had been instructed to send in a special story descriptive of the manner in which the guards performed

their duty. He had been much impressed by the vigilance and activity of the sentries whom he had noticed during his peregrinations of the night.

"Lucky I got this pass," he reflected as he walked towards his destination, which was hidden in a thick mist which had closed in after sunset, "for the way these fellows keep guard is a caution, and a civilian who isn't *en règle* stands a first-class chance of getting left if he tries to pass them."

A few steps more brought him in sight of the head-quarters buildings which loomed dimly through the mist; and the next instant he heard the sharp challenge of a sentry, "Who comes there?"

"A friend," answered Brooks, walking up to the point of the sentry's leveled bayonet.

"Advance, friend, with the countersign."

"I've advanced, but I have no countersign," replied Brooks. "But here is a pass signed by Colonel Cook, assistant adjutant-general,—is it all right?"

"I can't read it in the dark," answered the sentry; "and it's no good, anyway. Passes don't go after taps."

"The deuce you say! Why's that?"

"Orders," briefly responded the sentry, still maintaining an attitude of hostility with his bayonet.

"But this pass says, 'All guards and patrols will pass the bearer at all hours.' "

"That may be, but I can't read it; and my orders say, 'Pass nobody without the countersign after taps.' "

"Well, call the corporal and see what he says."

"All right;" and the sentry's voice went booming through the mist, "Co-o-o-rpral of the guard, number seventeen!"

The cry was taken up along the line, and in a few minutes the non-commissioned officer came running up.

Brooks stated his name, quality, and destination to the corporal, who, having no means of reading the pass, declined to look at it.

"I've no doubt it's all right," he said; "but we've got our orders not to pass the governor himself after taps unless he has the countersign. You're a newspaper man, and if we should break orders for you, you'd be the first one to roast us for it, wouldn't you?"

"You're right, corporal," replied Brooks, laughing, although considerably vexed at the situation, for the mist had turned to a chilly rain, which was decidedly uncomfortable. "Of course. you must go by your orders. But what am I to do?"

"Don't know," said the corporal, briefly. "Officer of the day or officer of the guard might pass you, but I can't."

Brooks reflected. It was evident that his pass had been issued without knowledge of the special orders of the guard for the night, and that the sentries could not pass him without committing a gross violation of duty. It was impossible to tell where the officer of the day might be, and to hunt for him would probably be a fruitless quest. Lieutenant Barr had been relieved and was probably asleep in his own quarters by that time. It might be necessary to disturb several persons before one could be found who possessed sufficient authority to countermand the orders of the guard in Brooks's case, and this Brooks was averse to doing. The corporal, who was in immediate command of the sentries at head-quarters, was compelled to remain with them, and could not be expected to leave his post to assist Brooks. The situation was exasperating, but Brooks could not fail to recognize that it had also its comic side.

There seemed to be no alternative except to remain on the field in the rain, or to walk to Fressingfield, two miles away, and sleep in a hotel. While Brooks was trying to make up his mind which to take, his memory suggested a third course.

Some time before he had received a letter from a friend, a regular army officer, who had boarded during a previous encampment at a placed called Hill-side Farm, situated on the Normansburg road about half a mile from the field. Major Carpenter had written a glowing account of the beauty of the place, and of the hospitality of the proprietors, and had urged Brooks to spend a few days at Hill-side Farm during his vacation. Brooks had thought but little of the matter, but now it occurred to his mind with full force.

"It's a bad hour to go there," he thought, "but if those people run a boarding-house they must be accustomed to being disturbed at uncanny hours. Besides, I can pay them for any extra trouble. Well, corporal," he said, aloud, "if you can't let me in, you can let me out, I suppose?"

"That's all right," said the corporal. "Come along to the gate and I'll pass you out."

As they walked rapidly along through the rain the corporal gave a half-explanatory, half-apologetic discourse on the duties and responsibilities of the men under his command. "You see," he said, "these sentries have got their orders, and they can't do anything but just stick to 'em. And I've got to see that they stick to 'em. Wouldn't do for me to take any responsibility when I get my orders straight,

see? Like as not if I passed you in, and you didn't go to work and put it in the paper, it would be all right and no harm done; and then again, like as not some of the mugs on guard here might talk about it, and if Cap. Hyde, my company commander, got onto it, I'd get it in the neck. Like as not I'd lose my stripes. Regular crank Cap. Hyde is on discipline; but the boys all like him, and he's got a mighty good company."

They soon arrived at the gate which was in the corporal's charge. This was not the main entrance to the reservation, but one sacred to the use of the officers at head-quarters. It was guarded by two soldiers who stood each in a sentry-box, well-muffled in his overcoat with the cape drawn over his fatigue-cap. Before passing out, Brooks asked the corporal if he knew the location of Hill-side Farm.

"Hill-side Farm?" said the corporal, "well, I should say I did. You follow the Normansburg road to a place where it forks; then you take the straight road to your right; that's the new road, and the other is the old one that leads right on to it again a little past the farm; then you go on until you come to a little cart-path cut through the bank on your left; that takes you on to the old road again, and you go on to the house a little way beyond." He gave a low laugh and went on: "Tell you how I came to know the place. I was running from the provost one night, about two years ago, and I tried to give 'em the slip by dodging through the cart-path on the old road. But they knew the place and got after me to beat the band. As I got near the house I saw two ladies standing by the stone wall. I says, 'The provosts are after me! where can I hide?' and one of the ladies pointed to a path that led to a patch of woods a little way off. I ran and got under cover just as the provosts came up, full gallop. One of them spoke to the ladies, and I saw them point down the old road, and the provosts started off without looking towards the woods, and I took my time about getting back to camp."

"I suppose the recording angel must have dropped a tear on that occasion," remarked Brooks.

"Don't know," answered the corporal, upon whom the allusion was evidently lost; "but those women saved me from dropping some tears,—that is, if the provosts had got me. Here, boys, let this man pass out. Thanks. I'll smoke this after I'm relieved." This last remark referred to a cigar which Brooks slipped into the corporal's hand as he left.

The rain was falling quite heavily by this time, and Brooks found his half-mile walk anything but pleasant. By keeping a sharp lookout

he had no difficulty in finding the cart-path and in following the "old road" to the house, which he reached just as the rain began to descend in sheets. Sheltering himself under a small porch, which, being wreathed with vines, offered some protection from the deluge which was drenching everything outside, Brooks applied himself to the huge knocker on the door, and gave a succession of blows like those of a blacksmith on his anvil.

"That ought to rouse them," he remarked, as he desisted a moment to observe what effect his summons produced. But it did not, and he was obliged to give a second and a third volley of raps before an upper window was thrust up, and a voice, scarcely distinguishable above the loud patter of the rain, demanded,—

"Who is it?"

"Is this Hill-side Farm?" asked Brooks.

"Yes. What do you want?"

"To speak with the proprietor."

"Who are you?"

"A man who is almost drowned in this rain!" answered Brooks, sharply, for a stream of water which had begun to trickle down his spinal column was disturbing his usual equanimity.

"Wait a minute," said the voice, and Brooks waited.

It was several minutes before his waiting came to an end, but the sight of lights glancing in the upper rooms kept his patience good, and he was finally rewarded by hearing steps approaching the door, which was presently opened. An elderly man stood before him holding a lamp, and behind him appeared a younger woman, both dressed with evident haste.

"Excuse me for disturbing you," said Brooks, "but can you let me have a room for the rest of the night?"

The old gentleman looked at him sharply before answering. "Who are you?" he at length demanded.

"My name is Brooks, a reporter of the *Daily Planet*. I'm well named, too, for the water is running from me in streams," he added, unable to suppress a mild joke upon his condition and appearance.

"Well, step inside," said the old gentleman.

The invitation was not particularly cordial, but Brooks accepted it with alacrity. As soon as he was in the house he stated briefly but fully the causes which led him to seek shelter at Hill-side Farm. His story did not appear to produce an altogether favorable impression upon the minds of his hosts, who regarded him with evident suspicion.

"We are not keeping boarders this year," said the woman, who had not previously spoken.

"It would have been better for you to have gone to a hotel at Fressingfield," said the old man.

"What, in this rain? Hardly," answered Brooks; "especially after Major Carpenter had said so much in his letters to me about the kindness and hospitality of the people at Hill-side Farm."

"It is strange that we never heard the major speak of you," said the woman.

"Probably he had no occasion to," answered Brooks. "But you see how I am situated. Your house is the only shelter I can possibly get now. Give me a room and I'll pay you any reasonable price for it and the trouble I may put you to. If you refuse I must walk in the rain until morning,—that's all."

"Oh, we wouldn't turn anybody away in such weather," said the woman, in a burst of kindliness. "Wait right here for a few minutes and we'll see what we can do for you."

The man and woman then retired into another room, leaving Brooks to await the issue of their conference. Brooks was somewhat irritated by their apparent hesitation, though he could not but admit to himself that his arrival at such an unusual hour, coupled with his bedraggled appearance, might well cause some embarrassment. But he was most disturbed by their manner, which was manifestly full of suspicion. It was plain that they did not wholly believe his story, although they had refrained from expressing any doubt in words. Though Brooks belonged to a profession which is popularly supposed to inculcate liberal views in regard to mendacity, he strongly objected to having his word doubted, in private matters at least; but he felt that it was useless as well as ridiculous to show offense when he was at the mercy of the doubters.

Presently the woman re-entered, and bidding Brooks to follow her, led the way up a flight of stairs to a room containing a bed and some other articles of furniture, all of an antiquated pattern. "You can sleep here," she said, and, bidding him good-night, she retired quickly as if afraid to remain with him an instant longer than was necessary. As she closed the door Brooks heard a sound as of a key being turned in the lock; and on trying the door a moment later he discovered that he was in reality locked in.

What could it mean? Why should his hosts, who appeared to be unwilling to receive him at first, be so anxious to retain him as to make him a prisoner in his room? And if this was their intention,

could they seriously expect that a light deal door with a clumsy, old-fashioned lock would prove an effective barrier in case he really wished to leave the room? Brooks found himself unable to solve the mystery.

The room was close and stuffy, although a window was open. It was evidently not a room which was in general use. It was low-studded, and a great beam which extended the length of the ceiling, its sides roughly squared as if by an axe and covered with lead-colored paint to match the rest of the woodwork, bore testimony to the antiquity of the house. There were three windows in the room, and, what was unusual in a sleeping apartment, three doors, one at the head of the bed, one back of it, and the third, the one by which he had entered, at the opposite corner of the room. There was also another door, leading evidently to a closet, and still another placed near the ceiling and covering an aperture about two feet square, which led, as Brooks judged, to the unfinished regions under the ridge-pole.

Brooks made these observations as he removed his clothing, which was much less the worse for the wet than he had expected. His light overcoat was indeed badly soaked, but his under garments, with the exception of his trousers below the knee were only slightly damp. Some sheets of copy-paper which he had placed in one of his pockets before starting out that evening were dry enough for writing; and as Brooks felt no immediate disposition to sleep, he sat down at a table to write a portion of his story for the *Daily Planet*. He had no need to hurry about it, for the story was good any time before the camp closed; but Brooks thought he might be able to write himself to sleep as he had done on several previous occasions.

But Brooks soon found that sleep when wooed is most elusive Instead of the drowsy languor which he expected to experience within a few minutes after setting about his task, he found that his wakefulness was, if possible, increased. Nor was he able to make satisfactory progress in his work. His mind stubbornly refused to concentrate itself on the memoranda recorded in his note-book, and his ideas failed to arrange themselves with their customary regularity. His thoughts would constantly recur, in spite of his efforts to direct them into other channels, to the singular actions of the people of the house; and at length he laid down his pencil and gave up his work in disgust.

At that moment a sound caught his ear and caused him to listen with tense nerves. In another instant he had become convinced that some one was stealing softly towards the door of the room. The

sound was repeated,—a board seemed to creak slightly under the pressure of a stockinged foot; and to dispel his doubts, if any remained, there was a slight jarring of the latch. Some one was trying the door. Then the sound ceased and silence reigned again.

The incident produced a decided effect upon Brook's nerves. He was not, in general, subject to nervous tremors, and he felt angry at himself because he could not control the feeling which had seized upon him. Every nerve was strained to the utmost tension. His sense of hearing had become painfully acute. He heard the beating of his heart distinctly, and a pulse seemed to throb in his temples. The rustling of the leaves of his open note-book by a slight breath of air from the window caused a sharp thrill to run through him from head to foot; and he found himself glancing involuntarily towards the doors near the bed as if in anticipation of their sudden opening. In short, Brooks found himself suddenly and unaccountably attacked by a "spell of nerves."

He had recourse to his cigar-case, that never-failing comforter. But even here he failed to find the soothing influence which he so much desired. His cigar drew badly, and when he had corrected this defect by cutting the butt almost entirely away, the wrapper began to uncoil and the ash to form unevenly. He threw the cigar out of the window and tried to compose his mind by reflection. But his reflections only added to his discomfort. Why was he locked in? and what meant that mysterious visit to his door? These questions would occupy his mind to the exclusion of all others. He tried in vain to reason with himself. Surely there was nothing to apprehend. The idea that he could be in any danger was supremely ridiculous. The truth was he was tired; he had drunk strong coffee at supper; he had got wet and out of temper; the result was that his whole system was disturbed, and the best way to correct it was to lie down and let sleep come when it would.

Just as he came to this conclusion he became aware that the room was growing darker. A glance at the lamp showed the cause,—the wick was above the oil. Brooks glanced at his watch; the hands indicated three o'clock. Allowing that an hour had elapsed between the time when he left the guard-house and that of his arrival at the farm, he had been in the room about two hours. He looked out of the window; the rain had ceased, and where the sky was clear the stars were already paling. Extinguishing the lamp, he threw himself on the bed with his face to the wall, and in a few minutes found himself gently journeying to the realms of Morpheus.

Suddenly he was aroused as if by a galvanic shock. The latch of the door near the head of the bed clicked; and a long pencil of light streamed into the room as if from the crevice between the door and the sill. But before Brooks could make up his mind as to its reality it had disappeared ,and no further sound was heard. Brooks lay awake several minutes trying to decide whether this last episode was a dream or an actual occurrence. But Nature was applying her own remedy to his system, which was naturally strong and healthy; the reaction had set in and drowsiness soon overpowered his thoughts; and at length he slept as soundly as a criminal on the night before his execution.

When he awoke the morning was well advanced. A long bar of sunlight was streaming through one of the windows, and the singing of birds reached his ears. As he shook himself awake his experience of the night came back to his mind, and he could not help smiling at the feelings which had kept him awake so long. He dressed himself, and on looking at his watch found that the hour was past eight. As he completed his toilet the thought came to him,—was he still locked in? But on trying the door he found it unlocked; and he went downstairs more than half convinced that the events of the night were the vagaries of a dream.

At the foot of the stairs he met the woman who had shown him to his room. Her manner had undergone a decided change since he had last seen her, a few hours before, for, instead of regarding him with evident suspicion and fear, she bade him a cordial good-morning, at the same time ushering him into a little parlor. "I did not call you," she said, "because I knew you must be tired; but if you will wait here a little while I will have breakfast ready for you. Or, if you prefer, you can step outside and get a breath of morning air before you eat."

Brooks preferred a saunter in the open air, and was well rewarded for his choice. A keen admirer of nature, he found much to interest him in the situation and surroundings of Hill-side Farm, where the taste of the occupants had spared much that would have ordinarily been marred by neglect or sacrificed to bucolic vandalism.

The house with its barns and out-buildings stood on the crest of a ridge which sloped with an easy descent down to the road which he had traveled the preceding night, and which swept with a wide curve under the shade of some mighty elms. Beyond the road was a broad flat divided by well-built stone walls into fields, the cultivation of which seemed to give promise of rich crops. Farther on the ground

rose in ridges of varying height crowned by woods. The farm buildings were surrounded by orchards of apple and peach-trees, under which the tall grass was ready for the scythe; and where the ridge was not cultivated it was covered with dense growths of pine and walnut-trees. Under the bright sun and cloudless sky of a summer morning the scene presented rare charms to Brooks, whose eyes, accustomed to the sights of a city, took in the rural prospect with delight.

The clang of a bell from the house warned him that breakfast was ready, and a few moments later he found himself discussing a succulent meal with Mr. and Mrs. Fowler, his hosts, whom he soon found to fully deserve the encomiums which Major Carpenter had bestowed upon them in his letters. Brooks was much puzzled to reconcile their cordial but unobtrusive kindness and hospitality with the suspicious and constrained demeanor which they had displayed the previous night, especially when they gave him to understand with all possible delicacy that they would accept no pecuniary recompense for their trouble. Several times he was on the point of asing for an explanation; but he could not bring himself to do so, and at last concluded to lay the blame of the inexplicable events to his own imagination.

During the meal Brooks referred to the advice which the major had given him to spend his vacation at Hill-side Farm; and as the Fowlers expressed their willingness to receive him as a boarder, since he would not consent to be considered as a guest longer than that day, he decided to follow his military friend's advice. Accordingly, after breakfast, having written his story for the *Daily Planet,* he added a note to the editor, stating that as his period of rest began at the close of the encampment his address for the next two weeks would be at Hill-side Farm; and then proceded to the camp to resume his journalistic duties.

Books spent the following fortnight at the farm, and enjoyed his stay immensely. It was not, however, until the eve of his departure that he succeeded in unraveling the mystery of his first night's exerience there.

He was sitting on the lawn with Mr. Fowler, enjoying a smoke in the cool of the evening, when Mrs. Fowler joined them.

"So you really must go to-morrow?" she asked.

"I must," answered Brooks, "and I am very sorry for it. You would think that strange, though, if you knew that my first impression of this place was anything but agreeable."

"Do you mean on account of the first reception we gave you?" asked Fowler.

"I do," said Brooks. And then in a humorous manner he described the incidents which led to his "attack of nerves." When he had ended, Fowler remarked to his wife, "You had better tell him our side of the story."

"Well," said Mrs. Fowler, "you'll think it foolish, of course, but you must allow for the circumstances. A few days before the camp opened a robbery was committed in a house near Normansburg. A man came there one evening and asked the people of the house to lodge him for the night. Although he had no money, they saw that he was too well-dressed for a tramp, and he told them some kind of a story that worked upon their sympathies, so they took him in. That night when all the family was asleep he got up, took everything of value that he could find, and went away without making any noise. Of course, after that everybody was alarmed and suspicious of strangers; and when you came at such an hour and told such a queer story it frightened us a little, especially as we couldn't refuse to take you in out of the storm. You remember how we left you in the entry while we went into the parlor to talk it over. Well, we decided that we would lock all the doors of your room and keep watch all night. After you had gone up-stairs and we found that your light was burning for a long time, went up and tried your door to make sure that it was still locked. We heard you moving in the room, and this frightened us still more, as we couldn't imagine why you should stay up so long if you were—all right. Then after your light went out I went up to the other door and tried that. I couldn't hear a sound in the room, and I didn't know whether you were asleep or waiting to get out and go through the house. We were frightened mostly because my son and both the hired men were away that night, and my husband is an old man who couldn't do much against a robber, if you had proved to be one."

"And you sat up all night for fear of me?" asked Brooks.

"Yes, for neither of us could sleep with the uncertainty hanging over us. I was wretchedly nervous, and imagined all sorts of things. But just before daybreak we went up to your door again, and we heard you asleep,—for you did snore dreadfully,—and then we concluded that your story was all right, and that we had been very foolish. And after the men-folks got back in the morning I unlocked your door, and hoped that you'd never find out about it, especially after we got to know you."

Brooks laughed.

"It's the first time I was ever taken for a robber," he said. "I suppose I shall be taken for a Congressman next. But if you had known the condition that your precautions put me into you would have slept as soundly as I did later on."

When Brooks resumed his desk in the office of the *Daily Planet* he related his story to the editor as something too good to keep.

"If that yarn is true," said the editor, "you had about as queer an experience as happens in ordinary life."

"I'll vouch for the truth of it," said Brooks, "and as for its queerness,—well, you should have been in my place to appreciate it."

"You ought to write and publish it," said the editor.

"Perhaps I may some time," answered Brooks.

"If you don't, I will," said the editor.

Jos. B. Rowell.

OUR CONTEMPORARIES.

An analysis of the contents of the principal military periodicals, systematically classified under a few general heads for the convenience of the reader and student, comprising extracts and comments, in which special attention is given to the most important and valuable articles.

The *fifth* article is a study by Colonel F. N. Mande, an authority on tactics:

The *tenth,* by T. Miller Maguire, contains some interesting matter:

"It is said that the French fortresses in 1870 were not in as good a condition for defense as they ought to have been, but this was the fault of the Government and not of the engineers; and at any rate three of them—Strasburg, Metz and Paris—were of sufficient importance to cause all the German operations to be in the first place directed to their isolation and capture. Also in the American Civil War the generals on both sides displayed extraordinary skill in improvising fortifications all through Virginia and Georgia; and not only so, but they followed the example of the Roman legions and constructed fortified camps whenever they rested, and even put up some kind of hasty entrenchment during the progress of several battles. Similarly the Turks, at Plevna and other places during their struggle with the Russians, were not behindhand in the art of defence. * * *

"Vicksburg, on the Mississippi, cut the northern forces at New Orleans and at St. Louis and Cairo in two. It had to be taken, and this compelled the Federals to spend an enormous amount of ingenuity and money in 1862-63. I have already referred to the improvised works during the American Civil War. But Lee understood the true use of fortifications—not merely to exhaust the energy of the attack on a purely defensive system, but also as a pivot for offensive maneuvers. From the works on the Rapidan, near Chancellorsville, in 1863, he allowed Jackson to sally forth to turn Hooker's right; at Richmond he delayed Grant from the middle of 1864 to April, 1865; and as his last avenue of escape was

well nigh closed, he went out and was only compelled to surrender by a combined attack by Grant and Sheridan at Appomattox. There is not the slightest doubt, as Colonel Henderson has proved, that the Confederates, although their armies were improvised, made more skilful use of works than most of the regular armies of Europe have done.

"The history of the Crimean War is practically a story of how Todleben not only improvised the works at Sebastopol but skilfully held them for a lengthened period, thus preventing any inroad on the main lines of Russia; and he ultimately evaded the Allies, notwithstanding their naval and military superiority in the Crimea.

"The importance of a flank position of a permanent character and well held is shown in the Franco-German War. Strassburg obliged 60,000 men to be detached after the battle of Worth from the main body of the Germans; and in spite of the splendid success of Borny, Rezonville and Gravelotte, the German advance on Paris was rendered risky by the defence of Metz, which caused the detention of 240,000 Germans. If MacMahon had retired to the southern flank, where there were ample supplies, and played a waiting game, and collected together the reinforcements which afterwards joined, in all probability the investment of Paris would not have taken place for a considerable time. But MacMahon made a flank march to the relief of Metz, which ought to have been left to its own resources for weeks at least, in such a fashion that he was skirting the frontier, thus giving the Germans a chance of causing him to fall back on the old fortress of Sedan, which, like Metz, proved a trap; the result was fatal to the regular armies of France. On the other hand, in justification of the Archduke's remarks about the delaying power of fortresses, every day that Metz and Paris held out was increasing the probability of a German disaster. The situation of the Germans on the Loire and on the Somme was only saved by the fact that the fall of Metz released a number of German Corps, which spread themselves out towards Besancon, Orleans, Le Mans, Rouen and Amiens and, by preventing the possibility of relief caused the fall of Paris through starvation.

"I am no advocate for trusting to fortresses; no more are the Germans, who have now few forts compared with France. But an army on the flank of an enemy which is invading can never be ignored, and if it is in a strong position it will be a source of danger.

The *eleventh* article is also of interest to us:

"That motor cars will have a very important part to play in the war of the future is scarcely open to doubt in view of the extensive employment that has been made of them in the more important autumn maneuvers of all armies, both for the conveyance of the superior officers of the Staff and for the transmission of orders to a distance. Attempts to transport heavy loads by motor wagons are less well known, though there can be no doubt that, with the increased size of modern armies, this method of forwarding supplies, etc., forms an equally important field for their employment. Realizing this, the Prussian Ministries of War and of Agriculture offered a prize in 1902 for the construction of a motor wagon, driven by spirit, which was to draw a load of 15 tons along a good road at an average speed of 3 miles per hour and 43 miles per diem and at the same time be able to negotiate gradients of 1 in 10.

"The supply of such wagons would be of special importance for fortress warfare. Whether experiments on a large scale for the transport of guns and ammunition have been made in any other country, and with what success is not known. It is all the more interesting to hear that such experiments have recently been made in Portugal, apparently with great success. The order for this was due to a suggestion by Colonel of Engineers du Bocage, upon which the Portuguese Government ordered a battery of four 6-inch howitzers from the gun factory of Schneider & Co. at Creuzot. This battery with its ammunition is drawn by one traction engine, and is intended for the defence of Lisbon.

The traction engine (or motor wagon)—built on the Brillié system—weighs 7 tons, and is capable of carrying a useful load of 5 tons (ammunition, equipment and men) besides drawing four 6-inch howitzers, weighing in all 14 tons, on roads having a maximum gradient of 1 in 12.5. With steeper gradients, up to 1 in 8, the traction engine ascends alone, unwinding a strong wire rope from a drum; its wheels are then scotched up, and the howitzers are wound in. It is possible to regulate the speed according to the condition of the roads and the amount of the load i. e., to 1.5, 3.28, 5.8, 8.8 English miles per hour. The supply of water and fuel (benzine, alcohol or petrol) is calculated for a distance of 50 miles; but there is no difficulty in carrying a larger supply in cans. The total load drawn is thus 26 tons, for which at least 50 horses would be required. But inasmuch as a day's journey for horses is about 15 to 18 miles, while the traction engine can easily do 40 to 50 miles,

it follows that the latter is equivalent to at least 100 horses. In addition a considerable saving in attendance is effected.

"The wagon itself carries 64 shells. The design includes a separate ammunition train consisting of four ammunition wagons, each of which carries 40 shells, and their motor wagon also carries 64 shells. Thus these two trains carry 288 rounds, 72 for each howitzer, and they occupy on a road a length of not quite 65 yards.

"The howitzer, constructed by Schneider-Canet, is a quick-firing weapon with long barrel recoil, similar to the older types of this factory and has therefore a great likeness to the French 75mm. (=3-inch) field gun M/97. In the firing position it weighs 65½ cwt., and it fires a shell weighing 88 lbs., with an initial velocity of 1,150 ft. and a maximum range of 8,720 yds. For firing the howitzer is placed with its wheels and the point of the trail, which has a folding spur, on planks; but in case of need it can also be fired from the natural ground without intermediate support. Special means for fixing, as provided for the French field guns, are in this case unnecessary. If minor changes of position are required, a small wheel is inserted in place of the spur, and this considerably facilitates the move, especially with the aid of the rope drum.

"At the point of the trail a limbering ring is provided by means of which the leading howitzer is connected to the motor, the second howitzer to the leading one, and so on. For this purpose an appliance is fixed to the muzzle end of each gun-carriage, to enable the limbering ring of the succeeding howitzer to be attached thereto.

The howitzer has an appliance by means of which the barrel can be rapidly changed from the firing position to the horizontal loading position, or vice versa. In place of a "collimateur" it has a telescopic sight, which is secured to the shield pins on the cradle.

"If hostile fortresses in future warfare are not to cause undue delay to the advance of a field army, it is essential to confront them with heavy guns as rapidly as possible. This is one of the most important lessons taught by the Franco-German War, and all nations have accordingly made provision for the horsing of heavy batteries, which follow the field army at a certain distance. Part of these batteries will under certain circumstances be in immediate touch with the field army, as they may have to take part in its battles. For such batteries it will for some time to come be impracticable to replace animal by mechanical haulage. With the remaining (i. e., mortar) batteries, however, horses could with advantage be replaced by traction engines."

ARTILLERY AND FORTIFICATION.

1. The Coast Fortifications of the United States.—*Kriegs. Zeit.*, 3.

2. Support of Ramps by Means of Steel Tubes.—*Same.* 4.

3. Deep Shelter Trenches.—*Same.*

4. Machine Guns.—*Ind. Vol. Rec.*, April 15.

5. Schimose Powder.—*Kriegs. Zeit.*, 4.

6. Guns for the Defense of the Outer Harbor.—*Jour. Arty.*, March-April.

7. Ammunition for Cannon.—*Same.*

8. Compression of Steel by Wire-Drawing During Solidification in the Ingot Mould.—*Same.*

9. Double Interpolation in Table II. of Ingalls' Ballistic Tables. —*Same.*

10. Progress in War Material.—*Same.*

11. New Horse and Field Artillery Equipment, England.—*Same.*

12. Russian Field Artillery.—*Same.*

13. Operations of the Artillery and Engineers at Port Arthur.—*Same.*

14. The New Field Gun of the United States.—*Kriegs. Zeit.*, 4.

15. Maxim Machine Guns.—*Same.*

16. The Problem of Barrel Recoil in Field Howitzers.—*Same.*

These articles are all of great technical interest and importance, especially the classical essay on *Ammunition for Cannon* and the excellent paper on *Guns for the Defense of the Outer Harbor.*

We quote a few extracts from the *fourth* article:

"We are so accustomed nowadays to regard the machine gun as an integral part of British Military organization, that it is a little difficult to believe that it is not twenty years ago that when a well known volunteer C. O., Colonel Alt of the 22nd Middlesex Rifle Volunteers, applied for sanction to form a machine gun detachment (with Gardner guns, purchased privately of course); he was informed that sanction could not be given as the weapon was not regarded as suitable for military purposes. Colonel Alt, however, was one of those determined gentlemen who declined sometimes to take his opinions from the sealed pattern at Pall Mall and consequently the 22nd Middlesex formed a "Machine Gun Club" to study and practice the use of the weapon. Colonel Alt did not have to wait long for a change of opinion, for in a few years ma-

chine gun detachments were established as a part of the organization of every battalion of Regular British Infantry, while since the war they have become similarly part of the establishment of every cavalry regiment as also of every battalion of infantry volunteers at Home. Such little facts of history as these are apt to be forgotten and certainly official army authorities seldom make reference to them, and we write them down again apropos of some interesting notes on the organization of machine guns in the armies of Europe generally which, appearing in the Revue Internationale, have been translated by the Broad Arrow, London, from which we quote:—

"In the German Army there are now sixteen machine gun detachments each with six Maxims; of these sixteen detachments three are with the First Army Corps; the Guard Corps, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Army Corps have each two; while the Third, Sixth, Twelfth, Sixteenth, Seventeenth, Nineteenth and 1st Bavarian Corps have one each only. Each of these detachments has an annual ammunition allowance of 100,000 rounds. In March, 1901, the Russian military authorities formed five machine-gun companies of eight guns each, and these were attached to the 4th, 6th, 8th and 16th Divisions, and to the 3rd East Siberian Rifle Brigade respectively. During the war with Japan these companies became by degrees separated from the above-named divisions and were sent to the 1st, 2nd, 5th and 6th East Siberian Rifle Division. In addition to these five machine-gun companies, two single Maxims were provided regimentally by the commander of the Dagesthan Cossack Regiment, and did very excellent service. New detachments are now to be organized for service with the six divisions belonging to the Fourth, Eighth and Sixteenth Army Corps. Japan had in 1903 two machine gun batteries only—one of Maxim, the other of Gatlings—each of six guns, and these were with the 1st and 2nd Divisions. By the beginning of the war four more divisions were provided each with a Maxim battery of six guns, while during the course of the campaign three more divisions were thus equipped, making a total of fifty-four machine guns with the army in the field. The Swiss were the first to experiment with machine guns, and already in 1892 they had taken them into use. Each of their four army corps had a mounted machine gun company with eight Maxims, and since the year 1900 these companies have been attached to the corps mounted troops. Besides these the Swiss have dismounted machine gun companies for the St. Gothard and other mountain defences.

"As we have already written we do not think our Continental contemporary is correct in attributing the first experiments with machine guns for land service to the Swiss and it should not be forgotten that the forerunner of the present type was the Mitrailleuse of the French service. This gun had been in course of manufacture in France before the outbreak of war in 1870 and its features were kept a close secret, while its powers as a weapon of destruction were darkly hinted at. On the outbreak of hostilities the guns of some of the artillery batteries were withdrawn and the new machine gun issued in their place. * * *

"Six of these Hotchkiss automatic rifle-calibre machine guns, fitted to a small portable tripod and fired by the gunner lying prone, were used in South Africa by a special company.

WARSHIPS.

1. Sir William White on Submarines.—*A. and N. Jour.*, May 13.
2. The Naval Estimates.—*A. and N. Gaz.*, March 4.
3. Armored Cruisers.—*Jour. Arty.*, March-April.
4. New Japanese Battleship Kashima.—*Same.*
5. The French Naval Estimates.—*Mar. Rund.*, May.
6. The United States Naval Estimates.—*Same.*
7. Ships Great and Small.—*Unit. Serv. Mag.*, March.
8. Changes in the World's Navies.—*Same; Jour. R. V. S. I.*, April; *Mar. Rund.*, May.

The *first* article is of special interest at the present time:

"Following is the third of the series of articles on submarine boats prepared for the London Times by Sir William White, formerly Chief Naval Constructor of the British Navy, the first two having already been published in these columns:

"Advances made during the last few years in the design and construction of internal combustion engines, storage batteries, electric motors, and other applications of electricity, have led to great improvements in submarine construction.

"Specially trained crews are absolutely necessary, not merely for efficient management of the propelling apparatus, but of the vessels themselves, if the inevitable risks incidental to submarine navigation are to be minimized.

"Obviously increased risks must be run if advantage is to be taken of increased offensive power resulting from the capability

of a submarine to dive and deliver an underwater attack; and it is necessary to have regard to both sides of the subject when the value of submarines is appraised. It is not possible to secure the power of diving rapidly without accepting the risk of going to the bottom before the enemy is reached."

The *second* is also of some value to us, as indicating the tendencies of the times:

"It is proposed to begin during the year 1905-06 one battleship, four armoured cruisers, six ocean going destroyers, twelve coastal destroyers, and eleven submarines. Practically this is a similar programme to that of last year, with the material difference of one battleship less than was then included; it must, however, be remembered that of last year's programme one armoured cruiser and fourteen destroyers were not begun, although one of these latter is to have substituted for it a destroyer which Messrs. Palmer, of Jarrow, have already in hand. It will be noticed that there are now to be two classes of destroyers, and on this head Lord Selborne states that their study of the tactics and other questions involved has led the Board to the conclusion that two classes of destroyers are required for the Navy, one for ocean work, and the other for the narrow seas. They have accordingly decided to combine the qualities of speed and sea-keeping power in a special type of ocean-going destroyer which will be expensive, and of which, therefore, the numbers must be comparatively few, and to design a new type of coastal destroyer which will be comparatively cheap, and of which, therefore, the numbers can be larger. In regard to another important point, the First Lord pays a well-earned compliment to the late Controller, Vice-Admiral Sir William H. May, when he states that the fleet has never been "in a more perfect state of repair than it is at the present moment." Moreover, he promises that, "while fewer ships will be under construction at the same moment than has lately been the case the period of the completion of the ships will be materially shortened from the present average of thirty to thirty-six months. In every way it may be said that the last estimates prepared under the regime of Lord Selborne are noteworthy. And he will have the satisfaction of feeling that on his retirement he leaves the Navy at least as strong and certainly as efficient as it was when he took office, and with even greater promise for the future.

MILITARY GEOGRAPHY.

1. The Three Great World Powers.—*Mar. Rund.*, May.
2. Russia in Central Asia.—*Same.*
3. The Island of Sackalin.—*Same.*
4. The Sea Defense of Indo-China.—*Same.*
5. The Struggle for the Pacific.—*Jour. R. V. S. I.*, April.

The first *four* are noteworthy articles of prime importance, and bearing on great questions.

The *fifth* is a subject that concerns us nearly now, and will concern us far more as soon as the Panama Canal is opened:

"If it could appertain to one Power alone to exercise the 'Mastery of the Pacific,' it would seem. at first sight, as if the right of maintaining the integrity and benefiting by the profits of the Far East should rest with Great Britain. Does she not possess, all to herself, a whole continent whose shores are washed by the waters of the great ocean? Does she not extend her rule over the islands, great and small, of the Australian Archipelago? Does she not by means of Singapore and Hong Kong control the depots of commerce in the China Seas and share the sovereignty of the American shores of the Pacific with the United States? Has she not, lastly, her mail steamers and cables which furrow the vast liquid desert? But among all these various countries where the flag of the British Empire flies there is neither similarity of organization nor unity of interests. Australia is in reality a new nation recently turned into a Commonwealth; it voluntarily remains loyal to the Mother Country on the condition of not being interfered with as regards liberty of action and self-government. New Zealand is so jealous of its independence that she even refused to join the Australian Commonwealth. British Columbia is a part of the Dominion of Canada, and has its particular administration and interests. Hong Kong and Singapore are only depots or bases for trade; the other tropical possessions are for the most part uninhabitable by Europeans, and can never be anything but small settlements. Thus in studying British influence in the Pacific it is necessary to carefully distinguish between the different portions of the Empire; each is liable to prosper by itself, and Great Britain receives no benefit from them except the somewhat empty honor of having given them life, language, and civilization. * * *

"Germany is a newcomer in the world of the Pacific, receiving a portion of the heritage left by decadent Spain. The history of German

expansion in the great ocean is as remarkable as its progress was rapid; her trade has, in fact, preceded her colonies, and she has powerful influence in the Pacific and Far Asia without owning hardly a particle of territory. She has, however, endeavored to acquire some harbors as victualling ports and coaling stations for her trading steamers and cruisers and as bases for her trade. Thus in 1885 Germany exercised authority over six groups of islands—viz., the Bismarck Archipelago, the Marshall Islands, part of the Solomon and Samoan Islands, the Carolines, with Palaos, and the Marianne Islands, with the exception of Guam, which belongs to the United States. In addition, Germany has acquired the northeastern portion of New Guinea, which they call Emperor William's Land, where about 60 Europeans govern about 110,000 Papuans, costing the Imperial Budget 732,000 marks a year, and only bringing in barely a revenue of 75,000 marks. Apia, in the Samoan group, occupies a favorable position on the route from Australia to San Francisco and Panama. The Carolines and Marianne Islands, equi-distant from Japan, Australia, and the Philippines, would constitute a very useful observation post for the German fleet in case of a conflict in the Far East. The opening of the Panama Canal cannot fail to increase their importance. With Kiaou-Chaou, on the coast of China, Emperor William's Land, and Samoa, a belt of German influence is stretched across the inhabited portions of the great ocean; in any case, these possessions suffice to afford Germany sufficient ground for demanding a share in the affairs of the Far East and for participating in any profits that may thence arise. In spite of American competition, German commerce has not stopped spreading, thanks to her excellent merchant service; although her colonies may only bring in a moderate revenue, yet they are wonderfully skillful in extracting profit from the possessions of other Powers. In Tahiti, in the Philippines, in Japan, China, and Dutch Malaysia, and even in the British Isles, the article 'made in Germany' is spreading and ousting its rivals. Through her commerce and possessions Germany is far from being a secondary Power in the Pacific, but to have more political power further territorial possessions are needed. * * *

"Such are the present interests and future problems involved in the Pacific Ocean, whose vastness alone was thought at one time to preclude all chance of war. It is not a question, as in former times, of petty trade alone and of mere quarrels between merchants. The vital interests of great Powers are now at stake; in fact, the maritime supremacy of the world! Japan struggles for expansion and for her

very existence as a nation. Russia is attracted by the necessity for providing her immense Asiatic territories with the maritime outlet she cannot do without. Great Britain will fight for her naval pre-eminence and commercial supremacy. The United States are pushing forward with that eagerness for expansion which characterizes a young and successful race. The wily and laborious Chinese quietly pervade all the countries at their gates, and 'oil the machinery' from Singapore to San Francisco. Germany, France, and Holland defend their colonies and demand their share in the development of the wealth of the Far East. Such problems have seldom been solved pacifically. * * *

"Whatever happens, the conclusion drawn from these pages is that great events are impending, and that the great Powers of the future will be developed in the world of the Pacific."

MILITARY HYGIENE.

1. Sanitation in Camps.—*Royal Engrs. Jour.*, May.
2. Army Medical Reform.—*Unit. Serv. Mag.*, March.

SMALL ARMS AND EQUIPMENTS.

1. An Improvement of the Manlicher Magazine Rifle.—*Kriegs. Zeit.*, 4.
2. Automatic Rifles.—*Same*, 3.

TRANSPORTATION.

1. Field Artillery Transportation by Ship and Railroad.—*Same.*
2. A Military Motor Bicycle.—*Same.*

MISCELLANEOUS.

1. Landscape Drawing From a Military Point of View.—*Royal Engrs. Jour.*, April.
2. Aeronautics in America.—*Same*, May.
3. An Automatic Fire Alarm.—*Same.*
4. Military Balloons in the Russo-Japanese War.—*Kriegs. Zeit.*, 3.
5. Automatic Topographical Instruments (Ferguson's).—*Same*, 4.
6. Compass With Lenses.—*Same.*
7. Microphotoscope.—*Same.*
8. Photographic Apparatus.—*Same.*

ORGANIZATION, ADMINISTRATION AND MOBILIZATION.

1. Notes on Promotion.—*Mil. Serv. Inst.*, July-Aug.
2. Enlistment.—*Same.*
3. Desertion.—*Same.*
4. The Porto Rico Provisional Regiment of Infantry.—*Same.*
5. The Truth about Naval Administration.—*Proc.. Nav. Inst.*, June.
6. Desertion from the Navy.—*Same.*
7. Promotion, Present and Prospective.—*Same.*
8. Recruitment for the French Navy.—*Mar. Rund.*, June.
9. General Story on Artillery Organization.—*A. and N. Reg.*, June 24; *A. and N. Jour.*, June 24.
10. Changes in the World's Armies and Navies.—*Jour. R. V. S. I.*, May; *Mar. Rund.*, June; *Proc. Nav. Inst.*, June.

The *first* of these articles relates to the much-discussed question of promotion by selection, and is from the pen of Brigadier-General Henry T. Allen, Chief of Constabulary, Philippine Islands, one of our most energetic of the younger officers.

He has shown himself efficient as a subaltern, as an instructor at the military academy, as an attaché abroad, in field service, and in administration in his present position.

He, like the rest of us who feel that they have made proper use of such opportunities as came in their way, believe in promotion by selection. The great objections to the system in the minds of most, briefly stated are:

1. Not all have equal opportunities.

2. The selection, after all, must depend too largely on personal acquaintance, either of the selector, or of the person upon whose information the selection is based, or who furnished the data upon which the officer's record is based.

General Allen, however, is evidently aware of these objections, and his scheme endeavors to overcome the objections. The plan proposed is certainly worthy of attention:

"Is it justice to men who possess superior attainments and who distinguish themselves in their chosen work to refuse them such recognition as would be their right in other walks of life?

"And finally is it a good business procedure for the Government to tolerate a system wherein such restrictions obtain?

"The army is pre-eminently a business machine (or should be such), and like any other should be administered on business principles. For its success physical activity is not less valuable than mental vigor. Every incentive to maintain a high standard in both should be assiduously fostered, and the army itself should take the lead in this advance. Rightly, no officer would admit that the army is maintained and trained for peace purposes, nor would he deny the necessity of immediately making great changes in the personnel, were hard field-service involving large numbers required. Why should this contradiction exist if we are truly maintaining an army for the purposes which are the fundamental reasons for the existence of all armed forces? The Government has a right to expect much, and if officers do not of their own volition take steps to keep themselves on the highest plane of army efficiency, external action should effect it. The most promising system is based on a full recognition for merit, in which failure to die or resign certainly is a factor, but not the most potent as at present.

"When actual war confronts us, the principle of selection is carried to a degree that leaves no doubt that we have been maintaining an organization adapted almost solely to times of peace—totally unlike the successful policy of Japan, which has not changed one of its principal military leaders since the outbreak of the war.

"There is not an army officer who does not know among his friends and acquaintances, in the several grades, certain ones who stand out as highly capable, and others whom he knows to be below a medium standard, if not inefficient; the former, full of initiative, improve themselves continually, while the latter do solely what is ordered, and that with the least disturbance to their comfort. By reason of fitness, the former are called to do far more than the latter, especially if the work or the circumstances connected therewith be new or difficult. No one can say that the rewards of these two classes should be coequal, and furthermore no commanding officer will fail, when times require men of head and action, to recommend the advancement of the meritorious at the expense of the incapable.

"With the superior school system recently introduced, with the improvement made in rendering personal efficiency reports, and with the establishment of a high-grade, capable personnel in the General Staff the power to properly select has been largely perfected.

"The first step in the proposed change would be to determine what percentage of promotions should be by selection. It should be large enough to insure obtaining a sufficiency of high-class officers in the

successive grades who would eventually make highly efficient regimental commanders or officers of equal grade, and from whom general officers, worthy of the Government in all respects, would be selected. The percentage should fall between 25 and 50, probably nearer the latter number.

"How should the selections be made so as to avoid bringing them within the influence of politics?

"My answer is, to have it done by the army itself.

"I shall not attempt to set forth a complete scheme, but will merely outline in a general way a plan that may serve as a basis for development: After a few years' service with troops, let the most promising available officers be sent to the service schools, then let the most promising from these schools be sent to the General Staff College, where they may be thoroughly tested in both practical and theoretical work. It is safe to say that the successful ones from this institution might well form the principal element in the lower grades from which the lists for promotion by selection should be made. Those who fail in these trials should not be granted special promotion. Specially meritorious officers of the lower grade who through exigencies of the service may not have been available for such tests, and highly deserving officers of the upper grades, should be put on eligible lists upon recommendation of department (brigade) and division commanders. From these lists the Chief of Staff or a general-staff committee would select and propose to the respective boards described below a certain number of names with records for final selection for each vacancy. To entirely eliminate political bias, there should be established a board for each branch of the service, or general board composed of members of the various branches to definitely pass upon all promotions below the grade of general officer. Generals would be selected by the President from colonels, and still higher officers from the grade next below.

The *second* article, by Captain H. B. Farrar, artillery corps, is a timely one and deserves consideration. We quote a few extracts:

"I believe it would greatly benefit the service if something could be done to encourage more good men to re-enlist, and the following suggests itself as practicable:

"Under the present law every soldier enlists for a period of three years. He probably remains at the recruiting station for a short time, and is then sent to join his organization, which he usually reaches within one or two months after he has taken the oath of allegiance. The next four months are spent in breaking in the recruit, and in

teaching him what the life of a soldier is. Experience has shown that a large percentage of the desertions occurs among the soldiers of about this length of service. The recruit having served from six months to a year becomes dissatisfied, and decides that he does not like the service. He has to look forward to two years or more of a life entirely different from what he expected to find, and a life he does not like. Again, he has been in the army hardly long enough to fully realize the gravity of desertion. He takes the first opportunity to desert.

"To partially correct this evil I would establish two terms of enlistment as follows: The first enlistment to be for a period of one year, and all subsequent enlistments to be for periods of five years each. Suppose the first term to be as stated for one year. As at present, a number of men at the end of six or eight months would want to leave the ranks and return to their vocations in civil life. However, with only four or six months more of service to look foward to, they would remain and perform their duty. It would not seem so long, and an honorable discharge would be worth waiting for, for a few months.

"Besides, of what value are these dissatisfied recruits to the army? Their worth is nil. Would it not be better to let them go and fill our ranks with new men, to try many and find the best material, to keep, and devote our attention to those who wish to make a life work of it and rise to the higher positions in the enlisted strength?

"One year is long enough for a recruit to decide whether or not he likes the life of a soldier, and if, after this period, he decides that he wishes to take it up permanently, then five years is not too long. The total of his first two enlistments would be the same in either case, six years.

"Recruiting officers are cautioned to explain to each applicant just what a soldier's life is, but experience has shown that very few understand what the real conditions of service are, until they have actually tried it for a longer or shorter time. Hence many enlist with a total misconception of what is before them. A year would be ample time for the commanding officer of any organization to form an opinion of the recruit. Again many men who are unfit for service do remain in, and serve out a period of three years. They may not have merited a dishonorable discharge, though their services were poor, and themselves troublesome. So they hang on for a whole term of three years, occupying the places that might be filled by worthier men. Under the system suggested, the end of the first year would find

these undesirables out of the service and new men being tried. Company commanders should be enjoined to use greater care in noting on discharges if any objection to re-enlistment is known to exist.

"The punishment for desertion and the reward for apprenhension should be increased. This, in connection with a short period of one year for first enlistment, would practically eradicate the evil of desertion; while a large increase of pay for old soldiers, gunners, and especially non-commissioned officers, would guarantee to us such a set of men as civilians would be proud to recognize in the uniform of the United States Army."

The *third* article, by Lieutenant-Colonel J. W. Pope, formerly Commandant of the Military Prison at Fort Leavenworth, is the opinion of an expert of large experience on a subject of vital importance to the army:

"With regard to the subject of desertion, it is strange to mark the threshing over of those issues which had been fought to a finish in what must now be called the Old Army of '70 to '95. This would never have occurred but for the abolition of the admirable system of punishment which had been built up with the United States Military Prison as its culminating point and the substitution of the present guard-house abortion. It is still more remarkable that so many of the precepts which had been studied and had been regarded as settled principles of military penology have been buried into oblivion in so short a period of time. We have lived fast in these strenuous times and another generation of army officers and another army have forged to the front.

"From an experience of fifteen years in dealing with the general mass of army prisoners, mostly deserters, and many years of study and writing of that class of criminals, let me recall for the benefit of the younger generation of students of military penology, some of the work done and the principles settled by the older generation. Judging fom the annual reports of Division and Department commanders, it is evident that they generally approve of a return to the punitory system subverted in 1895, when the United States Military Prison was abolished.

"The large percentage of deserters at the close of the Civil War (and during that war as well) excited the wonder and apprehension of officers in the army then, as at the present time. It seemed incredible that ten per cent of the American Army should break their oath of enlistment. They felt that this reproach upon the service must be

eradicated, and the elementary notion that severity was the only adequate remedy prevailed and was given ample trial.

CONCLUSIONS.

"The reformer, desirous of stopping desertion and improving the punitory system of the army, should therefore advocate the speedy establishment of a general prison for the longer termed prisoners (over six months) of several such prisons. This is a *sine qua non* of any just and enlightened punitory system for this or any army.

"The head of this central prison should be required to keep himself in touch with various detective agencies, which could be utilized for the recapture of both escaped prisoners and of deserters. Company commanders should ascertain all the personal history that is possible of the deserter, of his family, his friends, acquaintances and correspondents, and every fact bearing on his habits and probable whereabouts. These he should report to the head of the central prison, nor should he or his soldiers stop there but continue the efforts indefinitely, as it is often much easier to capture a man after he has dropped his own watchfulness.

"All such facts, and any other that can be learned, should be communicated to the proper detective agencies for their aid in the real work of tracking down the deserters. Such a system carried out with zeal and enthusiasm by one who has the required aptitude, would go a long way to solve the problem of desertion from the army or from the navy.

"I have been disappointed too often in the effect of reforms to believe that any one system or any degree of activity could entirely eliminate desertion from the American Army. This crime is with the army to stay, and we can only diminish it and mitigate its evil effects.

"Whether we can do away with the evil or not, we should firmly endeavor to do full justice to the offender, which does not mean severity any more than leniency, but does require in its punishment the three essential elements of certainty, equality and celerity, which need for their attainment, prompt pursuit and capture of the offender, his prompt trial and sentence, and equitable treatment in a suitable prison where escape is impracticable, or as nearly so as walls can make it."

The other articles under this general head are all valuable and interesting, but we have space only for a few quotations from the *ninth*, which appears to be of more than usual importance:

"General J. P. Story, U. S. Army, as chief of artillery, made a report to the chief of staff in obedience to the letter of the President, dated March 13, calling for recommendations on the organization and training of the artillery arm. In the report General Story says:

"INTRODUCTION.

"The act of February 2, 1901, which established the artillery corps, created for the first time in the regular establishment a chief of artillery. Not until after the appointment was there any representative artillery officer who could voice with authority the needs of his arm.

"With the extraordinary advance in the material and appliances of modern artillery, the question presents itself as to what changes, if any, have been made in the personnel and its organization to meet the new conditions, strange to say, the essential features in the organization of the artillery personnel, with the exception of an insufficient number of electrician sergeants, is practically the same to-day as it was fifty years ago. A company of coast artillery as organized by the act of February 2, 1901, is in its composition practically the same in principle for the service of the formidable high power guns with its complicated machinery as it was in the bygone days of sailing vessels for the service of the simple smooth-bore gun with its primitive manual appliances. To-day we have at our fortifications steam power plants of costly design and construction, and many with no engineers and no firemen to operate them. We have costly electrical power plants and delicate electrical appliances without experts to care for and operate them except an insufficient number of underpaid electrician sergeants.

"With the substitution of steam for sail, night attack has, to a great extent, replaced day attack, with the consequence that arrangements have had to be made for lighting up all channels of approach. We have searchlights with their power appliances distributed in our fortified harbors and practically no one provided to operate them.

"The act of February 2, 1901, transferred the submarine mine and torpedo defenses of the coast of the United States from the engineer corps to the artillery corps, but made no provision to enable the latter to meet the new and grave responsibility.

"The greatly increased power of the new armament demands for its efficient service the use of a range-finding system to accurately determine ranges at all distances within the field of fire of the gun,

with electrical communication to carry the information to the gun. The approved system calls for observers and plotters who must be skilled and reliable men for whom a special grading, which does not exist in the present company organization, must be provided if we wish to keep such instructed men in the artillery service.

"The law of 1901 does not even admit of the practical recognition of the tactical requirements of the field artillery as shown by its use on modern battlefields. No legal organization is provided for any unit above the 'battery,' and the act of 1901, probably through oversight, failed to provide the officers required by an earlier law in the organization of this unit. There is no provision for organizing batteries into battalions, regiments or brigades, and consequently no provision for any grade of officers for service with field artillery above that of captain, whereas experience has demonstrated that to obtain the volume and concentration of fire upon a selected objective (which is essential to success) there must be an efficient fire control, which cannot be secured without the grouping of field batteries into larger units under one responsible direction.

"The present organization of the artillery corps is not only unsuitable, but the number of officers and men authorized under the law of 1901, is entirely inadequate to the needs of either branch of the artillery service.

"This introduction shows that the letter of the President has come at a very opportune time, and I have the honor to submit, in sequence, the following answers to his interrogatories:

"1. The Separation of the Coast and Field Artillery; and, if Recommended, the Best Way of Accomplishing it.

"The duties of coast and field artillery are so different in their nature, and their methods of accomplishment so unlike, that service in one branch does not qualify for service in the other. The progress now being made in both the coast and the field artillery is so rapid that a transfer of an officer from one branch to the other, finds him quite unprepared for his new duties. This fact is fully recognized in the rules for examination for promotion since a field artillery officer is now ordered—months prior to his examination—to a coast artillery station, to give him the necessary opportunities to qualify himself in the subjects of examination in the prescribed schedule. Transfers must be frequently made, on account of the exigencies of the service, from one branch to the other, but experience shows that a loss of efficiency always accompanies such transfers.

"2. The Increase, if any, Necessary in the Coast Artillery, the

Organization it Should Have, and the Inducements that Should be Given to Retain the Technically Skilled Enlisted Men in the Artillery Service.

"It is my judgment that the best organization for the coast artillery would be to provide officers and men of the grades mentioned in this report with authority to organize them into detachments, companies, fire commands and battle commands, according to the requirements of the service; provided, if coast artillery be ordered to duty other than at coast fortifications it may be organized into battalions, regiments and brigades. This is essentially the organization of the Marine Corps and will best fit the requirements of the coast artillery. Any fixed strength for a company makes it almost invariably too large or too small for the service of the armament to which the company may be assigned.

"As regards the inducements that should be given to retain the technically skilled men in the artillery service, I know of none other than that of adequate pay for the service performed, and possibly separate quarters for especially skilled men in technical duties, who may be non-commissioned officers or warrant officers.

"Service in the coast artillery is a practical school to an intelligent man. The soldier learns how to handle, with precision and care, scientific instruments and complicated machines. He becomes familiar with the proper handling and economical running of many electrical machines used in commerce. This knowledge is not confined to practice, but, in many cases, includes theory as well. When such a man is discharged at the end of a three years' enlistment or course of instruction, he not only has this practical and theoretical knowledge, but a discharge with 'character excellent' written across the face. In addition to this, he has an official statement from his captain, endorsed by his commanding officer, giving a succinct account of his services, his ability and his record in general. With such credentials he is very likely to find in civil life like employment with a much more attractive salary and he is permanently lost to the service. It is not reasonable to expect to hold him in the service on the meagre stipend of the average enlisted man.

"It is urgently recommended that the following grades and rates of pay be authorized:

"Master Electricians.—(Warrant officers) with pay and allowances of a second lieutenant of artillery, not mounted.

"Electrician sergeant, 1st class.—$45.00 per month and allowances of ordnance sergeant.

"Electrician sergeant, 2d class.—$35.00 per month and allowances of ordnance sergeant.

"Observer, 1st class.—$25.00 per month and allowances of artillery sergeant; one for each primary station including submarine mine command station.

"Observer, 2d class.—$22.00 per month, and allowances of an artillery coropral; one for each secondary observing station including submarine mine command station.

"Plotter.—$30.00 per month and allowances of an artillery sergeant; one for each primary observing station.

"Gun commanders.—$5.00 per month extra pay; one for each gun mounted including high power guns, R. F. guns and mortars.

"Gun pointers.—Same as gun commanders.

"Engineers.—$65.00 per month and allowances of an ordnance sergeant; one for each main and one for each secondary power plant.

"Firemen.—$30.00 per month and allowances of an artillery private; one for each main and one for each secondary power plant.

"The completion of the entire torpedo defense of the United States will cost $3,819,420, about one-half as much as a battleship complete, and in no other way can the same amount of money be spent to such advantage for the national defense.

"The personnel regarded as necessary is as follows:

	Officers.	Master Elect'n.	Elect'n Sergt. 1st class.	Elect'n Sergt. 2d class.	Enlisted men of companies.
Torpedo Defense.....	117				3,740
Power Plants, S. L., etc.....	52	26	74	74	1,056

"There is a consensus of opinion among artillery officers that our present appropriations for target practice are not sufficient to qualify skilled gunners in either branch of the artillery. Coast artillery practice consists in subcaliber practice and in service practice. To develop the desired skill in hitting at long ranges, full service charges are necessary. (The cost is estimated at $200,000 annually). If we are compelled to resort to less than service charges, at least one practice in a year should be with the full service charge, and in no case should the muzzle velocity be reduced below 1,800 or 2,000 f. s."

MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING.

1. Notes from Essex Maneuvers.—*Jour. R. U. S. I.*, May.

2. Conjoint Practice of Navy and Army in Embarkation, etc.—*Same.*

3. The Russian Training Camp at Moscow.—*Mil. Serv. Inst.*, July-Aug.

4. Modern Infantry Target Practice.—*Kriegs. Zeit.*, 5.

The *first* of these articles relates to the recent British maneuvers, and contains some valuable lessons:

"It was clear from the experience gained that the opportunities of using artillery in a highly enclosed country, such as Essex, must be but few and far between, and that the long range of modern guns would be discounted by the impossibility of getting a target at anything but what, for artillery, would be a very short range."

"The range and stopping power of modern weapons are largely discounted when the physical features of a close country enable the attackers to advance almost unseen to within a few hundred yards of the defenders' position, while the difficulty of ascertaining the true direction of the attack and its progress makes it very difficult to decide as to the opportune moment and direction of the counter-stroke.

"Another marked feature of the recent maneuvers was the extreme difficulty of maintaining cohesion and direction in the fight. Direction was easily lost, and units were ignorant of what was going on in their immediate neighborhood. The need of communicating and connecting posts was seriously felt. Cyclists are well suited for this purpose, but in their absence mounted troops will have to be employed.

"On the whole, the nature of the fighting calls for the highest discipline and training on the part of the defending troops. It is a widely-held opinion that the intricacies of close country will enable imperfectly trained troops to offer lengthy opposition to an advancing force. This opinion is not corroborated by our recent experiences in Essex, where the need for highly-trained officers, a well organized system of command and communication and good discipline was convincingly proved.

"The selection of the county of Essex as the maneuver area was not without its advantages; it afforded an entirely new experience to all arms and ranks. The troops for the most part were confined to roads and lanes. Cavalry operations were difficult, artillery positions

generally absent, and the movements of troops were much hampered by the extent of the 'out of bounds' area.

"The leading of infantry in the very enclosed country operated over, presented great difficulties, and was new to most of the officers engaged. Without the utmost care the attack in closed country becomes spasmodic and without any cohesion, and is beaten in detail, as the defender can run from one field to another wherever danger threatens.

"I have no doubt that the diminution of the strength of artillery attached to each division of the Blue Force was due to financial reasons, but for tactical reasons also I consider it was perfectly justifiable, as in such closed country the amount of support which can be given to the infantry by the artillery is small, and long columns of guns only tend to block the roads.

"In an enclosed country such as Essex, the first steps in entrenchment (so-called) before any digging is begun should be to make gaps in the hedges to get inter-communication between companies, and the next should be to cut down the quick-set hedges to obtain a free field of fire."

The *second* of the above articles is the second prize essay on the subject, and constitutes a very interesting and valuable study.

The essay comprises the following chapters:

Over-sea expeditions.
Embarkations.
Disembarkations.
Landing Operations.
Re-embarkations.
Coast reconnaissance.
Training and conjoint practice.

The *third* is an entertaining article by the adjutant of the 7th Regiment, N. Y. N. G.

The *fourth* is a study by an officer of the Bavarian infantry, in which he outlines the modernization of infantry target practice in a very readable article.

MILITARY, HISTORY, STRATEGY AND TACTICS.

1. Fashions in Sea-Fighting.—*Unit. Serv. Mag.*, May.

2. Addendum to Operations of the Navy and Marine Corps in the Philippine Archipelago, 1898-1902.—*Proc. Nav. Inst.*, June.

3. Fighting in Enclosed Country.—*Jour. R. U. S. I.*, May.
4. After Mukden.—*Same.*
5. Optimism in the German Field Artillery.—*Same.*
6. Jungle Tactics.—*Mil. Serv. Inst.*, July-Aug.
7. The Battle of Shake (Sha) River.—*Same.*
8. Remarks Upon Tactics.—*Same.*
9. French Views of the Employment of Cavalry in Combat.—*Same.*
10. Field and Siege Operations in the Far East.—*Same.*
11. The Submarine as an Enemy.—*Proc. Nav. Inst.*, June.
12. Lessons from *Clausewitz* for the Naval Officer.—*Mar. Rund*, June.
13. The Three Great Commercial Powers.—*Same.*
14. The Magazine Rifle in the Attack and Defense of Fortifications.—*Krieg. Zeit.*, 5.

The *first* of these articles, by Commander Shore, Royal Navy, contains many points of general interest and application:

"To the student of naval warfare there can be few more interesting phenomena than the confident predictions concerning the doom of big fighting-ships which have heralded the advent of each new development of maritime warfare.

"In the old Elizabethan days, for example, there were sea-officers who sailed in dread of the Spanish galleys; and who, dazzled by the depredations of these ubiquitous craft, maintained that even large vessels caught unawares by them must needs succumb. * * *

At a later period came the gunboat craze, when timid Britons—*vis à vis* of Napoleon's Boulogne flotilla—pinned their faith on gunboats as affording the best defense against invasion.

"The introduction of the ram was the signal for a fresh outburst of 'expert' opinion; and, with the doom of the battleship for their text, great was the company of preachers. Men who affected to see further through the fog of futurity than their fellows, predicted, not the disappearance of the battleship alone, but of the big gun as a weapon of naval warfare. An officer of high scientific attainments even went the length of composing a long and learned treatise to prove that, because the ram could strike a blow with so many thousand foot-tons of energy, against the mere pounds of the gun projectile, naval battles of the future would be decided by ramming.

"And yet the battleship survived, and even grew in stature and in favor with seamen and naval architects.

"Then arose prophets, across the Channel, who declared that Brittania was to be brought to her knees by starvation and the destruction of her floating wealth; and immediately there ensued the commerce-destroying craze.

"And now, in the present year of grace, we find ourselves in the throes of the submarine agitation. A great future is predicted for these mammoth torpedoes; nations are investing immense sums in the new type of battleship-exterminator, and will probably go on increasing their holdings in this particular form of maritime insurance until experience has proved its futility—or the reverse!

"In view of past experience he would be a bold man who essayed to forecast the trend of naval shipbuilding policy many years ahead. The doom of the big battleship has been proclaimed so often, without any very startling revolution ensuing, that the wise man will do well not to risk his reputation on prophecy. * * *

"Amidst all the chances and changes of maritime warfare it is comforting to be able to point to one immutable principle which underlies all sound systems of naval administrations, namely, the frank recognition of the human element as the dominating factor in war. Types of ships may alter, guns may give place to more destructive weapons, and new methods of propulsion may find their place in future fleets. But the human element, like the poor, will always be with us; and human nature remains the same in all ages. There was a time, during the latter part of the Napoleonic wars, when British Ministers believed that a ship with guns, and a due proportion of men and officers, collected from no one knew where, or by what vile methods, constituted an effective man-of-war: a delusion the Americans helped to dispel. Within the last year we have seen a great and powerful empire confront her foes with a magnificent fleet which, under the stress of war, has collapsed in a way that has astonished the world. In both cases the cause of failure was identical—the neglect of the human element."

The *third* article contains some useful tactical notes on fighting in enclosed country which will find application in many parts of the United States, as our Civil War illustrated:

RECONNAISSANCE.

"How are its principles modified in enclosed country? So many difficulties hinder effectual reconnaissance that it has been suggested that the best plan would be to select an objective by the map and go

straight for it without any reconnaissance. This may save time, but the attacking force is very liable to strike the air only and become lost or cut off by the defender.

"Balloons.—Little information can be obtained from balloons in close country. The present day long-range guns can keep them at a distance, and they also require considerable escorts, but, as they afford a wider view than anything else does, they should be multiplied rather than reduced, and constantly practiced with. Our balloon was stalked and disabled.

"Cavalry patrols, being confined to roads, are very liable to be cut off, ambushed, or at least effectually blocked by the enemy, and they can see little.

"Cyclists can obtain considerably more information than cavalry, being less easily seen and heard, and being able to travel faster and furter round an enemy's flanks. Individual cyclist officers obtained much of the information gained during the Essex Maneuvers.

"Infantry scouting is the only reconnaissance that can succeed when the enemy is near at hand, but it badly wants developing. Infantry scouts should take advantage of ditches, and creep up to banks to see if they are occupied. In this work they take the place of the mounted scouts who rode up to the kopjes in South Africa. The service is a most dangerous one, and requires selected men and a regular course of training.

"The Germans have long employed infantry scouts, also the Russians, under the name of 'Foot Cossacks;' we ourselves have proved their value over and over again on the Indian Frontier.

PROTECTION.

The Advance Guard must be unusually strong in infantry because: *a.* More men are required to search out close country. *b.* There are none of the commanding points to economize men. *c.* Numerous connecting files are necessary. *d.* When cross-roads are reached the advance guard should be strong enough to detach parties down them to watch until the column has passed in safety. (This last is not necessary where flank guards can move along parallel roads).

"Advance guards require their local reserves very near the firing line to be at hand to repel an enemy who has got close up unseen.

"The advance gaurds may move near to the main body, as they have not got to keep the enemy's guns out of range.

"These two remarks apply to all protective formations.

ATTACK.

"With regard to the advance to the attack of the main body, a course commonly adopted would be as follows: Columns would advance by parallel routes and obtain contact along the enemy's front until the local reserves could effect penetration at some weak point. Mobile reserves would drive this assault home, while local reserves repelled counter-attacks. * * *

"Infantry are not exposed to long-range artillery fire from the enemy, but they are also, as a rule, unable to reckon on support from guns.

"Cavalry, like mounted infantry, will, I think, be chiefly confined to dismounted action, such especially as rapidly strengthening the attack on weak points and checking counter-attacks. It was cyclists and Yeomanry who got in on the right of Blue's position on 12th September.

"A large proportion of mounted men should be kept in hand for these purposes.

"Shock action is practically out of the question, though a charge or two was successful in the American War.

"Schemes for concentration of cavalry require to be carefully worked out and arranged beforehand.

"Cyclists, however, are undoubtedly more suited for enclosed country work, and even the cavalry commanders admitted this in Essex. In fact, cyclists were shown to be as useful in such country as mounted troops were in South Africa, and I believe that a few hundred cyclists supported by armored motors and machine guns, and with motor cyclists to convey orders and information, would successfully oppose many times their own number of other troops.

"Artillery is a large and important question, and might well form the subject of another paper and discussion here. Guns labor under the following great disadvantages in enclosed country:

"*a.* They cannot make use of their longer range, but must always come into action within effective rifle-fire of their target.

"*b.* The dangerous zone and general effect of their projectiles is halved.

"*c.* Being confined to the roads it is extremely difficult for them and their wagons and ammunition columns to get about and avoid blocks.

"*d.* They require large escorts, and are in constant danger of being surprised.

"*e.* They are somewhat at the mercy of pom-poms and machine guns, which can get near them under cover.

"*f.* It is extremely difficult for them to find positions at all for supporting infantry.

"*g.* Their fire cannot generally be observed.

"*h.* There is no room to mass them, and co-operation is too difficult.

"These considerations almost, if not quite, cancel their usefulness; but happily here we can remember that such flat, featureless, and completely enclosed country as Essex is the exception even in England.

"General French reports (of the Essex Maneuvers): 'The absence of artillery positions . . . . gave very little scope for this arm . . . . The only possible tactics appeared to require that batteries should be attached to infantry brigades, and should trust to local co-operation whenever it might be found possible.'"

The *fourth* article is a discussion of General Kuropatkin and the forces under his command:

"During the past 13 months of the war, up to the 12th March of the current year inclusive, 13,087 officers, 761,467 rank and file, 146,408 horses, 1,521 guns, and close on 500,000 tons of various military goods have been carried to Kharbin by the railway. This works out to an average monthly delivery at Kharbin of 1,007 officers, 58,574 men, 11,262 horses, 117 guns, and about 38,460 tons of war *matériel.* In other words, every month brought into Kharbin from 1½ to 2 army corps, every day close on two battalions (or more accurately, 1,918 men) of reinforcements were brought up. * * *

"In Kharbin, south of Kharbin, and as far as Port Arthur inclusive, 56,000 troops, with 60 field guns (including the Frontier and Railway Guards) were already distributed at the beginning of the war, and, in addition, troops were coming in to Kharbin from Blagoveshtchensk and Eastern Trans-Baikalia, not by rail but route march (approximately 5,000). Consequently we had altogether 823,000 men and 1,580 field guns south of Kharbin in the course of the 13 months of war; whereas at the present moment out of this enormous mass all that is left is General Linievitch's Army, which cannot exceed 300,000 to 320,000, with its whole communications up to Kharbin thrown in. It would appear from the above that for the year's war

we have lost half a million soldiers. We have despatched troops almost double the strength of the Army demanded by General Kuropatkin (400,000) for the expeditious conclusion of the war, but even two-thirds of this enormous host has melted away in these 13 months of campaigning. If that is so, then without doubt the moral responsibility for the lamentable outcome of the 1904-5 campaign falls with almost its entire weight upon General Kuropatkin, supervising our military operations in Manchuria. It appears from the figures of the *Russki Invalid* that General Kuropatkin almost during the whole course of the war had the benefit of an undoubtedly considerable excess over the Japanese forces, but was incapable of taking advantage of the numerical superiority of his troops over the enemy, and aimlessly wasted his strength and sacrificed the blood of his soldiers.

"We are not in the least anxious to undertake the thankless task of justifying the strategy and tactics of General Kuropatkin. On the contrary, as far as the present state of our Press admits, the writer of these lines strove as far back as the battle of Tiuren-cheng to indicate General Kuropatkin's blunders in the conduct of military operations, his constant policy of half-measures, his eternal vacillation between retreat and advance, and the absence of any decided plan of campaign. But it would now be unjust in the extreme to lay the whole burden of guilt for the loss of the campaign upon General Kuropatkin, as commander-in-chief, and his staff. To begin with, however enormous be the forces placed at the disposal of General Kuropatkin for the prosecution of the war, the figures for the strength of the rank and file shipped to Kharbin give a very exaggerated idea of the number of rifles and sabres in our Manchurian Army. The figures 761,467 for rank and file, to be absolutely accurate, represent not the number of actual combatants but the number of passengers arriving at Kharbin. Evidently these numbers include not only combatant rank and file, but also non-combatants (artificers, bakers, medical corps, hospital attendants, etc.), who form unavoidable accompaniments to an army, as well as various details of the auxiliary services (flying artillery packs, drivers, and mounted transport troops, etc.), who cannot be put in the fighting line. * * *

"Consequently, from these proportions it may be accepted that in the figures of 761,000 soldiers carried to Kharbin, 75 per cent. at the outside belonged to the combatant forces, and nearly 200,000 men to auxiliary services, who could not be put into the fighting line. Out of the general mass of over 800,000 arriving at the theatre of war, in no case could the fighting element have exceeded 600,000 men.

* * * "If the general strength of our forces for the whole campaign be fixed at 600,000 (exclusive of non-combatants), then deducting from this figure the present strength of General Linievitch's troops (300,000 to 320,000), our total losses for the whole campaign come to 280,000 to 300,000, and not half a million.

"Two hundred thousand soldiers, who must be cancelled from the grand total of the mass transported to Kharbin, make an enormous difference; why, this is equivalent to 5 whole army corps, with artillery and cavalry."

The *fifth* is a most important article, coming as it does from the pen of Germany's greatest living authority on Field Artillery, General Rohne:

"Our experimental authorities have been occupied for fully four years with the question of a Q.F. gun for the field artillery. The guns have been twice tried by the troops—in 1903 and 1904—and were found to be in every respect satisfactory after the first trials. In the interval nearly every European Power has adopted the Q.F. gun for its field artillery. No one can maintain that the experiments with this gun have been hastily carried out in Germany; it is rather the case that the system of barrel-recoil has met with strenuous opponents in Germany who were still eagerly fighting against it two years ago, at a time when it was universally recognized as the gun of the future. The reasons advanced for this operation were so weak that they fill me with amazement and disgust. However, we may turn to the discussion of our subject, for the triumphant introduction of the Q.F. gun into the German field artillery can be only a question of weeks. It follows its introduction into the German garrison artillery, which has been carried out with praiseworthy rapidity and energy.

"Contemporary literature shows that a dangerous spirit of optimism is prevalent in many quarters in the field artillery. It delights in maintaining that all our existing equipment is suitable in every respect, and certainly better than that of our neighbors. This is a serious obstacle to progress. It is quite comprehensible that the first reports about the new French field guns should have been received with great mistrust, for performances such as those of the quick-firing gun were in old days considered an unattainable ideal. But this mistrust was not abated after it had been demonstrated with guns made in German factories that it was a fact that the gun did not recoil when fired, and that whole series of shots could be discharged by rapid fire without observing each shot, and without any loss of accuracy. People

were not willing to admit that the '96 field gun was out of date, and maintained, with remarkable obstinacy, that it was capable of competing with the French protected batteries with good prospect of success. Our good fortune preserved us from so unequal a contest, and as France has now no Allies who are free to assist her, and as she is in great difficulties with her officers, it may be taken for granted that the re-armament of the German field artillery will be carried out without interruption.

"I consider that the principle laid down in the French drill book, that the batteries should be deployed at an early stage, but that they should only open fire when required, is very happily conceived. It is in accordance with the principle of economy of force without dividing force. It admits of a commander developing a powerful artillery fire at any moment, and allows him much greater liberty, since the batteries which have not opened fire are much more in hand. Briefly, it takes the fullest advantage of the increase in fire-effect due to the increase in the rate of fire. It is not necessary for the batteries to expose themselves, for the perfected laying apparatus and methods of shooting admit of fire from more or less covered positions. In comparison with this fundamental difference, all other differences between the French and German drill books are of minor importance, and I pass them by.

"The idea that the great fire-effect of the gun compels the enemy to make every possible use of cover, and that therefore the artillery must endeavor to make their fire effective from the first or else they will be too late, runs like a red thread through the French drill book. This must be borne in mind in considering the French fire instructions. The drill book requires the most careful and complete preparation for fire. (Part I, 620—2°). It lays more stress upon attaining the desired effect in the shortest possible time than with the least possible expenditure of ammunition. I consider this idea absolutely correct. The enemy can only be overcome if he is prevented from developing his strength by anticipating him. Therefore it is better to waste ammunition than time, though in this instance ammunition cannot be said to be wasted.* In brief, without going into every sentence, I am in complete agreement with the principles of the French fire instructions.

"The French methods of fire may be taken as generally known.

*It is a question whether more ammunition will be wasted when the three batteries of a brigade are firing at the same time at a comparatively narrow target, or when only one battery is shooting at the same target.

The fire instructions lay down that *tir progressif* is the normal method against a living target. By this method, when using rapid fire, a space of 500 metres deep is kept under fire. All the guns are laid upon some easily recognizable auxiliary mark, but with different deflections according to the orders of the battery commander. This method is very similar to our method of laying with the lining plane; but as the instruments are more exact, and the French attach no importance to pin-point shooting when using time-shrapnel, ranging for line is quite simple.

"In contradistinction to the German regulations, time-shrapnel is used for ranging; the bracket of 200 metres is obtained, and fire for effect is then begun. This is carried out at four different elevations, the first being 100 metres less than the shorter elevation of the bracket, the remainder increasing by 100 metres each. It depends upon the width of the target whether the guns are traversed after each round or not. A single battery firing at a target 100 metres wide and less will not traverse; if the targets are wider (up to 200 metres) guns will be traversed after each round, so that fire may be evenly distributed over the whole front. Against wider targets more than one battery must be brought into action, or the parts of the target must be dealt with in succession. The method is very simple and quite mechcanical. Of course, the battery commander or his assistants must understand the use of their instruments, especially the goniometer and the battery telescope; but this is easily learnt by practice.

"It is the case that, in ranging with time-shrapnel many rounds which burst too high cannot be observed. This was formerly of much greater importance than it is now, because the smoke on burst was much less, and because the very flat trajectory of modern guns has considerably reduced the probable error in height of shrapnel. The best proof that the observation of time-shrapnel is not so difficult lies in the fact that the Swedish and Danish field artillery, after the introduction of the Q.F. gun, have absolutely accepted the French methods of ranging, more particularly ranging with time-shrapnel.

"The views which I have quoted above are very widespread, and this is the reason I have dealt with them so thoroughly. They are a sign of the deadly spirit of optimism which has taken such a hold in certain quarters in the artillery. An unhealthy spirit of optimism has more than once been the cause of preparations for war not being thoroughly carried out. The French in 1870, the English in 1899, and in more recent times the Russians, have experienced this to their cost. We are now suffering from the sad consequences of it in

Southwest Africa. The Austrians did not recognize the advantages of the needle-gun. This cost them the hegemony of the German States and a fair province. We had to pay with rivers of blood for the fact that our infantry in 1870 were armed with a rifle inferior to that of the French.

"The necessity for re-arming the field artillery will no longer be disputed by anybody. It is my fixed opinion that changes in organization, in tactics, and in methods of shooting, will follow this measure in the direction which I have for a long time pointed out. It is only in this way that the German field artillery can regain the supremacy it has lost."

The *sixth* article, by Lieutenant Hamilton, 14th Infantry, is a very suggestive one, especially as it is based on actual experience in the field.

The other articles under this general head are all of prime importance, but do not admit of quotation or brief summary. Their titles sufficiently suggest the character of their subject-matter.

ARTILLERY.

1. Optimism in the German Field Artillery.—*Jour. R. U. S. I.*, May.

2. The 4 to 6-Inch Howitzers, Ehrhardt System, Model 1900.—*Kriegs. Zeit.*, 5.

3. Ehrhardt Howitzers and Field Guns.—*Same.*

WARSHIPS.

1. The Italian Battleship Ammiraglio di Saint Bon.—*Jour. R. U. S. I.*, May.

2. The French Naval Estimates.—*Same.*

3. The New Japanese Battleship Kashima.—*Same.*

4. The Question of Submarines in the French Navy.—*Mar. Rund.*, June.

5. American Warships.—*Same.*

6. Changes in the World's Navies.—*Jour. R. U. S. I.*, June; *Proc. Mar. Inst.*, June.

The *second* article contains the following item:

"It would seem to be necessary that France should maintain in Eastern waters a battle squadron strong enough, if necessary, to deal at once with the Japanese fleet. In order to have our fleet concentrated at the opportune moment, we must take in hand some such

scheme of organization as has been lately carried into effect in England. First, the Squadron of the North should be kept fully manned all the year round. An armored squadron should be constituted in the Indian Ocean, with its base at Diego Suarez, and it would seem to be indispensable to organize on a permanent footing all the vessels necessary for the auxiliary services of the fleet. Finally, it will be necessary to properly fortify our coaling stations along the route to China, to convert Diego Suarez and Saïgon into real dockyards, each with a couple of dry docks and the necessary plant for effecting repairs on a large scale, as well as a proper reserve of stores of all kinds, which will be required by a fleet, and perhaps create another naval base, should circumstances call for it, at some point on the coast of Tonquin. The need is pressing, and it is time the Government should make up its mind."

The *third* describes Japan's latest battleship:

"The first-class battleship Kashima, building by Sir W. G. Armstrong, Whitworth & Co. (Limited), for the Imperial Japanese Navy, was launched on the 22d March from the Elswick shipyard of this firm. Her principal dimensions are as follows: Length of the vessel on the water-line, 455 feet; beam, 78 feet 2 inches; draught, 26 feet 7½ inches, on a displacement of 16,400 tons.

"The disposition of the armor protection adopted in the latest and most powerful battleships has been followed in this vessel. The armor amidships is carried from below the water-line up to the upper deck. Above this deck additional protection is afforded by a 4-inch screen rising to a height of 7 feet 6 inches above the upper deck, covering the 6-inch gun positions amidships as well as the spaces between the 10-inch gun positions. The main armor belt has a thickness of 9 inches for more than half her length, and extends the whole length of the vessel, tapering slightly at the extremities. This belt extends to 5 feet below water and 2 feet 6 inches above water. Surmounting it is a belt of armor extending in length from the after 12-inch barbette right forward to the stem. This belt is 6 inches thick amidships, and tapered slightly towards the stem. Immediately above this 6-inch belt is the 6-inch citadel armor, reaching to the upper deck, and enclosing the two 12-inch barbettes Within this citadel are placed ten of the 6-inch guns, separated from each other by screens of 80-lb. armor plating; these guns fire through ports similar to those in casemates. The other two 6-inch guns fire through similar ports in the 4-inch screen armor on the upper deck amidships. The barbette armor

of the 12-inch guns has a thickness of 9 inches on the upper or exposed portions, and a thickness of 5 inches where protection is afforded by the citadel armor. The thickness of the 10-inch gun barbette armor is 6 inches, that of the conning-tower armor 9 inches, and the observer tower, 5 inches. In addition to these protected positions for commanding officers, two more officers' shelters will be provided of 3-inch armor; these will be placed on the boat deck amidships. The steel protective deck, running throughout the entire length of the vessel, and covering the whole of the machinery, magazines, etc., has a thickness of 2 inches on the flat portions amidships, and 3 inches on the sloping sides. The sides of this deck are carried down and join the bottom of the main armor belt. At the extremities of the vessel where the armor protection is reduced, this deck is 2½ inches thick all over. Further protection is given to the upper structure of the vessel by thick protective plating worked on top of the screen armor at the level of the boat deck.

"The main armament will comprise four 12-inch guns, twin mounted in barbettes, four 10-inch guns mounted singly in barbettes, twelve 6-inch guns carried in the citadel, twelve 12-pounder guns, six Maxim guns, three 3-pounder, and five torpedo tubes. * * *

"An efficient arrangement of torpedo-net defense will also be provided around the greater part of the vessel. Accommodation will be provided in the vessel for officers and crew. The total complement will be about 980."

1. An American Uniform for the U. S. Army.—*Mil. Serv. Inst.*, July-Aug.

2. Importance of Field Intrenchments.—*A. and N. Jour.*, May 27.

The *first* of these, by Major Gillette, Corps of Engineers, discusses the proper uniform for our army, based on modern principles.

The *second* relates to a subject of vital importance to our army:

"After considering the subject under various heads the committee reached these conclusions: 1. The committee is unanimously of the opinion that the intrenching tool should be carried on the person of the soldier; 2. A class of tools of size and weight for carrying on the person would be required different from those recommended by the Board of Ordnance and Fortification in its report of Jan. 8, 1903; 3. As to the best type of each the committee recommends that a pick mattock with twenty-two-inch handle and weighing two pounds four ounces, more or less, be adopted. The committee say, in their report: 'After considering the various types of intrenching shovels and spades

before the committee, all were finally rejected except model No. 4, and the German spade captured at Tientsin. The model No. 4 is preferred to model No. 1, with the iron crutch handle, which is recommended by Major Burr, because it weighs less, and also for the reason that if the handle of No. 1 came off and was lost it would be practically impossible to use the shovel, while if the handle of No. 4 came out and was lost, the soldier could always extemporize a crosspiece to insert in the eye of the handle.

" 'It may be pointed out that the experiences of the most recent wars—the Russo-Japanese war and the Boer war—lead to the conclusion that trenches, to be of value against modern rifle and artillery fire, must be of the kneeling or standing type, and these cannot be constructed with any variety of knife intrenching tool, except with the greatest difficulty.'

"Following is the memorandum by Capt. P. C. March, General Staff, upon the use of the intrenching tool by the Japanese Army in the Russo-Japanese war:

REPORTS OF CAPTAINS MARCH AND REICHMANN.

"The spade and pick mattock are carried by them on the pack during marches. When an attack was to be made, the intrenching tools were taken from the packs, which were left behind under guard. The spades were slung to the belt, so that when the desired position was reached intrenchments could immediately be made. Sometimes, when a Russian trench was captured, the Japanese immediately shoveled the earth from one side to the other of the trench and used it against the original constructors.

" 'There has never been a great war in which intrenchments have been used more than in this war. The whole of Manchuria passed over by the Japanese 1st Army, from the Yalu to the Shaho, was intrenched, and the army never took a position of any importance without intrenching immediately.

" 'The Russians did exactly the same thing, and there was not a single fight of which I have knowledge that was not an attack against an intrenched position. These intrenchments were not rifle pits or lying-down trenches, but largely standing trenches, and, as time went on, still heavier intrenchments affording overhead cover against artillery. It may be stated, generally, that hasty intrenchments or those affording only cover to a man lying down are utterly valueless against modern artillery fire.

" 'My observations of the use of intrenchments in this war lead me to the opinion that an efficient and serviceable intrenching equipment, consisting of spade and pick mattock, and carried on the man, is an absolute necessity as a part of the equipment of the American Army.'

The exceedingly interesting and important report of Capt. Carl Reichmann follows:

"I deem it of the utmost importance that our infantry be equipped with an efficient intrenching tool. In the war in the Far East, when the Russian soldier did not march and fight, he was digging intrenchments, and the same is probably true of the Japanese army. I doubt whether any part of the world was seamed with trenches as is Manchuria, and I know of no conflict in that war where the attacker was not confronted by substantial intrenchments, and there seemed to be plenty of time to construct them."

MILITARY GEOGRAPHY.

1. Map Showing Seat of War in Manchuria.—*Natl. Geog. Mag.*, June.

2. Hong Kong.—*Mar. Rund.*, June.

MISCELLANEOUS.

1. Forecasting the Weather and Storms.—*Natl. Geog. Mag.*, June.

2. Portable Military Building (Barracks, Stables, Officers' Quarters, etc.).—*Kriegs. Zeit*, 5.

3. Field Railroads (new type).—*Same.*

SERVICE SALAD.

IN THE RIVER PEI-HO.*

A NAVAL PENSIONER'S STORY.

The episode which is the subject of this ballad is in every detail historical. For certain incidents, which are now made public for the first time, the author desires to acknowledge his obligations to various survivors of this gallant affair, and notably to Admiral Sir George Ommanney Willes, G. C. B. (who was captain of the Chesapeake); to Paymaster-in-Chief James William Murray Ashley, C. B. (who was secretary to Rear Admiral Sir James Hope, and who has lent copies of all the official papers and plans bearing upon this subject); and to Staff Captain John Phillips (who was second master of the Plover, and who saw Flag Officer Tatnall's boat come alongside, and witnessed or heard what happened subsequently). It may be added that no medal was granted for this hard-fought action.

A yarn about some victory?—Why, bless you, there's no need
For the likes o' me to spin you one; there isn't, sir, indeed.
The folks as writes in the papers, or as brings out regular stories,
Have told you all you want to know about them naval glories.
There's precious little danger of the victories bein' forgot;
But, I'm feared, we do a bit forget the actions as was not.

Yet I count it to their credit, when men have done their best,
Though they have to turn their backs at last and leave undone the rest.
There's many a victory, surely, decisive and complete,
As meant a sight less fightin' than a hardly fought defeat:
And if people do their duty, every man in his degree,
Why, defeat may be more glorious than a victory needs to be.

What do I think of furriners?—Well, they're of many a sort:
You'll find a different lot of them in every furrin port—
There's Christians and there's cannibals; there's yallers, browns and blacks;
There's people as is fully dressed with nothin' on their backs:
But the only kind o' furriner it's pleasure to recall
Is the Yankee,—and I reckon, he ain't furriner at all.

He is? Well, howsomever, sir, he speaks like me and you:
He has a heart inside him: he ain't French, nor Turk, nor Jew.
I say he ain't no furriner; but have your way, not mine,
Though I don't see how he can be when I think of "fifty-nine."
—Ay! there's a yarn as I can spin—forgotten far too soon—
'Bout our defeat in Chiney on the twenty-fifth of June.

It ain't for me to tell you how the troubles there began,
Nor I don't pretend to remember the whole of our Adm'ral's plan;
'Twas a question of sendin' our Envoy up, by way of the River Pei-ho,
And the Chinese blocked the channel, determined he shouldn't go.
They had thrown three booms across it, and had lined both flanks with forts,
Designed by Roosian friends of theirs, accordin' to all reports.

*From *Blackwood's Magazine.*

Yet, lor'! we never dreamt as how the Chinese meant to fight:
There's mostwise more of bark, you know, in them there chaps than bite.
Leastways, we thought, if it came to blows, they'd have to pay the bill,
For we didn't see no troops about, and the forts lay wonderful still:
But a Yankee frigate below the bar had heard and seen a bit,
And their Adm'ral's cox'en said to me,
"You'll find you're chewin' grit."

That self-same Adm'ral—Tatnall—flag-orficer they called 'im,
Was a rum un, so they all agreed, when things went wrong and galled 'im;
Yet he was an excellent orficer—rough, p'raps, but bluff and hearty,
And very particular friends with Adm'ral Hope and the British party,—
Though I did hear tell that, in eighteen twelve, in the old American war,
He fought as a mid, agin us, and no one hated us more.

His cox'en, who told me that, explained—and it may be true, I s'pose—
That a family quarrel ain't the same as a row with outside foes:
Young brothers will fall to loggerheads, and fight to their heart's content;
And, in course, it's sad enough to see, but their ain't no lastin' rent:
And, from what I saw in Chiney, I tell you, fair and frank,
I shan't complain if I never have a better friend than a Yank.

Well, the Chinese beggars promised as they'd do as we desired,
And open the way; but they didn't stir, and our Adm'ral he got tired;
And at last says he, "We must force the forts, and burst the booms all three,
And clear the road to Tiensin, that our Envoy may go free.
So he took his gunboats across the bar, and he passed the word of Warnin':
"Be ready to-morrow, the twenty-fifth, at half-past four in the mornin'."

The first boom was of iron piles; the second of heavy spars;
The third, of timber balks, cross-lashed, and tied with iron bars.
The Chesapeake's skipper, Captain Willes, that night, with a boat or two
Crept up in the dark and nearly cut the second of 'em through;
But the Chinese rascals, bless your heart, were not to be done that way,
And they made the whole thing good again by dawn on the followin' day.

I was then A. B. in the Plover, which hoisted the blue at the mizen,
When the Adm'ral came with his staff to our little packet from his'n.
The 'Possum was sent to the first boom, and moored to it close as could be:
There was likewise the Sterling and Janus, the Cormorant, Kestrel, and Lee,
Not forgettin' the Bant'rer and Nimrod, and, lower down, nearly abreast,
The Haughty and Forester, and formin' a kind of reserve to the rest.

The channel was narrow and awk'ard, and the stream ran strong in our faces,
And it wasn't no easy matter to get to our proper places;

The Starling stuck in the mud on the left, the Bant'rer stuck on the right,
And the others had many a nasty shave of gettin' no share in the fight:
But, by two o'clock in the afternoon, we were most of us near to our stations,
And the 'Possum, by Adm'ral's orders, began to commence operations.

She had made a hawser fast to one of the spiked iron piles,
And she tugged and tugged at the thing, and she blew off steam meanwhile:
It set me laughin' to see her, for I couldn't help thinkin', in truth,
It was just like a little dentist along of a stubborn tooth.
But the pile came out at last, and gave the 'Possum room,
And she and the Plover together moved up to the second boom.

I never saw a lovelier day: the sun as hot, and the sky
Was as dark and deep a kind of blue as the Adm'ral's flag in the "fly";
And when we neared the second boom, and all lay calm and still,
It began to seem's if the Chinee braves were wantin' in pluck or will.
But, bless you, sir, we did them wrong, for suddenly every gun
In the forts blazed down on our little craft;—there were thirty-five, if one.

They had the range to a nicety, and they looked right down on our decks,
And in half an hour, or little more, the 'Possum and we were wrecks:
A shot took Cap'en Rason, cuttin' 'im clean in two
(And no wonder, sir, for he stood there right full in the enemy's view).
And another struck a soldier, McKenna was his name,
—A cap'en he was in the Royals,—and served him just the same.

The Adm'ral, he was wounded, likewise the second master,
And, as the afternoon wore on the men fell ever faster.
One shot 'most cleared our for'ard gun of all its proper crew,
And others tore great holes in us, and cut our cables through:
That's why we drifted down a bit,—it wasn't for loss of pluck,—
There wasn't a man on board us but cursed our evil luck.

We drifted, steerin' as we could, until the muddy tide
Carried us down to the Cormorant, and we lashed to her starboard side.
We were not out of range—no fear!—and we kep' on firin' hard,
For our bow-gun cleared the Cormorant's bows, though only by a yard:
But they took the Adm'ral out of us, he bein' very bad,
And board us there wasn't comfort nor quiet to be had.

I'm telling how the Plover fared, but I won't forget the rest,
For every single craft engaged did just as much her best:
The Lee and Kestrel sadly mauled, were sunk by the Chinee shot;
And the 'Possum had been ordered where the fire was not so hot:
Yet the action hadn't slackened much, except on the Chinee side,
And it looked as if a victory might even then betide.

At half-past four, or thereabouts, as near as I could learn,
A double-banked cutter came 'long-

side, with the Stars and Stripes at the stern.
Flag-orficer Tatnall, burly and tanned, was sittin', as usual, aft,
And behind him sat his cox'en my pal of the 'Merican craft.
They came to our starboard gangway, and, just as they happened to come,
Blowed if some Chinee gunner didn't manage to hull my chum.

I thought to myself, "Why neutral folks, as hasn't no business here,
Should be pullin' about in this storm of shot is a point as isn't clear;"
But, when old Tatnall climbed on board, and I heard what he'd to say,
I began to look at the pullin 'about in a different kind of way:
For he asked them to take him to Adm'ral Hope (which, in course, our orficers soon did),
And he said as he trusted he might be of use in removin' and tendin' the wounded.

He crossed our deck to the Cormorant, wnere our Adm'ral's flag was flyin',
And he left his cutter full of men alongside idly lyin';
And I saw the 'Mericans' eyes on us, as we loaded and fired as commanded.
(We were fit to drop from weariness besides bein' so short-handed);
And one says, "Bill, while we sets down here we does what he didn't oughter:
I'm going to help them blokes up there, for blood is thicker than water."

So first that one and then some more, slipped slyly aboard the Plover,
And did a job for the dear old flag as was blowin' out ragged above her:
They didn't say much, and they made no fuss, and I scarce know how it was done,
But, upon my word, an American crew was presently workin' our gun:
And so we rested a welcome spell till Tatnall, comin' agen,
Called out, with a rougish look in his eyes, "This ain't neutrality, men!"

He'd been to yarn with Adm'ral Hope, and he'd said there something too
'Bout blood bein' thicker than water: and, no doubt, he'd a liked to do
What his boat's crew did without askin', if only he felt so free,
—I mean, to have a slam with us at the yallow-faced Chinee:—
But, in course, it wouldn't have been the thing, and he couldn't do less than say,
"Come, come, my men, you must quit that gun!" in a mock indignant way.

Ay! that old man was a good un; and when the assault had failed,—
For we tried to carry the forts that night, but the walls could not be scaled,—
He sent his little steamer, a craft called the Toey-whan,
To help our boats with the wounded. and he thus saved many a man.
It wasn't the business of neutrals: he might have kept apart:
Nobody would have blamed him—only his kindly heart.

And that's why I draw the line when I hear our ridic'lous bluster
'Bout furriners bein' all alike,—not up to the British muster.
There's furriners as are furriners, and there's furriners as ain't
(I've met a sight of the first sort, and there's some as would rile a saint),
But of furriners as ain't furriners, the only ones I know
Are the Yankee sort as stood by us that time in the River Pei-ho.

WM. LAIRD CLOWES.

Brigadier-General DANIEL W. BENHAM,

United States Army.

Was born in Scipio, Seneca County, Ohio, December 23, 1837. He is a direct descendant of John Bingham, who landed at Dorchester, Massachusetts, from England, in 1630. This ancestor was one of the founders of the City of New Haven, Connecticut. At an early age young Benham removed to Tiffin, Ohio, where he grew to manhood, and received his education in the public schools. He entered the employ of the United States Express Company, of which his father was the local agent, and rapidly mastered the details of the business. In 1855 he accepted an advanced position with the same company at Sandusky, Ohio, and soon afterward he was still further advanced by the company and transferred to the Cincinnati office, where he remained for six years, resigning to enlist, April 20, 1861, as a Private in Company B, Sixth Ohio Volunteers, the regiment having been raised in response to President Lincoln's first call for volunteers. He was honorably discharged August 21, having served one month beyond the period of his enlistment. During this period he devoted himself assiduously to the acquirement of the duties of a soldier, and his thorough mastery of the details were of great value to him in his after military career. On October 24, 1861, he was appointed a Second Lieutenant in the regular Army, and was assigned to the Eighteenth United States Infantry. His thorough business education had qualified him eminently for the duties of an executive officer, and he was early assigned to duty as a staff officer. He was engaged in the Campaign in Kentucky under General Thomas, 1861-2; the battle of Pittsburg Landing, 1862, under General Buell, and the siege of Corinth and the pursuit of General Bragg, under the same officer in the same campaign. In the latter part of 1862 and the early months of 1863, he was with General Rosecrans in his Memphis and Chattanooga Campaigns, and in the pursuit of the Confederates after the battle of Mission Ridge. He served under General Sherman in his famous march from "Atlanta to the Sea," participating in all of the engagements of that historic campaign, and accompanying that Army in its triumphal march through the Carolinas and Virginia to Washington, terminating in the grand review in May, 1865.

For his conspicuous gallantry and successful defense from capture of a battalion train at the battle of Murfreesborough, Tennessee, December 31, 1862, Lieutenant Benham was brevetted a Captain, and for his bravery in carrying the body of a wounded officer to a place of safety under fire, he was brevetted a Major. His promotion to the grade of First Lieutenant was made on February 19, 1862, and he received his commission as Captain on February 8, 1865.

Soon after the close of the war Captain Benham was assigned to duty

on the Western frontier in the suppression of Indian hostilities, in which department he rendered conspicuous service, frequently receiving the commendation of his superior officers. For his valuable services in administering the aid tendered by the Government to the sufferers by the Mississippi flood in 1882, he received a highly congratulatory order from Lieutenant General Sheridan. He was on the staff of General Brooke, at Omaha, Nebraska, as Inspector of Small Arms Practice for five years, and was specially commended by the commanding officer for the "marked efficiency with which he performed his important duties." At the conclusion of these duties he was assigned to duty as Lieutenant-Colonel of the Seventh United States Infantry at Fort Logan, Colorado, and in 1898 was commissioned as Colonel of the same regiment. At the breaking out of hostilities with Spain he proceeded with his regiment to Chicamaugua, Georgia, and thence to Tampa, Florida, where he embarked for Cuba. In a forced march to support General Wheeler's attack on the Spaniards, the officers being without horses, Colonel Benham was prostrated by the intense heat, a disability which caused his retirement from active duty on July 23, 1898. He was promoted to the rank of Brigadier-General, April 23, 1904. Few officers in the service have seen more continuous active duty than General Benham, and none have been accorded higher praise for conspicuous bravery in action and faithful and intelligent discharge of duty at all times.

BOOK REVIEW.

The Picayune's Creole Cook Book. Second edition. Published by The Picayune, New Orleans, La. Per single copy, $1. By registered mail, $1.25.

From the Picayune, New Orleans, we have received a copy of the *Creole Cook Book,* which is by all odds the most practical and useful to ordinary people of all the books of its class. It is not a book for a chef, but it is a book for a cook to use and to use constantly. Every caterer of a ward room mess in the Navy should send for this volume.





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"You are at liberty to use my name as one of its commenders."



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CONTENTS

Page.

I. Strategy and Tactics of the Russo-Japanese War. Twelfth Paper..... 201

II. Captain Pierre de Landais, Commander Continental Frigate "Alliance." By H. D. SMITH, Captain U. S. Revenue Cutter Service..... 214

III. The Contest for Sea Power—Germany's Opportunity. By ARCHIBALD S. HURD..... 229

IV. The Modoc War—Its Origin, Incidents and Peculiarities. By Colonel JAMES JACKSON..... 242

V. André's Ride (Poem). By T. H. FARNHAM..... 255

VI. Our Contemporaries. By JOHN P. WISSER, Major U. S. A..... 260

VII. Service Salad..... 281

IX. COLONEL TATTNALL PAULDING..... 299

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

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THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.

TWELFTH PAPER.

(November 25th, 1904, to February 8, 1905).

THE operations on land, towards the end of November, began to reach a critical stage. The Russian fleet in the Far East had been practically put out of action, consequently the efforts of the Japanese land armies, both in Manchuria and before Port Arthur, were redoubled.

Meanwhile, the Russian army received considerable reinforcements. At the beginning of November their transportation began, and was to be completed before the end of February. The reinforcements comprised the IV. and XVI. Army Corps, the 1st and 5th Rifle Brigades, an additional cavalry division, and six newly organized mountain batteries of eight guns each. The total strength of these reinforcements was to exceed 100,000 men, so that by the end of February the Manchurian army would have a strength of about 360,000 men.

The number of Russian field guns, at the end of November, was about 900, having been materially increased, in spite of the losses in the battles of October, 1904.

The Manchurian army was reorganized. General Kuropatkin was made commander-in-chief on land and sea. The Manchurian army was to be divided into three separate armies, as follows:

First Army, General Linevitch.—I, II, III, IV Siberian and X European Army Corps.

Second Army, General Gipenberg.—Composition unknown, but it is assumed that it will receive the V, VI Siberian, and the VIII European Army Corps, and the 68th Infantry Division.

Third Army, General Baron Kaulbars.—Proposed composition unknown.

The command of the First Pacific Squadron had meanwhile passed to Rear Admiral Yessen.

The Japanese army of operations had also been reinforced at the front, in Manchuria, as well as before Port Arthur.

The army of occupation in Korea and on Liao-Yang peninsula was reinforced by the 7th and 8th Divisions.

The armies landed on the main land were provisioned and supplied so as to be self-sustaining for about five months, in the event of an interruption of communications with Japan by the Russian Second Pacific Squadron.

THE FALL OF PORT ARTHUR.

(November 25, 1904—January 2, 1905).

The most important defensive point at Port Arthur was the Russian position on 203-Meter Hill, and against this the Japanese, after several previous failures to capture it, finally directed all their efforts.

The position was in reality composed of three successive heights, called in order, beginning at the southwest and going north-eastward, 210-Meter Hill, 203-Meter Hill and finally Akasayama Hill, the entire group lying south of 180-Meter Hill (previously mentioned), and the latter lying east of 174-Meter Hill. The 210 and 203-Meter Hills occupied the southern and northeastern corners of the ridge, while Akasayama Hill was situated on a lower spur, or foothill. The position was occupied by about 1,000 men, and was armed with field and ship's guns, besides the regular armament.

The Japanese, after their great losses in the September attacks on the position, made no more direct assaults, but limited themselves to regular approaches over the open ground to the south, in the dead angle of 210-Meter Hill, until these reached the foot of the declivity.

In November the Japanese placed a battery of six 11-inch howitzers in position, and decided to make an attack with 14 companies of the 7th Division, which had just arrived from Japan. On November 27th, the bombardment of the three heights began, not only by the 11-inch howitzers just mentioned, but also by the 4.7-inch howitzers,

a number of field batteries and some navy 6-inch guns, previously placed in position.

General Kadama, the chief of staff of Field Marshal Oyama, had been sent down to take charge of this operation.

On November 28th, in the early morning, the infantry attack opened, eleven companies, under the protection of an increased artillery fire, advancing against 210-Meter Hill, and when, in the afternoon, several sub-divisions succeeded in gaining the crest and entrenching there, a number of battalions were set in motion against the other two heights. The first sub-divisions was exposed to the fire of the works in rear and could not hold their position. They were therefore forced to retire to the foot of the declivity, only the most advanced sub-divisions remaining at a point way up the slope, and the garrison thus gained time to meet the attack of the other forces, and take the latter under flank fire. The entire attack therefore failed.

On November 29th the artillery continued its bombardment. In the morning of the 30th, these companies again scaled 210-Meter Hill, and reached the first sand parapet, just below the crest; they held this position in spite of repeated counter-attacks by the Russians. During the rest of the day and the following night. Attempts of other troops against Akasayama and 203-Meter Hill, however, failed. During the following night the pioneers (engineers) brought their approaches nearer to 203-Meter Hill, and just before dawn an infantry column broke from this position across the open ground in front and reached a depression just below the work, where it was cut off, to be sure, but where, screened from the enemy's view, it could entrench itself.

Based on these two advanced positions close up against the enemy, the final assault was to be made on December 1, 1904.

The morning was devoted to another bombardment, and at 3 P. M. the troops for the assault had filled the parallels, while other masses stood ready behind the neighboring hills.

The first lines of skirmishers attempted to cover the distance to the two advanced positions at a run, when, without apparent cause, the troops which had entrenched themselves close up against 203-Meter Hill, left their position and ran down the slope towards the parallels, followed by the Russian infantry. The attack, therefore, could not be executed, and the storming columns were withdrawn. The Russians retained possession of Akasayama and 203-Meter Hill, the Japanese, however, holding their position close under the southern crest of 210-Meter Hill.

The Japanese losses in these attacks had amounted to 15,000 men.

The commander-in-chief, therefore, decided to further prepare for the next attack, and, with this in view, the entire Japanese artillery covered with its fire, for three days and nights, the western side of the three works, while the engineers ran their parallels and approaches still closer to 203-Meter Hill.

The Russian garrisons, except a small detachment, could not remain in the works, but retired behind the eastern slopes intending, when the artillery fire ceased, to again occupy their original positions, but even in their temporary retreats the Japanese fire reached them and decimated their ranks.

On the afternoon of December 5 the last assault took place. The eight battalions selected for this work were assembled in the approaches, and as they reached the heights, the artillery fire was concentrated on Akasayama, leaving 210 and 203-Meter Hills free, and the infantry assault began.

The sub-division, which had been in front of 210-Meter Hill, found little resistance there, and that was soon overcome; while the columns advancing against the fort on 203-Meter Hill, found the latter empty.

The Russian garrisons were forced to retire behind the inner girdle of forts, and the garrison of Akasayama was soon compelled to do likewise because of the Japanese fire from 203-Meter Hill, which commanded it.

The success of the attack was due mainly to the artillery, and above all to the 11-inch howitzers, which had laid the forts on the three heights in ruins.

The defenders lost about 1,500 men in this assault; and among them the chief of artillery, Colonel Illmann, and the first officer of the Sevastopol, Captain Bachmetjeff.

The Japanese had lost over 15,000 men, and in this assault they also lost the small cruiser Saiyen, which struck a mine in Pigeon Bay, while supporting with other vessels of its division the attack from that direction. The vessel sank in two minutes; most of the crew were saved, but the commander and 35 men were lost.

Simultaneously with this attack on the west front, the Japanese had planned an attack on the northeast. But the failure of General Nakamura's attempt to surprise Sungshushan by a night attack, put an end to this plan. On December 3 an armistice took place on the Ki-kwan-shan front, lasting five hours, for the burial of the dead. The hostile intrenchments were here separated by only 50 feet, the Japanese holding the caponniere on the counterscarp, which commanded the trenches.

The significance of the fall of 203-Meter Hill was at once made evident. Up to this time the Japanese had been able to fire on the Russian warships only from the Wolf hills and 180-Meter Hill, but from these positions only the inner roads were visible. The outer roads and the entire eastern harbor were not visible from these positions. The view from 203-Meter Hill, however, enabled the Japanese to observe the effects of the fire of their 11-inch howitzers in the north, and therefore to properly direct this fire on the Russian ships.

By December 11, as the result of this fire both large cruisers and the mine ship (the Amur), had been sunk.

The Sevastopol, which had passed on December 9th out into the outer roads, lay at anchor under cover of the Tiger Peninsula, where she was not visible from 203-Meter Hill. Her crew and her armament had been reduced for use on shore. Torpedo nets had been put out to protect her, and a barricade had been erected to cover her on the sea-side.

For five consecutive nights, beginning on December 11, the Japanese torpedo boats attacked this ship. The first attack was made on December 11, before the floating barricade was completed, and one of the torpedoes was effective through the net, although the opening in the ship's side was promptly closed and the broken torpedo net repaired. The ship had only 6 and 12 inch guns aboard, as the rapid-fire guns had all been taken ashore for use in the forts, consequently she had great difficulty in repelling these attacks. On the other hand, bad weather rendered the operations of the attack very difficult too.

On the night of Dec. 14 several torpedo-boat squadrons carried out a bold attack on the Sevastopol. About midnight they reached the entrance of the harbor, the leading squadron and a special squadron advancing for the purpose of reconnoitering. The boats attacked at 1 A. M. in the face of searchlights and a heavy fire from the enemy's ships and batteries, one being struck once and another four times. Afterwards all the squadrons concerted a plan of attack. The first squadron was to break the enemy's obstructions and divert the searchlights, while the second, third, fourth, and fifth squadrons, following up, were to deliver attacks in succession. This programme was put into execution between 2 A. M. and 3 A. M., the third squadron notably displaying much dash, but all closed up and discharged torpedoes at very short range and then retired in order. During the retirement one boat received many hits, the commander and five men being killed and one man wounded. The boat became unmanageable, but was taken in tow by a consort amid a hail of shot. Several other boats

were also hit. The results of the attack are not yet clear, but not a few torpedoes were distinctly observed to strike. On the following morning observations from the shore look-out showed that the Sevastopol was down by the head and was not swinging with the tide and wind.

On the night of the 15th the squadrons again attacked the Sevastopol, the Otvajni, and several destroyers lying under Ching-tai-shan. The leading squadron, in the teeth of a snowstorm, passed in between the Sevastopol and the destroyers, and at 4.30 A. M. discharged torpedoes against the Sevastopol and Otvajni at close range. Every one was observed to strike. Moreover, the squadron engaged a destroyer at a range of 100 mètres and inflicted more or less damage. Throughout the attack the Russians maintained a hot fire, but perhaps owing to the shortness of the range the squadron was wholly unhurt. The second squadron attacked next. This squadron also engaged the destroyers and then steamed out. One boat of this squadron advanced to attack the battleship alone and discharged torpedoes. Considering the circumstances in which these repeated attacks were made, the number of torpedoes discharged, and the number of boats engaged, it is singular that the enemy inflicted insignificant injuries.

In the night of December 19, the captain of the Sevastopol received orders to sink her. The Otvajni was at once blown up, and the Sevastopol, after being dismantled, was run into deep water (35 fathoms) and sunk, turning turtle as she went down.

Meanwhile, the attacks on the lines of fortifications around Port Arthur continued with redoubled vigor.

On December 15, a shell killed General Kondratenko, in the north fort of Ki-kuan-shan. His loss was severely felt by the Russians.

On December 18, the Japanese, having pushed their mine galleries up to the scarp wall of the north fort of Ki-kwan-shan, exploded the mines, and sent their storming columns from the capponiere (already in their possession) through the ditches, to pass through the breach. They were repelled for a time, and only succeeded in the following night, between 7 P. M. and midnight, in taking the fort. Only 100 of the original 230 of the Russian garrison were left at the time of the assault, and they blew up the casemates in retiring. This was the first breach effected in the actual girdle of permanent forts. The Japanese captured five 3.4-in. guns and eight guns of smaller calibre.

Between December 22 and 24 the Japanese occupied the outer positions of the Russian left flank resting on Pigeon Bay, mainly field for-

tifications armed with field and machine guns, rendered untenable by the loss of 203-Meter Hill.

On December 27, another mine gallery reached fort Tai-yan-kau (directly west of Port Arthur), and the mines were exploded, but the subsequent assault was repulsed.

On December 28, the mining of the scarp wall of Erlungshan was also completed, and the mines were exploded at 10 A. M., without previous bombardment. The garrison was completely surprised, and many were entombed by the explosion, but the rest made serious resistance, although overcome by superior numbers by 3 P. M. The Japanese captured four heavy guns, nine light guns, and thirty machine guns.

On December 31, a mine was exploded under the walls of the auxiliary work below Sungshushan, and the position taken. On the evening of the same day a portion of the old wall in front of the east fort of Pau-lung-shan was blown up; and on the first of January two forts on Pau-lung-shan were taken, as well as the heights of Hon-san-yan-tao. Meanwhile, the Japanese center and left captured the fort at Wantai, within the Chinese Wall, northeast of Port Arthur.

The Japanese, therefore, had possession of a considerable portion of the girdle of forts and commanded the surrounding area. The Russians still held the crest in rear, and portions of the old Chinese Wall between the works, but further resistance was hopeless. Moreover, the Japanese stormed the two neighboring works and thus controlled the entire north front by January 1, 1905.

General Stoessel had already decided to capitulate. The bearer of the flag of truce appeared in the Japanese outer lines at 5 P. M., Jan. 1. General Nogi was sick in Dalny at the time, and the proposition to surrender did not reach him till 9 P. M. It read as follows:

"Judging by the general condition of the whole line of hostile positions held by you, I find further resistance at Port Arthur useless, and, for the purpose of preventing needless sacrifice of lives, I propose to hold negotiations with reference to capitulation. should you consent to the same you will please appoint commissioners for discussing the order and conditions regarding capitulation, and also appoint a place for such commissioners to meet the same appointed by me.

"I take this opportunity to convey to your excellency assurances of my respect.

(Signed) STOESSEL."

General Nogi's reply was:

"I have the honor to reply to your proposal to hold negotiations regarding the conditions and order of capitulation. For this purpose I have appointed as commissioner Major General Ijichi, chief of staff of our army. He will be accompanied by some staff officers and civil officials. They will meet your commissioners on Jan. 2, noon, at Shui-Shi-Ying. The commissioners of both parties will be empowered to sign a convention for the capitulation without waiting for ratification, and cause the same to take immediate effect. Authorization for such plenary powers shall be signed by the highest officer of both the negotiating parties, and the same shall be exchanged by the respective commissioners.

"I avail myself of this opportunity to convey to your excellency assurances of my respect. NOGI."

Marshal Yamagata, chief of general staff, under orders from the Emperor, dispatched the following cablegram to General Nogi:

"When I respectfully informed His Majesty of General Stoessel's proposal for capitulation, His Majesty was pleased to state that General Stoessel has rendered commendable service to his country in the midst of difficulties, and it is His Majesty's wish that military honors be shown him."

During the night of the first, six destroyers, which had been hidden during the bombardment, steamed out of the harbor, four of them (Vlastny, Skory, Statny and Serdity) headed for Cheefu, and two (Smiely and Boiky) for Tsingtau, which they reached in safety, and were there disarmed.

On the morning of January 2, the Russians blew up the ships which had been beached and demolished some of the works in the east front.

The capitulation was signed on January 2. The execution of its terms occupied until January 10. The Japanese captured 24,362 men, including 878 officers, 54 heavy guns, 149 guns of medium caliber, 343 light pieces, 82,670 rounds of ammunition, 35,252 small-arms with 2¼ million rounds of ammunition, 60 torpedoes, 17 search-lights and 1,920 horses.

Vice Admiral Shibayama was appointed governor of the fortifications.

The besieging army was transported northward to reinforce Oyama's army with about 50,000 men, a division being left to garrison the peninsula.

The Japanese fleet withdrew from the vicinity, the battleships and armored cruisers to go into dock for repairs, and the lighter cruisers to act against the commerce of Vladivostok.

The condition of the Russian fleet remaining in the harbor was as follows:

The torpedo planter Amur lay, severely injured astern, at the mouth of the Port Arthur docks, thus preventing the use of the latter.

The armored cruiser Bayan was sunk at the quai in the East Harbor.

The battleships Pobieda, Retvisan, Poltava and Peresviet, and the protected cruiser Pallada lay in the West Harbor close up to the shore.

On all these vessels only a part of the armament remained at the time of the surrender; all the light guns and much of the artillery of medium caliber had been removed, and had been utilized in the land forts.

The Sevastopol had been sunk in deep water at a point unknown to the Japanese.

COMMENTS.

The siege of Port Arthur will pass into history as one of the most memorable of the world's great sieges.

The entire siege lasted 327 days (Feb. 8, 1904, to Jan. 2, 1905), but during the first 86 days (Feb. 8 to May 4, 1904), attacks were made solely from the sea, and the next 86 days (May 5 to July 30, 1904, were devoted to battles on the positions at some distance from the city.

The siege proper, therefore, lasted 155 days (July 31, 1904, to January 2, 1905).

The lessons of the siege are many and important, since they affect the defense of coasts in general, and have, besides, many applications to the defense of land frontiers between contiguous nations.

The first great lesson taught is the necessity of fortifying important harbors. The command of the sea in the Far East was essential to both contending nations, and Port Arthur was the only port, free from ice for the greater part of the year, available as a base for the Russian fleet. By giving it up at the beginning of the war, the Russians might have had superior numbers in the earlier battles on land; on the other hand, by holding it, they prevented the Japanese from having sufficient superiority at Liaoyang and on the Sha-ho to make these battles decisive.

The Japanese could have held Port Arthur by a mere retaining force, and thus secured greater superiority in the land battles of the main army, but the importance of Port Arthur to Russia, as a base for the Russian fleet fitting out in European Russia, was so great that its early fall was absolutely essential to secure the Japanese command of the sea, preventing that fleet from finding a secure base on its arrival.

The next important lesson of the siege is the value of earthworks as an outer defense of forts. Even these temporary fortifications, when properly placed and armed, require regular approaches to reduce them. Incidentally, however, it is also indicated that the main line of defense must be at such a distance from the city or harbor to be protected as to preclude the possibility of bombarding these points by siege material from positions outside this line of defense. It is to be noticed that the ships in Port Arthur harbor were destroyed before the main defensive line was broken, and that, in consequence, it was not necessary to reduce the latter in order to force the capitulation of the fortified place.

The other lessons of the siege relate to matters of minor importance, but are still valuable from a tactical point of view.

The garrison of Port Arthur consisted of the 4th and 7th Divisions of East Siberian Rifles, with their artillery brigades, three battalions of Fortress Artillery, and one company each of sappers, miners and telegraphers; a total force amounting to about 40,000 men.

The Japanese, by the beginning of August, had in the besieging army the 5th, 6th, 9th and 11th Divisions, besides the 5th and 11th Reserve Brigades; during this month the 6th and 9th Reserve Brigades joined the army before Port Arthur, and in September the 8th Division was added; a total force of at least 75,000 men.

STRENGTH OF OPPOSING ARMIES.

The strength of the Russian army in Manchuria, which was about 97,250 at the beginning of the war, was increased in May to 151,250, in June to 190,500, in July to 248,450, in August to 280,450, in October to 344,450, and at the end of the year to 412,050, with 1,282 guns. This estimate includes all the troops in the theatre of war, and probably some still en route.

The strength of the Japanese army was increased from 60,000, at the beginning of the war, to 262,400, with 780 guns, at the end of the year.

LOSSES DURING THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.

The losses of the first year of the war are interesting in many ways. At sea the Russian fleet in the Far East was practically annihilated, and on land the Japanese as well as the Russian army suffered enormous losses.

LOSSES IN OPERATIONS ON LAND.

The total losses in the two armies up to the 20th of October was as follows:

Russian Army: 341 officers, 8,730 men killed; 1,506 officers, 49,626 men wounded; 66 officers, 10,085 men missing; total, 70,354.

Japanese Army: 172 officers killed, 652 officers wounded; total losses, 38,433.

Japanese field surgeons and field hospitals have accomplished a triumph, according to statistics obtained from the Chief Surgeon of General Oku's army. There have been in the entire army since the landing on May 6th only forty deaths from disease.

The figures show that up to December 1st there were treated 24,642 cases of disease. Of these forty resulted fatally, 18,578 patients recovered, 5,609 were sent to Japan and the remainder were undergoing treatment when the figures were compiled. It is believed that these figures are unequaled in the history of warfare. There were only 193 cases of typhoid and 342 of dysentery, while of beri-beri there were 5,070. The other cases of disease were not serious.

The casualties in General Oku's army May 6th to December 19th were as follows:

Killed: Officers, 210; men, 4,917. Wounded: Officers, 743; men, 20,337. Missing—Officers, 4; men, 402.

Sixteen per cent. of the wounded died, 19 per cent. recovered in the field, and 65' per cent. were sent to Japan.

Eighty-five per cent. of the wounds were inflicted by rifle shots, 8 per cent. by artillery, and 7 per cent. by cold steel.

The largest percentage of recoveries was in the cases of chest wounds. Most of the recoveries were due to the small caliber of the rifle bullets. The percentages of the other Japanese armies are believed to be about the same.

LOSSES IN NAVAL OPERATIONS.

The total Russian naval losses in men up to the end of the year cannot be given with any accuracy, but the killed in action comprised:

One vice-admiral, 2 rear-admirals, 12 captains, 20 lieutenants, 24 midshipmen, 9 engineers and 1,500 sailors.

The Japanese navy, up to the beginning of November, had lost 2,162 killed and wounded (exclusive of the Yoshimo incident), among which 1,400 by torpedoes (mines). On December 15th, in the attack on the Sevastopol, 17 officers and men was lost.

The ships lost by the two nations during the first of the war comprised the following:

JAPAN.

Battleships—Hatsuse. Blown up by mines off Port Arthur May 15. Yashima. Sunk by a mine near Dalny in June, but afterwards raised and repaired.

Protected Cruisers—Yoshino. Rammed by Kasuga in fog May 16. Sai-yen. Blown up by mines off Port Arthur, Nov. 30. Miyako. Blown up by mines off Dalny. Takasago. Lost with all on board in November.

Coast-Defense Ship—Haiyen. Sunk by mines off Dalny.

Gunboat—Kaimon. Blown up by mines at Dalny.

Torpedo Boats—Three destroyers and torpedo boat No. 48.

RUSSIA.

Battleships—Tsarevitch. Disarmed at Kiauchau August 10. Retvisan. Sunk by shell-fire at Port Arthur December. Pobieda. Sunk by shell-fire at Port Arthur December. Peresviet. Sunk by shell-fire at Port Arthur December. Poltava. Sunk by shell-fire at Port Arthur December. Sevastopol. Sunk by Russians at Port Arthur December. Petropavlovsk. Sunk by mine off Port Arthur April 13.

Armored Cruisers—Bayan. Sunk by shell-fire at Port Arthur December. Rurik. Sunk in action, Straits of Tsushima, August 14. Gromoboi. Badly damaged in action August 14, lying at Vladivostok. Rossia. Badly damaged in action August 14, lying at Vladivostok.

Protected Cruisers—Variag. Sunk at Chemulpo February 9. Pallada. Sunk by shell-fire at Port Arthur December. Diana. Disarmed at Saigon August 10. Askold. Disarmed at Shanghai August

10. Boyarim. Blown up by mine at Dalny February 14. Novik. Wrecked at Korsakov August 10. Yenesei. Blown up by mine at Dalny. Amur. Sunk by shell-fire at Port Arthur December. Bogatyr. Badly damaged, striking a rock at Vladivostok.

Auxiliary Cruisers—Vsadnik. Sunk in Port Arthur December. Gaidamak. Sunk in Port Arthur December. Zabiaca. Sunk in Port Arthur December. Rasboinik. Sunk in Port Arthur December. Djijdjit. Sunk in Port Arthur December.

Gunboats—Gremiastehy. Destroyed by mine off Dalny. Korietz. Sunk at Chemulpo February 9. Sivoutch. Destroyed at Newchwang. Mandjur. Disarmed at Shanghai. Otvajny. Blown up by mine at Port Arthur December. Grosiashtchy. Sunk by shell-fire at Port Arthur December. Gilyak. Sunk by shell-fire at Port Arthur December. Bobr. Blown up by mine at Dalny.

Torpedo Boats—Eighteen destroyers, 3 torpedo boats.

CAPTAIN PIERRE DE LANDAIS, COMMANDER CONTINENTAL FRIGATE "ALLIANÇE."

THE MOONLIGHT ENCOUNTER OFF SCARBOROUGH HEAD.

"Of heroes and statesmen I'll just mention four
That cannot be matched if we trace the world o'er;
For none of such fame ever stept o'er the stones
As Germain, Jemmy Twitcher, Lord North, and Paul Jones.

"Through a madheader war which old England will rue,
At London, at Dublin, and Edinburgh too,
The tradesmen stand still, and the merchant bemoans
The losses he meets with from such as Paul Jones."

THE Revolutionary patriots experienced great trouble and no end of disappointment in their efforts to obtain suitable vessels, guns, and men with which to contend against the vaunted invincibility of the British navy. Despite drawbacks and embarrassments, the lack of an organized navy department, and the scarcity of money, the actual results accomplished by the few war-vessels and privateers of the revolutionary period may well challenge the admiration of the naval officer of to-day. American seamen viewed the British sailor and his famed walls of oak with far less apprehension than a term in the dreaded and infamous prison hulks, and before the contest terminated had confidence in their ability to cope with an antagonist of equal size and calibre.

The French ministry, in proof of their good will to the United States, had promised to furnish John Paul Jones with a ship, but beyond polite and long-worded assurances the impatient naval officer received little or nothing substantial from the suave, smooth-tongued diplomats. Thrusting paper and pens aside, actuated by the axiom of his friend Benjamin Franklin,—"If you would have your business done, go; if not, send,"—the impulsive seaman hurried to Paris, where he met John Adams, who viewed him with anything but favor.

The trials and disappointments of Paul Jones were both numerous and trying, resulting finally in the possession of the Duc de Duras,

an Indianaman, then fourteen years old, lying at L'Orient, and capable of mounting forty guns. She was represented as fast and sound, the owners no doubt having no compunctions in driving an advantageous bargain with the government, even to the extent of gross misrepresentations, for the vessel proved to be both a dull sailer and rotten. She was a long, single-decked vessel, and was pierced for twenty-eight guns on her main-deck. When ready for sea the battery comprised 12-pounders on the main-deck, 9-pounders on the quarter-deck, and 6-pounders on the forecastle, and six 18-pounders on the lower gun-deck, amounting to forty guns in all.

The crew was as mixed as the armament, including Americans, English, French, Maltese, Portuguese, Malays, Swedes, and Norwegians, in all three hundred and eighty men and boys. The petty officers were made up of Americans, and Jones in one of his statements mentions the fact that there were not over thirty Americans on board. Included in this number were one hundred and fifty French volunteers, peasants newly enlisted, to act as soldiers.

With the Bon Homme Richard was the Alliance, an American-built frigate of thirty-two guns, manned, for the most part, by Americans, but commanded by a Frenchman, Pierre Landais. History has rendered but scant courtesy to the unfortunate officer, whose career from beginning to end was marked with disappointment and failure. His faults may have been legion, his temper soured, and disposition flavored strongly with envy and jealousy, but his motives in joining the American Navy appear to have been actuated by a love for the cause he adopted. His subsequent neglect by the government, poverty, and obscure death more than offset whatever shortcomings have been attributed to the unfortunate gentleman, whose reputation has been in some instances outrageously aspersed.

Cooper thus alludes to Landais: "The Alliance had a Frenchman for a captain, a person of the name of Landais, whom Congress had appointed in compliment to its new ally. M. Landais had been educated in the navy of his native country, but had left it in conseuence of an irascible temper that was constantly getting him into trouble. * * * Some persons even called his sanity in question."

John Knox Laughton, M. A., Professor of Modern History at King's College, London, and Lecturer on Naval History at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, in his "Studies in Naval History," after alluding to Paul Jones as, "If he is nothing more, he is the pirate," etc., calmly adds the following: "I shall endeavor to write as becomes a student of naval history, not as a professional eulogist, still less as an angry reviler. If I can do this, I may claim some degree of merit,

for though the life of Paul Jones has often been written, it has never yet been written except in a tone of extravagant praise or of senseless disparagement."

Branding a man as pirate who bore the commission of Congress is on a par with the spirit animating the English naval historian James, who could never find one redeeming feature in anything pertaining to the navy of this republic. But Professor Laughton's epithet has about as much weight and value in point of fact as James's frantic explanations and excuses for the victories won by the American Navy during the war of 1812.

In alluding to Landais the professor thus disposes of that much-abused officer: "* * * The Alliance, manned, for the most part, by Americans, but commanded by a Frenchman, Pierre Landais, the master of a French merchant ship, who had taken service under the American Government; a man, it would appear, of low birth and disreputable antecedents; a man of neither temper, courage, nor conduct."

The talented professor cannot be accused, as far as Paul Jones and Landais are concerned, of perpetuating their fame "as a professional eulogist."

As a curious reminiscence of an unfortunate foreigner and officer of the Continental Navy, the following fragment is given:

Pierre Landais boasted of good blood and an ancient lineage. He was the youngest representative of the oldest, poorest, and proudest house in France. Through the influence of a friend and school-mate a midshipman's warrant was procured for Landais in the Royal Navy of France. He was a hard and faithful student, becoming in the course of twelve years a fair navigator and sailor. He was thirty-two years of age before he won the epaulet of a lieutenant, in which rank he remained stationary for over ten years. The long-looked-for vacancy, the golden opportunity for promotion, came at last; the prize was all but in his grasp, when he had the mortification to see his long years of service and honorable experience brushed contemptuously aside, his claims of right and justice overslaughed, and an offshoot of nobility, a youth, the kinsman of a court-mistress, elevated over his head, bearing off in triumph the royal commission which fairly and honestly belonged to him.

It was a severe blow to the proud, sensitive Landais, and there is no knowing what course for redress the aggrieved officer would have adopted had not the famous "shot that was heard around the world" aroused in the Frenchman's breast new hopes, longings, and ambitious aspirations. A new field presented itself in the whirls and mazes of the

revolution, promising opportunities for adventurous spirits. He was possessed of a scientific, methodical, and approved naval education, well versed in the tactics which for years had been in vogue. Congress required the services of experienced officers. Landais, as a loyal subject of Louis VI., presented his credentials to the Continental authorities, and it was peculiarly in keeping that the first commander of a frigate named in compliment to the hopeful alliance with France should have a Frenchman to preside over and direct her destinies.

The frigate Alliance was built on the Merrimac River, at Salisbury, Massachusetts, by John and William Hasket, two brothers, renowned at the time for their skill and proficiency in turning out superior crafts. She was about two years in building, and was one hundred and twenty-five feet keel, about thirty-seven feet beam, and nearly nine hundred tons burden. She was thought to be long, narrow, and too sharp. She was also considered over-sparred; her maintopmast was eighteen inches diameter in the cap, mainyard eighty-four feet long, eighteen inches in the slings, and maintop-sail-yard eighteen inches in the slings.

She was launched in the spring of 1778, and Pierre Landais was appointed a captain in the Continental Navy June 18, 1778, and assumed command of the new frigate. She was ship-rigged, possessed beautiful lines, carried two hundred and fifty men, and Emmon's "History of the Navy" gives her thirty-two guns, but other authorities have stated her as carrying thirty-six.

She was fortunate in her career, and escaped capture and destruction during the war. She was in many engagements and always victorious, was a remarkably fast sailer, could always choose her combat,—she could either fight or run away,—beating her adversary either by fight or flight.

Twice she bore the fortunes of Lafayette across the ocean; De Noailles, John Adams, and other distinguished men were accommodated and entertained in her cabins. September 5, 1783, she was ordered to be surveyed with a view of being repaired, but the order was delayed for some cause, and on June 3, 1785, she was sold out of the service, and with her disappeared the last vestige and relic of the Continental Navy. It is believed that when she was disposed of the United States did not own a single vessel of war. She was purchased in Philadelphia and successfully employed as a merchantman, and when no longer seaworthy (long years afterwards) her hull was left upon the margin of Petty's Island, a mournful, neglected relic of past greatness. Her timbers and frame were allowed to moulder alone and uncared for, a spectacle for the curious and idle to gaze upon, many

of whom were unmindful of the glorious associations connected with her eventful history in the Revolution. The closing scenes in the life of her first commander were much in keeping with the vessel he had presided over. Like her, he was a wreck, forlorn, weather-beaten, neglected, and unheeded by the careless passer-by,—stranded on the shores of an ungrateful republic.

John Adams in June, 1779, dined at L'Orient with a distinguished assembly, notables and military men. Among them was Monsieur Thevenard, intendant of the navy, and one of the ablest and most scientific naval commanders in Europe. To quote from the correspondence of Adams: "The frigate in which you came here," said Mr. Thevenard (the Alliance, Captain Landais), "is equal to any in Europe. I have examined her, and I assure you there is not in the king's service, nor in the English navy, a frigate more perfect and complete in materials or workmanship." Mr. Thevenard repeated, with emphasis: "You may depend upon it, there is not in Europe a more perfect piece of naval architecture than your Alliance, and indeed several other of your frigates that have already arrived here and in other ports of France."

Captain Landais first met John Adams at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, in November, 1777. The Frenchman had but lately arrived from France, and beyond his credentials was comparatively friendless and unknown in America. The official life of the French naval officer, after his entry into the Continental navy, was to a certain degree brought under the direct notice and supervision of Adams, who, in the third and seventh volumes of his works, has occasion to allude to Landais in several instances. That a more complete estimate of Landais's character and general calibre may be chronicled, the following extracts from the versatile pen of John Adams are given.

In a letter received from the Marquis de Lafayette, dated St. Germain, April 9, 1799, the distinguished Frenchman writes: "It is with a great concern that I hear of discontents between Captain Landais and his officers, and I flatter myself that you will again establish harmony and concord among them."

Adams's diary of May 15, 1779, has the following: "In the evening, Captain Landais, chagrined,—suspecting plots among his officers against him,—had written to Dr. Franklin, relating things to him, etc. The captain is not of an accommodating humor or temper. His resolutions, when taken, are without conditions or exceptions, and unalterable, as one would think, yet sometimes too easily and too entirely altered. My presence has had some degree of awe upon the captain

and all the other officers; it has made them endeavor to respect one another; but the fire is not extinguished; it will break out again.

"Landais said honor and delicacy are his second God; he shall die poor and despised, not by those who knew him. This is an honest man; but chagrin and disappointment are visible in everything about him; he is incapable of all art, has no address or dexterity at all in managing men."

Again Adams writes: "Landais will never accomplish any great thing. He has honor, delicacy, integrity, and, I doubt not, courage and skill and experience; but he has no art; and I firmly believe there never was, or will be, a great character, without a great deal of art. I am more and more convinced, every day, of the innocence, the virtue, and absolute necessity of art and design. I have arrived almost at forty-four without any. I have less than Landais, and, therefore, shall do less things than even he. This evening, Landais said that mathematicians were never good company; that mathematics made a man unhappy; that they never were good writers. I said, no, nor the lawyers; it had been often observed that lawyers could not write. Landais said that observation is not just; there are many other instances of that beside you. This looks like art, but was too obvious."

Another entry runs as follows: "Landais is jealous of everything, jealous of everybody, of all his officers, all his passengers; he knows not how to treat his officers, nor his passengers, nor anybody else. Silence, reserve, and a forbidding air will never gain the hearts, neither by affection nor by veneration, of our Americans. There is in this man an inactivity, and an indecision, that will ruin him; he is bewildered,—an absent, bewildered man, an embarrassed mind. This morning he began, 'You are a great man, but you are deceived. The officers deceive you; they never do their duty but when you are on deck; they never obey me but when you are on deck. The officers were in a plot against me at Boston, and the navy board promised to remove them all from the ship, and yet afterwards let them all come on board.' "

On another occasion he writes, "Our captain talks much about Batavia,—is an admirer of the Dutch settlement in the East Indies. This gentleman has been disappointed in love and in his ambition; disappointed in the promotion to which he aspired, and in a marriage of which he thought himself sure. He has not so much activity, dispatch, and decision as I could wish. He seems not to know how to gain or preserve the affections of his officers, nor yet how to keep them in awe. Complaisance, firmness, and steadiness are necessary to the command of a ship. Whether it is his imperfect knowledge of the

language, or his absence of mind when poring upon his disappointments, or any defect in his temper or judgment, I know not; but this happy mixture seems to be wanting. His lieutenants are smart men, quick and active, not lettered, it is true, but good seamen and brave."

We will now glance at the world-renowned action between the Richard and Serapis, fought off Flamborough Head, under the calm sky and round harvest moon of September. It may well be pronounced one of the most terrible on record, from its unusual duration for a naval action, the obstinacy displayed by both combatants, and from the proximity of the two vessels, the muzzles of the ships' batteries almost extending into each other's port-holes. Fennimore Cooper has pronounced it "The most obstinate and bloody in the annals of naval warfare."

The details of the engagements have been narrated in nearly every naval history extant, and, so far as Paul Jones is concerned, it is scarcely possible that any new light could be thrown on the desperate combat. But Landais's participation in the famous battle has, perhaps, never received the careful consideration due to an officer of his rank, or extenuating circumstances taken into account, which in the heat and prejudice following in the wake of the bitter struggle for freedom was scarcely to be expected.

It was about noon on the 23d of September, 1779, that a fleet of over forty sails appeared off Flamborough Head, on the coast of Yorkshire, and Paul Jones at once made signals for a general chase. It was the Baltic fleet under convoy of the Serapis and Countess of Scarborough. The merchantmen took refuge under Scarborough Castle, while the Serapis and her consort stood out to sea, prepared for action, and for the purpose of having a nearer look at the strange vessels.

The Serapis was a new ship, built in the best manner, and of a class that had given much satisfaction in the narrow seas and smooth water, being particularly handy and quick-working by reason of their shortness. Her battery consisted of twenty 18-pounders on her lower deck, twenty 9-pounders on the upper gun-deck, six 6-pounders on her quarter-deck, and four 6-pounders on the forecastle. She numbered three hundred and twenty men for a crew, who were well drilled and disciplined. The Countess of Scarborough was a hired vessel, mounting twenty-two guns, and carried about one hundred and fifty men.

It was a beautiful autumn evening, and Flamborough Head, distant about three miles, was thronged with people whom the rumors afloat had drawn to the point,—having an unobstructed view of the

sea. As the sun set, the full harvest moon rose clear and brilliant, casting a flood of light athwart the sparkling waters.

About half-past seven o'clock the Bon Homme Richard and Serapis were within hailing distance, the American vessel to windward, both vessels on the port tack and standing in for the land. The Serapis hailed first, and soon after the Richard delivered her broadside, and then began a fight which for obstinacy and bravery has never been surpassed in naval annals. Both vessels were soon enveloped in smoke, and it was impossible for the other vessels composing the armed force to distinguish friend from foe.

As soon as Jones sighted the fleet he had signaled his vessels to form line of battle, but the Alliance paid no attention to it, and the Pallas also disobeyed the instructions of Jones, leaving him to bear the brunt of the battle, with the Alliance hove to on the weather quarter of the Serapis, but beyond gun-shot, with the Pallas finally following some distance astern,—which vessel eventually closed with the Countess of Scarborough, compelling Captain Piercy to strike his colors after a brave resistance of over an hour.

The Serapis was using her starboard broadside guns, while the Richard opposed to her the port battery. But almost at the beginning of the action two of the 18-pounders, upon which the American naval commander had placed great hopes and reliance, burst at the first discharge, blowing up the deck above and killing and wounding a number of the men. Confidence in the guns was naturally destroyed; the men deserted them, and they were not used again during the action. As Cooper states it, "The combat, now, was in fact between an 18-pounder and a 12-pounder ship; an inequality of metal, to say nothing of that in guns, that seemed to render the chance of the Richard nearly hopeless. * * * Wherever a gun bore, it necessarily cleared all before it, and in reloading, the rammers were frequently passed into a hostile port in order to be entered into the muzzles of their proper guns."

Professor Laughton thus alludes to this stage of the engagement: "The advantage lay entirely with the Serapis, which ought, beyond a doubt, to have won an easy victory. Captain Pearson was a brave man and a good seaman, but he was not equal to unwonted emergencies." As regards coping with situations and difficulties not embraced in scientific and theoretical warfare, the same criticism might aptly be applied to Captain Landais.

The Alliance during the fight had proved of but little value. In the early part of the engagement she had sailed around the Pallas and her antagonist, keeping at some distance, firing occasional broad-

sides, inflicting as much damage probably upon friend as foe, and at no time did she engage the Serapis in support of her consort the Richard.

The two principal vessels were now locked in a deadly embrace, lying together bow and stern, their starboard sides touching each other. The moon was well up at this stage of the conflict, revealing the two vessels encircled with flame from the rapid discharge of the cannon, and the mainmast of the Serapis, which was painted yellow, stood out prominently, a conspicuous mark for the American officer's artillery. It was also comparatively easy to distinguish the ships from the appearance of the disengaged sides, that of the Serapis having two yellow streaks, marked with ports, while the Richard was painted black, with nothing to form a prominent mark for the enemy's fire. The force stationed in the Richard's tops at this time poured in a hot fire from swivels and muskets, supplementing their efforts with hand grenades, which had the effect of driving the Englishmen from their guns.

The effect of the Serapis's fire upon the Richard was terribly apparent, and the guns of the American craft were nearly silenced. The helm had been shot away, ports driven in, pump disabled, and the poop was only supported by an old and shattered piece of timber, which alone prevented it from giving away.

Captain Landais now communicated with the Pallas, and was begged by her commander to go to the assistance of the Richard, offering at the same time to go himself if the Alliance would take charge of his prize. Captain Landais, trumpet in hand, was on the quarter-deck. Hailing the Pallas, he inquired what vessel he had taken, and then asked what ship was engagged with the Richard. Receiving the information he desired, the Alliance, under easy sail, slowly forged ahead, her white sails and tapering spars standing out in bold relief in the silvery light, and steadily passed into the darkness and fiery obscurity of the battle cloud enveloping the Richard and Serapis.

Landais, irresolute, possibly bewildered and embarrassed by the wild unsystematic style of fighting instituted by Paul Jones, so totally at variance with the "old-school" notions in which he had been trained, perplexed by the shadows and uncertainties of the darkness, while striving in vain to penetrate the thick volume of smoke enveloping the antagonists, relieved only by transient gleams of the broadside guns and bursts of vivid flames circling above the tops,—poor Landais hesitated, striving in vain to make up his mind what maneuver to undertake that would scientifically meet the requirements, until for him,

as in days of yore, the great opportunity of his professional career for success slipped from his grasp, and his opportunity to win and share renown in the glory of the great naval combat was forever lost.

At this point of the engagement the state of affairs on board the Richard may be briefly enumerated as follows: There were five feet of water in the hold, with three pumps working continually; the guns were silenced save three on the forecastle, the ship was on fire, colors shot away, a number of guns disabled, and ports knocked to pieces. The quarter-deck was scarcely more than a stage upheld by a few splintered stanchions that were liable at any moment to be carried away.

The surgeon made his way with difficulty from the cockpit over the bloody and hideous débris encumbering the main-deck, reaching the side of Paul Jones, whom he thus addressed: "I am told the vessel is sinking, sir, and in mercy to the wounded and helpless, I beg you to strike our colors and terminate this terrible bloodshed." "What, doctor," replied Jones, with a low laugh, "would you have me strike to a drop of water? Here, help me get this lee gun shifted over. A few more shots and that fellow's mainmast will go over the side." The doctor was evidently impressed with the wondrous courage and determination of his superior, and respectfully declining to dabble in duties foreign to his profession, returned to the cockpit and resumed his practice.

Paul Jones, in a dispatch transmitted to Dr. Franklin from the Texal, thus describes what transpired: "At half-past nine o'clock or thereabouts the Alliance appeared, and I now thought the battle at an end, but to my astonishment he discharged a broadside full into the stern of the Richard. We called to him for God's sake to forbear firing, yet they passed along the off side (starboard) of the ship and continued firing. There was no possibility of his mistaking the enemy's ships for the Richard, there being the most essential difference in their appearance and construction. Besides, it was then full moonlight and the sides of the Richard were all black, while the sides of the prize was yellow. Yet, for the greater security, I showed the signal of our reconnoissance by putting out three lanterns, one at the head, another at the stern, and the third in the middle in a horizontal line. Every tongue cried that he was firing into the wrong ship, but nothing availed. He passed round, firing into the Richard, head, stern, and broadside, and by one of his volleys killed several of my best men and mortally wounded a good officer on the forecastle."

Professor Laughton, in his article on Jones, pays a generous tribute to Jones's intrepidity, even though in the beginning he pronounces

him a pirate. He says, "Throughout the action Jones's conduct as the captain of a ship of war is beyond all praise. His ship was in every way very inferior to the Serapis, and Pearson was a man of known courage and good repute. * * * I think that it was the mere presence of the Alliance that determined the result. * * * But, on the other hand, I think that it is impossible to overrate the ability, the pluck, the determination, and the presence of mind with which Jones fought and won the battle. The Alliance gave Pearson an excuse for striking his flag. It was Jones, Jones alone, rather than the Bon Homme Richard, who first beat him to a stand-still."

In June, 1780, Franklin submitted to John Adams the following: "Mr. Adams, after having perused the inclosed papers, is desired to give his opinions on the following questions:

"1. Whether Captain Landais, accused as he is of capital crimes, by his senior and late commanding officer, after having apparently relinquished the command of the Alliance frigate, by withdrawing his effects from the same, after having asked and received money by order of the minister plenipotentiary, in order to transport himself to America, and take his trial there upon the said accusations, and after having for that purpose, in writing, requested a passage to be procured for him, was entitled at his pleasure, to retake the command of the Alliance (contrary to the positive order of the minister plenipotentiary, whose orders the said Landais was by the navy board instructed to obey) and to dispossess his successor, the oldest naval officer of the United States in Europe, who had commanded the said frigate near eight months, and brought her to the port where she now is?

"2. Whether the conduct of Captain Landais, at L'Orient, in exciting the officers and seamen of the Alliance to deny the authority of Captain Jones, under whose command they had voluntarily come, and remained there, and encouraging the said seamen to make unlawful demands on the minister plenipotentiary for the United States, and to enter into a mutinous combination not to put to sea with the Alliance till said demands should be complied with, thereby retarding the departure of the said frigate, and of the public stores on board, be not highly culpable?

"3. Whether, after Captain Landais's late conduct, and the manner in which he has retaken the command of the frigate Alliance, it be consistent with good order, prudence, and the public service, to permit him to retain the direction of her, and of the public stores intended to

be sent with her, accused as he is of capital crimes by his late commodore, and for which, if he arrives in America, he must of course be tried?"

ANSWER TO THE QUERIES.

"PARIS, June 26, 1780.

"I have read over all the papers in the bundle left with me, numbered to thirty-seven. I have also read the three queries stated to me.

"These queries I apprehend can legally be answered only by Congress, or a court-martial; and, therefore, it would be improper in me to give any answer to them, because the papers will appear before Congress or a court-martial, who can judge of them better than I. They will also hear Captain Landais in his defense, which I cannot do. My opinion, therefore, would have no weight either before the one or the other tribunal; or, supposing it to be admitted to be read, and to have any weight, it ought not to be given, because I cannot be legally either a witness or a judge.

"I cannot, however, think that the instructions of the navy board to Captain Landais, to obey the orders of the minister plenipotentiary, contain authority to remove him, without his consent, from the command of a ship committed to him by Congress, because the navy board themselves had not, as I apprehend, such authority.

"Since those instructions were given, as I was informed at Boston, Congress has given to the navy board power, upon any misbehavior of an officer, to suspend him, stating to Congress at the same time a regular charge against him. But I do not find among those papers such authority given to any body in Europe, nor do I find that any regular charge against Captain Landais has been stated to Congress.

"There has seldom, if ever, been in France a sufficient number of officers at a time to constitute a court-martial, and our code of admiralty laws is so inadequate to the government of frigates for any length of time in Europe, that it is presumed Congress will in future, either omit to put frigates under any direction in Europe, or make some additions to the laws of the admiralty adopted to such cases. For there is an end of all order, discipline, and decency when disputes arise and there is no tribunal to decide them, and when crimes are committed, or alleged, and there is no authority to try or to punish them.

"I have not observed among these papers any clear evidence of Captain Landais's consent to leave the command of the ship; and, therefore, upon the whole, rather than bring the present dispute about the Alliance to any critical and dangerous decision here, where the

law is so much at loss, and there can be no legal tribunal to decide, I should think your excellency would be most likely to be justified in pursuing the mildest measures, by transmitting all the papers and evidence to Congress or the navy board for a trial by court-martial, and ordering the commanding officer of the Alliance, with the stores and convoy, as soon as possible to America. I give this opinion to your excellency to make what use of it you think proper.

"JOHN ADAMS."

From a Life of Richard Dale the following is quoted:

"The Bon Homme Richard was so much shattered that it was necessary to abandon her. The next day she sunk, her crew having been transferred to the Serapis. The rest of the squadron arrived in a few days at the Texel.

"Jones now took command of the Alliance and made a short cruise in her, Dale being with him. This cruise afforded a bold display of the most extraordinary seamanship. The Alliance passed along the Flemish banks, and, getting to windward of the enemy's fleets of observation in the North Sea, the next day passed through the Straits of Dover, in full view of the fleet in the Downs. On the succeeding day she sailed near the Isle of Wight, in view of the British squadron at Spithead, and in two days more got safe through the Channel, having passed to windward in sight of several of the enemy's large two-decked cruising ships. In March, 1780, they arrived at L'Orient. Notwithstanding that Captain Landais, the former commander of the Alliance, a man whose eccentricity approached, if it did not amount to, insanity, had been ordered to America for trial, for certain insubordinate conduct, he contrived to secure the influence of some one or two of our public functionaries abroad, who were not well disposed towards Jones, and, by means which Jones deemed unfair and illegal, regained during his temporary absence the command of the ship. Dale scornfully rejected Landais's proposal that he should join him."

Congress, largely influenced by the written account of Paul Jones, informed Landais that they no longer required his services. In vain the Frenchman explained that he had been governed in his actions by the most approved principles of naval warfare to his own entire satisfaction; he failed to convince the committee, who could see no practical results in such a line of conduct. Therefore, while Jones received the thanks of Congress "for the zeal, the prudence, and the intrepidity with which he had sustained the honor of the American flag," etc., and a committee was also of opinion "that he deserved a gold medal in

remembrance of his services," Landais was ignominiously dismissed the service. How John Adams viewed the action of Congress is not recorded in that statesman's works.

Landais took up his residence in New York, where he remained until his death in 1818. He never was able to revisit his native land for lack of means. Every alternate year he presented himself before Congress, submitting a memorial detailing the injustice that had been dealt out to him, and claiming restitution of rank and arrears of pay, which fell alike unheeded and uncared for upon each succeeding Congress. He claimed the title of admiral, always considered himself an officer of the American Navy, and, however slighted by others, never abated his self-respect, nor the firm maintenance of his rank and dignity.

Sixty odd years ago he might have been seen almost daily on Broadway, indulging in a solitary promenade. His figure was tall, thin, and bent, with a sharp, careworn visage, with deep-sunken eyes, whose vivacity and expression age and rankling disappointment had failed to eradicate. In commemoration of the tragic death of his beloved sovereign, the old veteran invariably carried his cocked *chapeau* in his hand, allowing the winds of heaven to blow aside the scanty silvery locks, revealing his bald head plentifully covered with powder. His clothes, though threadbare and shiny, were scrupulously neat, proclaiming the straitened circumstances of a gentleman. His linen, of a coarse texture, was whole; his stockings, though faded and yellow, were of fine silk,—relics of better and happier days; his long-skirted coat showed evidences of continued and faithful services; while the entire appearance of the venerable veteran could scarcely fail to impress the most careless observer with a sentiment of pathos, respect, and veneration.

As time passed on and the feebleness of Landais increased, his appearance on the street became of rare occurrence, and the more closely did he confine himself to his obscure lodgings, where he buried the deeply-cherished sense of his wrongs, his sufferings, and his indomitable pride.

Twice a year he would appear in his Continental naval uniform,—the 4th of July and the 25th of November. The plain cocked hat, hair powdered and cued, coat of ample flowing skirts, with slashed cuffs, small-clothes, hose, and buckled shoes, never failed to attract from the passer-by respect and attention.

His income was little more than one hundred dollars per annum, the proceeds of an investment of prize-money secured in the early dawn of his connection with the Continental Navy. Upon this he

subsisted, how, no one but himself knew, scorning the nearest approach to charity, and refusing the slightest favor, even to a dinner, unless paid for by his own scanty shillings. "A man so steadily consistent, so sternly self-possessed and independent, scorning weak complaint, and steeling his heart against assailing circumstances," deserves from his adopted countrymen at least some recognition of virtues and fortitude seldom met with among the sons of men. To the last he maintained that it was he, and not Jones, that captured the Serapis.

Exactly where he lived or how he died is a secret hid forever in the womb of time. His lowly resting-place is marked by a plain white marble slab in the church-yard of St. Patrick's Cathedral, on which is carved, "To the memory of Pierre de Landais, formerly rear-admiral in the service of the United States who disappeared in June, 1818, aged 87 years."

H. D. Smith,
Captain U. S. Revenue Cutter Service.

*THE CONTEST FOR SEA POWER—GERMANY'S OPPORTUNITY.**

THE balance of naval power in the world has been dramatically readjusted owing to the completeness of the victory of the Japanese Navy. Were it not for the naval ambitions of Germany, the moment would be opportune for an international agreement for a limitation of naval armaments. This understanding, so far as the British people are concerned, need not necessarily be set down in black and white, because the building resources of this country are so unrivalled that at any moment British shipyards, Government and private, can produce a tonnage equivalent to the output of any other three nations. In the circumstances it would, therefore, be sufficient for British interests if the agreement to limit the construction of new men-of-war were of an indefinite character. To any such action Germany, and Germany only, bars the way.

The British people, who have held the supremacy of the seas for so long, naturally view with alarm the determined efforts of yet another Power to place afloat a great fleet which in certain circumstances might be in a position to contest the command of European waters. But it is as well that this irritation should not hide the fact that Germany, by reason of her geographical situation and her rapidly developing commerce, may justifiably claim that she requires a Navy to protect her legitimate interests. Next to Great Britain, Germany has the most considerable mercantile marine in the world, and it needs no stretch of imagination to appreciate the danger in which her shipping would be placed in time of war if the German flag were not in a position to defend it. If the German people had not realized the need for a large war fleet, they would have been guilty of remarkable blindness to their own welfare as a manufacturing people with a large over-sea trade conducted by means of their own merchant ships. In the interests of the future good relations between the two countries, it is essential that the British people should realize that Germany is

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England's principal European rival in the peaceful pursuits of commerce on the world's seas, and that, this position having been obtained, a strong Navy is a necessary adjunct. Germany's aspirations may be traced in some measure to natural causes, and the success with which they are being realized should act as an incentive to British shipowners to greater enterprise and more strenuous efforts.

The point of immediate moment is whether some influence cannot be brought to bear upon the German Government so that the strength of the war fleet may be kept within the reasonable limits dictated by the size of Germany's mercantile marine and the character of the territory to be defended. Of course no other nation has a right even to suggest directly to the Kaiser and his advisers the number of battleships which they should maintain, but a great step forward towards the limitation of the present contest for sea-power would have been taken if by some means the German people could be shown that they, and they alone, are checking a world-wide movement towards economy in naval armaments. Unfortunately the German Navy League has disseminated throughout the Empire an entirely erroneous view of Great Britain's position and the attitude of public opinion. It has conveyed to its 600,000 members the impression that Great Britain has reached the high-water mark of naval expenditure, and that consequently the more money German people devote to strengthening their fleet the more nearly will they approach the British naval standard. The temper of the people of Great Britain has assuredly been misinterpreted. Never was there a time when the essential character of the British fleet in the scheme of British defence was more widely recognized, and the determination to maintain it in adequate strength held with more dogged determination. There is no sacrifice which the British people will not make in the interest of British supremacy, and the sooner this central fact which dominates the naval situation is realized in Germany, the sooner will the present ruinous rivalry in naval aggrandizement cease.

At this moment an unique opportunity occurs for reducing the burden which the maintenance of the colossal fleets of the great Powers casts upon the people of Europe and America. In a period of sixteen months the whole fighting fleet of Russia has been swept off the seas. Outside the Baltic the Czar has only one battleship ready for sea, and that of the second class, the Alexander II., eighteen years old. Another battleship of 13,516 tons, which has been christened the Slava, is nearly completed, while two other battleships are in the early stages of construction. Two other battleships are being built in the Black Sea. The vessels in the Black Sea may be definitely

eliminated from all calculations of naval strength. If Russia had not the courage to break out from these waters in contravention of her treaty obligations when she possessed the third greatest fleet in the world, a fleet of high prestige, she will surely not dare now to tamper with the Treaty of Berlin. The composition of the Russian force is opposed to its usefulness against a modern ocean-going squadron, and the British fleet commands the Mediterranean in unrivalled power. We may safely dismiss this bogey force of Russia; it can exercise no influence outside the Black Sea. This hypothesis is inevitable on the facts as they now exist, and there remain only the naval resources of the Baltic to be considered. By the end of this year Russia may hope to have the battleship Slava ready for sea, and two years hence this vessel will be joined by the two battleships of 16,630 tons which were laid down at the Baltic and Galerny Island yards at St. Petersburg in the course of last year. Thus the end of 1907 will be reached, and Russia will possess only three first-class battleships; and judged by the fate of the Russian-built ships which took part in the battle of the Sea of Japan, it is by no means certain that even these three vessels will be vertitable men-of-war. There is ground for suspicion that Russian naval construction is radically faulty.

Even as a second-class naval Power Russia may be eliminated from all calculations. For many years to come she must be a negligible quantity in European waters. Far more sensational than the losses which she has suffered in the struggle with Japan has been the revelation of the inefficiency of her personnel in all the essentials of warlike training. The Russians have never been either seamen or mechanicians, and the modern sailor requires both a familiarity with the sea and a mechanical aptitude. The limitations which the Russian sailors have revealed in such glaring colors in the course of the war may be traced in part to their environment and the social condition of Russia, and in part to the restrictions under which sea training must be carried out. A large proportion of the population of Russia is uneducated,, and the modern bluejacket must be well equipped mentally if he is to vie with his "opposite numbers" in other European navies. Moreover, the Russian sailor is drawn for the most part from inland provinces: the sea is to him a strange and fearsome element, and some time elapses before he becomes reconciled to the life to which he is condemned by conscript laws. Never more than to-day has it been true that one volunteer is worth two pressed men. In the war in the Far East the Russians, it is said, met conscript crews in battle, but there was this essential difference, that the Russians

fought merely because they had to fight ,and did so without any patriotic ambition, whereas the highly intelligent Japanese crews were saturated with a patriotic enthusiasm which found an outlet in the facile use of all the complicated weapons of war.

The restrictions imposed upon Russia by her geographical situation are self-evident. Outside the Black Sea she has only one ice-free port now that Port Arthur has been lost, and even Libau leaves much to be desired. Consequently the Russian Navy must remain in the future, as it has been in the past, a summer Navy. During the long winter months whatever ships she may acquire must remain in harbor, and not until the ice has broken up can the naval authorities turn their attention to sea practice of the crews. If the work were well done in the summer months a passable Navy might be evolved. But the Russian bluejacket has no enthusiasm for his task at best, and at worst is a poor dumb driven animal with the tenacity and courage of a bull, which in these days of scientific instruments and long-range actions count for little. Out of such material, and circumscribed by so many limitations and geographical restrictions, Russia cannot hope to become a naval Power in this generation. Consequently the British people have no reason to view with nervous alarm the efforts which, it has been said, are being made at St. Petersburg to draft a programme for the rebuilding of the Russian fleet. It has been reported that the Ministry of Marine have under consideration a project for building a large number of vessels in the Baltic yards. In the course of three years, it is said, eight battleships, each of from 16,000 to 18,000 tons displacement, will be built, together with five armored cruisers of 16,000 tons, five armored cruisers of 10,000 tons, four armored cruisers of 6,000 tons, sixty torpedo cruisers, ten squadron torpedo boats, twenty torpedo boats, sixty submarines, and a number of river gunboats and smaller craft. The suggestion that a programme of these colossal proportions can be carried out in Russian shipbuilding yards within a short period is too absurd to merit serious consideration, and even if the work could be done the cost would amount to from twenty-five to thirty million pounds. It may be that, as in the past, Russia will call in the assistance of shipbuilding yards in Germany, France, and America to help her in re-creating the fleet. By these means she may obtain within five or six years practically as many men-of-war of various types as the Russian Admiralty in its wildest and most sanguine moments can desire.

When the vessels are complete, where are the trained crews to be obtained with which to man them? In the course of the present war Russia has lost the flower of her naval personnel, and her apologists

must be convinced that in the hands of officers and men trained under the present system even the most powerful man-of-war, with the best guns, the hardest armor, and the finest machinery, must become comparatively innocuous to an enemy whose crews have been adequately trained. Russia might find it possible to raise sufficient money to pay for the construction of a large number of ships, but if she pours out her treasure with the most lavish hand, she cannot convert these inert engines of war into veritable emblems of sea-power, because she does not possess the resources with which to provide them with trained officers and men. During the present generation Russia must be regarded as definitely swept off the seas. The prestige of her Navy stands lower than that of any fleet in the world, and by no miracle, by no autocratic rescript, by no friendly assistance of neighboring nations, can it be placed in our time again in the position which it occupied prior to the war. Whatever may be true of the Russian Army, the Russian Navy is dead, and before it can be called to life again the Empire must undergo a revolution in thought and in method, and must bend itself to the acquisition of that technical facility which may do something to compensate for the absence of sea aptitude.

It is a fortunate coincidence that the destruction of the Russian fleet should have occurred at a time when, with the single exception of Germany, there are evidences of a desire by the great Powers to limit the expenditure on their fleets. The British estimates this year show a reduction of three and a half million pounds, and the programme of shipbuilding which Parliament has authorized includes only one battleship and four armored cruisers. The battleship, it is true, will be equal to any two battleships now afloat in offensive and defensive qualities, and the armored cruisers will be more than equivalent in fighting power to any battleship in the French or German navies. This is stating the case with extreme moderation. In view of the débâcle of the Russian fleet on May 27-29, it would not be surprising, however, if the Admiralty determined to postpone the construction of at least one of the armored cruisers. But apart from any modification which may be made owing to the result of the battle of the Sea of Japan, the programme of shipbuilding for this year, judged by the number of units, is the smallest for a decade past. As will be shown, the Admiralty are thoroughly justified in the action which they have taken in view of the events of the past sixteen months.

Turning to the French Navy, here again there is no evidence of a continuation of the mad race for sea-power. France is laying down no battleship and only one armored cruiser this year. In the past

six years France has begun only six battleships to twelve begun by Germany, and Germany is responsible for the anxiety as to the strength of the French fleet which has recently occurred. The French people have witnessed year by year extraordinary activity across the frontier. With admirable self-constraint they refused to abandon the unambitious programme to which they set their hands in 1900, but this spirit of calm assurance has at last been dispelled by the immediate prospect that Germany will possess a greater fleet than the Republic, and that, unless action is immediately taken, France must cease to be the second naval Power. It is only in the face of this emergency, due entirely to the aggrandizement of Germany, that the French Admiralty is about to embark upon a new programme. A resolution inviting the Government to submit a scheme of new construction was adopted by the French Parliament by a majority of 342 votes, and the probability is that very shortly the country will be committed to a programme of construction entailing an annual expenditure of nearly five millions, or about one and a half millions more than Germany is spending in the present year. On the other hand, it must be remembered that Germany, owing to her more efficient resources, is able to complete men-of-war at a much cheaper rate than French shipyards. In the case of France we have, therefore, the spectacle of a country which has persistently limited the expenditure on its fleet for several years past, and which is now departing from this policy only in the face of the serious situation created by Germany. In Italy the naval expenditure for many years has varied singularly little from year to year. This has been due more to financial stringency than to any hope that the modesty of the Italian programme would affect the action of other Powers.

This short review exhausts the first-class naval Powers of Europe with the exception of Germany. Under the inspiration of the Kaiser, assisted by the German Navy League, the colossal programme of 1900, which aims at more than doubling the size of the German fleet as it existed at the begining of the century, is being carried out in advance of the programme dates. In accordance with this scheme the German fleet should consist of thirty-eight battleships and fourteen armored cruisers by 1920. Germany possesses already thirty-seven battleships built or building, but of these many are of the third class and will automatically be replaced by ships of the first class. The programme of 1900 also included six additional armored cruisers and seven small protected cruisers. These thirteen ships were intended for service abroad. The Reichstag refused this portion of the programme, but Admiral Tirpitz announced that he should regard these

ships merely as postponed and not abandoned. Five years have passed, and this autumn, this rejected portion of the programme will again be introduced in a fresh form. If rumor may be credited the six armored cruisers will be battleships in fact, if not in name, and since small protected cruisers are now discredited, the seven vessels of this class will be displaced in the programme by forty-two destroyers. It is the reintroduction of this portion of the programme of 1900 in a more aggressive form, and the steady concentration of the whole fighting power of Germany in the North Sea, which has legitimately caused anxiety not only in England but in France, and must exercise a powerful influence upon the future programmes of both these Powers. On land the army of France is probably no match for the legions of Germany, and consequently it is reasonable that the French people should feel alarmed at the prospect of relinquishing into the hands of Germany the position of the second sea-Power in the world. In England, as in France, therefore, Germany is the Power which is provoking precautionary measures which the utterances of the Kaiser himself, the German Navy League, and many public men throughout the German Empire have amply justified.

It has become a settled axiom that the continued growth of the fleet of the United States should not be regarded as dangerous to British supremacy, though the maintenance by America of an increasingly large fleet off the Philippines may in certain contingencies interfere with the policy of the Admiralty to concentrate all the fighting units in the "Near Seas." It may be found essential for commercial reasons to support the British flag in China seas with at least as large a force as America employs. This, however, is a side issue, and the most significant fact in the present development of the American Navy is the difference of opinion on the other side of the Atlantic as to the wisdom of the present active naval policy. In the present war the General Naval Board recommended that three battleships should be commenced, but this proposal was reduced by one-third by the Naval Committee of the House of Representatives, and this reduction was afterwards confirmed. American sentiment is by no means in agreement with President Roosevelt, whose ambition is to see the American Republic defended by a great fleet. In spite of the wealth of the American people they realize that, owing to their tariff system, sea-power must be more expensive to them than to the British nation. The cost of construction is very much higher, and owing to the rate of wages which rules throughout the United States, the officers and men have to be paid on a far higher scale than in the British Navy, and the disproportion between the cost

of the American personnel and that of Germany, France, and Italy is even more remarkable. In the case of America, one of the main contributary causes of the expansion of the fleet is the action of Germany. The inception of the naval movement in America dates, it is true, from the Venezuela trouble during the presidency of Mr. Cleveland, but it is impossible to read the debates in later years without realizing that one of the main objects which is being kept in view is the provision of a fleet of sufficient strength to frighten away any European Power—Germany in particular—which might be tempted to interfere with any of the South American Republics and even seize territory from them. If Germany slackened her pace her action would greatly strengthen the hands of a large section of the American public who regard the aspirations of President Roosevelt without sympathy.

There was never a time when the British people could approach the question of a limitation of naval armaments with more equable mind. Owing to the sacrifices which have been made since the Naval Defence Act was passed, the two-Power standard in battleships has been attained, apart from the margin of a strength ear-marked for commerce protection and represented by a large number of armored cruisers. In consequence of the losses suffered by Russia the British Navy has gained proportionately in strength.

From 1889 down to 1900 the two-Power standard was calculated exclusively with reference to France and Russia. Parliament insisted that the British Navy should comprise at least as many battleships as the fleets of the Dual Alliance, and that each battleship should be superior in fighting power. This standard of comparison has now completely broken down, because the Russian fleet no longer exists, and since the United States and Japan cannot be regarded as coming within the category of Powers with whom war is probable, Germany naturally takes the place of Russia in British calculations. In estimating the relative strength of the British fleet we must in future, therefore, take into account the battleships built or building for Germany and France. This will be the basis at any rate during the present generation, in which the Russian fleet must continue to be a negligible quantity.

It is, however, especially difficult at the present moment to imagine any circumstances which would bring the fleets of Germany and France into line. The memories of 1870 have not died, and recent events in Morocco have certainly not tended to draw the two nations together in amity and a desire for co-operation. Thanks to the splendid work of the King, supported by Lord Lansdowne, England

no longer occupies a position of splendid isolation, surrounded on all sides by nations regarding her with jealousy and hatred. We are on the most cordial terms not only with France, but with Japan, America, Spain, Portugal, and also with Italy, and we may be sure that much as France may desire for obvious reasons to improve her relations with Germany, she will do nothing to threaten her continuance within the circle of this happy family. With all these nations we have adjusted outstanding differences, and this condition of peaceful environment may reasonably affect in some measure our defensive machinery. We are no longer faced, as we were faced two years ago, with a Dual Alliance with fleets approaching in strength that of the British Empire, but we are faced by two distinct and unsympathetic peoples, each of whom possesses a Navy of considerably less than half the fighting power of the British fleet. Is it unreasonable to believe that in this circumstance the two-Power standard may be interpreted with less margin for contingencies than was the case even two years ago?

In consequence of the destruction of fourteen battleships, two armored cruisers, and many protected cruisers in the war in the Far East, we may disregard, as has been already claimed, the Russian Navy, or if it gives any pleasure to the wildest enthusiast we may include the Russian fleet, and thus boast that our Navy has reached the three-Power standard. It certainly is more than equal, so far as can be judged by paper contrasts, to the forces which France, Germany, and Russia could place in line of battle. But as Russia even at the end of 1907 will have only three first-class battleships, her weight is not sufficient to justify her serious inclusion in any contrast of power.

As the Navy League has been protesting that our sea-power is endangered by the smallness of this year's programme, it may be well to disarm the criticism of this organization by adopting its own figures for calculating the relative strength of the British Navy in contrasts with the fleets of Germany and France. Fifteen or sixteen years is the effective life of an armored ship, so rapidly does science advance in these days. No ship dating back prior to 1889, the date of the Naval Defence Act, merits inclusion in any comparative statement, and there need therefore be no hestitation in accepting the Navy League's basis of comparison* which begins with that year and shows the number of battleships built and building in England, France, and Germany:

**Navy League Journal*, April, 1905.

Displacement of Ships	Great Britain	France	Germany
From 16,000 to 18,000 tons	11	none	none
From 14,000 to 15,000 tons	31	6	none
From 12,000 to 14,000 tons	7	3	10
From 10,000 to 12,000 tons	4	8	14
From 8,000 to 10,000 tons	none	1	none
From 6,000 to 8,000 tons	none	4	none
From 4,000 to 6,000 tons	none	none	5
Under 4,000 tons	none	none	2
Totals	53	22	31

On the basis of these totals, vouched for by the Navy League, Great Britain would appear to possess exactly the same number of modern battleships as France and Germany together—fifty-three built and building. This comparison, however, is most misleading, as the above analysis shows. Five of the French battleships which are classified even by the Navy League as of the second class are merely coast-defence ships. Four of them displace less than 7,000 tons, carrying only sufficient coal for short cruises and mounting only two big guns either of the 12-inch or 13.4-inch types, and the secondary armament consists of 3.9-inch quick-firers, of which two ships carry eight and two others only four. The fifth ship, the Henry IV., is a vessel of just under 9,000 tons. Turning to Germany, seven of the so-called "battleships" are coast-defence vessels of the smallest size—of between 3,500 and 4,100 tons, armed with nothing bigger than 9.4-inch guns. In the combined total of the French and German fleets we have therefore twelve vessels which do not deserve to be classed as battleships, and the true figures for the three fleets are as follows:

	Battleships	Coast-defense Ships
Great Britain	53	—
France	17	5
Germany	24	7

This is a much truer comparison of the fighting material of the three fleets, but those who care to examine in further detail the ships of contemporaneous date will see that the advantage year by year is with the British Navy, the battleships of which are bigger and far more powerful than those of France and Germany. All the British battleships are now concentrated in European waters.

Now that the time has come to readjust the two-Power standard, so as to contrast the British Navy with that of France and Germany instead of with the fleets of France and Russia, we still have a good

margin of superiority, and never was there a more ill-founded agitation than that which followed the announcement of the Admiralty shipbuilding programme for the present year.

Owing to the commercial position of Great Britain the Admiralty have refused, and quite rightly, to limit the construction of cruisers to the two-Power standard, because it is recognized that in time of war, apart from battle actions aimed at the annihilation of the enemy, the British fleet would have a heavy responsibility in the defence of the mercantile marine conveying to this country food and raw material so essential to our well-being. Since, owing to the development in the construction of boilers and engines and improvements in the manufacture of armor and of powerful guns of medium weight, the protected cruiser has become obsolete, the Admiralty have been active in the creation of a great number of armored vessels. Again we cannot do better than turn to the Navy League's statement for a contrast between the progress which has been made by ourselves and by France and Germany in the construction of this type of men-of-war since 1889, and it will be seen that British superiority in big armored cruisers is very considerable, even if not as complete as a naval enthusiast can desire or the size of Britain's mercantile marine suggests as essential:

	Armored Cruisers laid down since 1889
Great Britain	39
France	19
Germany	8

The inevitable conclusion to be drawn from these comparisons is that the British naval position is satisfactory, and that Germany, which has laid down in the past six years twelve battleships to seventeen begun by Great Britain and six commenced by France, is forcing the pace in the contest for naval power, and Germany alone.

It is not alone the size of the German Navy which causes disquiet in France and England, but the determination with which the policy of concentration is being pursued. Germany claims to be a world-Power and to have a say in all international questions, but she masses all her battle squadrons in and about the Baltic. This policy gives a sinister appearance to her naval aggrandizement because it suggests that the fleet is being held on the leash to act the part of "honest broker" when England or France is engaged in some enterprise in which Germany is not concerned. It is possible to imagine circumstances in which the Kaiser might employ a fleet, thus concentrated,

with much profit. What more simple than to find cause of intervention after the Navy of either England or France had emerged from some contest or when either or both were engaged in some matter in the Mediterranean? This has been the avowed policy of Germany. It has been evident for years past. But owing to the wise statesmanship of France and Great Britain the opportunity seems less near than it did when these two Powers were at enmity. The *entente cordiale* which has been demonstrated before the eyes of the world at Brest has greatly interfered with the plans of Germany and decreased the value of her fleet a hundredfold. To-day it is Germany and not England which is in "splendid isolation"; but unfortunately for the peace of the world the German Empire, having by its own doings achieved this consolidation of British and French interests, chooses to regard the accomplished task with jealousy. German plans have miscarried, and the German people are chagrined by the fact that they are to-day solitary and estranged. They are viewed with no sympathy in England, France, America, or Japan, and even Spain and Italy have refused to be the tools of the authorities at Berlin. If Germany is for peace—and she needs peace for the development of her commerce overseas and the upbuilding of her mercantile marine—now is her opportunity to announce her pacific intentions and crystallize them in an act which cannot be misunderstood—the abandonment of her fresh shipbuilding programme. She needs a navy for the defence of her legitimate interests; now is her chance to show that she does not desire a navy for the purposes of aggression.

If Great Britain has gained by the elimination of the Russian fleet, so also has Germany, and to an even greater extent. She is no longer faced with the dread that in the event of hostilities with France she would also have to contend with the Russian Navy at her very door, and, therefore, she has all the less reason for the proposal to introduce an extension of the programme of 1900. If the scheme of which Admiral Tirpitz has given notice is persevered in, Great Britain and France will be compelled to take steps to neutralize these new ships, and after she has spent her treasure in further naval aggrandizement Germany will be relatively in the same position as she occupies to-day, while the peoples of all three countries will be considerably poorer. The German fleet owing to financial stringency is being constructed largely out of loans, and this might be urged as sufficient reason why she should desist from a mad contest. The German Emperor and Prince von Bülow have an opportunity to-day of showing that their policy is one of peace, and they could give no

better illustration than by abandoning the new programme, and thus responding to the recent efforts which have been made by the British and French and the American authorities to limit the outlay upon the building of men-of-war.

The decision to mass the main British battle squadrons in or near the English Channel and North Sea is a wise, indeed inevitable, precaution. As Germany adds to her squadrons in the Baltic, Great Britain must in self-defence concentrate increasing forces in the North Sea. It is the inevitable result of German policy, undertaken in no unfriendliness, but merely in self-defence. The "Near Seas" are the British frontiers, and must be as adequately safeguarded as the land frontiers of Russia and France. Prince von Bülow has indulged in words of peace; now by abandoning the intention to construct additional men-of-war he can translate these words into an act which all the world will applaud. Will Germany seize the opportunity?

ARCHIBALD S. HURD.

THE MODOC WAR—ITS ORIGIN, INCIDENTS AND PECULIARITIES.*

DURING the winter of 1872-73, in southern Oregon and northern California, occurred an Indian outbreak remarkable in many respects. Remarkable for the loss of life on the part of troops in proportion to the number of Indians they were endeavoring to subdue; remarkable for the tenacity with which a comparatively small number of Indian warriors held out against the arms, solicitations, and promises of a government so powerful and a people so numerous as ours, and with whose power and numbers they were quite familiar; remarkable for the peculiar and almost indescribable country in which they had taken refuge, and which enabled them to hold out as they did against the forces endeavoring to bring them to terms; remarkable for the vengeful treachery which closed the labors of the "peace commission," by which one of our most capable commanders, General E. S. Canby, lost his life, ending a career of great usefulness, quiet benevolence, unselfish patriotism, and soldierly devotion to duty, by the bullet of a treacherous savage; remarkable, finally, for the complete stamping out of this causeless Indian rebellion and the well-merited, prompt, and exemplary punishment of its leading spirits, something unusual in the history of Indian wars.

The home of these Modoc Indians was in a district of country just east of the Cascade Mountains and lying on both sides the boundary-line between Oregon and California, a rocky, broken, sage-brush region containing a number of alkaline lakes, some fertile valleys, and a few mountain streams, but covered by the most part by volcanic scoria.

Their principal habitat was the valley of Lost River and the basin of Tulé Lake, into which the valley opens.

The rivers and lakes abounded in fish and were the resort of vast numbers of water-fowl; game was plentiful in the adjacent mountains, the bunch-grass was luxuriant, the climate mild, snow

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seldom fell and never remained long in the valleys. Taken altogether it was a paradise for nomadic Indians.

At the eastern extremity of Tulé Lake basin was a district of country known as the "Lava-Beds," which at the outbreak of hostilities was, to the white man, a terra incognita, being for miles each way a confused jumble of lava which had in some prehistoric period rolled down the slopes of the volcanic peaks on its eastern border, and, lashed into furious foam and toppling waves by the obstructions in the lake valley, had—apparently while at the height of the disturbance—solidified into a hard, blackish rock, honeycombed by bursting air-bubbles, caught in the lava flow, leaving a surface over which no white man ventured of his own accord and whose intricate passages and cavernous retreats were known only to this tribe of Indians and the mountain lion as he stalked them in search of prey. The ocean breakers as they dash on a rocky coast, suddenly petrified in all the wildness of their fury, would give some idea of the character of a portion of this lava surface and induce a realizing sense of the difficulty of carrying on military operations in such a country.

Along a mile or more of the lake front the molten lava had poured over the abrupt and irregular bluffs, forming, as it cooled, a rock-wall whose almost vertical face was impossible of direct ascent. On the crest of this wall the lava, in cooling, had broken away from the horizontal flow, forming a deep crevice which in an irregular line followed the indentations of the lake shore and, curiously enough, made almost as perfect a defensive work as a military engineer could have laid out.

There was no part of this abrupt rocky glacis that was not covered by a line of fire from the natural rifle trench, while at the angles masses of rock had fallen forward, forming lunettes, covering the receding lines and affording loop-holes or windows through which all approaches could be observed, and serving as admirable picket or look-out stations for a defending force.

Where the line of crevice had been broken through, or failed to give sufficient defense, the Indians had supplemented it with a double wall of broken lava, carried to and around the caves used for sleeping purposes, affording a continuous channel of unexposed communication from one flank to the other, completing and making impregnable against a small force this Modoc stronghold.

The Modoc Indians belong generically to the races known as "Digger Indians,"—from living largely upon esculent roots which the squaws dig dry and cache for winter subsistence,—but they are much

superior to the average Digger Indian, and are more nearly allied in character—and by intermarriage—to the "Rogue Rivers," a warlike tribe, now about extinct, inhabiting at one time the western slope of the Cascade Mountains in Oregon, and with whom portions of the "old army" under Captains C. C. Augur, A. J. Smith, Benjamin Alvord, and others whom the *stars* have since fallen upon, had frequent warfare and whose last war chief, "Old John," while being transported as a prisoner in a sailing vessel to San Francisco, attempted singly and alone to capture the vessel and crew and came very near succeeding.

The Modocs were treacherous and bloodthirsty.

In the "days of '49" and subsequent years they proved very troublesome to emigrants, frequently waylaying their trains and sparing neither men, women, nor children. "Bloody Point," a rocky projection on the north shore of Tulé Lake, received its baptism from one of these periodical massacres.

Their combative disposition prevented them from living in harmony even in their own tribe, which split into three parts or families, known, to the whites, as "Hot Spring Modocs," located in northern California, "Rock Modocs," living in the vicinity of the lava-beds, and the "Lost River Modocs," whose country was principally in Oregon. This last was the principal division, and contained the chief or governing family, the Sconchins.

A Sconchin was chief of the tribe when the treaty was made with the Klamaths, Modocs, and Yainaskin Snakes, by which these tribes, for the consideration offered by the Indian Bureau, agreed to live upon the Klamath Reservation, then just established.

The Indian title to the Lost River and Tulé Lake country was thus extinguished, and the land thrown open to settlement.

The Klamath Reserve proving to have a much colder climate than the Modocs were accustomed to, and the Klamath Indians, their ancient foes, taunting them with living on "their" land, catching "their" fish, and killing "their" game, the Modocs became discontented.

The governing chief, "Old Sconchin," with a large part of the tribe, got as far away from the Klamaths as he could, and lived up to the terms of the treaty; but the restless and desperate spirits of the tribe under the leadership of the Indian afterwards widely known as "Captain Jack," and John Sconchin, a brother of the hereditary chief, left the reservation and returned to the Tulé Lake basin, declaring that they would live in their old home and nowhere else.

It is with this band of desperadoes that history has to deal when

treating of the Modoc War, though subsequently to the breaking out of hostilities they were joined by the Hot Spring and Rock Modocs, making a fighting force of about one hundred and twenty warriors. Many of these Indians were what would be called "half-civilized." A number of them had been born and reared near the outlying California settlements, and had worked for white men on their ranches and cattle-ranges.

They dressed like the frontier white men, talked some English, and were familiar with the ways of white people, including all their vices.

They were well armed with breech-loading and other rifles, which, by constant practice at game and water-fowl, they had learned to handle with skill and precision.

The settlers in the country thrown open to settlement by the treaty soon began to complain of Captain Jack's band of desperadoes, charging them with killing cattle and abusing the settlers' families when their men were absent.

The Indian agent of the Klamath Reserve made repeated efforts to induce them to return to the reservation, but every effort was met with contemptuous refusal and the declaration that they would fight rather than leave their present location.

In June, 1871, the Indian agent, Mr. John Meachem, requested the commanding officer at Fort Klamath, Major James Jackson, captain First Cavalry, to have Captain Jack arrested by a military force; he had rendered himself liable to criminal action by killing an Indian doctor—shooting him through the head while asleep in his tepee—for failing to cure one of Jack's children of some malignant disease,—a facetious way of settling his doctor's bill, but one quite in accordance with Indian custom.

To avoid jeopardizing the lives of settlers by provoking hostilities with Jack's people, who, it was known, would resist his arrest, it was decided to capture him under the ægis of the civil law at Yreka, California, whither he generally repaired with his band and their families on the 4th of July and other festive occasions to pick up money for the purchase of arms and ammunition.

A detachment of cavalry was sent to Yreka to effect the arrest, but Jack, warned by the squaw-men who infested that section of country of the movement of the troops, "took to the woods" and hid in the mountains for some time.

In the fall of 1872 the settlers in southern Oregon procured an order from the Interior Department for the removal of Jack's band to the Klamath Reservation, "peaceably if possible, forcibly if necessary." The Superintendent of Indian Affairs for Oregon, Mr. Odeneal, vis-

ited their village and tried to induce them to comply with the orders he had received, but failed in his attempt; and while negotiations were still pending, but with no uncertainty as to the result, turned the matter over to the military authorities, sending his agent, Mr. Ivan Applegate, to Fort Klamath to request the commanding officer there, at that time Colonel John Green, major First Cavalry, to send a force to the Modoc camp to compel their compliance with the orders from the Department of the Interior, and insisting upon it that only a "show of force" (about twelve or fifteen men was mentioned) was necessary to accomplish the object.

Colonel Green directed Major Jackson to take all available men of his troop (B, First Cavalry), and proceed by forced march to the Modoc camp, and induce them to comply with the orders given by Superintendent Odeneal, or, failing in this, to arrest the leaders.

Major Jackson with thirty men, and accompanied by Lieutenant F. A. Boutelle and the post surgeon, Dr. H. McEldery, who had volunteered to go with the command, was soon on the march.

Mr. Ivan Applegate, in the capacity of interpreter, and a few citizens joined the column while en route. These citizens were detached at the ford on Lost River to take post at Crawley's Ranch to protect the family there and prevent an attack on the rear of the troops, the ranch being situated between the two Modoc villages or camps, which were about a half-mile apart on opposite sides of Lost River, a deep, sluggish stream with abrupt banks, that could be crossed only by boat.

Marching continuously day and night, the troops arrived at the Modoc village about daylight and formed line among the tepees, taking the Indians completely by surprise. Had they been undoubtedly hostile there would have been no Modoc war. The chiefs and leaders were called for, particularly Captain Jack, but he did not put in an appearance, and, so far as is known, took no part in the subsequent fight. Some of the sub-chiefs gathered around and the orders of the Indian superintendent were explained by the commander of the troops to such Indians as could understand English, and to all of them by Mr. Applegate, who visited both villages to carry out his instructions.

The time given to parleying was used by the Indians to recover from their surprise and to get ready for the resistance which they had previously determined upon. While some talked to gain time, the boldest spirits disappeared in their tepees and soon came out painted, stripped to the buff, and carrying from one to three rifles.

The interpreter, after using every effort to persuade the tribe of the folly of resisting United States authority, gave it up, and, con-

vinced that no compliance with the orders of the Indian superintendent could be obtained, so informed Major Jackson.

It was then determined to carry out the second part of the instructions before alluded to and "arrest the leaders."

A squad of the best known warriors having taken position near some tepees about thirty yards in front of the line of dismounted cavalrymen,—seventeen men in skirmish order,—Lieutenant Boutelle was directed to advance some men from the left and secure these Indians.

At the order to move forward all of the Indians aimed their rifles at the line and one of them fired, apparently at Lieutenant Boutelle.

The troops instantly returned the fire, pouring volley after volley in and through the tepees, behind which the Indians had taken cover and from which they were rapidly firing at the soldiers.

This fire beginning to weaken the line, a charge was ordered, which drove the Indians from cover of the tepees into the surrounding brush and left in the village only a few squaws bemoaning their dead and wounded.

The Indians continuing the fire from distant cover, a line of pickets was thrown around the captured camp, in such shelter as could be found or improvised, while the wounded were being cared for by the surgeon and then transported across the river, by canoe, to Crawley's Ranch.

This done, an advance was ordered, when the owner of the ranch came galloping up on the other side of the river, imploring assistance to protect his family and the wounded men at his house from a threatened attack on that side of the river, the citizens stationed there having left to notify the settlements of the breaking out of hostilities. He was told to hold the place at all hazards, and the troop, carrying its dead, moved quickly up the river to the ford, Lieutenant Boutelle with a small skirmish-line protecting the rear and keeping the Indians at a respectful distance.

The command arrived at the ranch in time to prevent any catastrophe there.

The Indians lingered around until sundown, burned a few haystacks, and then retired to the "rock fort," which they had told the settlers was to be their refuge and stronghold.

What this "rock fort" was no one knew, further than that it was a place in the lava-beds which Jack had boasted he could hold against any number of white men, and where he had cached the possessions of the tribe and a sufficiency of dried roots and jerked beef to last his people a year.

Thus commenced the Modoc War.

The Indians in retreating to their stronghold had murdered a number of citizens and threatened to raid the settlements.

More troops were dispatched to the scene of action, and General Wheaton, the district commander, came from Camp Warner to take command of the forces in the field.

The assembling of troops was necessarily tedious; they came from distant posts and marching was the only "means of transportation."

In January, the troops having assembled and being joined by a contingent force of California Volunteers and Klamath Indians, General Wheaton organized an attack on both sides of the Indian position, expecting certainly to crush them out between the two forces.

Colonel Bernard, captain First Cavalry, with two cavalry companies and the Klamath Indian allies, was directed to move upon the Modocs from the north, while General Wheaton, with a battalion of the Twenty-first Infantry, two cavalry companies, and the California Volunteers, attacked from the south; the lake, on which the "stronghold" faced, being respectively the right and left of the assaulting lines.

The lava-beds being impracticable for horses, the cavalry companies were dismounted and operated on foot. As the troops marched into position the day before that appointed for the combined assault, a fog settled down over the whole lake basin, so dense that objects a few yards distant could hardly be distinguished.

The troops from the south had comparatively easy traveling until they arrived at the edge of the lava-fields, a mile or more from the stronghold, but Bernard's battalion had ten miles of scrambling over lava before they could reach the point from which the attack was to be made on the following morning, and in getting there ran on the Indian outposts and had a lively skirmish with them, capturing the largest part of their pony herd, and demonstrating the unreliability of some of the Indian auxiliaries.

The next morning the fog was, if possible, denser than the day before, but the lines formed in skirmish order at daylight and advanced to the attack, expecting soon to meet and greet each other over a victory won. Lines of battle have seldom or never before crossed such a difficult country; every step had to be watched or the men came to grief. Through fissures and chasms, over jagged heights, around masses of vertical rock, across wave crests of inky lava, in file, in bunches, in open order, as best they could make some headway, the troops moved forward until the crack of Indian rifles told that their outposts had been reached; then with a cheer the lines charged, —if scrambling over rocks where a misstep would prove as deadly as

an Indian bullet can be called charging,—and moved rapidly on, seeing nothing of the Indians but the flash of their rifles from behind rocky points, until men were shot down from almost underfoot and the character of the terrain became simply impassable for any military organization.

The troops had run up against the "stronghold," and human feet could go no farther and retain any governable formation.

General Wheaton's line had struck the lava-wall on the southwest, too long to flank and too abrupt to scale. Bernard, finding he could make no headway in such a country, and unable even to see it, halted at one of the rocky wave crests near the stronghold. The men, quickly taking such advantageous positions as could be found, sought in vain through the blinding mist to discover the Indian warriors, though the crack of their rifles showed them to be not many yards distant.

Stripped to the buff and of the same color as the rocks, they glided stealthily from cover to cover through the intricate rocky passages and could not be seen. Efforts were made to discover some way to flank the position of the Indians, but the fog and exceedingly difficult nature of the country baffled all efforts.

Hospitals were improvised for the wounded, and the troops waited in the hope that the fog would lift and enable some communication between the two forces to be had, so that, acting in concert, they could gradually surround the Indians. After some hours the fog did lift a little, and the signal-flags on each side of the bay fronting the stronghold commenced to work, but before a message could be sent or received the mist settled down thicker and darker than before. Then came a rapid fusilade from the south, answered by volleys from Bernard's line, and another effort to penetrate the inaccessible conglomeration of jagged lava in front of the troops.

Colonel John Green from General Wheaton's command, endeavoring to get in rear of the Indians, struck the rocky glacis that faced the stronghold, and, following its trend, passed with his command, under the guns of the savages in the natural rifle-trench, along the lake front, forcing his way over the broken rocks until he joined Bernard's right, resting on the lake, losing heavily in killed and wounded. That his men were not annihilated was due principally to the density of the fog.

The attack from both sides had failed, more on account of natural obstacles than the resistance of the Indians, the two days rations taken along were exhausted, ammunition was getting short, and the wounded had to be cared for, so it was decided to draw out that night, dispose of the wounded, and, with the knowledge of the country obtained by

this reconnaissance in force, and better weather, renew the attack under more favorable auspices.

On arriving in camp the following morning, General Wheaton received a dispatch from Washington forbidding an attack on the Modoc Indians. It had come too late for those who lost their lives, and it prevented any further effort to force these Indians into submission until a peace commission had duly labored with their untutored minds, wasted their time, and sacrified their lives to persuade them to become good citizens.

Humanly speaking, there is but little doubt that had the day been clear so that the country could have been observed and taken advantage of, there would have been no need of a peace commission. The Modocs would have been surrounded in their stronghold and their surrender only a question of days. The order to suspend operations was unexpected and, in the end, unfortunate. Another attack with the additional forces then en route and a tolerably accurate knowledge of the terrain would have closed the campaign and left the Modocs prisoners in the hands of the troops.

Retiring to their camps, and scouting the country to prevent the Indians leaving their chosen place of refuge to raid the settlements, the troops sat down to await the advent and labors of a peace commission, composed of General Canby, the department commander, General Gillem, the recently selected commander of the troops in the field, Dr. Thomas, a Methodist divine from San Francisco, Mr. A. B. Meacham, ex-superintendent of Indian affairs for Oregon, and Mr. Dyer, then agent of the Klamath Indians.

After assembling, the peace commission, with considerable difficulty, opened negotiations with the Indians and "dragged its slow length along" through the winter, renewing after each failure the futile effort to make terms with or procure the surrender of the Modocs. Officers, agents of the commissioners, and representatives of the press, taking their lives in their hands, visited these savages in their rocky caverns, to talk with them, ascertain what terms of peace would be acceptable, and represent the solicitude of the government for their best welfare. The Indians would listen to nothing but a withdrawal of the troops and a return to the ante-war status. Once it seemed that they were about to accept the amnesty and generous terms offered by the commissioners, and agreed to come if wagons were sent to a certain point on the lake to haul their families and effects. Wagons were sent, tents pitched for them to live in, fires built to keep them warm, and every arrangement made for the comfort of these misguided brethren, but, alas! the weary eyes of the commissioner were

strained until dark looking for the dusy forms and saw returning only empty wagons.

General Canby, now weary of this trifling, moved the troops closer to the Indians, stationing Colonel E. C. Mason with a battalion of the Twenty-first Infantry and First Cavalry on the north and General A. C. Gillem with battalions of the Fourth Artillery, Twelfth Infantry, and First Cavalry on the south, about two miles from the Indian stronghold.

The peace commissioners, camped with General Gillem's command, reopened negotiations, and, *unfortunately*, yielded to the solicitations of the Indians to have the conference or "peace tent" placed a half-mile from the camps of the troops, in a rocky depression not visible from the picket stations.

To impress them with the power of the white man's government and the numerical strength of the troops assembled to enforce, if necessary, the requirements of the commissioners, the Indians were invited to come, unarmed, to General Gillem's camp, and did so, frequently trading at the extemporized store for tobacco and other luxuries.

Dr. Thomas, a kindly man and devoted Christian, fed some of them at his own table and made them many presents, to evince the good feeling and friendly intentions of the commissioners. He was particularly kind and generous to "Boston Charlie," subsequently Dr. Thomas's murderer; he heaped favors upon him, but when, after being mortally wounded by this fiendish savage, the doctor plead with him for the remaining hours of his life, the only answer was a shot through the head.

After placing the "peace tent" a few unimportant councils were held, always under the agreement that each party should come unarmed. The Modocs, intending treachery and desiring to lull the commissioners into security, put off from time to time the final decision, waiting for spring and a good opportunity to carry out their devilish purpose.

A Modoc squaw,—Mrs. Riddle, a white man's wife,—who acted as interpreter for the commission, had frequently warned them that while the Modocs talked of accepting terms, she thought they did not mean it, and that in her opinion they would eventually commit some act of bad faith, she did not know exactly what. This warning was repeated on the morning of April 13th, when the last and decisive council was to take place.

A message was signaled to Colonel Mason that a council would be held, and "it was *reported* that treachery was intended." The com-

missioners evidently did not believe it, and repaired to the tent in the usual manner, making no arrangement for relief in case of an attack.

About the time for the conference to take place two Indians with a white flag appeared on a rocky ridge in front of Colonel Mason's camp and indicated a desire to talk. Colonel Mason directed the officer of the day, Lieutenant Sherwood, Twenty-first Infantry, to ascertain what was wanted. Sherwood in starting out was joined by Captain Boyle, who, having been an Indian agent, was quite familiar with the chinook jargon spoken by all the Pacific Coast Indians. Passing the pickets, they picked their way slowly through the rough lava towards the Indian with the white flag, who, as they approached, fell back slowly towards the stronghold. Nearing a chasm in the rocks the officers halted and evidently refused to be tolled any farther away from camp. After a few moments' conversation with the Indian, the officers faced about to return. As they did so the Indian fired at Sherwood with a pistol. At this, these officers commenced running towards the pickets, their pace accelerated by the crack of several rifles from Indians concealed in the chasm. Sherwood fell and Boyle came under the protection of the pickets, who immediately opened fire and drove the Indians to cover. An officer in the signal-station watching these proceedings and remembering that it was near the hour for General Canby to be in council with the Indians at the "peace tent" on the other side of the stronghold, and knowing that treachery to these officers meant death to him, seized the signal-flag and calling for the operator directed that a message be sent instantly to General Gillem's camp, that the commissioners might be rescued if possible. The message was sent, the troops were warned, and the companies sprang into line in their streets and awaited orders. Before they were given, firing in front told of the tragedy that had occurred. The Indians had timed their actions well. The pistol fired at Sherwood was the signal for attack upon the commissioners nearly two miles away, and ere assistance could be sent them from the unprepared camp, resting in the security of Indian faith, General Canby and Dr. Thomas had been killed, Meachem wounded and left for dead, while agent Dyer, who had failed to comply with the agreement in regard to carrying arms, pointed his hitherto concealed pistol at the Indian detailed to kill him, and so astonished his would-be assassin that he missed his mark, and before he could reload the long legs of the agent had carried him out of danger. General Gillem, on account of sickness, did not attend the council.

The massacre of the commissioners was followed in a short time by an attack upon the Modoc stronghold.

The lake front was captured, cutting off their unlimited supply of water. The troops pushed forward by degrees, covering each advance with rifle-pits of rock to prevent any unnecessary loss of life. A mountain howitzer battery was carried to the crest of the rock formation, and, opening upon the rear of the defenses, shelled the Indians from cover and forced the evacuation of the stronghold. They retreated through a channel or chasm in the rocks and took up a position in the black lava nearer the volcanic peaks, rather more inaccessible than that from which they had been driven, and where the only water to be had, for miles, was in caves held by the Indians. Then came the gallant but unfortunate reonnaissance of Captain Thomas, of the Fourth Artillery, to the vicinity of this black lava, which ended so disastrously to the officers and men engaged, and which demonstrated how little chance regular troops, as usually handled and fought, have against these wily warriors with all the advantage of terrain in their favor.

Following this effort to locate the Indians, the cavalry and Warm Spring Indian allies scouted the borders of the lava-fields to place them and prevent their escape.

On the morning of May 10th the bivouac of the cavalry and Indian allies at Dry Lake, on the northeastern edge of the lava-beds, was savagely attacked just about daybreak by all the hostile Modocs, a number of whom had crept inside the pickets through crevices in the lava, and posting themselves in the rocks about sixty yards from the bivouac, opened, at dawn of day, a rapid fire upon the sleeping soldiers.

Jumping the men from their blankets, the Indians were charged in front by the cavalry, and the Warm Springs were moved out on the flank to cut off their retreat.

The Modocs were quickly driven back from the camp, and seeing the Warm Springs making for their flank, broke into such rapid retreat through the lava that the troops could not keep up with them.

Hasbrouck and Jackson now closed on them from the north and east, Mason from the west, and Perry from the south. Their situation was getting desperate. Quarrelling amongst themselves as to what should be done, they came to blows, and separating on the old lines crept out of the lava at night,—the Hot Springs to the south, the Lost Rivers, under Jack, to the north, seeing safety in flight to the mountains.

Striking the trail of the Hot Springs Modocs, the cavalry pursued rapidly and brought them to bay in the mountains of northern California, and compelled their surrender to General Jefferson C. Davis,

who had succeeded General Canby in command of the department and of the troops in the field.

The party with Captain Jack so thoroughly covered their tracks that it was some time before they could be located.

Their hiding-place was eventually revealed by some of the bucks who had surrendered to General Davis, and who, to save their own necks, agreed to guide the cavalry to Jack's retreat.

They were found in a deep gorge in the mountains north of Clear Lake, driven from it, followed closely, overtaken and surrounded in a rocky cañon near the head of Lost River Valley, and, seeing the "game was up," surrendered to Colonel John Green, commanding the Cavalry battalion.

Captain Jack with two or three bucks escaped during the night, but was trailed to Willow Spring Cañon and captured by Colonel Perry's command of the First Cavalry. The Modoc war was ended.

General Davis intended to hang the leaders immediately, and erected gallows for that purpose, but a telegram from Washington caused him to change his mind.

The Modocs, with no one missing but the dead, were taken as prisoners of war to Fort Klamath, Oregon, whence a handful of men had marched just six months before to put them upon their "reservation."

The leaders were tried by a military commission; six of the participants in the massacre of the commission were condemned to be hung; the sentences of two of these were commuted to imprisonment for life; the remainder of the band was banished to Indian Territory. Captain Jack made a strong plea to have a cousin of his wife's, "Scar-faced Charley," hung in his stead, but the white man's justice could not accept the vicarious sacrifice.

On an October morning in 1873, in the presence of the troops who had captured them, the Klamath Indians, in their gayest attire, and the non-hostile reservation Modocs under Old Sconchin, Captain Jack, John Sconchin, Black Jim, and Boston Charley expiated the killing of the peace commissioners and numerous other crimes.

COLONEL JAMES JACKSON.

*ANDRE'S RIDE.**

(September 23, 1780.)

WITHIN a little road-side dell,
Where light and shade alternate fell
Through quivering branches gently swayed,—
The quiet of whose solitude
Was only broken by the sound
Of music by the brooklet made,
While softly murmuring through the wood,
To merge its waters in the flow
Of Hudson's lordly stream below,—
Three men lay crouching on the ground,
Listening intent, for on their ear
A sound has fallen, fast coming near;
And in those troublous times who knows
If travelers be friends or foes?

He comes;—a horseman. In his way
He had no thought that danger lay.
Concealed from him the lurking foe,
And all unseen the fatal blow,
That harbinger of coming woe
To him who bore from traitorous hands
The name and signet which should see
Him safely by the roving bands
Of cow-boys when on plunder bent,
Or patriot guard, whose searching eye
Sign for suspicion might espy;

*The old tulip tree, long known as "Major André's tree," disappeared man years ago, and near its former site, and close to the entrance to the little dell, now stands the André Monument. What was at that time a wild and lonely country road, is now one of the principal and most beautiful streets of Tarrytown. Major André was, at the time of his death, engaged to Honoria Sneyd, a young and beautiful English girl; and, as is known, was partly sent to America, at the secret instigation of his family, for the purpose of breaking the match.

And blind them to the dread intent,
The purpose dark that lay concealed
Until the time to be revealed,
And every peril passed should be.

Perhaps his thoughts on that dread day
Were with his heart in far-away
Old England, where one loving breast
His heart's true love alone possessed.
Perchance unbidden to his lips there came
The softest whisper of a cherished name;
The faintest sigh, through which he breathed his soul
O'er the sea's far expanse, whose ceaseless roll
Fit emblem was of his unquiet heart
And restless longing, as within him burned
Memory of her, from whom so far apart
His country's cause, stern duty's call, had cast
His lot; to whom in his last hour he turned,
And gave to her, his love, his fondest, last,
Best thought, as faded, with his closing eye,
The one bright star of all his memory.

Perhaps his thoughts, of darker cast,
Took a more drear and sombre hue,
As silently along he passed,
Nor once turned round his head to view
The brilliant charms of woods and fields,—
The blushing beauties of the year,
Arrayed in every gorgeous dress
Which Nature's ample stores possess,
And early autumn's advent yields
Ere she puts on her garments sere.
Nor casts he e'er a single glance
O'er the broad Hudson's fair expanse,
Where lofty hill and crowning wood
In solemn beauty darkly stood.
No charm for him in leaf or flower,
No music in the wayside rill,
Nor softening influence in the hour;
No tender tint in cloud or sky,
No morning carol of the bird;—

For him all Nature's sounds were still;—
Naught to delight his ear or eye;
Unheeded all;—unseen, unheard.

And yet that look betrays a care
That ill befits a brow so fair
And young. And why casts he about
At times a glance of dread, or doubt?
What can it be he seems to fear?
Surely no peril lurking near.
Hath he not but to show the sign—
Safe conduct to the British line—
To all who scan with searching eye,
And to the question seek reply
Of whence he comes, and whither goes,
Be they who ask his friends or foes?

The deepening shadows round him fell,
As 'neath o'er-arching boughs he rode,
While far below the little dell
The Hudson's current brightly flowed.
The broad expanse of Tappan Zee
Gleamed like a newly burnished shield,
Or dazzling mirror which the sun
Flashed his bright image full upon;
While every mountain, wood, and field
Basked warmly in the noon-tide ray
Shed by the radiant god of day,
In brilliant hues resplendently.

Hard by the entrance to the dell,
Standing like some grim sentinel,
Just in the middle of the way,
As if to guard the pass, a tree
Spread its gnarled limbs fantastically.
A cheerless place it was at best,
As if by some weird spell possessed;
A grewsome spot, in whose deep gloom,
Scarce lighted by a single ray
From sun or moon, by night or day,
No flower could ever hope to bloom.

With doubtful glance and hurried tread,
As half expecting in the gloom
Of that drear, dim, uncertain light,
To meet some weird, uncanny sight;
Some pallid spectre of the tomb,
Or nameless horror, dark and dread,
The traveler pursued his way
Beneath its sombre shades by day.
By night the screech-owl's piercing cry,
The peevish cat-bird's, sharp and high,
The bittern's, from the sedgy stream;
The prowling wild-cat's dismal scream,
The only sounds that e'er intrude
Upon its awful solitude.

He quickens now, with spur and rein,
His horse's somewhat lagging pace,
For, sooth to say, it likes him not
The dismal aspect of the place.
Nor can he, as he now draws near
To those weird branches spreading wide,
From quick and timorous glance refrain;
Cast doubtfully upon the spot
Where the dark tulip-tree upreared
Its tangled limbs, as if he feared
Behind its bole some foe might hide,
Ready to leap with sudden spring
At the same moment which should bring
His horse's head within the clasp
Of that bold foe's resistless grasp.
Of nearer peril thought he not;
Could he but pass that dreaded spot
In safety, all might yet be well;—
So thought he, as he passed the dell.

"Stand and deliver!" such the word
Of harsh command he sudden heard:
A hardy hand hath grasped his rein,
Another on his horse's mane
Is firmly laid, and a stern voice

Bids him dismount. He hath no choice
But to obey the dread behest;
Though zealously doth he protest
His innocence of wrong intent.
On lawful mission is he bent:
Behold his papers, drawn with care;
Arnold's own signature they bear;
What more need they? So let him on;
For he must end, ere set of sun,
His journey, with the morn begun.

Firmly the men their prisoner hold;
Vain his entreaty to pass free;
Vain the deception, vain the lure.
With scorn they spurn his proffered gold;
No bribe he offers shall secure
From them his purchased liberty.
In vain! he hath himself revealed
The secret he would keep concealed.
Those patriot hands, which brought to light
The proof that pales his cheeks with fright,
Will guard him well. The game is lost;
'Twas played in vain—his life the cost.
Yet for her sake, whom he held dear,
Shall he not claim at least—a tear?

T. H. FARNHAM.

OUR CONTEMPORARIES.

An analysis of the contents of the principal military periodicals, systematically classified under a few general heads for the convenience of the reader and student, comprising extracts and comments, in which special attention is given to the most important and valuable articles.

ORGANIZATION, ADMINISTRATION AND MOBILIZATION.

1. The General Staff.—*A. and N. Gaz.*, May 20.
2. The Needs of an Imperial Army.—*Same*, June 3.
3. Lord Roberts and National Preparedness.—*Same*, June 17.
4. American Naval Policy.—*Mar. Rund.*, July.
5. The New French Navy Boards and Committees.—*Same.*
6. The French Naval Program.—*Same.*
7. Short-Term Re-Enlistments.—*Jour. Cav.*, July.
8. Changes in the World's Armies and Navies.—*Jour. R. U. S. I.*, June; *Mar. Rund.*, July.

The *first* of these articles is one of considerable interest to ourselves as well as to the British. The General Staff in our army is considered by many to be still in the experimental stage in many details, although it appears to be an established part of our organization to-day.

The importance of an effective General Staff is more than ever apparent, and Great Britain is now at work solving the problem:

"No point in the report of the Esher Committee was more important than its urgent insistence upon the necessity for a complete reorganization of the staff of the Army. While the European Powers, and Germany most conspicuously, were seeking to perfect their general staffs, we were content with arrangements which provided only for the collection of intelligence and the preparation of plans for mobilization, whereas, there was, and is required, a General Staff with defined functions in the preparation for war, educated for its special duties, drawing to itself the pick of the brains of the Army, and working continually to widen the experience of officers and improve the training of the troops. It is a truism that no general, either in peace or war, can perform his duties without assistance; and certainly

no work is more worthy of the assiduous care of the authorities than the creation of a completely efficient, thoroughly trained, and highly educated General Staff, intimately bound up with the Army, interpenetrating it, and reflecting its views and character. The German staff, vitalized by Müffling, and carried to perfection by his three successors, Krauseneck, Reyher, and Moltke, has since the death of the last eminent chief, assumed even greater importance.

"No more important matter is before the Army Council than this, and if there is failure the responsibility will be heavy. The German system is well known to most soldiers, and we do not propose to describe it. We will only say that it is in a real sense the brain of the Army and the school of generals, which enabled Moltke to say that, whatever might be the advance of other armies, the German army would always be superior in the command. That judgment as to the future was, perhaps, not justified, and we do not present the German system as necessarily in all its details the best for this country. It may, for example, be questioned whether it would be possible to make the Chief of the General Staff directly responsible to the Crown. Much must always depend upon the qualities of individuals, but there are, in the German staff system, arrangements which open the way to divided authority and perhaps to dangerous disputes. Such is the educative value of the staff, however, that it is hoped these defects will not be developed. It is for the Army Council to produce a staff suited to the needs of the British Army, and to take the best brains wherever they can be found. Distinguished officers have been chosen, but there is no sign of a full and complete understanding of the system, and some mistakes seem likely to be made. The General Staffs with the District Commands are, it may be observed, upon an entirely different footing from that established in Germany. The only object in view must be preparations for war, and we shall continue to hope that the Army Council will have no other thought until the reverse is proved. It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of the question at issue, and there has already been too much delay in setting the General Staff upon satisfactory and complete lines."

The *second* article relates to the British army for the defense of the empire, but discusses also some principles of more general application:

"The binding of the Colonial forces into the Imperial military organism is a vast business that will require all the energies of statesmen and soldiers for years to come. * * *

"We have been promised a General Staff, but it is slow in the making, and is stoutly opposed in some quarters, though its creation is essential and inevitable, and, if we look at the Staff arrangements of the Home Commands we find them imperfect, and not at all of the character that many think meritorious in the German system. If anything were required to demonstrate the heterogeneous character of our forces in organization and command, we have but to refer to the state of the Militia and Volunteers, and the lack of sympathy between them and the Regular forces. There are virtues, no doubt, common to them all, but they have been formed and trained with no reference to strategical employment, and in the stress of war much time would be occupied, as was the case in South Africa, in giving them the form and substance of a united Army.

"If we look for light in this darkness, we seem to discern it in the stream of thought which leads us to the institution of a great General Staff, though it will be unfortunate if it should prove to be true that the Army Council has decided that there shall be no interchange between the students at Camberley and those at the new staff college in India. In the General Staff, if anywhere, should be found the trained intelligence of officers competent to perceive and to organize. The staff should be the eyes and the brains of the Army. We cannot any longer rely even upon the saving virtue of mere common sense. It is by the training of the staff that intellect is given power to transcend. War has become a science, and armies require to be directed by those who not only have the highest ability, but have gone through an extended course of education, and from whose ranks the generals are chosen. The Staff College is, up to the present time, the only school of strategy, organization, and Imperial Defence in the King's dominions, and those who have been trained by it should be the best guides for statesmen as well as for the Army itself. As President Roosevelt has said, British officers 'have conquered many a barbarous people in all the ends of the earth, and hold for their Sovereign the lands of Moslem and Hindu, of Tartar and Arab and Pathan, of Malay, Negro and Polynesian; in many a war they have overcome every European rival against whom they have been pitted; again and again they have marched to victory against Frenchman and Spaniard through the sweltering heat of the tropics; and now, from the stupendous mountain masses of mid Asia, they look northward through the wintry air, ready to bar the advance of the legions of the Tsar.' But that they may be used with wise strategy, that none of their efforts may be wasted, that they may be enabled to organize and train their forces well upon a higher and more systematic and uniform plan,

there must be unity and cohesion in the Army, the absence of which is so conspicuous. In providing those qualities, the General Staff should prove a prime agency, and should enable that co-ordination to be brought about, and that uniform system to be established, which are essential in all efficient military organizations."

The *third* article, on the important subject of National Preparedness, being based on the opinions expressed by Lord Roberts, is of special interest to the military and political world. The value of preparedness has been too forcibly illustrated in all wars since our own Civil War to be readily forgotten, and Lord Roberts, with his wide experience extending over so long a period of time, is particularly well qualified to speak on the subject:

"Lord Roberts enforces, with all the weight of his great authority, the principles we have long proclaimed, and it is little to the credit of the Government that it has taken no step when our most distinguished soldier, the late commander-in-chief, who is a member of the Council of Imperial Defence, has pointed out in plain language its grave responsibility. The War Commissioners, though they did not specifically point out the way, were even more insistent when they deduced as the true lesson of the war that no military system would be satisfactory which did not contain powers of expansion outside the limit of the Regular forces of the Crown, whatever that limit might be. What says Lord Roberts in his Memorandum?

"'I am satisfied that, unless some system of obligatory physical training and instruction in rifle shooting be enforced in all schools and colleges, and amongst the youth of the country generally, up to the age of 18 years, we shall be compelled to resort to conscription in some form or another. For in no other way would it be possible for the very large reserve of men required in the event of a serious war to be provided, so far trained as to warrant their taking their places in the ranks against a civilized enemy, without what might prove a fatal delay of months in preliminary drill and training in the use of the rifle.'

"It is impossible to dissent from Lord Roberts' judgment.

"It is the obligatory physical training of which he speaks that we require. He is right in saying that the Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteers are now a main reserve for the Regular Army; but how much easier, as he remarks, would it be to find desirable recruits for these forces if there had been preliminary rifle practice and training in schools. Our system of education is at fault. It gives to boys much knowledge which is valueless to them in their station in life, and

which, indeed, often unfits them for that station, and it implants in them no training calculated to make them useful defenders of their country. Conscription is not what we require. * * *

"Before the war it was the accepted view of the authorities—not creditable to their perspicacity—that we should not have to despatch across the seas any force larger than two army corps and one cavalry division, numbering in all about 80,000 men, but during the hostilities we had to gather men from all imaginable sources to a far larger number, and the day will come when still greater demands will be made upon us. There may come a time when we shall have to put even a million of trained men in the field."

The *fourth* article is a very complimentary review of Commander Bradley A. Fiske's prize essay in the Proceedings of the U. S. Naval Institute, an article which has attracted attention the world over.

The *sixth* article contains a complete outline of the re-organization of the French Navy Department.

The *seventh,* by Major Gale, Inspector General, is explained, as to its general character, by its title. The entire paper must be read, however, to be fully appreciated. It appears to voice the opinion of a large number of officers and enlisted men, and suggests a means of improving the army by diminishing desertion and encouraging re-enlistment.

MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING.

1. Fleet Maneuvers in the Levant.—*A. and N. Gaz.,* May 20.
2. Naval Training in the United States.—*Same,* May 27.
3. Comparison between Continental and English Methods of Military Education.—*Jour. R. U. S. I.,* June.
4. Manual of Instruction in Field Works for the Japanese Infantry.—*Same.*
5. Training of Naval Officers.—*Mar. Rund.,* June.
6. An Instrument for Measuring Height of Burst of Shrapnel.—*Kriegs. Zeit.,* 6.
7. Infantry Target Practice without Ammunition.—*Same.*
8. Additional Course in Target Practice.—*Jour. Cav.,* July.
9. How Japan Makes Her Army Officer.—*Same.*
10. General Sherman and the Infantry and Cavalry School.—*Same.*
11. Setting Up the Horse.—*Same.*
12. Outline Card of Public Animals.—*Same.*
13. Philippine Division Infantry Competition.—*Same.*

The *first* of these articles is of interest as illustrating the present tendency of keeping the results of all military and naval maneuvers secret, a plan which certainly prevents any possible future enemy from gaining any information that might prove detrimental to the nation whose fleet or army is exercising, but also prevents the latter from reaping the full benefit of its labors and the money expended:

"Naval men are, of course, fully alive to the value and importance of assembling large fleets for tactical and other maneuvers. Foreign officers, one need not doubt, are equally alive to the potential value of such exercises, and so it is both prudent and necessary that the results of these experiments in the British Navy should be closely safeguarded. * * *

"In pursuance of the strategic policy lately adopted by the Admiralty, our Mediterranean and Atlantic Fleets met off Rhodes on the 27th ult., and engaged in combined maneuvers until May 6. The naval force thus assembled in the fine harbor of Marmarice consisted of thirteen battleships and ten cruisers, besides four destroyers and other craft. * * * After coaling and other preliminaries, the exercises commenced on May 2 and continued during three days.

"* * * The main object of the exercise, we learn, was for each of the rival fleets to gain a tactical advantage over its adversary. * * *

"Of the results of these competitions nothing is known outside the fleets, nor is it desirable that the knowledge gained should be published. A naval correspondent of the *Standard*, who very properly refrains from divulging any confidential information, contends, however, that these battle exercises are somewhat less instructive to the junior officers of the Navy than might be expected. Our flag officers and captains, he states, are practically the only officers engaged in these maneuvers who are able to gauge the effect of the various tactical movements. The general and special ideas which are the key to the formations employed, he states, and without which all is incomprehensible, are sent to the captains of ships and marked confidential. Some days after the conclusion of the maneuvers, plotted charts, showing the tracts and ranges, are circulated among the officers, by which time, this correspondent complains, all interest in the game has evaporated."

The *second* article is of interest as presenting a foreign view of our system of naval training:

"As many of our readers are probably aware, Professor J. A. Ewing, Director of Naval Education, was deputed by the Admiralty

last year to examine and report to their lordships upon the system of training officers in the United States Navy. * * *

"Now this report upon the American system of training naval officers is extremely valuable for two reasons. Firstly, Professor Ewing was admirably qualified for his mission; and, secondly, the terms of his instructions make it evident that he was desired by the Admiralty to consider the problem with an open mind. Dr. Ewing's task was threefold. He was to see in operation the American system of training officers; he was to ascertain from American officers the general view of the amalgamation scheme; and thirdly, he was to report upon the training of naval constructors. Within the limits of our space we shall endeavor to condense Professor Ewing's report. Admiral Fitz-Gerald and other critics have asserted that the amalgamation of "line" and engineer officers in the American navy has proved a failure. This hasty judgment is not confirmed by Dr. Ewing, nor by any of the distinguished American officers whom he has consulted. On the contrary, he finds American officers warm in their approval of the scheme, and of its results, so far as they can as yet be judged. Admiral Evans, lately in command of the China Squadron, spoke emphatically in favor of the results of the experiment. * * *

"Moreover, Admiral Evans is confident that all the most progressive officers of the U. S. Navy share the opinions which he expressed on the subject. Rear-Admiral Rae, the Engineer-in-Chief, expressed equal approval of the amalgamation experiment, but favors the higher training in engineering of a few selected officers, whom he would keep more continuously engaged upon their specialty. Professor Hollis, the Professor of Engineering at Harvard, advocates a system by which certain naval officers who display engineering talent, should be employed as engineers over a considerable period. But these specialists should not, he holds, be debarred from attaining high commands in after life. Here speaks a former engineer officer, and one of recignized ability. * * *

"With regard to the general system of training American officers, Professor Ewing reports in high terms of all he saw at Annapolis. The system mainly differs from that now coming into force for the education of British officers in the greater length of the college course at Annapolis, and in the circumstance that the American midshipman begins his training at the age of eighteen, continuing it up to the age of twenty-four. Admiral Evans, commenting upon this difference in the two systems, considers that British cadets are entered too young, but admits that the American cadets might, with advantage, be entered earlier."

The *third* article is a very interesting discussion of the Continental and English methods of military education. The author, Colonel A. M. Murray, R. A., late Assistant-Commandant, Royal Military Academy, obtained his data on a short professional tour, in which he visited the principal military schools of France, Austria, Germany and Belgium.

The *fourth* article is a complete translation of the Japanese manual of instruction in field works, so far as this instruction is deemed necessary for infantry troops.

The remaining articles under this head are sufficiently explained by their titles.

TACTICS, STRATEGY AND MILITARY HISTORY.

1. The Employment of Cavalry.—*A. and N. Gaz.*, May 20.
2. The War in the Far East.—*Same*, May 20-July 8.
3. Some Principles of Imperial Defense.—*Same*, May 27.
4. Tactical Fitness for Command.—*Same*.
5. The Battle of the Japan Sea.—*Same*, June 3.
6. The Defence of Afghanistan.—*Same*, June 10.
7. The "Times" History of the War.—*Same*.
8. The Tactics of Togo.—*Same*.
9. The Battle of Tsushima.—*Same*, July 1.
10. The Lhasa with the Tibet Expedition, 1903-'04.—*Jour. R. V. S. I.*, June.
11. A Brief Historical Sketch of the Irish Infantry Regiments of Dillon, and the Irish Stuart Regiments in the Service of France, 1690-1791.—*Same*.
12. After Mukden.—*Same*.
13. War Notes.—*Same*.
14. Japanese Tactics.—*A. and N. Jour.*, July 15.
15. The Battle in Corea Straits.—*Mar. Rund.*, July.
16. Shrapnel and Protective Shield.—*Kriegs. Zeit*, 6.
17. Military Value of Pioneers (Engineers).—*Same*.
18. Field Artillery Range-Finder.—*Same*.
19. The Automatic Rifle in the Attack and Defense of Fortifications.—*Kriegs. Zeit.*, 6.
20. Means of Attaining Fire Superiority in Battle.—*Same*.
21. Attack Upon Fortified Harbors.—*Jour. Arty.*, May-June.
22. Notes on the Defense of Port Arthur.—*Same*.
23. The Effectiveness of Rifle-fire.—*Jour. Cav.*, July.
24. Scouts.—*Same*.

25. Five Years a Dragon.—*Same.*
26. Raids During the War of Secession.—*Same.*

The *first* of these articles relates to the importance of cavalry as well as its tactics:

"There was a time when military opinion tended to the idea that the mounted arm had lost the value it possessed in the heroic days of the great old cavalry leaders. The introduction of smokeless powder and of long-range flat-trajectory weapons had almost destroyed its tactical value. There would be no more great cavalry charges, and the cavalry would be transformed into a species of mounted infantry. We have never shared these views, and they have never been entertained by cavalry officers. The statement that unmounted men were preferred did not emanate from those who had any right appreciation of the conditions of modern war. It is true that in actual contact with the enemy in battle the work of cavalry will not be so prominent as in the past, but there will be cases where it will have decisive value—the war in South Africa gave instances where such would have been the case—and in completing a success, assailing an enemy's communications, or falling upon his exposed flanks or rear, its action will be as necessary as at any earlier time. * * *

In continental armies there is no under-estimation of the cavalry, and in Germany especially, the arm is assuming greater importance, and is being increased. In France there is a strong school of keen cavalry officers, and there is no doubt at French headquarters as to the value of the mounted forces. One great defect of the Japanese in the war has been the deplorable weakness of this arm of their service, and it is easy to see that the Russians would have done much better if their cavalry had been efficient and had been well used. * * *

"Lord Roberts addressed to Major-General Baden-Powell, Inspector-General of Cavalry a letter in which he enforced the extreme value of cavalry. He declared that its duties will be even more important than in the past, since it will be more difficult to obtain information of the enemy's movements, which it is the main rôle of cavalry to obtain. Greater distances will have to be traversed, demanding higher skill in horsemastership, and hence all ranks will have to be more carefully trained. Whatever may be the regret still felt at the disappearance of the lance, it must be admitted that the possession of the new rifle will give to the cavalry a much greater degree of independence. 'It possesses the power of defense or of attack on

foot, without in the least degree losing any of its offensive value when mounted.' * * *

"Though there must be sufficient cavalry for security attached to each large unit, the cavalry mass must be at the disposal of the chief, to obtain information and screen strategic movements, being pushed forward in concentrated bodies for well-defined strategic purposes. Its work is to keep touch with the enemy's forces while remaining in communication with its own, and it will march independently. Useful as the German cavalry proved in 1870, it was badly organized and employed, being wholly at the disposition of the army commanders, while none was available for Moltke's purposes. * * *

"To give us anything like the proper proportion to the other arms, we require, at least, eight or ten more regiments. The Germans had such a weakness, but they have taken urgent steps to remedy it. Lord Roberts agreed entirely with the plea for an increase, and said that a much greater proportion of cavalry is required than in the past."

The *second,* as well as the other articles relating to the war in the Far East are utilized in connection with the separate article on that subject.

The *third* article contains some matter of general interest, although concerned primarily with the British Army alone:

"There must, of course, be a regular army to maintain the garrison of India at the present figure, if not to increase it largely, together with troops sufficient to furnish the necessary drafts during the first year of war. There must also be reinforcements of at least eight divisions of artillery and cavalry, supplied during the same period, which Lord Kitchener has demanded, if not a very much larger force. But can it be said that this is sufficient? If Russia should desire to attack India by encroaching upon Afghanistan, repeating incidents like that of Panjdeh, will she not concentrate upon the lines of approach far greater forces than some have contemplated? The Orenburg-Tashkend railway is the latest addition to her facilities for bringing a great army against Afghanistan, but other lines are already in contemplation. Our responsibilities are grave, and we must prepare betimes to meet them.

"By what means has Japan exerted her military superiority in the present war? It has not been by landing merely an élite force of a calculated strength for the requirements of a brief period, but by calling out the latent strength of the nation, placing men under training at the very outbreak of hostilities, and preparing in this way

successive reinforcements which have made good all the losses of the war, and have progressively augmented the armies in contact with the enemy. The wars of the future will not be conducted with the restricted numbers which took part in the great wars of the past. Better brains are in many ways better than big battalions, but we shall discover of armies what Nelson knew to be true of ships, that only numbers can annihilate."

The *fourth* article on the question of tactical fitness, is also of some interest to us, in connection with examination for promotion:

"We have lately received a good deal of correspondence concerning a subject which is of keen interest to all army officers. We refer to the examination for tactical fitness, which is the necessary preliminary to the appointment of substantive majors as second in command or for promotion to the rank of lieutenant-colonel. There appears to be a general impression that the system works unfairly, and, in some cases, to the disadvantage of officers, owing to the various and uncertain conditions.

"No one disputes that tactical ability is an essential part of the mental equipment of officers who are to command forces in the field. The theoretical person 'who never set a squadron in the field' was ridiculed long before Shakespeare described him. The decline of formal military movements made tactical ability more than ever necessary, and it is of vital importance in these days of long-range fire and smokeless powder. No army can be efficient whose officers do not possess that ability. Throughout all our military administration we are strenuously seeking the best brains wherever they can be found —at least, theoretically, that is the object in view, and practically we are sure, in the great majority of cases, it is so."

The *sixth* article is again concerned with the organization of the British Army, but contains some points of general interest as well:

"Russian prestige has received a blow in the last naval battle from which it will not for a very long time recover. At the same time the army of Linievitch is manifestly powerless to regain the territories which have been lost, and seems destined to suffer further defeat; and yet, even if the Tsar should favor peace, the war party in St. Petersburg appears to be clamorous for more. Can we lose sight of the fact that from this state of affairs some dangers may arise for ourselves? * * *

"We may dismiss from our minds the idea that a great Russian force will cross the Pamirs, or traverse the forbidding fastnesses of the Hindu Kush to descend upon Chitral through the Durah Pass,

or some other equally lofty defile. To carry a great army across the Hindu Kush or the Koh-i-Baba, with the secondary ranges whose axial line is transverse to the line of approach from the north, would certainly be an operation demanding extraordinary exertions.

"This, however, is not the immediate danger. That the Russians will push forward the Orenburg-Tashkend railway to the Oxus may be taken for granted, and there is certainly a khafila route across the Hindu Kush by the Khawak Pass and the Panjshir Valley. The mountain roads to Kabul from Turkestan and the Oxus have been greatly improved, and there are roads to Kafirstan, and a central line brings Badakshan into direct communication with Jalalabad. The greater proximate danger is, however, further to the west, where the Russians have pushed forward their railway to Kushk, and are within striking distance of Herat. * * *

"Lord Lansdowne recently said that there is one great lesson to be learned from the war in the Far East. It is that, if any great country desires to maintain its position amongst the nations of the earth, it requires not only armies and navies of adequate strength, not only armies and navies properly composed and distributed, but with every unit in the highest state of efficiency, and animated by the spirit of patriotism and devotion. All this is true, but how is the adequate strength to be procured? If there is one lesson more than another to be learned from recent events, it is that success is attained, not by the despatch merely of a large regular force, but by constantly bringing up reinforcements from national reserves, so that the army is unfailingly maintained and strengthened. We have it on the best authority that the Japanese have at the present time all their training depots full of men preparing to take the field. Have we even developed all the resources of India? What have we done to develop the resources at home? * * *

"In undertaking to defend Afghanistan, we are saddled with an enormous responsibility, and only by organizing a national army can we prepare to execute our pledges. There would be the advantage that such an army would be available for use in any other part of the world."

The *twelfth* article is a Russian verdict of Russian failures, the present instalment of the article being mainly devoted to a comparison of the Russian and Japanese small-arms and field guns.

It is extremely interesting and appears to have been written in a perfectly fair spirit.

From this it appears that the Japanese small-arm, although lighter than the Russian, is far longer ranging (giving 400 yards more of aimed fire), and has a greater dangerous zone of fire, greater accuracy and better penetration. The new Russian field gun (1902 model) is little known, but many of the batteries were armed with the older 1900 model which is also superior to the Japanese Arisaki gun in range, accuracy and rapidity of fire, and fires a heavier projectile. But the gun has certain defects tending to counteract these advantages. For example, the carriages jumps and does not remain firm during firing, which diminishes its accuracy, the pieces are much heavier than the Japanese gun, hence, less mobile in the field, and less able to change position in battle, finally, there was but one projectile, shrapnel, which proved powerless against cover (entrenchments or villages).

ARTILLERY AND FORTIFICATION.

1. The New Field Gun.—*T. and N. Gaz.*, May 20.
2. Quick-firing Field Guns.—*Same*, May 27.
3. The Coast Defense Guns.—*A. and N. Reg.*, May 27.
4. Field Artillery Range-finder.—*Kriegs. Zeit.*, 6.
5. The French 75 mm. Field Gun, Model '97.—*Same.*
6. Coast Artillery Projectiles.—*Jour. Arty.*, May-June.
7. Extracts from Report on Capped Projectiles at Oblique Impact.—*Same.*
8. The Action of Capped Armor-piercing Shells.—*Same.*
9. A New Explosive.—*A. and N. Gaz.*, July 1; *A. and N. Jour.*, July 15.
9. Targets for Coast Artillery Practice.—*Jour. Arty.*, May-June.
10. Mobile Artillery.—*Same.*
11. Growth in Power of Guns.—*Same.*
12. British Naval Guns.—*Same.*
13. Armor-plate and Projectile Trials.—*Same.*
14. Field Guns, Germany and Austria.—*Same.*
15. Aiming by Telescopic Sight.—*Same.*
16. The Fortification of Port Arthur.—*Kriegs. Zeit.*, 6.

The *first* article relates to the new British field gun:

"The step of providing a quick-firing gun for the country has not been taken in a hurry, nor one moment before it was absolutely necessary. But the advantages of this tardiness and mature consideration will doubtless be found to be considerable. The new weapon is more powerful than the French gun, and is not any heavier. The

delay has saved this country the cost of the double rearmament which Germany has now to face on account of her mistake in adopting the '98 model, as she then adopted a new gun which was really no great improvement on the gun which had been in our possession for over 10 years. * * *

"The results which the French gunners claim to have achieved, and which critics to a certain extent acknowledge, have caused every country in Europe to wish to imitate them, and, if possible, 'go one better.' The chief features of all these new guns are those which are required to obtain the greatest possible rate of aimed shell fire and the greatest possible protection for the detachment. Quick-firing guns are no new things, but the quick-firer for the Field Artillery involved many difficulties in construction which did not exist when firing from a fixed platform such as a deck or a parapet. To obtain a thoroughly efficient quick-firing field gun, it is necessary that the carriage should not move at all, as otherwise it would be impossible for two or more consecutive rounds to be fired without relaying. Loading and firing a gun never takes long, but unless the layer can remain at the sights while the gun automatically returns to the firing position, it cannot truly be called a quick-firer. * * *

"Every new gun must be a compromise, and in deciding on our new gun the authorities, basing their judgment on war experience, had decided in favor of a powerful shell. Three things may be considered disadvantages—a rather low muzzle velocity, rather a heavy gun-carriage, and rather fewer rounds of ammunition. But the gun overcomes these disadvantages very fairly, and in no direction would it appear that it will be found deficient. The velocity developed—1,658 f.s. for the 12½ pr., and 1,610 f.s. for the 18½ pr.—is certainly sufficient to give a range greater than is ever likely to be required, while the other points have been treated above. We gave particulars of the weights and many details of the new guns on March 25. We may add that the range is 6,500 yards."

The *second* article refers to the same subject:

"It is of some importance to the soldier to study closely the capabilities of the new gun with which we have decided to rearm our Artillery, and to compare it with some of the most recent quick-firing equipments adopted by Continental Powers. The two antagonistic qualities which are required from a field gun are shell power and mobility to which, in recent years, has been added rate of fire. Offensive power depends on three things—the muzzle velocity, the

calibre, and the weight of the shell. The energy at any point in the trajectory will be the product of the velocity at that point and the weight of the shell, and this velocity will depend on the muzzle velocity, and how far this has been reduced by the resistance of the air, the quantity of the reduction being influenced by the weight of the shell and the surface opposed to the air. Details in the construction of the shell may have influence in its power, but that is a question of ammunition and not of the gun.

"With our new gun we have adopted the heaviest shell in Europe, with a calibre slightly larger than all the powers except Russia, but we have only demanded from it a moderate muzzle velocity, the result being that, though at short ranges, say under 2,000 yards, the French gun may be superior, our gun will show better results at any range over 3,000 yards. The Russians have attained a very high muzzle velocity, but they have a light shell, about 14½ lbs., and a larger calibre than ours, and thus they do not seem to have obtained a general efficiency, with the result that our gun should be more than a match for theirs, gun for gun, at any ordinary artillery ranges. In fact, it is very difficult to understand the Russian gun, as the high muzzle velocity brings no advantage, except a slightly increased sweeping effect to the shrapnel bullets at the shorter ranges, while the blow which it gives on the carriage is so great that the latter has to be very heavy and has not even been able to take a shield.

"As regards rate of fire, the new gun should be, at least, equal to anything in Europe.

"Mobiltiy, other things, such as means of traction, being equal, depends upon two considerations—the weight to be drawn and the ease of draught. These are not the same thing, as those which have had anything to do with drawing carriages must know. The weights given for the various foreign equipments vary; but, amongst the heavier equipment, the others are much less powerful. Those of France and Russia are within ½ cwt. of our equipment, while we have the advantage for draught of having wheels which are 7 and 8 inches greater in diameter than those of the above countries respectively. There is, of course, some disadvantage in having high wheels, but on rough roads and on heavy ground, they will be found an enormous advantage. It is important to keep the axis of the piece low, as, if high, the gun will be less steady. Our gun is brought as close to the axle tree as possible, and could only have been placed lower had it been in the centre of the axle tree, as is the case with the Japanese gun. It is for this reason, keeping the gun low, that the buffer is above the gun instead of underneath, as is the more usual

method adopted, even by the Americans in their new euipment. The length of the battery with 18 wagons is very great, and it is perhaps worth considering if some form of mechanical traction might not solve the difficulty, at least for the rear six wagons. Probably horses will always be required for the guns and the first line of wagons. Of the Horse Artillery gun we may say that it is not a powerful gun, but is essentially a light one, and for Horse Artillery mobility has rightly been given the first place."

The *third* article is one already referred to in a previous number of the UNITED SERVICE. It is by Captain Howell, and was originally published in the *Journal U. S. Artillery.*

The entire article is worthy of careful study, but we have space here for only a small quotation from the review of original article in the *Register:*

"Captain Howell concludes his admirable article with this passage: The completion of the torpedo defense, the general installation of position-finding equipment and the increase in the personnel sufficient to furnish one full relief of artillerymen to man all the batteries are the most urgent needs of our coast defense; but it is none too early to decide upon the gradual elimination of such heavy guns as will not be fully equal to the destruction of the essentials of the best battleships that any nation could bring before our harbors. I saw at the Watertown Arsenal a few days ago a 12-inch gun of improved model mounted on a disappearing carriage, model 1901. This gun is expected to give 2,600 foot-seconds muzzle velocity. That is, I believe, the one gun of large calibre needed in our coast defense, and the further mounting of 8 and 10-inch guns should, in my opinion, be discontinued, or at least all new emplacements should be constructed with gun centers sufficiently far apart that 12-inch guns may be substituted for any 8-inch or 10-inch guns that may be temporarily emplaced; the day of these guns for outer harbor defense is about over—if indeed it has not already passed."

The *sixth, seventh* and *eighth* articles are most interesting and instructive to the artillerist.

The *ninth* relates to a substitute for cordite:

"Messrs. Kynoch, Ltd., gave a demonstration on Tuesday at their Birmingham works of the newly-invented explosive "Axite" before a distinguished company of experts and representatives of foreign Governments and War Office and Admiralty officials. An interesting

series of experiments had been devised to give practical and ocular demonstration of the qualities and power of axite, which may be summarized as follows: A rifle, from which 10 rounds of axite cartridges had been fired and which had been under lock and key for 20 hours afterward, was produced and examined. After using the "pull-through" the barrel was absolutely clean and fit for use. A .303 axite Service cartridge, fired for velocity and pressure at an ordinary temperature, gave 2,179 f.s. velocity and 15.76 tons per square inch, as against 2,010 f.s. and 15.67 tons for the .303 cordite Service cartridge. A .375/303 axite cartridge with a 200-grain bullet gave 2,498 f.s. and 19.24 tons; while with a 215-grain bullet, 2,726 f.s. and 20.95 tons resulted. After being subjected to a temperature of 110 deg. F. for one hour axite gave 16.73 tons per square inch and cordite 17.21, as against 15.76 and 15.67 respectively before testing. * * * Another excellent property of axite, which was shown by means of photography, is that it shows hardly any flame at night—almost none at all if compared with black powder and cordite. Axite can also be used for big guns. A 12-inch shell projected by M. D. gives a velocity of 2,360 f.s., with a pressure of 17 tons. With axite, without increasing the pressure, a velocity of 2,600 f.s. can be given, an increase of about 20 per cent., with, in addition to the other advantages already mentioned, a great reduction in the mass of flame at night. * * *

"Pending the completion of the patents, says the London Times in a description of the experiments, the ingredients of axite were not made known, but it was stated to contain nitro-glycerine and nitro-cellulose in proportions similar to those in M. D. cordite, with other materials added. In appearance it resembles cordite, but it is prepared in the form, not of cords, but of flat ribbons, which, when intended for use in large guns, are made with a raised rib along each edge, thus presenting the same section as a double-headed railway rail. The advantages claimed for axite by its inventors are that it does not corrode the barrel in the way cordite does; that with equal pressure it gives greatly increased velocity; that the effect of temperature on the pressure and velocity is only half that with cordite; that the maximum flame temperature of axite is 13½ per cent. less than that of cordite, and that the total heat of decomposition is 18 per cent. less, the erosive effect being, therefore, considerably less; that the residue deposit in the barrel after firing axite cartridges reduces the friction between the bullet and the barrel, and that therefore it becomes practicable to use axite cartridges giving higher velocities than can be employed with cordite, owing to the latter

nickeling the barrel through excessive friction; and that accuracy is greatly increased."

WARSHIPS.

1. Submarine "A8."—*A. and N. Gaz.*, June 17.
2. The Submarine Disaster.—*Same*, June 24.
3. American Naval Policy.—*Mar. Rund.*, June.
4. The French Naval Programme.—*Same.*
5. Submarines.—*Jour. Arty.*, May-June.
6. Changes in the World's Navies.—*Jour. R. U. S. I.*, June; *Mar. Rund.*, July.

The *first* two articles refer to the disaster to the British submarine boat off Plymouth breakwater on June 8, 1905:

"The result of the court-martial at Devonport in connection with the submarine disaster is satisfactory inasmuch as the officers are cleared of responsibility for the loss of the vessel, but at the same time we think it will be found anything but satisfying. The finding of the court is in effect that the vessel foundered from some unexplained cause at a time and in circumstances when the expert evidence shows that there was no reason to anticipate danger and when it appeared to be impossible for her to behave as she did. It will not be unlikely if there are those who will hold that this finding implies that the cause must rest with the design or with the fittings of the boat. We entirely disagree with this view ourselves, because it seems more probable that in the present state of comparative ignorance as to the actual performance of these boats under any and every condition owing to lack of experience, a simpler explanation will meet the case. The whole trend of the expert evidence goes to show that the presumption that the boat could not dive under the conditions which were assumed to obtain is based upon theory and theoretical calculation. But as all engineers are aware, it is proved in practice that large margins must be allowed upon theoretical values if safety is to be assured."

SMALL ARMS AND EQUIPMENTS.

1. Equipment for Foot Soldiers.—*A. and N. Reg.*, July 16.
2. Design of Sight for Magazine Rifle.—*A. and N. Jour.*, July 8.
3. Improved Pistol Cartridge Box.—*Jour. Cav.*, July.
4. Bits.—*Same.*
5. Cavalry Packs.—*Same.*

The *first* of these articles relates to one of the most important subjects before the military world to-day:

"Following is a report of the general staff of the army on the campaign equipment for foot soldiers:

"First Division General Staff,
"Washington, D. C., July 7, 1905.

"Memorandum Report:

"Subject.—The proper campaign equipment for the foot soldier.

"The division has long had under investigation and is now prepared to report upon the following questions submitted to it by the chief of staff:

"1. The proper campaign equipment or field kit for the foot soldier.

"2. The best receptacle or pack for carrying this kit.

"3. The occasions on which the kit should be carried.

"In the investigation, the second question has been found, as was anticipated, much the most difficult, and it is deemed important to the best solution of this question that, before reporting upon it definitely, the matter of the kit itself be determined; for its composition will necessarily affect (particularly as to dimensions) the device to be recommended for its reception and carriage.

"Of late years the great increase in range and rapidity of fire of small arms having markedly augmented the supply of ammunition necessary to be on or near the rifleman, and this same improvement in arms having correspondingly widened the areas over which troops must maneuver and fight, we find that all the principal military nations have been conforming more or less to these changed conditions by lightening little by little the foot soldier's kit in every way consistent with his efficiency. This tendency (which, crisply stated, is to reduce the infantryman's load to 'bread and lead') is not only wise but is thought to be essential, and the following recommendations have in view the nearest approximation to such reduction consistent with the soldier's health and his proper shelter. Moreover, it is believed that every dollar will be well spent which goes into transportation to relieve to the greatest extent practicable the foot soldier's burden.

"It is recommended:

"(a) That the outfit of armament, clothing, equipment, etc., for the soldier when in garrison shall be called the general kit. * * *

"(b) That, for campaigning, there be made up from the general

kit (except ammunition) the service kit (the name of which explains the purpose) to be divided into—

"1st.—The field kit, to be carried by the soldier.

"The total weight carried is 42 lbs., 13.69 ozs.

"More than five-sixths of this is in arm and ammunition, and intrenching tool.

"2d.—The Surplus Kit. To be carried on company wagon. Articles to be packed in kit bags, at the rate of one bag per squad and one for the sergeants and musicians. The bag, properly marked to indicate regiment, company, squad, etc., will thus keep clean and together the kits for the separate squads, etc."

The *second* is another article of great interest to our army:

"The board of officers appointed by special orders of the War Department to meet at Fort Leavenworth for the purpose of testing such designs for sights for the United States magazine rifle, model of 1903, as were referred to it by the Chief of Ordnance, has made its report, and the same has been submitted to the General Staff, by which it has been approved and transmitted to the Military Secretary of the Army. * * *

"The recommendations of the board are as follows:

"1. The board does not consider any muzzle cover necessary. 2. The board recommends the adoption of the front sight cover for the calibre .30 carbine, modified for model of 1903 rifle. This cover should be retained on the rifle when in scabbard. Experience shows that this form of protector will give ample protection to the front sight when rifle is in or out of scabbard, and will also protect the scabbard from wear or cutting by the front sight.

"3. The board further recommends no change in the form, thickness or size of the front sight proper. 4. The board recommends a peep-hole of 0".050 diameter, as that size of hole was found to give the most satisfactory results at all ranges; and also a strictly U-shaped open notch 0".054 wide by 0".0325 deep. * * *

"8. In order to secure the advantage of volley fire at longer ranges than the leaf is graduated, the board recommends the issue of a number of slides graduated from 2,600 to 3,500 yards, if practicable. These slides should be made to slip into the undercuts inside the leaf, and should be attached to the latter by a suitable clamping device. Such an addition to the sight would enable trained infantry to use indirect fire at these extreme ranges. * * *

"It is believed that the position of the Chief of Ordnance is correct, with reference to the auxiliary slides graduated up to 3,500 yards

—suggested by the board, 'if practicable.' In the Russo-Japanese wars the Russians used volleys in all their firing, beginning at long ranges and continuing until the final rush of the Japanese. The Japanese fire is always individual in action. Volley fire was noted only once in seven months' observation, used against a retreating Russian force massed, at an estimated range of 1,800 to 2,000 yards, and this fire soon ceased. Small arms fire at such extreme ranges as 2,500 yards is of practically no value, while ranges from 2,500 to 3,500 yards are artillery ranges, pure and simple. The experiences of this war are demonstrating the value of the American idea of having skilled individual marksmen, not a body of men firing volleys into the air with the hope of accidentally hitting something.

"The division also concurs in the opinion of the Chief of Ordnance that the issue of sights having different sizes of peep-holes does not appear necessary. A man who has obtained a special slide turns in his rifle on discharge, and the next man to receive the rifle will want some other slide. There will be constant and unnecessary changes. The standard peep recommended by the board (after thorough test) as suitable to meet all the requirements of shooting under battle conditions, should not be changed unless practical experience by all arms of the Service using the rifle dictates such a change."

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MILITARY GEOGRAPHY.

1. The Resources of Russian Railroads in Peace and War.—*Jour. Cav.*, July.

2. German Plans for a Naval Base in the Far East.—*Jour. Arty.*, May-June.

3. The Significance of the Commerce of the Seas.—*Mar. Rund.*, July.

MISCELLANEOUS.

1. Visual Drill Signals.—*Jour. Cav.*, July.

2. Automobiles in the Army.—*Same.*

SERVICE SALAD.

Readers of the "United Service" are cordially invited to contribute to this department items of either fact or fancy, grave or gay, instructive or only entertaining; in short, any literary flotsam and jetsam likely to interest our subscribers.

VANISHING VIENNA.

A RETROSPECT.

From Nineteenth Century.

These notes, made some ten years ago, have hardly more than a historical interest now, for Viennese society has since then undergone great changes. The ensnaring old-world aroma, elusive and intangible though it was, is now barely more than a memory, and I daresay the generation which has replaced the one I knew will declare that my account in many ways is incorrect. This, however, is not the case, as those who knew Vienna in the eighties can aver, and these notes were made soon after my departure from that city, when my impressions were quite vivid, and the sorrow at the parting from so many loved friends still fresh. I will, therefore, give them as they were made, without any changes, as I fear to trust the correctness of my memory after a lapse of fifteen years.

It is not possible, I think, to give a just and adequate idea of Viennese society without showing out of what roots it sprung, and this I propose to do in a few words. When Francis the First renounced in 1806 the title of Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, and assumed the one of Emperor of Austria, he severed himself completely from German interests, and many of the highest German aristocracy who had hitherto flocked to Vienna withdrew to their respective countries, leaving only a small nucleus of society, formed of the richest and most powerful families belonging to the different parts of the Austrian Empire. The diaries of Frederic Gentz, the well-known and celebrated diplomatic agent, give a very good idea of this transformation. This society was composed of some families belonging to Austria proper, a fair proportion of great Bohemian names, a few Hungarians, and a sprinkling of Poles. They all had splendid palaces in Vienna, and some of these families live in them unto this day. The principal and ever-recurring names in Gentz's diaries are Liechtenstein, Auersperg, Dietrichstein, Harrach, Metternich, Esterhazy, Schönborn, Rasomoffsky, Pallavicini, Palffy, etc. Such was the composition of society at the time of the Congress in 1815, and it is not very much changed now. Vienna had through the best part of the nineteenth century the reputation of being the gayest capital of Europe. Relieved from the strain and agitation of Napoleonic days, the Austrian aristocracy gave itself up with its natural *insouciance* to its love of sport, pleasure, and display, living a

life of continual social intercourse, whiling time away in its own "gemüthlich" fashion, and never caring what the future might have in store of good or evil. Vienna was always pre-eminent for the facilities it affords of spending money, and together with Paris it set for the Continent the fashions in dress, furniture and carriages. Many foreigners of high degree came there, and were always received with cordial hospitality whatever the season of the year might be; for, until the existence of railways, many of the great families lived in their villas and country houses close to the town, or even in the suburbs or in summer resorts on the green and smiling slopes of the "Wiener Wald," a chain of wooded hills which encircles Vienna on the south and west. The waters of Carlsbad, so fashionable up to the beginning of the sixties, were a favorite meeting place for aristocratic Europe. Princes, statesmen, and diplomats went there, and many members of great Austrian families, also some of the bankers and rich merchants came from the capital; but these latter formed a completely different society, for then, as now, the line was clearly and firmly drawn, and when Viennese society is spoken of, it must be understood that it means the score or two of noble families, some of which have been mentioned, and that no exception is made to this rule.

A second society does exist; it is wealthy and very fashionable, and said to be amusing, and some of the young men belonging to the first society frequent it. It consists of bankers, artists, merchants, architects, engineers, actors, employes and officers, with their families. The only occasions on which the two societies meet are the great public charity balls; but even then they have hardly any intercourse.

The predecessor of the Emperor Francis Joseph was the Emperor Ferdinand—a prince of weak intellect, during whose reign a regular and unvaried routine had been maintained at court. The year was portioned out between Vienna, Schönbrun and Laxenburg, the three imperial palaces, all of them only a few miles distant from each other. All the archdukes followed this example, spending their winters in old-fashioned stateliness in Vienna, and the summers in the extremest simplicity in their country houses. This curious combination is very distinctive of Austrian life, even to this day. When the young Emperor at the age of eighteen came to the throne through an understanding between his mother and his aunt, the Empress his eyes opened on troubled waters, for it was in the midst of the Hungarian revolution; but he was full of hope and courage, and to youth everything seems possible. His chivalrous manners, his kindness and great charm won every heart, and under his impulse the troubles were soon forgotten, and Vienna became gayer than ever. The Emperor loved dancing, and acquitted himself of it with supreme grace and elegance. Through many cold winter nights the windows of the old "Burg" shone with a thousand candles, and the strains of the graceful trois-temps and mazurkas filtered out into the frozen air, and the faithful Viennese rejoiced at the thought that their young Emperor was enjoying himself.

In 1854, six years after his accession, the Emperor married the Duchess Elizabeth in Bavaria, his first cousin. The slight pale girl, barely seventeen, with the marvellous crown of chestnut hair, did not then give the promise of the incomparable loveliness which dazzled Europe for so

many years. She had been brought up with Spartan simplicity amongst the mountains and the woods of her native country, and she came with diffidence to take the place of the first lady of a society which was known to be the proudest and the most exclusive of the whole world. It has been said that the great ladies of that day discovered a flaw in the pedigree of the young Princess, and, conceiving themselves to be better born than her, made her feel it. This circumstance, many think, accounts for the dislike the Empress has always shown for Vienna and its society. The political events of the Emperor Francis Joseph's reign are too well known to require repetition; but it is not to be wondered at that a sovereign who ascended his throne during the terrible Hungarian episode—who, ten years later, was compelled to sign the disastrous Peace of Villefranca; who, in 1866, ended a seven days' war with Sadowa and the cession of Venice, and the year after was doomed to see his brother Maximilian perish in the most tragic and humiliating way, and for whom the utmost limits of grief and shame were reached in the mysterious, incomprehensible and shocking death of his only son—should bear upon his brow the impress of these storms. (When these lines were written, the cruel, wanton assassination of the Empress had not yet been committed, nor could in these pages allusion be made to the many minor family misfortunes which have at times befallen one of the best of men and most conscientious of monarchs.) The lines about the Emperor's forehead and mouth are very sad. but courage and above all resignation look out of his blue eyes, and now and then, when talking to his children and grandchildren, flashes of gaiety light them up. The highest and the most rigorous sense of duty is the mainspring of the Emperor's character. At his writing-table every morning by five o'clock, he despatches all his business himself, and when the press of work is very great his meals are brought in to him on a tray, and eaten in a perfuctory fashion. I have heard it said that at times the food is not very good; but the Emperor, instead of scolding, simply remarks to his A. D. C.: "You are a lucky man; you can go to the club and get another dinner."

After the Crown Prince Rudolph's death, the Empress, who until then had made short appearances at the court balls, and also assisted at a few dinners given at the "Burg," retired altogether from the world, and the Emperor had alone to bear the brunt of these receptions. He did so from the first with unflinching courage, his slight, straight figure as erect as ever, and addressing all those present with his usual courtesy and *bonhomie*. The Empress, whose transcendent beauty and great love of solitude have made her such an object of romantic curiosity to all strangers who visit Vienna, used for many years to give herself up entirely to riding and hunting. So fond was she of this latter pastime, that it was reported that a visit to Ireland was the promise held out to her if she would consent to assist at the Court festivities given in honor of some foreign sovereign. Later on, when she lost her nerve, she carried on fencing with the same keenness, and at last it was mountaineering which claimed her energies. She could walk from sunrise to sundown over the Syrian Alps, refreshing herself only with a glass of milk and sleeping on the fragrant hay in the loft of a mountain hut. The Hungarians were always the preferred of the Empress; she learned to speak their language and resided

much at Budapest, where, after Count Beust had created the dual system, nearly all the rich and brilliant Magyars had withdrawn. This naturally dealt a great blow to Viennese society, for many of the Bohemian nobles followed suit and went to live at Prague, loudly declaring that their country also ought to be recognized as a separate monarchy.

Viennese society therefore now consists mainly of families belonging to the German provinces and a very few from the other parts of the Empire who have remained attached to the old order. Its numbers fluctuate from two to three hundred. This does not include the diplomatic corps or many high officials, civil and military, who, though bidden to Court festivities, never appear at the smaller social reunions at private houses.

Every winter during the carnival two Court balls are given. The first one, which is styled "ball by Hof," includes from 1,500 to 2,000 persons. No invitations are issued for it; a simple announcement that the ball will take place is sent to all those who are entitled to go to Court. The second ball is called "Hofball," and to it only the élite of society and the corps diplomatique are convened by a formal invitation. It ends with a supper at small tables, at each of which a member of the imperial family presides, the ladies of highest rank being told off to the Emperor's table, the corresponding gentlemen to that of the Empress or the Archduchess who represented her. These small Court balls were very brilliant indeed, but quite informal, and no "cercle" preceded them. The young ladies (Contessen) were generally there in good time, standing in a compact phalanx in front of their mothers, seated on the benches to the right of the throne. "Contess" is the term by which any young lady of rank is designated at Vienna, be she a princess or a countess. On these occasions they were all dressed more or less alike, in very fresh and well-fitting tulle dresses, with little plush capes identical in shape, but differing in color. Around them. walking or standing, were the dancing men, all of them officers, with a card and pencil in hand making up their books. Involuntarily one was reminded of a saddling paddock. When the "fanfare" announced the approach of the Court, the capes all flew off like a flash of lightning, and were stuffed away under the sofas, on the knees of the mammas—anywhere, in fact, all the Contessen faced round in a row and stood ready for the race, which began at once with a spirited waltz.

These balls were given in the large room added on to the Burg for the Congress of 1815. The walls are of white stucco, and a row of fine yellow scagliola columns runs right around the room. The space between the walls and the columns is filled with hundreds of blossoming shrubs, and though the room is not beautiful, it looked very brilliant with its many crystal chandeliers, studded with hundreds of wax candles, and the assemblage I saw before me justified its reptation of being the most aristocratic society in Europe. They certainly all looked gentlemen and ladies, with a great air and good manners, and they moved and stood naturally and with grace. The ladies were covered with fine family jewels in old settings, to which the well-developed expanse of their persons afforded ample room. The men were in uniform, and those in Hungarian costume looked particularly well, and outvied their wives in the gorgeousness and size of the precious stones they wore. The Empress took her seat on a raised sofa, the Austrian ladies sitting on the benches on one side of

her, and on the other side were the Archduchesses. Ambassadresses and any foreign Princess who might happen to be at Vienna. About ten o'clock tea was taken by the Empress at a large round table to which a dozen ladies were convened, and on the return from this we found the cotillon had already begun. It is danced standing, and lasts two hours. The Contessen never show the slightest sign of fatigue. The figures of the cotillon were the prettiest and the best executed I have ever seen, and they were danced with the precision of a military maneuver. A score of Contessen tear to the other end of the room like a charge of cavalry, and then get back to their places through the most intricate mazes in the nick of time, without ever making a mistake. Strauss's band played with the greatest spirit and *entrain*, whilst the patient and exemplary mothers on the benches never took their eyes off their sprightly danghters. These balls begin precisely at eight o'clock and end at midnight.

Viennese society is almost one vast family, and there are few belonging to it who are not related to nearly all the others. Putting official rank on one side, their respective positions would come in this order: The Liechtensteins, being a still reigning family, come first. After them the mediatized princes, *i. e.*, those who at one time exercised sovereign rights directly under the Holy Roman Empire. These have the privilege of intermarrying with royal houses on an equal footing. Thus the daughter of the Duke of Croy has become an Archduchess. The next in rank are the Austrian princes created after 1806. Then there are mediatized counts and also counts of the Holy Roman Empire. The title of baron is almost unknown in this society; it is reserved for the *haute finance*, and is considered specially Semitic.

In order to be received at Court it does not suffice to belong to a noble family; it is absolutely necessary to have irreproachable quarterings. The most curious complications sometimes ensue. A young lady who had always gone to Court, as she belonged to one of the best families, married Count R——, who, though belonging to the aristocracy, was not "hoffähig"; that is, he could not go to Court, his mother not having been of noble birth, and his wife had to share his fate. A few years after their marriage, Count R—— accepted some official position, and received from the Emperor what is termed a "Handbillet," a letter making him "hoffähig," allowing him to go to Court. His wife, who had the right by her birth, was not, however, permitted to accompany him. These imperial "Handbillets," called so because they are written by the Emperor himself, sometimes grant the right to go to Court for life, but often only during official tenure. Many of the ministers and high functionaries spring from the middle class, and though they go to Court they never mix otherwise in society. The one brilliant exception to this rule is that of the late Count Hübner, once ambassador in Paris during the second Empire, and later on to the Vatican, who, though being of humble birth, managed, with the protection of Prince Metternich and infinite patience, tact and good fortune, to penetrate into the inmost circles.

It is natural that, in a society thus composed, mere wealth counts for nothing, and that the introduction of new elements on this basis would be quite impossible. Daughters of great houses, however numerous, plain or poor they may be, never dream of

marrying outside their order to secure a rich husband. Even if they had the wish to do so, the opportunity would be lacking, as they only meet the men belonging to their set. In some very rare cases the younger sons of impoverished families have been constrained by debt and extravagance to seek salvation in a money marriage; but then they retire into the country or live abroad, as their wives would not be received. Nearly all the great families who compose Viennese society have large means to keep up a good style of living. Those who cannot keep pace with the others retire to the country. Thus a few years ago the head of one princely house was completely ruined by racing, betting and gambling, and he, together with his wife and children, left their fine town palace and retired to their château in the country, never to be heard of or seen again. Gambling and betting are a great scourge in Viennese society, and nearly all the young men get hit hard at one time or another. The Emperor has been most desirous of stopping it; but in vain, for this passion is deeply ingrained in the blood of the Teutonic race. I am told the gambling in Austria and Germany is much higher than in any other country. It is, however, only fair to say that, whenever the crash comes, all the friends and relations rush to the rescue to help to the best of their ability. The feeling of solidarity is very great.

Vienna is probably the most expensive capital in Europe for people of high rank, as you pay there according to position. Nobody belonging to society, however badly off, could think of going in anything but a two-horse *fiacre*, the shortest fare being a florin. Most men, whether married or single, keep a *fiacre* (a matter of three or four hundred a year), irrespective of their own stables. Many ladies use *fiacres* in the evening to save their horses from standing in the bitter cold winds and blinding sleet of a Viennese winter's night. Most newcomers who enter a Viennese drawing-room would probably be struck by the extreme simplicity in the dress of the ladies, and it would not occur to them that to secure these garments, prices are paid in excess of anything in Paris or London. These clothes are remarkable for their extraordinary good fit and their exceeding freshness. The girls especially always look as if they had come out of bandboxes, and as if their dresses had grown upon them.

Large dinner-parties are confined to the diplomatic and official circles, but the Austrians dine out a good deal amongst themselves in a quiet, unostentious way. At some houses a large circle of relations flocks in almost daily, without any particular invitation. The way of living is eminently patriarchal; the large retinue of servants, badly paid, but well cared for, generally all comes from their masters' estates.

After all dinner parties, even the great official ones, everybody, ladies included, retires to the smoking room. One's æsthetic sense is rather shocked, by seeing a beautiful young woman, with bare shoulders and blazing tiara, lighting a big cigar over a lamp. The first thing a man does when he gets engaged is to request leave from his future monther-in-law for his fiancée to smoke. Many girls, however, do not wait for this moment, and anticipate, and there are evening parties of nothing but "Contessen" where the fumes of Havanas have been seen hovering in the air. Until quite lately the usual dinner hours were from four to six o'clock, this latter being quite the latest and most fashionable time,

for everybody had boxes at the Burg and the Opera, and these begin at seven and have to be over by ten, as that is the charmed moment at which all who do not live in a house of their own have to be back, unless they wish to be mulcted of the sum of ten kreutzers. Every porter closes his door punctually at ten, and the ten kreutzers are his perquisite. When, some years ago, the question was mooted of putting back the closing time to eleven o'clock, there was a revolt amongst the porters, and the authorities had to give in.

In spite of the pleasure-loving reputation of the Viennese, there are few theatres, and it is only the large subsidies the Emperor gives the Burg Theatre and the Opera which makes it possible for them to exist. A new ballet and opera of Wagner's always commands a full attendance, but at a classical play or an opera of Gluck's or Mozart's the house is nearly empty, though the acting and singing are first rate. The most prominent actors of the Burg are Messrs. Levinsky and Sonnenthal, who to their own individual talent unite a thorough knowledge of the stage. At the opera such representations as Massenet's *Manon* with Vandyke and Mdlle. Rénard in the principal parts, can hardly be rivalled anywhere. The younger sporting generation do, however, not care for the theatre. They like dining late, and then meet in small sets and play bézique or less innocent games. The men go a good deal to the club, where their conversation is entirely of racing and shooting. The Austrian shoots nearly all the year round, and all his faculties are devoted to this pursuit. He does not mind how much he roughs it or what weather he is exposed to. He is nearly always a good shot, and so are some of the ladies, who often accompany their husbands on their expeditions. Princess Pauline Metternich is a great proficient in this line. The chamois shooting begins in August, and is succeeded by stag and roe-deer, partridge and pheasant, with ground game, all through the autumn and early winter. Then comes the bear and wild boar season, and in February, amongst mountains of snow, the arduous shooting of the hinds. When this is barely over the stalking of the capercailzies begins. In order to secure this wily bird at the moment at which he sings his lovesong to his mate at the break of day, whilst she is sitting on her nest, it is necessary to get up between one and two A. M., and to scramble for hours up hill in the dark. Many men do this for the six weeks during which the "Blazing" season lasts. They live in the most elementary log-huts, existing on the coarsest food, and return to their homes perfectly attenuated.

The only time during which it is possible to count with any certainty on the presence of young men in Vienna is at the time of the races, which begin in April and go on with short intervals all through May till the end of June. This is the really brilliant time of the Vienna season, when the young sporting world come to the capital for a short spell of amusement. Sport of every kind is what really hypnotises the Austrians, and they are also fond of games, but they are not nearly so adroit or athletic as the English. They are devoted to horses and dogs, and are good and judicious riders; but the hunting which had been started at the Empress's instigation came to an end when the Emperor withdrew his support, and there is only one private pack of harriers in the monarchy, and this belongs to Count Larisch Moennich. If an Austrian travels,

which is a very rare occurrence, it is sure to be in order to shoot lions or tigers, but otherwise they are the most stay-at-home people of the whole world. The Austrian loves to be in the open air. The first thing that strikes the foreigner are the numbers of *cafés* in the Prater. They are crowded all the summer through. There the Viennese shopkeepers breakfast, dine, and sup, imbibing the most fabulous quantities of beer and *café au lait,* and smoking all the time whilst a band plays a waltz, a czardash, or a march.

There is one aristocratic restaurant in the Prater which goes under the name of "Constantin Huegel," and as long as anybody in society is left it is much frequented in spite of the plague of mosquitoes that infests it. There is no other capital which becomes as thoroughly empty and deserted as Vienna does in the summer. Even the smallest tradesman goes with his family to the country, and the aspect of the broad two-mile-long Prater Avenue under a sweltering August sun, with the accompanying clouds of huge mosquitoes, is the most desolate thing one can imagine. The climate of Vienna is neither healthy nor agreeable and, for those who live there always, rather exhausting. Whether it be owing to this or the too frequent inter-marriages amongst the Austrian aristocracy or the very small circle of interests bred by the extreme exclusiveness in which they live, it must be conceded that charming, amiable, and kind though they be, Viennese society is pervaded by a great moral indolence and a want of energy and initiative.

Politics, religion, literature, art, and science are hardly ever alluded to in general talk. The Viennese "Salon" (annual exhibition) is far below that of Munich, both in number of pictures and excellence of merit. There are exquisite concerts, but none but the middle class frequent them. Most Austrians are musical, but they do not cultivate their talent. Occasionally you hear a young man, after a small and *intime* dinner, strumming among clouds of smoke, a waltz or galop on the piano. The ladies hardly ever play or sing, and seem to care less for music than the men.

Referring to the constant intermarriages, there is no doubt that they often have most injurious effects, and they ought to be prohibited, especially those of uncles to their nieces, of which there are some examples. Somehow these marriages seem to be less deteriorating to the mind than to the physique, as some of the most intelligent, agreeable, and gifted couples of the Austrian nobility belong to historical families which have constantly inter-married for more than two hundred years. Love marriages are the only unions known at Vienna and admitted. The daughters of great families have small fortunes, for everything is entailed on the eldest son. Beauty, charm, and goodness are the only dower these young ladies bring their husbands. It sometimes happens that a young Austrian chooses a bride in the German Empire, or even a foreigner. If the young lady is well-born, well-bred, and simple, she is at once received with open arms. The one thing Viennese society most heartily detests are airs of affectation, and if anybody is suspected of indulging in them it is hopeless for that person to think of getting on. In this peculiarity lies the whole secret of the popularity of some people. Diplomats often do not like Vienna. They have a difficult part to play, and, especially those who represent Republican governments are looked upon with coldness and distrust.

Exceptions to this rule are, however, every now and then made in favor of those endowed with good manners, distinguished appearance and a modest, retiring behavior. In a society so closely united by the bonds of relationship, where rank is so clearly defined, every member knows its own place, and there can be no unseemly struggling or pushing, as takes place too often in more mixed communities. Snobbishness is also a thing unknown, for the reverence which Austrians have for good birth can hardly be designated as such. To them it is a law, nay, almost religion, which if taken from them would make them feel as if they were landed on a quicksand.

Another thing which makes it sometimes difficult for foreigners to get into Viennese society is the language, as German is now almost universally spoken, and the younger generation is not at all proficient in French. The ladies as a rule acquire a smattering of English from their *promeneuses,* a kind of daily governess, only engaged to take the "Contessen" out walking. Things were very different fifty years ago, when Princess Lory Schwarzenberg was the queen of society. All conversation was then carried on in French. The ladies who do so now belong to a former generation, and the type was mainly represented by three sisters, daughters of a princely house who were a power in Vienna. The youngest of them, Countess Clam Galls, held for many years, by dint of her grace, intelligence and kindness, the scepter laid down by Princess Lory. The *salon* of her elder sister is accounted the most exclusive one of the capital. A score of habitués resort there every other evening, and this illustrious conclave has been nicknamed the "Olympus." To be one of the elect implies that you are at least a demigod. Another cliques goes by the name of the "Cousinage," and is formed mainly by the members and relations of the powerful Leichtenstein family. If one of them dies the whole of society is paralyzed for the time being, and to obviate this all mournings are shortened considerably. It does not, however, prevent their tears from flowing, for kindness of heart is the fundamental virtue of this society. It is quite enough for anybody to be in trouble that all their faults and shortcomings should be forgotten, and everybody flock around them with proffered help and sympathy.

The one form of amusement dear to every Viennese heart is dancing. The young ladies think and talk of nothing else during the season, and everything is sacrificed to the amusement and wishes of the "Contessen." They are quite the dominant party, though of late a few of the young married women have shown signs of revolt, for they not only come to town, but they actually have the hardihood to dance!

At every ball and party the "Contessen" have a room set apart for them, into which no married man or woman may penetrate. They go to this room the moment they arrive, and if it be a party they are not seen again until they leave. At balls the "Contessen" always move about in bands of six or seven, linking arms. They never sit about with men as other girls do, but the moment the music begins they stand up in rows, three or four deep, for the dancers to choose from. As the "Contessen" are very numerous, their partners are not allowed to take more than one turn with them, so as to give the less popular girls a chance. After every dance there is a stampede for refreshments, which stand about on diffierent tables in nearly every room.

At supper the young ladies develop appetites only to be compared to their endurance in the dance. Quite different is the fate of the devoted mother. If once she succeeds in capturing a chair in the ballroom, no blandishments of any kind, no hopes of whist or pangs of hunger, will ever move her again. She would rather die than miss seeing how many turns her Finny takes with Sepperl T—, and how many more bouquets Fannerl S— gets than Mimi L—.

The "Contessen" have an enchanting time of it before they marry. They dance, they ride, they smoke, they shoot, they go to races, they have expensive hats and frocks, they eat as many sweetmeats as they like every afternoon at Demmel's shop; in fact, there is nothing that they wish for which is refused to them. They sometimes have the appearance of being very fast, but the moment they marry they become the best and the most devoted wives. Without a regret they follow their husbands into the country, and often only reappear when they have a daughter to bring out.

It strikes strangers as very curious that girls brought up in severely religious and strictly moral households should be allowed to go to every race for weeks together. Such, however, is the case. In freshest dresses of latest fashion the "Contessen" crowd together in the passages and on the steps of the grand stand or walk about in bevies in the enclosure.

Society flocks to these races in great numbers. The weather is generally fine in May, and the racecourse, which lies between the greater and the lesser Danube, is a pretty one. Most of the men and some of the ladies bet very heavily. For those who wish to be moderate the *totalisateur* is an easy solution. Many of the great bankers and merchants go to these races, accompanied by their wives, but there, as everywhere else, the separation from the society of which we treat here is absolute. The return from the races is one of the sights of Vienna. The long Prater Avenue is filled with carriages, three or four abreast, most of them horsed with very fast Hungarian "yukkers," tearing and careering along as fast as they can lay legs to the ground. The coachmen hold the reins in two hands at arms' length, shouting, laughing, and splashed from head to foot, which is supposed to be the acme of *chic*. In the evening the racing set meets again at drums and dances, given at some hotel, but here young ladies are excluded.

Though nearly every great family has its palace at Vienna, few of them entertain, but picnic balls are very much the fashion. They are so popular because everybody can do as they like, and that is what suits the temper of Viennese society. The finest private balls are those of the Marquis Pallavicini, a rich Hungarian magnate, whose handsome wife, wreathed in priceless jewels, receives the Court and society in spacious and profusely gilt halls. The Harrach and Schönborn palaces are renowned for their beautiful and costly appointments, dating from the days of Maria Theresa, whose prosperous reign gave a great impulse to architecture, and there is little that is good in Vienna left of the earlier date. People who do not possess houses of their own live in flats. As they never receive, it is difficult to penetrate into these apartments, unless you are a relation or an intimate friend. No casual visitor is ever admitted, which, I imagine, accounts a good deal for the strict morality of society. The excuse always given by the servant who opens the door, no matter at what

hour of the day, is that the lady is at her toilet. The Ambassadresses, the Mistress of the Robes, and the wives of one or two high officials have days, but if anybody else presumes to take one they are considered forward. Amongst themselves the Viennese are in and out of each other's houses all dav long. However occupied a married daughter may be, she is supposed to find time to visit her mother during the day. Whenever they meet, even at a dinner party or a ball, the daughter respectfully kisses her mother's hand. This holds good in the case of aunts and nieces, and, indeed, nearly all the girls would kiss the hand of the lady to whose house they go, if she were a relation or an intimate friend of their mothers.

All the women, of all ages, address each other with "thou," and for the men the rule is the same. In the army it is even made obligatory. A girl writing to an older woman would begin her letter thus:—"Honored Princess,—Mamma hopes thou wilt," etc. If there is a shadow of relationship, men and women always use the "thou" in speaking to each other as well as Christian names. If a lady of a certain age and rank shakes hands with a man, he always kisses it as a sign of respect. Everybody is called and addressed by a diminutive or nickname, which is utterly bewildering to a stranger, and the general topics of conversation being family affairs and purely local gossip, carried on in Viennese jargon, it is utterly incomprehensible to the uninitiated.

The Austrians bring up their children at home. The sons have tutors till they go to the University or into the army. This latter profession, diplomacy and internal administration are the only careers open to young men of good family. Abbés are not, as in France, tutors in families, and the clergy play no part in social life. Except occasionally some cardinal of high degree at a dinner party, no church dignitary ever appears in society. The Austrian ladies are strictly religious and severe in the observance of church rites. It would be impossible to give dinners on Fridays, as is done in Italy, for all the women fast. The men, though less bound by forms, are extremely respectful in their attitude towards religion. This example is set by the Emperor, who at Easter, before the assembled Court, washes on his knees the feet of twelve old men, and at Corpus Domini walks bareheaded through the streets of Vienna accompanied by all the great dignitaries of the realm, and devoutly kneels before the many altars erected on the way. In former days the Empress and all her ladies joined in the procession, in full Court dress, with their diamonds glittering on their hair. and bare shoulders and arms, and those who remember this say it was a sight worth seeing.

A great deal is done in Vienna for the poor. There are many practical and widespread organizations, headed by all the great ladies. The number of charity balls during the carnival is something appalling. At these festivities the lady patronesses sit on a raised dais, and one or two of the Archdukes grace the entertainment. The dancing public consists entirely of the middle class. The prettiest ball of this kind is the artists' ball, which is always in fancy dress. The walls of the spacious rooms are every year decorated in a new way with great talent and skill. Sometimes they represent Alpine scenery, at others the bottom of the sea, a tropical region or a mediæval town. Painters, sculptors, musicians, poets, actors, architects and engineers are to be seen

there with their families in picturesque or comic disguises. The week after this ball has taken place a public sale of all the decorations, ornaments, furniture, etc., takes place, and often the things go for fabulous prices. They are all clever imitations of real objects and are called in Viennese dialect "gehnaas."

Princess Metternich, a lady of extraordinary wit, prodigious energy and resource, sets every year some charitable scheme on foot when the spring approaches. Sometimes it is a *fête* in the Prater, sometimes an exhibition or *tableaux vivants*. The proceeds go to the hospitals and the poor.

The inclination to remain at their country seats gains ground very much with the Austrian nobility. In spite of this, few of them are good administrators, as their native indolence and easy-going disposition prevent them looking into their affairs. Sport fills up all their time. They are not great readers, nor do they take the slightest interest in what happens in the world at large. Even the affairs of the Empire sit very lightly on their consciousness. They live contentedly in the midst of their large family circle, in comfortable but unpretending affluence. Intimate friends are always welcome, but invitations are seldom extended to mere acquaintances, an exception being, however, made for those English who come to Austria in search of sport which their own country does not offer. They are always most hospitably received. It is difficult for anybody who has not lived in it to imagine a society of this stamp, and those who only see the outside of it are apt to form a wrong estimate. The extraordinary exclusiveness of the Austrian aristocracy is not a matter of pride; it is one of habit. The people who compose the second society would not wish to enter the first, as they would not feel at home in it, and the rare artists and literary men who sometimes are asked to great houses are more bored than flattered by these attentions, as it obliges them to don evening clothes and tears them away from their beloved pipes and Pilsen beer.

Prejudiced as many may be in these go-ahead times against a society so narrowly restricted, there is nobody who, once having passed the charmed boundary, does not appreciate the lovable qualities of those that form it; and whatever changes years may have wrought in its outward forms, the intrinsic qualities must remain, and they are most attaching, for they consist of kindness of heart, purity of life, frankness, and extreme simplicity.

WALBERGA PAGET.

MADAME TALLIEN.

From Nineteenth Century.

"C'EST demain qu'on me tue! N'êtes-vous donc qu'un lâche?" The wild words of a distracted woman—young and singularly beautiful—written in her prison of death, and surreptitiously conveyed to her faithful lover outside: "To-morrow they kill me! Are you then merely a coward?"

The prison was La Force, in the Marias, Paris, and the note was passed out on the eve of the historic ninth Thermidor, year II. of the Republic (1794). The Reign of Terror had imperceptibly reached its culmination, and the writer of the note was merely one of a crowd of victims selected and listed for slaughter on the following day. She was Thérézia, daughter of Count Cabarros. Spanish by birth, but of French origin.

Before the Revolution she had lived at Bordeaux with her husband, the Marquis de Fontenay; during the Revolution both were cast into prison there, on some suspicion of aristocratic leanings, and some proof of an intention to fly into Spain. There existed, apparently, no more definite charges against them, but at the time slight suspicion was enough to entail arrest, and arrest commonly meant condemnation and death.

The Communists and Jacobins, with Robespierre at their head, were in power, and twenty-one thousand local Revolutionary Committees, each with its staff of mercenary or voluntary spies and informers, were scattered all over France, exercising everywhere more authority than was ever possessed by a French king, or exceeded by a Roman tyrant in the worst days of the ancient city. Acknowledging no responsibility to the nominal government and National Convention in Paris, they carried on their inquisitorial and murderous work without check, and regardless of every principle of justice, and every rule of law and evidence. Their efficiency and patriotism were manifested by more and more arrests and more and more executions, and when more open and outspoken opponents became scarce they filled their prisons with those whom they chose—often on the slightest or most absurd grounds—to consider "suspects."

But Madame de Fontenay was a woman of exceptional grace and beauty, and her personal charms saved the lives of herself and her husband. She fascinated the young and terrible proconsul, Tallien, who had been sent from Paris to Bordeaux in order to purge that region of any leaven of royalism which might have survived the wholesale slaughter of the Girondist deputies. Four years previously he had casually seen and admired Madame de Fontenay, when she was already a marquise and he a white-bloused workman in a Paris printing office. In the new order of things the all-powerful Tallien was the only man strong enough to save her and her husband from death.

He saved them, but she had to pay the price—a price which many an unfortunate poor woman, similarly situated, in those days, was obliged to pay, or, in the alternative, die in her pride or piety.

Lowness of origin and vileness of soul were characteristics of the majority of the revolutionary extremists, and that majority might well have claimed Tallien. His parents were domestic servants. he had been reared in the gutters of the Marais quarter of Paris, and, in after years, was often referred to (scornfully but not untruly) as "Ce gamin de Paris." That was his origin; his texture of soul may be judged by his traffic with the helpless and distressed Marquise de Fontenay. At Bordeaux she became his loathing mistress; later on in Paris, in 1794, his reluctant wife, according to Republican forms of marriage.

His tyrant mission at Bordeaux ended, he took Madame de Fontenay with him to Paris. There Robespierre, and his other friends and colleagues, contemplated with a suspicious eye his relations with and interest in this woman of the aristocracy. To rescue him from contamination they caused her to be again arrested, thrown into La Force, and condemned to die. It was then that she sent out that last despairing cry to her protector: "N'êtes-vous donc qu-un lâche?"

Tallien was no coward, and was far from indifferent to the fate of his beloved mistress. But what could he do? What could she expect him to

do? Already he had deeply compromised himself with his friends for her sake, and it had only been by an exaggerated display of revolutionary faith and sentiments that he had been able to some extent to recover the ground he had lost on her account. He dared not renew efforts on her behalf—they would have been worse than useless to her, and probably fatal to himself.

But he did not abandon all hope, though it was only a vague hope of possibly discovering some means by which she might yet be saved. Through the instrumentality of his mother, *concierge* in the Rue de la Perle, another *concierge* of a house close to the prison walls had been induced to allow him secret access to a garret from the window of which he could daily see and salute the woman in whose fate he took an agonized interest, and could communicate with her by signs and occasional brief notes. Innumerable ideas and schemes of rescue were mooted, but nothing practical was decided upon before all hopes of prison evasion were crushed by the terrible news conveyed to him in her brief note of the eighth Thermidor: "To-morrow they kill me!"

The critical moment had arrived; only counsels of despair were possible; all the savage within the man was aroused, to the exclusion of every other emotion or consideration.

Tallien, whatever his faults or vices might be, was not wanting in boldness and resolution. He was capable, under provocation, of manifesting the dauntless and desperate courage of an enraged bull. Here was, for him, provocation the most extreme and irresistible. He saw plainly—for there was nothing else to see—that the only chance for the woman was a complete and immediate revolution in the actual condition of state affairs—in the violent and prompt overthrow of Robespierre and the Jacobin domination. Undaunted, he contemplated the gigantic and almost hopeless task, and unhesitatingly resolved to attempt it. He would make a revolution to save a woman's life, or, failing, accompany her to the scaffold.

The morning of the ninth Thermidor—"le jour de flamme"—arrived; the tumbrils were being made ready to carry to the guillotine the thirty-six victims who were to constitute that day's holocaust. In the Place de la Révolution the executioner and his assitants were arranging the dreadful machinery for slaughter. The National Convention was to be in session to listen to its master Robespierre propounding some fresh measure for more repression and more bloodshed.

Theretofore the Convention had been the humble and trembling servants of the Jacobins. In it there were two hundred members who, with the recent fate of the Girondist deputies in mind, had never dared to give expression to an independent thought or opinion likely to offend—who, in both a figurative and a literal sense. had never dared to call their souls their own, even when required to join in the new and fantastic religious worship invented by the philosophical fanatics.

But to-day there was a strange coolness and reserve in the assembly, as St. Just, Robespierre, and others of that faction addressed it. The bearing of the members seemed to suggest the prevalence of a sentiment that the Terrorists had gone far enough—perhaps that they had gone too far, and should go no further. It even looked as if a storm of revolt was brewing in that placid and silent assembly, and might well burst forth if only there was a man present

bold and desperate enough to excite and direct it.

The man was there, and—of all others!—a man who had been deeply compromised in the worst and foulest work of the Communists and Jacobins—in the massacres of September and the slaughter of the prisoners of Orleans—the butcher "qui faisait trembler Bordeaux."

Tallien vaulted into the arena with the air and gestures of a madman. In the thundering accents of a Mirabeau or a Danton he called upon the convention to rise up and assert itself against the veiled tyrants and conspirators who had usurped its functions, reduced it to a state of ignominy and slavery, and were drowning the Republic in torrents of innocent blood.

"With eyes on fire, boiling over with enfevered rage, amazing and inciting the stupefied and trembling auditors, carrying all before him in the torrent of his impassioned eloquence, he succeeded in imparting fresh courage and resolution, and new bone and nerve to the hitherto jelly-like assembly. And when as a ripe and fitting climax, he seized Robespierre by the throat and hurled him from the tribune, no hand was stretched out to stay his maniacal career, and no voice raised in protest. Perhaps without intending it—possibly without knowing it at the moment, he had saved the Republic, France, the world. He had accomplished his purpose—he had made a revolution to snatch from death the woman he loved."—(Lenôtre.)

Later on it will be shown how he was rewarded.

The Reign of Terror was at an end; the two-line note from the trembling woman in La Force was its death-warrant. And it was also the key which opened the prison doors of France to multitudes who had expected nothing but death.

The tumbrils did not go out on that day of the 9th Thermidor, and the services of the executioners waiting in the Place de la Révolution were not required. The tumbrils and the guillotine were, however, once again in requisition a few days later when, as a seal of blood to the Reign of Terror, Robespierre and twenty of his familiars were sent to the doom to which they had consigned so many of their felow creatures and fellow citizens.

Tallien, "the savior of his country," became for a time its master and leader, and did it good service too, both in civil and military affairs. He discovered, patronized and protected the young Bonaparte, and lived long enough and sank low enough to need the patronage—sparingly and grudgingly given—of his former *protégé*. But his rise and decline are not here in question, except in so far as they were associated with the story of his wife.

That association, brilliant and glorious at the outset, was not destined to last very long. Tallien himself was happy and content enough in the possession of the most elegant and beautiful woman in Paris, and, having nothing more to desire, formed and carried out the design of abandoning public employment and returning into private life with his great prize and modest fortune. For it is to be counted to his credit that he did not make use of or abuse his opportunities to acquire riches. His colleagues of the Revolution—those of them who had survived its convulsions—had known how to profit by it, according to their chances or tastes. Of the whole original gang, the sanguinary and implacable Robespierre was, perhaps the only one who can

safely be said to have deserved the title of "the Incorruptible."

The estate of Brunnoy had gone to Boursault. Fouché had Ferrières, Barras was like a king in the wide domains of Gros-Bois, Merlin got the rich monastery of Mount Valérien, Overard was all powerful by virtue of the millions he had amassed—and so on with many others. But Tallien had Therezia, and esteemed himself, and was esteemed by others, the most fortunate of all.

But the *ci-devant* Marquise de Fontenay did not take kindly to the idea of "love in a cottage," though that cottage was the charming bower of the Chaumière, buried amidst the bloom and greenery and the rural suburban region where now stands the Show Palace of the Trocadéro. It was well enough at first when Tallien could afford grand fêtes and when all fashionable Paris thronged to worship at the shrine of the glorious Thérézia. It was good enough to have been the wife of the hero of Thermidor and master of France. It was not quite the same thing to be the wife of Tallien the extinct Terrorist, the man without power or position, and whose fortune was diminishing. The birth of a daughter—commemoratively named Thermidor—did not reconcile her to the new situation, or consolidate her attachment to the father of her child. The memory of the circumstances of her earliest association with him may account in part for her growing distaste for the man who had twice saved her life; the debt of gratitude (where it is not forgotten) is not always payable in love. Then there was always the fundamental difference of caste between the high-born lady and the low-born "gamin de Paris." She aspired to re-enter her proper social sphere, he was gradually sinking back into his.

Be it as it may, the fact remains that one fine morning Thérézia was missing from the Chaumière and never reappeared there.

One of Tallien's millionaire friends had put up a fairy-like palace in the not very far away Faubourg Saint-Germain. Madame Tallien was invited to visit it, and was enchanted: "Que c'est beau!" she exclaimed; "le bonheur doit être ici!"

"Madame, here is the key," was the ready response of the gallant donor, who might have been a courtier of the days of Louis the Fourteenth instead of an ex-revolutionist.

Then commenced a third chapter in the strange life of this woman who had been Marquise de Fountenay, then Madame Tallien, and now took back her maiden name of Thérézia Cabarros. Such a life leaves upon one the impression of a long lapse of years, and it is somewhat of a surprise to find, on chronological reference, that at this time she was barely thirty years of age.

A foreign visitor to Paris, in 1802, who was introduced to her, describes her as having a fine and imposing presence, and a small, well-shaped head, giving her an air of being taller than she really was.

"Her magnificent black hair slightly concealed her white forehead and hung in rich tresses over the back of her neck, where it was interlaced with ropes of fine pearls. Her robe was of white satin covered with costly lace. She flitted gracefully from table to table, now and then laughingly risking five or six louis on a card. When she posed on her knees before a shy young girl, begging her to sing—her little hands joined in supplication, her large eyes widely open—she was an admirable model for a painter."

No doubt she was beautiful and graceful to a pre-eminent degree, but

the story of her life does not disclose any of those high intellectual and moral qualities which distinguished other conspicuous women of the French Revolution.

She troubled no more about the deserted and broken-hearted Tallien, unless to procure a divorce from him as soon as possible.

The fourth, and last and least eventful, chapter of her life opened in 1805, when she married Prince de Caraman. Before this she had become the mother of several children, besides Thermidor. A daughter was born to her in 1800, a son in 1801, another daughter in 1802, and still another in 1803. Her life, from 1805 onwards, appears to have been quiet and happy. If its turbulent past was ever recalled, she would say, with a sad smile: "Quel roman ma vie! Je n'y crois plus!" She did her best to forget it, and only once more had she occasion to confront it and come into contact with Tallien.

Their daughter Thermidor was about to be married to Count de Narbonne-Pelet, and the official presence of her father at the ceremony was necessary. As this was very objectionable to all the great personages interested in the event, the proceedings were simplified and made as private as possible. The degraded and despised revolutionist went through the part assigned him with becoming meekness and humility. When, with trembling hand and abashed mein, he put his signature to the marriage register, did the poor man, or that proud company, think of the similar occasion, not so very many years before, when, as the leader of a gay and distinguished company, he testified to the marriage of the couple who but for him might never have been Emperor and Empress of France?

The ceremony over, the grand princess who had once been his wife —and something else—condescendingly offered him a seat in her gala carriage as far as the Champs Elysées, in the vicinity of his poverty-stricken dwelling. He accepted, and for the last time found himself alone with her. driving in the streets through which, in the old days, they had rolled in triumph amidst the plaudits of a populace acclaiming the couple who had made Thermidor a landmark in history and put an end to the Reign of Terror.

On the 17th of November, 1820, the Paris journals briefly announced the death of Monsieur Tallien, the ex-Conventionalist, noting that he had died in extreme poverty and in the midst of wretched surroundings, and that in his last days he was only saved from absolute starvation by an almost too-late grant of a small annuity from the privy purse of the king whose brother he had helped to dethrone and murder.

DOMINICK DALY.

THE PRUDENTIAL SECURES SOME BRITISH TERRITORY.

Rock of Gibraltar arrives at the Insurance Company's Home Office.

The Prudential Insurance Company of America, well known for its world-famed trade-mark, "The Prudential Has the Strength of Gibraltar," has just received, at its Home Office, in Newark, N. J., a great slice of the rock from the famous English fortress on the Mediterranean.

By arrangement with the American consul at Gibraltar, R. L. Sprague, this rock was quarried from the parent rock and forwarded to America on the North German Lloyd steamer

"Koenig Albert," with certificate from the Admiralty Contractor at Gibraltar to prove its authenticity. Photographs showing the place from which the rock was cut out from Gibraltar have also been received by The Prudential.

The employees of The Prudential have a feeling of sentiment for the Rock of Gibraltar, the use of which as a trade-mark they feel has been largely instrumental in bringing about, through good advertising, increased popularity for The Prudential, and a public appreciation of the Scope and Strength of the Company, resulting from its progressive and, at the same time, conservative administration.

The Prudential selected Gibraltar as its trade-mark because of the great and renowned strength of that famous fortress. The rock which came to America is of grayish-white limestone of such an unusually dense and compact mass, and offering such difficulties to the stone-cutter, that the judgment of the Prudential officials in selecting Gibraltar as a trade-mark is well verified.

The English authorities at Gibraltar readily gave their consent to sending the Rock to The Prudential, and the only cost involved was that covering the shipment. Small portions of the Rock will be sent out as souvenirs to certain of the Company's employees.

COLONEL TATTNALL PAULDING.

A century and more ago the name of Paulding became famous in American history through the capture by John Paulding and two companions of Major André, of the British Army, on his way from West Point to New York, after his interview with the traitor, Benedict Arnold. It is a matter of history how Major André failed in his attempt to bribe his stanchly patriotic captors, and how he was tried, convicted and executed as a spy. His son rose to distinction as Rear Admiral Paulding, of the United States Navy. Colonel Tattnall Paulding, the son of the latter, is a native of the State of New York, where he was born in the year 1840.

In April, 1861, at the outbreak of the Civil War, when about twenty-one years of age, Mr. Paulding enlisted in the ranks of the Seventh Regiment of New York, and went with it into active service. He remained with that regiment only until May 14 following, when he received the appointment of lieutenant in the Sixth United States regular cavalry, with which command he served through the war, participating in the various memorable battles of the Army of the Potomac. On the third day of the hotly-contested battle of Gettysburg, he was made prisoner by the enemy, and passed nine months of bitter experience in Libby Prison, at Richmond. Upon his liberation he rejoined his regiment, and continued in active service until July, 1866, when he resigned, having in the meantime been promoted through the various grades up to that of lieutenant-colonel, by brevet, for gallant services.

After leaving the Army, Colonel Paulding located in the city of Philadelphia—his father being at that time governor of the Naval Home in that city—and entered upon the study of the law, which he soon relinquished in order to undertake more active business. In 1870 he commenced the fire insurance business as an agent and broker, becoming a member of the firm of Carstairs & Paulding, then well-known fire underwriters in Philadelphia. This firm subsequently became Carstairs, Paulding & Beokwith. In 1871 he became the Philadelphia agent and representative of the Commercial Union, of England, which then first extended its business to this city, and subsequently of the London & Lancashire Company, of Liverpool, and other offices of high standing at home and abroad. In all these companies Mr. Paulding enjoyed the fullest confidence of the home officers, and worked efficiently in the development of their business. He was a particularly successful underwriter in the various fields assigned to his guidance by his companies, his success arising alike from his practical experience and from his close study of the principles of the business, which made him thoroughly familiar with its theory; in a word, he took pride in his profession, and worked therein with earnest energy and intelligence.

It was doubtless this devotion to, and his evident mastery of, the science of his chosen profession, as well as his sterling character and recognized ability, that attracted to Colonel Paulding the attention of the directors of the old Delaware Mutual Safety Insurance Company, when in 1889-90 a radical change was contemplated, not only in the name, but in the old-time methods of business of that institution, and a competent person was sought to carry the proposed changes to a definite completion, and place the Delaware on an equality with its *confreres* of the city in which it dwelt. Colonel Paulding was selected as the man who could pilot the company safely through its troubles, and the presidency was tendered to and accepted by him. He at once entered upon the onerous duties imposed by the high position occupied by him, and the confidence of the directors has been fully warranted by their president's devotion to the interests confided to his keeping.



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

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

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

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FOUNDED 1879

THIRD SERIES.

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CONTENTS

Page.

I. Old France and Young America. Campaign of Vice-Admiral D'Estaing in 1778. By G. LACOUR-GAYET 301

II. Jack Hilton's Love Affair. By T. H. FARNHAM 322

III. British Naval Policy and German Aspirations. By ARCHIBALD S. HURD 327

IV. The Strategy and Tactics of the Russo-Japanese War. Thirteenth Paper. 361

V. Some Military Reminiscences of the Rebellion. By T. J. JORDAN, Brigadier-General U. S. Volunteers 375

VI. Service Salad 392

VII. W. F. DRAPER, Brigadier-General U. S. Volunteers 399

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UNITED SERVICE

EDITED BY L. R. HAMERSLY, Jr.

OCTOBER, 1905.

OLD FRANCE AND YOUNG AMERICA; CAMPAIGN OF VICE-ADMIRAL D'ESTAING, IN 1778.

Translated from the French (Revue des Deux Mondes, Jan. 1, 1905) by Chaplain T. G. Steward, 25th Infantry, for the Second Division, General Staff, U. S. A.

THE remembrance of the ties of affection which, from the epoch of Louis XVI and Washington, have united France and the United States, has been recently called to mind and consecrated in an original manner. A Franco-American committee was established about four years ago for the purpose of collecting the names of all French combatants—plain seamen, obscure soldiers, celebrated officers—who had taken part in the American war. Long lists have been prepared from the archives of our departments of War and Navy, which were published some months ago under the oversight of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Americans who will visit us for business, study or pleasure, will be able to find in this, or that city of France, some descendants of those who formerly fought for the liberty of their forefathers. Relations of a personal character to the advantage of both countries may thus come to be established between the sons of Washington's militiamen and the sons of the soldiers of Rochambeau.

Washington, Rochambeau, La Fayette: this trinity of glorious names presents itself to the minds of all those who study the records of old monarchic France and young republican America. But history is probably too exclusive in its manner of conserving for posterity the

name of the President of tenacious faith; of the old soldier who was the last marshal of the old France; and of the young hero who saluted the birth of liberty with all the enthusiasm of his twenty years. By the side of these names: How many others worthy of being cited do we see coming to light in the lists of the Franco-American committee! In the same way Yorktown, that double triumph of French and American arms, has perhaps too often thrown into the shade the episodes which preceded it and rendered it possible. How many pages dear to the patriots of both countries are worthy of being recalled in connection with this great event!

The first, as to date, of these episodes it is proposed to recount here, following the documents of the archives of the Navy and, as occasion shall serve, two recent works, one by Mr. Charlemagne Tower, Ambassador of the United States at Berlin: "*Le Marquis de La Fayette et la Revolution Amerique;*" and the other by Viscount de Noales: "*Marins et Soldats Français en Amerique pendant la guerre de l'Independence des Etats-Unis.*" Notwithstanding its failure of complete success, the campaign that the naval arm of the Very Christian king made in the waters of the United States in 1778 remains a just subject of pride for the Navy of Louis XVI, and a service of prime importance to the America of Washington.

I.

Monday, April 13, 1778, the people at Toulon witnessed a notable spectacle. Toward the close of a beautiful spring day, favored by a fresh breeze from off shore, twelve ships and five frigates in perfect order sailed out of the harbor by the southwest cape; in a few hours they were out of sight. Where were they going? To Brest, said some, where was assembling at that very time a great maritime armament. The inhabitants of Toulon remembered that they had seen, less than twenty years before, the squadron of M. de La Clue leave their port to join, at Brest, the squadron of M. de Conflans, and that they had both been either destroyed or dispersed in the seas of Gibraltar and Lagos. Fortune, which had so many times disfavored the junction of the squadrons of the Levant and the Ponant; would it show itself more lenient this time toward the naval forces of the king of France?

To say the least, the appearance of the squadron was calculated to inspire confidence, for it presented a beautiful sight. The Languedoc,

the Tonnant of eighty guns; the Cesar, the Zele, the Hector, the Guerrier, the Provence, the Fantasque of sixty-four, the Sagittaire of fifty, were all vessels of recent construction, upon which the engineers had placed the very latest nautical improvements, and which appeared well-fitted for a long cruise.

The officers were for the most part from a generation too young to have taken part in the maritime misfortunes of the previous reign; however, it drew from these sad and recent memories the lessons of the experience, and the ardent desire to revenge them. Many belonged to the nobility of Provence, which was, with the nobility of Brittany, its rival in devotion and glory, the great nursery of the military marine of the old regime. Broves, Raymondis, Barras de Saint-Laurent, Mories Castellet, Chabert Cogolin, Desmichels, Champorcin, Suffren, d'Albert de Rions, bore names justly celebrated in the Navy of the Levant.

The least known perhaps at Toulon among the general officers of the squadron was the commander-in-chief himself, the Vice-Admiral Count d'Estaing, aged at this time forty-nine years.

Charles-Henri-Theodet d'Estaing du Saillas, known as Count d'Estaing, was not a sailor until in the second part of his life. After having served under Maurice of Saxony he went over into the Indies as brigadier-general with Ashe and Lally; he fought valiantly but was taken by the English at Madras. He entertained for the enemies of France a profound hatred which could inspire in him one of his latest utterances: "When you have caused my head to fall," he said to the judges of the Revolutionary tribunal, "send it to the English, they will pay you well for it." Regaining his liberty after the battle of Madras, he set about arming, at the Isle of France, two vessels of the India Company. In a cruise of five months, conducted with great dash, he destroyed several English settlements on the Persian Gulf, and on the coasts of Sumatra. Captured by an English vessel while on his return to Europe; thrown into prison at Plymouth where he remained some time, he finally returned to France and prepared a great expedition against Brazil; but this did not take place. It served, however, to raise him step by step to the grade of lieutenant-general of the Army and of chief-of-squadron of the Navy (October, 1762).

His ascension to the highest grades was very rapid; governor-general of the Leeward Islands with residence at Saint Domingo; lieutenant-general of the Navy; commandant of the Navy and of the city of Brest, he attained on February 6, 1777, to have created for him in time of full peace, by the side of the ancient dignities of vice-

admiral of the Ponant and vice-admiral of the Levant, the new title of "vice-admiral of the seas of Asia and America." His intrusive character, and this abnormal advancement, joined with the art that he possessed in marvellous degree of pushing himself at court and in public, brought to the new admiral much enmity. As to d'Estaing, he justified his course by appealing to illustrious examples. "I have not come up through the lower grades of the Navy. In this respect I am in common with four of the greatest men that have commanded it. The great Du Quesne was one of them; the marshal of Tourville also entered with the same grade he had held in the land service. M. Du Guay-Trouin and Jean-Bart were not able to begin there on account of their birth. If I ever come to imitate them in anything it will be glory for me to have had the same disadvantage that they had."

Among the reproaches that the jealousy of the naval corps addressed to d'Estaing, was that of giving his confidence readily to "upstarts," whose origin recalled his own career; but it must be recognized that this confidence was far from being always misplaced. He gave the command of the Guerrier to an officer who had been at first a lawyer, then secretary to an embassy, then captain of dragoons in Canada, then aide-de-camp to Montcalm and brigadier-general. This captain of vessel, with a career so little classical, was the first French sailor to make the tour of the world—his name was Bougainville. D'Estaing brought from Brest a geometrician and inventor of nautical instruments to whom he confided the delicate functions of major and intendent of the naval Army; this man of science made proof, in the course of a campaign of twenty months, of the complex and multifarious qualities which mark the accomplished chief of staff, he was the chevalier de Borda.

D'Estaing was very fond of writing and he often wrote with talent. His papers of all classes, easily recognizable by the fine (small) hand and numerous erasures—memoires, reports, plans, correspondence, etc.—form the most extensive collection among papers from general officers, possessed by the archives of the Navy But the man of the desk was also a man of action, energetic in manner and quick in decision

Called February 8, 1778, to the command of the squadron that was fitting out in Toulon, he took at Paris, in concert with the minister, M. de Sartine, all the measures necessary. March 27th he arrived at Toulon. April 13th he put to sea with all his squadron. "Promptitude," said he as a true warrior, "is the first of weapons; to surprise

is nearly to conquer." Later he was caused to grieve over the same haste in his departure. It is certain that everything was not entirely ready; the arsenal of Toulon which he had characterized as "cruelly, miserly," had not been able to furnish him with all that he had asked for, and which was really necessary for him. But he wished to sail without delay because it was necessary; he was off.

II.

It was not in the direction of Brest that the squadron of d'Estaing sailed from Toulon before the breeze. It did not leave the shores of Provence to regain the French coast in Brittany. It left to cross the wide Atlantic and to approach the shores of the United States. At this time France had not yet broken officially with England; nevertheless she had formed an alliance with the new State born in Philadelphia. It was to the young Republic of the New World that d'Estaing had the great honor of conducting the vessels of the oldest monarchy of Europe.

Considered from the point of view of maritime history proper, the decision taken by the government of Louis XVI marked a capital date of our naval history. Until then, even with those men of the sea of the stamp of a Du Quesne, or of a Tourville, the French navy had always been a little slave of the coast; it had rarely had other fields for maneuver than the Mediterranean, the Gulf of Gascony, and the Channel. As to the fleets which had left France for Canada, the Antilles, or India, they had had at least as much the character of convoys of commerce, as the character of war squadrons; far from going to attack, they went to escort and defend. In this instance it was the most audacious offensive—a great maritime war with entire liberty of movement, that d'Estaing was authorized to carry on. To comprehend the capital importance of this movement we must not forget that this crossing of the Atlantic from Toulon to New York constituted the inaugration of the American war. The squadron of d'Orvilliers had not yet left the harbor of Brest; when it did leave it was for the purpose of cruising in the Channel, following the classic play of temporizing and awaiting a combat. Here, on the contrary, the instructions to d'Estaing enjoined upon him to go to seek the enemy directly, beyond the Atlantic. In submitting his plan to the council of Louis XVI and in inducing them to accept the idea of this very

long distance campaign, Sartine gave to maritime warfare an altogether new orientation.

In the offensive which d'Estaing inaugurated there was much that was unknown. The dangers of a long voyage, the difficulty of keeping together the diverse unities of the fleet, were nothing alongside of the ignorance of the conditions under which they were to fight. At such a distance from France the French squadron would have no other source to depend upon but itself and the country where it was going. This country itself was a land unknown; of its coasts the conditions of access and anchorages, they knew almost nothing; for a French ship was never seen in these regions, reserved exclusively for the English. They expected pilots from the country who alone could furnish them with the knowledge of the nautical conditions. In this respect they were doomed to experience more than one disappointment; all our chiefs of squadrons and captains, d'Estaing, Grasse, Suffren, are unanimous on this point—the ignorance or incompetence of the American pilots. With respect to material resources that the country could furnish for a naval force, there had been also more than one deception. In this republic which was hardly born, there was nothing which could remind one of France with its intelligent organization and its well-fitted arsenals. In fact, our squadron was not able to secure, so to speak, either cordage or naval stores during its sojourn in the United States. But, that which was never lacking, was the cordiality of the welcome which our soldiers and sailors everywhere met. The first officer of the Royal Navy who, in his official character, de Sainneville, lieutenant of the Navy commanding the frigate Nymphe, has left an interesting account of his sojourn in Boston; he remained in the capital of Massachusetts from the 5th to the 19th of May, 1778; it was at this time that the squadron of d'Estaing was crossing the sea.

"I was," says Sainneville, "conducted on my arrival to the office of war, the president of which invited me to dinner. We dined in a coffee house. An enthusiast, after drinking, fell upon my neck in his delight on seeing me among them, and congratulated me on being the first vessel of the king of France that had been seen in Boston harbor and compelled me to agree with him that the situation in which I found myself marked an epoch in the life of man." At the wharf the people of all ranks flocked around me seizing my hand, listening to me, following me, and turning away from me only to look with satisfaction upon the flag of the king floating for the first time in this centre of American cities. The spectacle was one of the most inter-

esting I have ever enjoyed. Three days afterward the "Sovereignty" of Boston invited him with all the officers to a grand dinner. They spent four hours at the table. At the close the president proposed nine toasts in an order which might have aroused irritation concerning the proctocol. But he said to Sainneville "that if he had committed any faults against what was due to France or to him, he begged him to attribute it only to the ignorance which a poor countryman such as himself must have of the received usages in such a ceremony."

III.

When it was decided at Versailles that the squadron of d'Estaing should depart, the military situation of the United States was as follows: The English general, Clinton, had taken possession of Philadelphia which had been the cradle of the Republic; the English squadron of Richard Howe, nine vessels strong, cruised off the mouth of Delaware Bay which formed the harbor of Philadelphia. Coming unexpectedly, the French squadron was to disperse the squadron of Howe; by this stroke Clinton, shut up in Philadelphia, would be obliged to lay down his arms. A new Saratiga, much grander than the original, would consecrate definitely American liberty. This all could be—on one condition. If d'Estaing should appear in America with the rapidity of lightning, and should disperse Howe before that person had had the time to recognize the hand that had launched the bolt. Things did not come to pass that way.

Leaving Toulon with a fair wind our squadron was almost immediately stopped by calms. It required more than a month, exactly thirty-three days to reach the Straits of Gibraltar. The satisfaction of having finally passed, with all his vessels, this dangerous channel, above all, the joy of being wafted at present on the Atlantic with a good wind from the east which was swelling the sails, inspires the admiral with this despatch (May 19th, 1778):

"The details of humanity do not appear to you, monseigneur, beneath you. The sailors have families to whom they are dear and whom they love. Their imagination is satisfied in writing to them, but they all say their letters never arrive. I have ordered, following the statute, that they make all enclosures under your envelope. Be kind enough to order very positively that they do not fail in your office to deliver them strictly to those addressed. If they should arrive countersigned, this would have a prodigious effect. There is not a quartermaster's wife who would not believe her husband was

on intimate terms with you. All the girls of the villages, expectant of this honor and the freedom that comes from an absent husband, would, without contradiction, want a sailor for a husband, and the sailor classes would increase. Pardon me for my extravagance, but the wind is fair, and that wine goes to the head."

May 20th, when they were forty leagues west of Cape St. Vincent the purpose of the expedition was officially revealed; the captains received orders to open their sealed orders; they knew then that they were going to America. On board the Languedoc, the admiral's vessel, solemn preparations were made. At 11 o'clock the chaplain celebrated mass with great pomp; d'Estaing and his staff were present, as well as a passenger who had embarked at Toulon in a mysterious manner, and who was then presented under his real name—Gerard de Raynevel, minister plenipotentiary of his Very Christian Majesty near the Congress. The Languedoc was thoroughly decorated; the admiral's flag and the flag from the quarter deck floated in the breeze. After the mass the admiral had read a declaration before the whole ship's company: Order was to pursue any English vessels, each one being assured of a share in the prizes taken, according to his rank. The reading of this was received with acclamations, many times repeated, of "Vive le Roi" (Long live the king).

Crossing the Mediterranean had taken up thirty-three days; it took fifty-two more to go from Gibraltar to the Delaware; that is in all three months and five days. People have not failed to reproach d'Estaing for the excessive slowness of this voyage, which wore out his crews before coming in contact with the enemy, and which caused him to arrive after the enemy had stolen away. The admiral, who suffered more than any one else from this loss of time, knew well that it was necessary to sacrifice everything to celerity; but, not to speak of the calms against which he could do nothing, how could he proceed at a regular and uniform rate of speed with vessels, some of which were desperately slow? In a table of classification with respect to sailing, it was shown that in twelve of the naval units, there were six catagories of speed. "That which would give you an idea, monseigneur, of the slowness to which we are condemned by the Gurrier and the Vaillant, is that all the merchant vessels which are along with us are never separated from the squadron only when they chose to be. These two vessels suffer and run the risk of losing their masts, by being always covered with sails, while we roll and the sea devours us, because it is constantly necessary to brail up and wait for them."

The single incident of these long and weary weeks of sailing was the capture of two English commercial vessels; they were captured to prevent them from carrying to America the news of our coming. Finally, July 7, without anything as yet having announced their presence, the twelve vessels arrived in Delaware Bay. The anchorage, which was not without danger, was made with perfect success, notwithstanding the lack of pilots. But the English had left. About fifteen days of delay had prevented d'Estaing from executing his plan.

Clinton, whose position in Philadelphia was threatening to become critical, had evacuated that city on June 22, going in the direction of New York. He had ordered Howe to leave the cruising off the Delaware and to establish himself in the bay of Sandy Hook. These two movements were effected on parallel lines, by land and by sea. Clinton and Howe had rejoined at Sandy Hook; from this place the English Army passed over to New York on the sqaudron. Clinton was saved.

What did d'Estaing do now that the nest was empty? His instructions were but little definite; as will be understood, because of the distance, the time required to pass over it, and above all, because of the imperfect knowledge that they had in Versailles of the theatre of the American war. They said to him to do what he "believed to be the most proper;" he had perfect latitude to attack the enemies "there where he would be able to injure them most, and where he judged it to be most useful to the interests of His Majesty or to the glory of his arms." If the superiority of the English upon the sea did not permit him to attempt anything, he muse retire to Boston, revictual himself there, and from there proceed to the Antilles where various operations against the English islands were indicated to him. Nevertheless he was urgently recommended not to leave for the Antilles before having performed "an action beneficial to the Americans, glorious for the arms of the king, fit to manifest immediately the protection that His Majesty accorded to his allies."

To respond to the spirit of his instructions, d'Estaing decided to attempt immediately off Sandy Hook what he had not been able to do off the Delaware. He detached the frigate Chimere to carry Gerard de Rayneville to Philadelphia, then he again put to sea, July 8. He arrived off the heights of Sandy Hook about forty-eight hours later. He remained there eleven days, from July 11 to July 22.

Sandy Hook was in this campaign the first station made by the French squadron, the second was Newport, the third Boston.

IV.

The squadron of Howe was in the anchorage off New York, was materially less in number than the French squadron—nine vessels against twelve, of which six were of sixty-four guns and three of fifty; but it had several advantages; more homogeneity, crews in better condition, and above all, the advantage of a defensive position in an anchorage which its chief knew prefectly.

D'Estaing feared to enter these channels of the bay of New York without pilots; some of his vessels, as the Languedoc and the Cesar, drew a great depth of water. He began by casting anchor off the heights of Shrewsbury River, between the point of Sandy Hook to the north, and, to the south, the bathing beach much frequented today, of Long Branch. From there he could command all the entrances to the harbor of New York. Howe was enclosed in the mouse-trap; it remained now only to go there and seize him.

The admiral had sent by land a confidential officer, M. de Choin, major of infantry, to Washington to secure a re-supply of water for the squadron, and to send some pilots, thoroughly familiar with the channels to New York. While he awaited an answer he received this letter from a correspondent who wrote to him then for the first time:

"In camp near Paramus July 14, 1778. It is with very lively satisfaction, M. le Count, that I learn of the arrival of a French fleet upon the coasts of America. I have not less, in knowing that you command it; and this latter furnishes me with a pleasure greater still, that of learning the news of a victory more important, I believe at this juncture, than ever a victory has been. I love to think that you will give the first blows to an insolent nation, because I know that you will appreciate the pleasure of humiliating it, and that you know it well enough to hate it. I have the honor to share with you in this sentiment by reason of the ties of blood and by our common title of Auvergnat, and there are no reasons in the world which do not join in making me desire your success with an ardor impossible to express. It is very important at this time for more than one reason, and I hope M. le Count, to see very soon justified anew the sentiments with which I have seen, messieurs, the English in London honor you. May you defeat them, send them to the bottom, put them as low as they have been insolent! May you begin the grand work of their destruction which will put their nation under the feet of ours! May you prove to them, at their expense, what a Frenchman and a French

Auvergnat can do! May you do to them as much evil as they desire to do to us!"

The author of this vibrant letter was the young Marquis de La Fayette.

D'Estaing received also a very generous letter from Washington. "The arrival upon our coasts of a fleet belonging to His Very Christian Majesty is an event which renders me extremely happy." The general-in-chief felicitated him in advance of the victory that every one expected; as he also felicitated himself upon the assignment which united him to the admiral.

The moment seemed to have arrived to give to the English the mortal blow. At that hour even Washington thought of crossing the Hudson above New York at King's Ferry; joining himself on the left bank to his lieutenant, Gates, who was already there with 7,000 or 8,000 men, he would then move to envelope Clinton in the rear, while d'Estaing would attack Howe's squadron in front.

The plan was fine and an excellent combination. To execute it it was necessary for the French squadron to enter the lower bay which forms the southern part of the harbor of New York. It was not until July 18th that de Choin announced to d'Estaing the arrival of some pilots, among them a colonel of militia, "who was said to be very thorough in his knowledge of the river;" this man who knew himself to be necessary and who could not have had a very ardent attachment to the cause of independence, took his time; he did not wish to travel otherwise than in a cab. The pilot, the most experienced in the country, the one who in the preceding wars piloted the English ships, commenced by refusing to come aboard our vessels; he had the fever. It took the supplications of La Fayette and some American generals to overcome his attack. Some captains of merchant vessels could still be found. De Choin had but little confidence in a personnel which moved with so little spirit; he advised d'Estaing to make them answer for their maneuvers with their heads.

The admiral was very anxious for action; he was expecting the arrival very soon of Byron's squadron which had left England about the middle of May. By all means it was necessary to act without delay. Now the pilots declared unanimously that what was demanded of them was impossible; the vessels of sixty-four guns could not enter New York with these guns. D'Estaing had six of this class, two of most powerful artillery, four of only smaller artillery. He insisted; the pilots replied that there was in the channel only twenty-three English feet or twenty-one and a half French feet of water; while the

French vessels drew from twenty-three to twenty-five feet of water. D'Estaing verified these statements by soundings made by the pilots under the direction of a lieutenant of the Navy, M. de Ribieres, the verification gave upon the bar, twenty-two feet. D'Estaing tried a final argument; he offered 150,000 francs to the pilot who would take him through—no one would accept.

Then a council of war was held on board the Languedoc on the 20th of July. The admiral informed the chiefs of squadrons and the commanders of what had taken place and showed one time more the categorical refusal of the pilots. It was then impossible to attempt anything in the harbor of Sandy Hook. Washington had expressed the desire that if the operations at New York could not be executed, the allied squadron should proceed to Rhode Island to deliver Newport. The admiral communicated to his officers the information that he had with regard to that city and informed them that they would sail for that port.

On July 22d the French squadron sailed from the shores of Sandy Hook. Off the Delaware d'Estaing had not seen the English. Off Sandy Hook he had seen them but did not attack them.

While rendering justice to the good will of d'Estaing to his very sincere desire to pass through the New York channels we cannot refrain from saying that his decision was infinitely to be regretted. New York was then the English military capital in the United Sates; to destroy the squadron of Howe and the army of Clinton was to end the war at a single blow. The admiral knew this better than any one else. Hence he took care to lay before Laurens, the president of the Congress, as, later before the minister, the imperious reasons which had forced upon him his determination. Nevertheless, we may ask: If a bold sailor would not have risked, if not all of his squadron, at least some of his vessels upon that bar reputed impassable? Let us admit that d'Estaing would here have lost some vessels on the bar; he thus might have "bottled up" the squadron of the enemy. But among his vessels four at least could have passed; those which were of the same class as the vessels of Howe anchored in the bay. One of these, the Fantasque, had for its commander, Suffren. Who knows if it would not have been given to the future vanquisher of Praia to inaugurate in the lower bay his irresistible offensive? Nothing was done; neither blockade, obstruction of the channels, nor penetration into the bay.

V.

From Sandy Hook to Rhode Island took seven days, "seven days of anxiety," said d'Estaing, "for we were short of water and the number of cases of scurvy increased rapidly." July 29 the squadron arrived in sight of Newport. Here, too, the help of pilots was necessary; the approach to Rhode Island was only through difficult and sinuous channels. Rhode Island is one of the islands of the very much indented Narragansett Bay; at its southern extremity it contains the city of Newport, which is to-day the queen of American watering places. It is surrounded by a very narrow arm of the sea. The channel on the east separates it from the main land; on the west, it fronts the islands of Conanicut and Prudence, themselves being separated from the coast by Narragansett Bay proper. Altogether it forms a military position of the first order. For d'Estaing it was his work to guard the three channels. Major-General Sullivan, coming from the interior, was to attack from the north and cause the capitulation in Newport of the six thousand men who were there. The part of the French admiral was to hinder this army from escaping either by the coast or by sea.

D'Estaing and Sullivan could not act at once. On coming to anchor, July 29th, near Newport, the admiral received a letter from the general; he was not ready; his militiamen were still at their homes; he asked that they wait on him. The reason was genuine; it is known how little the American militia had of the character of regular troops; but perhaps there was mingled with it a little of that jealousy of which La Fayette forewarned d'Estaing. "I feel truly that it is annoying to certain people to see foreigners play the attractive parts of the piece. The attack of General Sullivan, however important, would only be what is called in comedy a little *robe de chambre affair* in comparison with the spectacle that your fleet and your troops would make." The admiral consented to wait, but as he said: "The precious moment of arrival, the moment which astonishes, and in which often there is no resistance, was lost."

The operations commenced by a sort of blockade. The bulk of the squadron remained at the opening of the central channel between Rhode Island and Conanicut; two frigates entered the western channel and there burned a corvette and two galleys. In the western channel, or in the Narragansett, were sent the Sagittaire of d'Albert de Rions and the Fantasque of Suffren. These two captains who were often brothers in arms, sailed around the island of Conanicut,

reducing to silence two batteries on it; then passing between this island and Prudence, they burned four frigates and a corvette. All the approaches to Newport were occupied by our vessels. Sullivan had nothing to do but to come and gather the laurels which had all been prepared.

Things remained in this state until August 8th. At this date the American Army was finally ready; the moment had come for a vigorous action. D'Estaing left at sea to prevent any arrival of succor, the Protecteur and the Provence. With the eight vessels remaining he forced the central channel after a lively cannonade with the batteries of Newport and went directly to an anchorage out of the range of the English fire. At this anchorage he was joined by the Sagittaire and the Fantasque, while a third frigate had re-enforced, in the eastern channel, the two frigates which were already there. All these movements were accomplished with precision and method. The general attack was to take place on the 10th. Sullivan was to attack along the eastern channel under the protection of the three frigates; d'Estaing, with his ten vessels jointly, was to attack by the central channel of which he was master.

On the 9th d'Estaing landed on the island of Conanicut some battalions of troops intended for land service to be drilled some hours to prepare them for the general assault the next day. The weather was foggy as it often is in this region, even in midsummer. With the ascending sun the fog lifted. The admiral then discovered in full view an unexpected sight. The Protecteur and Provence had taken refuge with all haste in the channel of the west; and a squadron of thirty-six sail, of which fourteen were vessels of double batteries, was approaching the coast. One can easily imagine what had taken place. Howe, being at liberty since the 22d of July, re-enforced by several vessels, had put off in our pursuit. It was the position of Sandy Hook reversed, we were in the trap, the English on the outside.

It is proper here to applaud the firmness and above all the presence of mind of d'Estaing. Surprised all at once by this contretemps so unfavorable, attributable above everything else to the delay of Sullivan, he did not lose a moment in preparing to face the danger; his decision and energy and his rapidity surely deserved a better recompense.

He employed the evening of the 9th in mooring his vessels very solidly in case of a direct attack from the enemy; he had at the time eleven vessels; the Provence had joined the others; as to the Protecteur, her draught of water obliged her to remain in the western

channel. The night passed under arms but without alarms. Although the prevailing winds of the season, that is to say, the winds from the south, invited the English to attack, Howe had anchored at a good distance from the shore. On the morning of the 10th the wind, by little and little, shifted to the north. In a moment d'Estaing took his course; at half-past six in the morning he signaled to hold themselves in readiness to sail; at half-past he signaled to cut their cables and file to the south.

The sortie was a dangerous operation. It was necessary to go through the channel of Newport where new and powerful batteries had been erected the night before; and, after that, they must run the risk of presenting themselves to the enemy, one after another, for the narrowness of the channel obliged them to go out in single file; but following the words of d'Estaing: "The combat, the most disadvantageous was really less so than our anchorage." The movement was effected under a rather light wind; to show that there was nothing to fear, d'Estaing did not send out the Languedoc until the fifth vessel. They exchanged some volleys with the batteries of Newport and passed on. At sea they were rejoined by the Protecteur which had disembogued on its own side from the western channel. The whole squadron had now reunited, except the two frigates in the eastern channel which were to protect Sullivan.

Howe had not expected this bold movement which was executed in barely two hours. As the fourth vessel came out he raised anchor. D'Estaing set off immediately in pursuit at half-past eleven the same morning. The wind was light; Howe was in advance, and our vessels—as will be remembered—sailed with unequal rates of speed. They chased all the afternoon and night. The English thought of nothing but getting away, and fled until they closed themselves up in New York. On the 11th d'Estaing thought of winning a victory. Let us listen to him; his report to the minister contains some most dramatic recitals.

"The wind having freshened, we were gaining on them sensibly. An hour-and-a-half after noon, there seemed no more doubt; we believed that we would certainly overtake them. The maneuvers of Lord Howe, who continued to flee before the wind, but losing distance, showed that he no longer flattered himself of escaping a combat. The wind and sea increased. Our advance guard, in five hours and three-quarters, had reached the English rear guard; in luffing up they were engaged. The weather, which for four hours had been growing worse,

and cloudy, was now blowing a gale. At six o'clock, I was compelled to take in all sail except the fore stay-sail and mizzen try-sail." The two squadrons were soon hidden one from the other, separated. D'Estaing intended to resume the chase the next morning; but the night of the 11th proved to be the supreme night for the Languedoc.

"At half-past three in the morning—pardon me, sir, this excess of detail and precision; the man who has had both arms and both legs cut off, all at the same time, cannot in his sad narrative omit an instant—the bowsprit broke; then the foremast; then the main-top; then the mizzen mast; finally the main-mast fell. Our rudder broke next. This last misfortune was the greatest of all. We were now only a floating mass with nothing to steady us, and nothing to guide us." This horrible storm continued all day of the 12th and all the night following. In the afternoon of the 13th the wind became more manageable. But then there was danger of another character. An English vessel, the Renown, of fifty guns, came down upon the quarter of the Langueroc, which was without rudder and without sails, and which had only six guns, very soon only five capable of answering. The English shot swept her from one end to the other; entering the stern they traversed the whole length of her batteries, and lodged in her bows. For some unknown reason the Renown, after some volleys, gave up its prey and disappeared.

Upon the advice of one of his officers, d'Estaing decided to anchor. The idea was a happy one; the next day, the 14th, at daybreak, they saw approaching seven vessels of the squadron, and soon after, two more. While they were at work setting up a jury mast on the Languedoc, and re-rigging the other vessels, which had all suffered, d'Estaing transferred his flag to the Hector. "I yielded," he said, "to the desire to find the English." At least he was able to capture on the 15th, a corvette of seven guns. The 17th, the repairs were nearly terminated, so far as they could be on the high sea; and all the squadron was together except the Cesar, of which they had no tidings. D'Estaing returned to the Languedoc, but was ready in case of battle to go to the Protecteur, and raised anchor. If he had consulted only his own urgent need of repairs and repose, he would have sailed away to the Delaware, whics was near enough, or, better still, to Boston, because of the resources at that port. But he had promised Sullivan to return; before all it was necessary "to prove to the new allies of His Majesty that one must know how to sacrifice all, to hold to what has been promised." The signal was given to proceed northward.

August 20th, after this cruise of ten days so full of hazard and accident, the indefatigable Admiral anchored again before Rhode Island.

The situation at Newport was just the same. Sullivan had confined himself to erecting some batteries against the place which were ineffective; he needed, he said, some French troops to attempt an escalade, and he asked that the squadron retake its position in the central channel. La Fayette and General Greene came on board the Languedoc to hold a conference with d'Estaing. A council of war was held August 21. To the demand for the aid of six hundred men made by La Fayette in the name of Sullivan, the Admiral replied that he was ready to furnish twelve hundred on condition that they would guarantee him that Newport would fall within two days. La Fayette could not undertake this obligation. Then the council decided that the squadron could not tarry longer in the harbor; two of its vessels were entirely dismasted; they were short of everything. The order of the King was positive: to go to Boston in case of accident, or of the arrival of a superior fleet. Now the Fantasque, and the Sagittaire, had recognized a vessel of three decks, which could belong only to the squadron of Byron, recently arrived. The unanimous decision of the council was to go to Boston immediately, for the purpose of re-rigging and re-victualing. This decision was put into execution at once. August 22 the whole squadron set sail. The second halt before Rhode Island had lasted only twenty-four hours.

Such was the third stage of the French squadron. At the Delaware they had not seen the enemy; at Sandy Hook they had seen him without being able to get to him; at Rhode Island they had pursued him without being able to overtake him.

When it was seen that Newport which the Franco-Americans had failed to take was still in the hands of the English, the disappointment was very great in the camp of Sullivan. This general went so far as to publish a general order uncomplimentary to the French; he forgot that his own delay was the first and only cause of the series of mishaps. D'Estaing, who had the consciousness of having done his duty, did not take the trouble to exhonerate himself; he contented himself with saying that if his men and his vessels who had been at sea these long weeks could enjoy finally some days of repose; if they could find in Boston the recuperation and the material of which he had such urgent need, he would be ready to go out afresh and to "fight for the glory of the French name, and for the interests of America."

VI.

Leaving Rhode Island August 22d with all the squadron, including the two frigates which had remained in the east channel, d'Estaing arrived in the harbor of Boston, August 28th. He found there the Cesar which had been separated from the fleet since the first departure from Rhode Island. This vessel, that Count de Broves, chief of squadron commanded, had sustained a very severe conflict with the Iris of fifty guns August 16th, and was upon the point of capturing her when its steering wheel was knocked to pieces by a shot; it was compelled to give up the chase. Following previous instructions it had come to Boston. The French squadron found itself again complete.

Hardly arrived in the waters of Boston, d'Estaing made proof of an astonishing activity. Rightly fearing he might be followed, he did not wish to be surprised. One of the good anchorages of Boston harbor is Quincy Bay; but it is commanded by the island and bay of Nantasket, situated further east. Hence, three vessels only, of which the repairs were urgent, the Languedoc, the Marsellais and the Provence, anchored in Quincy Bay; the nine others remained in the waters of Nantasket. The frigates taken into the port itself were nearly wholly disarmed; equipage and material were used in a few hours in arming a vast entrenched camp. They occupied the three positions which commanded Quincy Bay, the very tapering peninsula of Hull which forms the western point of Nantasket; George's Island which is occupied to-day by a powerful fort; Lovell Island; behind this Galop Island also was put in a state of defense. Bourgainville, Broves, Chabert, d'Albert de Rions occupied these several positions, all well supplied with mortars, and making altogether a very solid defense. Supported by these batteries, the nine vessels which had suffered least were anchored in a semi-circle in the harbor of Nantasket; from the offing, said d'Estaing, "they presented the most imposing order." Aboard the Cesar the admiral was ready to respond to any attack.

Only three days after the arrival at Boston, August 31st, while these preparations for defense were going on with feverish activity, the English squadron was signaled outside. For the Americans, ever ready to pay little account to the dangers our vessels were running, this was only a *mirage*. The next morning, September 1st, it could be seen very well that it was the squadron of Howe sixteen or eighteen sail strong; for it had been re-enforced by a part of Byron's

squadron. The preparations to receive it were not finished, but each one was at his post for battle. The English showed themselves in the distance without even coming within range of cannon shot; they judged the position too strong to be forced; too dangerous to be blockaded. One of their vessels, the Saint Alban, lost its anchors in Cape Cod, southeast of Nantasket. After their departure the work on the fortifications continued; the squadron was soon put beyond the reach of any surprise. At last they could enjoy a few days of security.

However, this sojourn in Boston which was prolonged a little over two months was far from being a period of idleness. To procure masts and provisions in a country which was almost without resources; to deal with the government of Boston which was badly enough disposed toward us because of the pretended abandonment of Rhode Island; this task so difficult, required nothing less than the prodigious activity of the Chevalier de Borda, the unlimited devotion of all the officers, and the great diplomatic ingenuity of d'Estaing. It is difficult to form an idea of the work accomplished in these few weeks in rehabilitating, as nearly as possible, this squadron which had left Toulon in a state of imperfect preparation, and which had not been reprovisioned since its departure.

September 25th the Council of Boston gave a grand banquet to the admiral and the officers of the squadron. Four tables of seventy covers each were laid. "The Americans were intermixed with us at each table to do honor to the festival which was of the greatest gaiety." The hour of toasts having arrived, they drank to the health of, I do not know how many persons and things: "To America, to the King of France, to Congress, to the French fleet, to General Washington and the American Army, to the Independence of America, to the Alliance of France and America which should never be broken; to the minister of France, near the Congress; to Mr. Franklin, American Minister to the Court of France; to the friendship of France and to Liberty, to Commerce, to Count d'Estaing and all the officers of the French squadron in Boston harbor, to M. d'Orvilliers and all his Army, at the request of Count d'Estaing, to the President of the Council and all the Americans here present, to Mgr., the Duke of Chartres; to the Queen of France, to M. du Chaffault, to M., the Marquis de La Fayette; to the American Navy and ships, to all the women and girls who have lost their husbands and lovers in the good cause, to the Duke of Choiseul, to M. de Sartine, to M. Maurepas."

D'Estaing regretted to be so badly informed of what was going on among the English. "The part of spies," said he, "is absolutely unknown, neglected, even despised by the Americans." The news that Washington sent to him was always "late or false." It was said that the English were preparing a great expedition against Boston. D'Estaing believed little in this, because of his conviction, elsewhere justified, that they were sending reinforcements to the Antilles. Admiral Byron had left Sandy Hook with sixteen vessels of the line and a large fleet of transports. D'Estaing waited twelve days without seeing him appear. It became difficult to remain longer in port. We had stored all that the country could furnish of provisions; "it was now indispensably necessary for us to leave." At the end of October they prepared to sail with destination in the Antilles; in forty-eight hours they put on board all the artillery which had been landed for the work of fortification. November 2d a very violent wind favored our departure, for the enemy's vessels were bound to take refuge at Rhode Island and New York.

November 3d d'Estaing began preparations for sea; the next morning all the squadron was off Nantasket. They had not got out without accident. The Zele got badly aground, the Protecteur and Languedoc came near being lost. The admiral's vessel, whose masts had been only imperfectly repaired, steered badly. They finally all got to sea. At the end of a month's sailing, December 9th, the squadron of d'Estaing dropped anchor at Fort Royal, to-day, Fort de France, in Martinique. The days of trial were not over for d'Estaing. After a laborious campaign in the Antilles which was marked at least by the victory of Granada, he was to reappear in the United States for the operations of the fruitless siege of Savannah. He returned to Brest December 7, 1779, he had been to sea twenty months less six days, since his departure from Toulon.

VII.

On leaving Boston, the vice-admiral of the waters of Asia and America, addressed to the minister a long report recounting to him the incidents of his sojourn upon the coasts of the United States. This document, bearing date of November 5, 1778, opens with the following lines: "The slowness of our sailing which robbed us of certain success, the lack of depth, which was found insurmountable, a violent wind which enabled an English squadron which came to attack us, to escape after thirty-six hours of pursuit, the dismasting of two of

our principal vessels, and the enormous superiority which the junction of two squadrons gave the enemy, have allowed us only a few tentative of little injury to the English, ending with defensive precautions, as well as the preparations necessary to the carrying out of that part of my instructions which my judgment dictated."

The entire campaign of 1778 was not fruitless; for the deliverance of Philadelphia was the result of the arrival of the squadron. But our inability at Sandy Hook, our ill-fortune at Newport, our inactivity at Boston, had too often given to these operations, however interesting, a character negative. The Americans were nevertheless very grateful to the Naval Army of His Majesty, Very Christian, for this vigorous effort, of which it could be said, it had paralyzed the movements of the English. The Congress of the United States rendered to the admiral and to his squadron a brilliant homage in its resolution of October 17, 1778.

"Resolved, that His Excellency, Count d'Estaing, has constantly acted as a brave and wise officer; that His Excellency, the officers, sailors and soldiers, have fulfilled all that the United States could expect of the expedition, as far as the circumstances and the character of the service would permit; and that they all hold just claims to the esteem of the friends of America."

G. LACOUR-GAYET.

JACK HILTON'S LOVE AFFAIR.

I.

LIEUTENANT JOHN RANDOLPH HILTON, or more briefly, Jack Hilton, as he was familiarly known among his more intimate acquaintance, sat in the cozy and elegantly appointed library of the paternal mansion on Madison Avenue, with the morning paper in his hands and his eyes fixed with a look of apparently profound interest upon the column devoted to sporting news. He had just completed his twenty-fourth year; was nearly six feet tall, with a form finely proportioned, clear blue eyes, light hair, and complexion to match, regular features, and of easy and engaging manners. He was an adept in all manly sports and athletic exercises; a bold and fearless rider, with an almost overweening love of horseflesh; which latter trait had, a few days before, led him, for the first time in his life, into doing a very foolish thing. He had bet—some would not hesitate to say recklessly for a person of his rather slender means—upon his favorite horse, which had been badly beaten in the late races at Jerome Park; and which fact, being duly chronicled in the morning papers, would have afforded him, it is to be supposed, food for reflection of a somewhat painful nature. But it would have been apparent to a close observer that his eyes were not following the lines; and, from his expression, that the subject-matter before him was not that which engrossed his thoughts.

This was further evinced by his suddenly tossing the paper aside, rising abruptly from his chair, and pacing up and down the room, muttering to himself, "By Jove, a capital idea! If this isn't a stroke in love's diplomacy that is sure to win, let no one hereafter say that there is the first spark of genius in Jack Hilton's noddle, that's all."

He resumed his seat a minute or two after with an air of intense self-satisfaction, and lit a cigar just as the door opened and a young man entered the room.

"Accept my sincerest condolences, old boy," were his first words, as he extended his hand to his friend. "Can't stop but a moment; but I thought you needed sympathy."

"Pshaw! I don't want your condolences or your sympathy," exclaimed Hilton. "I never felt better in my life. Congratulate me, old fellow! Congratulate me! Victory is at last in sight."

"Well, you do take it rather peculiarly, to say the least," remarked the other, laughing. "For a man who is just out of pocket a cool three hundred to ask the congratulations of—— But you know you have not won your——"

"I say I have,—just as good as won," exclaimed Hilton.

"Just as good as won? What do you mean?" cried his friend, regarding him with a perplexed look. "Are you crazy? I tell you, you have lost. Why, Execlsior came in third. Haven't you seen the morning papers?"

"Oh," said Hilton, with a laugh, "you are talking about those beastly races."

"The man actually laughs about it. Of course I am. And I must say, as the result of your first venture——"

"And I say," exclaimed Hilton, interrupting him, "confound the races! My brain was full of another matter. Sit down; I have something to tell you."

His friend, Charles Levison, drew a chair up to the opposite side of the fire-place and seated himself.

"Fire away; let fly the shafts of your eloquence, Roanoke (sometimes facetiously so called by his friends on account of his illustrious namesake), for I think I rightly surmise your theme, and I am all attention," he said, settling himself comfortably back in his chair and regarding Hilton with a somewhat amused expression.

"As my oldest and most esteemed friend, Charlie," Hilton began, handing him a cigar and relighting his own, "whom I have made my confidant all along, as you know, in this *affaire du cœur* of mine with Louise, I am now going to confide to you my next proposed step. It will bring her to may arms at once, I feel sure. I am going to write a novel. I did think at first that I would attempt a poem; something in the style of 'Childe Harold'; regular Spenserian metre, four cantos, and all that; but I'm afraid poesy wouldn't prove my winning card; my—my forte doesn't lie exactly in that direction. No; I'll write a novel."

Levison did not look the least bit enlightened. He could not see the connection between Hilton's writing a novel and his way to the fair Louise's heart. But he smoked on in silence, and awaited further developments.

"Louise, you know," pursued his friend, "besides her other charms and accomplishments, is possessed of high literary attainments; being in that respect, indeed, especially gifted. She dotes on Byron and Moore, admires sentiments strongly and warmly expressed, and inclines almost wholly to the romantic school of poets,—as she calls it; and she has often accused me of having no poetry in my soul because I don't go off into high-flown raptures, like herself, over her favorite authors. Imagine a veteran like me, a plain, matter-of-fact, hardy old son of Mars, paying court to the Muses, and falling into ecstasies of that kind! But I am sure she likes me; though, like all of her sex, she is, of course, more or less fickle. She sort of plays fast and loose with me. One day she warms and another fairly freezes me. I don't know how often she has said to me, 'Jack, if you were only an author.' Indeed, she has said it so often, and at times, as I have thought, with such peculiar significance, that I have been tempted to interpret her meaning into, 'Jack, if you were only an author, I'd marry you.' Now, you know, I'm not literary myself,—that is, not particularly so; and there's all the trouble. Louise is so awfully literary herself that, no doubt, she has made up her mind she won't marry a man who isn't. *Hinc illæ lachrymæ.* Yes, I shall write a novel."

"Why not begin in a more modest way, with a short essay?" said Levison. "But *can* you write a novel?"

"Of course I can't. When I spoke of doing so I simply meant the mechanical or manual part."

"But, my dear fellow, it requires brains—some at least—as well as hands to be an author."

"Well, not necessarily in all cases," laughted Hilton, "judging from some of the specimens of the literary art with which the market is now glutted. But in my case, others will supply the brains."

"Ah! I see. In plain English, you will bribe some poor devil of an author to write your novel for you, which, when transcribed into your own handwriting, you will proceed to palm off upon an unsuspecting public as the offspring of your own genius."

"You haven't quite hit it," said Hilton; "but not to keep you in suspense any longer, I will now let you into my secret. But first—make me a bet; for I want to win back some of the money I lost on that confounded horse. I will wager you a hundred to fifty that I will write and have published, within one month from the present time, a good, readable novel, not of my own composition

or any one else's,—better than any of Howell's, Bulwer's, or Crowford's or any other author, and a great deal more original."

"And yet not written by any one," observed Levison, smiling at the absurdity of the idea.

"Now for my secret," continued Hilton. "I go to a circulating library and procure—say a dozen novels; or as many as I can carry away in two or three visits. From each of these I select three chapters and a half, which will give me, at the least, forty-two; enough to make a good-sized novel. The subject, of course, must turn upon love and heroism; for that is the kind Louise likes."

"But, my dear fellow," remarked Levison, amused at his friend's earnestness, "there will be no connection; no continuity of plan or plot."

"No,—but an amazing degree of variety."

"And then the names."

"Those, of course, I shall alter. There must be an English nobleman,—say the Earl of Broadlands, and his young and lovely daughter and sole heiress, the Lady Ethelinda. The rival lovers, —Sir Marmaduke Neville and the Count de Château Rouge; and a villain,—Jasper Blackmore. These are, of course, the merest outlines; the other personages and the various incidents of the story, such as murders, thrilling adventures, hairbreadth escapes, heroic exploits,—virtue triumphant, villany defeated, et cetera, et cetera, I will work in as they shall appear in the aforesaid novels."

"A novel way of writing one, certainly," laughed Levison. "But Louise will be sure to detect the plagiarisms."

"I will take good care to guard against that," said Hilton, "as I shall select only the oldest and least-read novels I can find; such as 'Clarissa Harlowe,' 'Sir Charles Grandison,' 'The Mysteries of Udolpho,' 'Cecilia,' 'The Italian,' and other antiquated rubbish of that sort. To be sure, Louise admires the romantic and sentimental, and has read a good deal of such stuff, but I don't believe she ever waded through any of those. Of course, I shall ask her advice on certain points, and read the story to her before it is printed."

"A most wise precaution, my dear fellow," remarked Levison, with a touch of sly humor in his tone; "otherwise she may never be made aware of its existence."

Reserve your jokes,—at least till after the event, my dear boy," retorted Hilton. "And as for my confidence in regard to that, you have my offer of a bet of a hundred to fifty."

"And do you realy mean to tell me in all seriousness, Jack," asked Levison, "that you think you can write that story out and get it published within the short space of one month. And, besides, there is another difficulty in the way. The publishers would be sure to detect the imposition."

"Pshaw! publishers are used to such thefts."

"But, then, other authors may read your book and expose you. Besides, the critics would mercilessly tear you to pieces."

"Authors only read their own works. And as for the critics, the more abused a book is the more it is read. It is the very best way to advertise it, and insure it a larger circulation."

"For a man who professes not to be literary," remarked Levison, laughing, "you seem to have a pretty good knowledge of the experiences of publishers, the habits of authors, and the effects of criticism. Nevertheless, I fear your scheme is altogether too chimerical; but you have my best wishes for your success all the same. And in the mean while I will take up your bet. A hundred to fifty I think you said."

"With one proviso," said Hilton. "And that is that I am not ordered to march before the expiration of the time named. If those rascally red-skins only behave themselves, and refrain from a breach of the peace for the next five weeks, I can have my leave of absence extended for that length of time, I am sure."

"Love and war are pretty serious matters, Jack; aren't they?" said Levison. "Bad enough when taken separately; but when they get mixed up together—— Well, one may damage the body, but it is quite sure that the other plays very havoc with a fellow's wits."

"Ah, Charlie," said Hilton, sententiously, "'the lord of the unerring bow' will some day transfix your heart with one of his fatal shafts. You will then feel less inclined to ridicule *la grande passion.*"

"Perhaps. In the mean time I shall remain in full enjoyment of my liberty, and my—wits," observed Levison. "'The lord of the unerring bow!' That is good. You get that out of Byron; so it seems you do dip into poetry sometimes."

"Oh, I'm not quite such an ignoramus, in that respect, as perhaps Louise thinks I am; and I shall soon force her to confess that she has done me great injustice in accusing me of having no poetry or sentiment in my soul," said Hilton. "And now that you know it, what do you think of my scheme?"

"What do I think of it? One word in parting, my dear boy," replied Levison, in a tone of unmingled humor and mock seriousness, as he rose from his seat, "which, as your sincere friend and well-

wisher, I feel it my duty to speak. Remember Marc Antony, Hercules and Omphale, and the lion in love. They all yielded to the seduction of your 'grande passion.' And what then became of their prowess? Under the baleful influence of this same 'grande passion,' the first threw away a throne, the second laid aside his club for a distaff, and the third tamely submitted to having his teeth and nails extracted. As Jack Bunsby would remark, 'the bearings of this observation lays in the application on it.' *Verbum satis sapientis.*"

"Oh, bother your mythological rubbish! Can't you be serious for once in your life, Charlie?" cried Hilton. "I confide in you as a supposed sympathetic friend, and I find you a veritable Job's comforter."

"Believe me, Jack, I wish you all the success in the world," responded Levison. "I'll drop in upon you in a day or two to learn how you are progressing. And—let me see" pausing a moment by the open door, "a hundred to fifty, I think you said."

II.

Immediately after his friend's departure Hilton set about his arduous task, or what might be more properly called his labor of love. With the books obtained from the public library, and others borrowed from a few of his friends, he was soon in possession of the working material from which was to arise the wonderful superstructure that was destined (as his rosy imagination pictured it to him) to win for him the hand of the obdurate and fickle Louise, and perhaps lay the foundation of his future fame and fortune. How happy and proud he would feel when he would have the right to say, "Louise, I *am* an author," and to behold her soft blue eyes turned upon his with a look of mingled surprise, love, and admiration, and hear her exclaim in tones of unfeigned rapture, "Now, Jack, I am thine. Take me!"

In order to be free from interruption he confined himself within the strict privacy of his own room, and denied himself, upon the plea of indisposition, to all callers; where he would write nearly all day and often far into the night. Not to make his transformation into a full-fledged author appear too sudden, Hilton, like some skillful tactician or wary general, bent upon the capture of some important stronghold, made his advances towards the purpose he had in view with all due precaution. Upon those even-

ings which he spent with Louise he would deftly turn the conversation on literary topics,—no very difficult thing to do,—and descant, in an animated way, upon the beauties of literature in general, and those of Byron and Moore in particular. Indeed, the extent and fervor of his newly-awakened admiration for her own two favorite poets equally gratified and delighted Louise. She was endowed in a higher than ordinary degree with fine literary abilities and discriminative powers, and was at times a most unmerciful critic. She disliked Browning and laughed at Walt Whitman. They did not belong to the romantic school of poets. Kipling's themes were distasteful to her; Tennyson and Longfellow, she thought, might pass, though neither was comparable, in point of interest, to Scott; but what any one who could revel in the beauties of Byron and Moore and Shelley and Keats might find to admire in the two first-mentioned poets she couldn't imagine; and more than once, when she was indulging in a merciless dissection of their respective faults and shortcomings, as they appeared to her, did a cold shiver run through poor Hilton at the thought of the farrago of nonsense that he had designed to prepare for her especial delectation.

But he had soon decided not to adhere too closely to his original plan. In the ardor of his love he had been dazzled, as it appeared to him, by the brilliancy of his conception; but when it began to pale in the calm, clear light of reason, he could not fail to become impressed with the utter absurdity of the idea. He would only avail himself of such ideas and suggestions as might be presented in the novels, and trust to whatever powers of originality or ingenuity he might possess to maintain at least some semblance of uniformity of plan and plot, incorporating verbatim into his work only such passages as should be consistent with such purpose. This would, of course, necessitate more time and labor; but with the end in view this was nothing. Whether this would prove more satisfactory or not the result could alone determine. And now another step in the pursuance of his plan must be taken.

The next time he called upon Louise he artfully led her into a discussion upon poetry, during which he slyly intimated that he had himself once courted the Muse, and confessed to having written several poems and dainty little sonnets to the object of his affections,—when he was quite young and didn't know any better; some of which, however, had been considered worthy of a place in the columns of a country newspaper. He furthermore

admitted that he had written several stories,—he didn't know but that one of them might be called a regular novel. This had been published in a Sunday paper, and highly praised by a number of his friends. He hadn't, of course, written anything lately, as his professional duties required all his time and attention; but he had never lost his early love for the poetic muse, and only regretted that he could no longer be her devoted slave. But perhaps—well, he didn't know—he might again yield to the promptings of the—the—the divine afflatus, which he felt at times very strong upon him, and—and write something more. He hadn't, of course, said anything of all this to her before, because—well, he probably thought it of insufficient importance; or—which was the more likely—because he had forgotten all about it. (Deliberate falsehoods, every one of them. But Cupid slyly winks and laughs at all such subterfuges; and the old adage justifies them.)

If Hilton had hoped to make a highly favorable impression upon Louise by these tender little confidences, he must have felt some disappointment at the way in which they were received. She laughingly remarked that she supposed all school-boys wrote poetry, and that many other children of a larger growth, whose years should have taught them discretion, were afflicted with the complaint known as the cacoethes scribendi. Poor Hilton; he was committing the same indiscretion himself, and perhaps only to be laughed at for all his pains,—the thought was dreadfully discouraging. But he tried to comfort himself with the reflection that Louise's words had always been, "Jack, if you were only an author;" and with that fact once established, she might not, perhaps, be disposed to be over-critical in regard to the quality or character of his work. "Only an author." Well, he would be one; and that was all she had wished.

But he now felt that he must lead her on to speak more particularly upon the subject of prose fiction. He desired—for reasons not at all difficult to understand—to ascertain the extent of her reading in that direction, and who were her favorite novelists.

"Louise," he remarked, in a careless tone, shortly after he had opened the discussion, "I suppose you don't care much about old-fashioned novels; those, I mean, which were written about a hundred years ago. I know you admire sentiment, spirited action, romantic situations, and all that, but then, of course, you would never think of reading such antiquated stuff as 'The Mysteries of Udolpho,' 'The Italian,' or 'Clarissa Harlowe,' or books of that sort."

"'The Mysteries of Udolpho,'" replied Louise, "was my especial delight when I was a child; and you may laugh, but I could read it even now, though I remember nearly every word of it."

Poor Hilton; he didn't feel much like laughing. No; anything but that. He had that very morning incorporated nearly an entire chapter of that work into his own novel.

"And the others, Louise," stammered Hilton, "the—the—'Clarissa Harlowe,' 'The Italian,' or 'Sir Charles Grandison,' or—or——"

"Oh, yes," said Louise, "I have read them all; some of them twice over. In fact, there are very few modern novels I care at all about. Especially these so-called realistic novels; those of Howells and James, for instance, I think dreadfully insipid. We don't care for reading about people whom one may meet in the street every day. I don't take the slightest interest in the sayings or doings of such ordinary, humdrum folks."

"No; certainly not," said Hilton, brightening up a little; "neither do I. Your tastes are more for the romantic and the heroic; the—the love and glory style. But, of course, Louise, you have quite forgotten all about those stories, or most of them, which—which charmed your youth. Indeed, who could remember anything in novels that were spun out into six or a dozen volumes."

"I am happily blessed with a very good memory," she replied, "and generally remember nearly all of what I read. Those books, I mean, which have particularly interested me."

Hilton wished in the very depths of his soul that Nature had been less lavish of her gifts—the one at least of which she had spoken—when dealing with Louise. But, despite these discouragements, he determined to persevere to the bitter end. His work had now progressed too far for him to entertain, for a moment, a thought of abandoning it. But what if, after all, he should fail to find a publisher for it? Even should Louise approve his work, and reward him with her sweetest smiles, and warmest words of praise and encouragement, and even extol his genius, what kind of opinion might she not be induced to entertain, upon sober second thoughts, of a writer who could find no publisher sufficiently impressed with the merits of his work to introduce it to the public? In that case, could he claim to be an author at all? And then all his labor would go for nothing. He also began to harbor a suspicion that he had possibly, in the first exuberance of his feelings, allowed himself to indulge in too roseate and hope-

ful a view of the final issue of his scheme. And the mere idea of writing a novel, at least forty-two chapters long, hunting up a publisher, and getting his book out, all within a month's time, now struck him as being so supremely absurd that he could hardly resist the conviction that he had made an egregious fool of himself. But these various reflections he did not suffer to dampen in the least the ardor of his pursuit. He would still persevere, for his happiness and peace of mind were so deeply involved in the stake at issue that he could not for a moment think of desisting from his purpose. And Fate—so he flattered himself—had decreed that he must go on to final triumph or defeat.

He derived, moreover, as time went on, renewed hope and encouragement from thinking that he could perceive a marked change in Louise. She appeared more glad to see him; to derive greater pleasure from his society, and to be more uniformly gracious in her manner towards him; though, apparently, she entertained no suspicion of the real motive that actuated him. Once, when recalling those early courtings of the Muse, the imaginary juvenile efforts, of which he had made previous confession, he came very near betraying his secret. "What would you think, Louise," he had said, with a laugh, "if I should turn author again? You know you have often expressed the wish that I were one."

"What would I think, Jack?" she replied, laughing herself. "I fear that I would be compelled to think, and also to say, that you had not mistaken your calling. That the profession of arms was the proper sphere for the display of your activities, and that you were far better qualified to achieve distinction upon the field of Mars than in futile dalliance with the Muse in the courts of poesy."

"And yet, Louise," said Hilton, earnestly, "you know that distinguished soldiers have achieved fame as authors. I could cite several who have gained brilliant reputations from the books they have written. And why not——?" But he would say no more. The time had not yet come for him to burst upon the astonished and delighted Louise in the full splendor of a literary glory that was destined to throw even the illustrious author of a "Ben Hur" into the shade.

His friend Charlie Levison had called once or twice, but he had found Hilton entirely too much engrossed with his work and impressed with the importance of every moment he could devote to it to waste any time in social amenities; so his visits had been very brief.

"Remember, old fellow," he said, on leaving him one morning, "one week more and the month will be up. Within this time your book must appear."

"I said in the hands of a publisher within a month," responded Hilton.

"No, you didn't," said Levison. "It is evident you are trying to hedge."

"It can't be done," said Hilton. "We will have to call it that."

"I won't accept the amendment." Levison replied, with a laugh. "The original bet must stand."

"All right; but the time isn't up yet. When it is, we'll talk about it. Drop in one week from to-day, and you shall hear what I have written."

Under the stimulus of his all-absorbing passion, Hilton had proved a most indefatigable worker. Early and late he labored away at his task, and in time had the satisfaction to behold his novel ssuming quite formidable dimensions. But his work had been by no means entirely manual. Often he would lay his pen down and wrestle mentally with some knotty problem; and they were neither few nor easy of solution. Had he undertaken, indeed, an altogether original composition, he might have found his work much less difficult. He believed, or willingly persuaded himself into the belief, however, that he had maintained a sufficient consistency and thread of connection throughout his story, which, as a set task, the most ingenious and experienced author would. no doubt, have pronounced to be simply impossible. But his method was peculiarly his own, and if the result should prove to be not altogether what he had hoped for, he could console himself at least with the reflection that it was not so from his having failed to do his very best under the circumstances. He knew also that authors had sometimes made curious mistakes; and if he made a few more than they had, he could at least plead some distinguished precedents. Besides, he was quite a young author; it was his maiden effort; the public and the critics would be more lenient on that account, and not disposed to judge him too harshly.

And what if he should at first fail to find a publisher for his story? Would he not but undergo the experience of numberless other authors whose merits the publishers, strangely blind to their own interests, either could or would not see; and had not some of these authors, shamefuly neglected at first and often con-

temptuously refused even a hearing, afterwards risen to the full noontime splendor of literary fame?

And again, what if his remuneration should be small? Did not Milton receive but a paltry ten pounds for his immortal epic; and others who might be named, the scant recognition of whose merits, pecuniarily considered, was far below their just deserts? Poor Hilton! he had indulged in a bright and happy dream; and, as in other cases, was he, perhaps, only destined to an early and bitter awakening?

One fear had troubled him at times, which was that he might be ordered to join his regiment before he had completed his work, in which case his project would have to be indefinitely postponed.

But as the days went by without this apprehension being realized, and he had nearly ended his sixth week of labor, he now felt entirely confident that he would have sufficient time to finish it. And in a day or two more this would be accomplished.

III.

The last word had been written. His magnum opus—the crowning triumph of six weeks' unremitting labor—was finished, and Hilton threw himself back in his chair with a profound sigh of relief. Never, perhaps, did author view with fonder hope or brighter anticipation his first literary offspring than did he the goodly piles of manuscript that lay before him; and to-night—he almost trembled at the thought—would he know whether that hope was to be realized or cruelly disappointed, and melt away, like the baseless fabric of a vision, into thin air.

Levison called upon him, by appointment, in the morning to hear portions of his story read, for Hilton was desirous of first obtaining his friend's opinion, and of noting the impression that it made upon him. So lighting their cigars and seating themselves comfortably in their chairs, Hilton with a markedly sober and serious expression, and Levison with a highly amused and expectant look, as if anticipating a rare treat, the former gathered together a number of the loose sheets of his manuscript and arranged them in order preparatory to reading.

"I suppose it doesn't make much difference where you begin," remarked Levison.

"I will give you a number of extracts," said Hilton. "You don't suppose I'm going to read the whole thing through to you, do you?"

Seeing that his friend was, apparently, in no mood for joking, Levison tried hard to assume a serious air, but his sense of the ludicrous getting for a moment the better of him, he could not refrain from saying in a slightly deprecatory tone, "I hope not, indeed, old fellow. But begin where you please," he added. "As the thing has neither head nor tail to it—a sort of nondescript monster, you know—it makes no kind of difference, of course."

"The chapters are necessarily somewhat short," said Hilton, not noticing his friend's slyly humorous thrust, "on account of the extent of ground I had to cover; but I will begin with these two, which are the longest."

As the reading progressed, Levison tried hard not to laugh. He would, perhaps, have found it difficult to say which amused him most, Hilton's perfectly serious and earnest manner, or the highly ludicrous character of the matter to which he listened. He had to pinch himself severely, on the sly, several times in order to maintain a becomingly solemn expression and to manifest a (literally) painful interest in those passages which were intended to be especially pathetic and soul-harrowing, and thus repress any tendency to a risibility that otherwise he might have found it impossible not to betray. As an offset to this, however, he relieved himself by giving full vent to his mirth over passages of a designedly ludicrous nature; though he would have found it hard to tell which one indeed of those he had heard read might not have been justly entitled to such a charactr.

When Hilton had finished, Levison exclaimed, "Capital! First rate! Couldn't have done better myself. But it does seem a little strange now, doesn't it, that the wicked old Lord Melville, who was so unmistakably murdered by those four ruffians at the instigation of his much-abused and long-suffering old wife,—so unquestionably dead and buried,—should have turned up alive and smiling in the next chapter as the husband of the youthful and virtuous Ethelinda, and who was old enough to be her great-grandfather?"

"I may have got mixed up a little in some places," replied Hilton. "But you know such discrepancies appear sometimes in novels; in fact, in the works of nearly all writers. None are infallible."

"By the way, what is the title of your book?" asked Levison.

"The title? By Jove! I never thought about that," exclaimed Hilton. "I'm glad you mentioned it. Let me see——"

"Why not," suggested his friend, "as your novel is of a sort of

nondescript character, you know, take a hint from Wilkie Collins, and call it No Name."

"Not original; besides being altogether too prosaic."

"I should hardly suppose," observed Levison, in a slightly humorous tone, "that such a trifling little matter as a lack of originality would trouble you very much."

"I have it!" cried Hilton, as if illuminated by a sudden ray of inspiration. "I will call it Love and Glory. That will catch Louise's fancy right off."

"Well," said his friend, rising from his seat, "I have not the slightest doubt that your novel will make a marked impression upon her. But, my dear fellow, hadn't you better number your pages? You may get them mixed up, and that you know might prove—confusion worse confounded. But I must be off. If agreeable to you I will drop in to-morrow to learn the result. And," he added, pausing a moment after he had opened the door, "I believe it was—wasn't it—in one month's time, and a hundred to fifty? Good-by."

But Hilton was not to have the pleasure of reading his story to Louise that night. Levison's prediction of the possible consequence of his friend's having neglected to number his pages had unfortunately come true; for in collecting the loose sheets together he had found them so badly mixed up (though Levison would probably have told him, in his aggravatingly humorous way, that could have made no possible kind of difference) that it required the remainder of that and the greater part of the next day to bring order out of chaos, which was attended with about as much difficulty as a novice in the art would experience from his first attempt to put together the various ingeniously constructed pieces of a Chinese puzzle. He finished his task at last, however, and having numbered and divided the sheets into several separate packages, and thus duly prepared, he took his way to the home of Louise.

He found her seated in the library, and, fortunately, alone. She was writing at a small table in one corner, with an open book lying before her, but rose upon Hilton's entrance, and gave him a cordial welcome. She appeared, indeed, to be in an especially gracious mood, which he was disposed to regard as a happy augury. He wanted to break the ice as soon as possible and take the first plunge; but he did not know exactly how to begin.

"Composing a poem, Louise?" he said, with a smile, observing the nature of her occupation.

"A mere trifle that I have just dashed off," she replied. "It is a

translation of an Italian love-song, or serenade. You shall hear it, and give me your opinion of it." She took the paper from the table, and read, in a clear, full, musical voice, as follows:

"As on the dusky brow of night
One solitary gem
Pales with its rays each lesser light
In her broad diadem,

"So come thou forth, my soul's desire!
And thy bright eye of love
Shall shame the ineffectual fire
Of those dim orbs above.

"As the sweet moon, with modest gaze
Upon the limpid stream,
Beholds within its liquid rays
Her own reflected beam,

"So thou, my star, serene and fair!
Shalt view within this breast,
In brighter rays reflected there,
Thine image deep impressed.

"To thee I now attune my lute,
My pleading voice I raise;
Surely thine own will not be mute
My song to blame, or praise.

"I do but ask a word of thee,
A whisper, or a sigh;
If it breathe not of love for me,
Then, hapless, I shall die."

"Beautiful! Exquisite!" exclaimed Hilton, enthusiastically. "Such tender sentiment! Such melting pathos! And now, Louise," he added, in a slightly hesitating voice, "I should like to—to—have you listen to a—a composition of mine."

"I should be delighted to, I'm sure," she responded, graciously, eying with a partly curious and amused look the several packages of

manuscript of which Hilton now divested his pockets and laid on the table in the middle of the room.

"What may be the subject and title of your poem?" she asked.

"It is not a poem," he replied, "but a novel, entitled Love and Glory. And before I place it in the hands of a publisher I wish you to hear it, and offer such suggestions, by way of improvement, as you may think advisable."

The idea of Hilton's appearing in the rôle of an author afforded Louise not a little amusement. "You have kept your secret well, Jack," she said; "but I should have thought you would have sought my valuable advice while at work upon your novel. It might have saved you some trouble."

"The truth is, Louise, I wanted to—to give you a little surprise."

"You have certainly done that," she observed, with a laugh, "for I never should have thought that you, who—but I won't begin to criticise you before I have heard your story."

"I want your candid opinion, Louise. And I hope you will not allow your native sense of politeness to get the better of your judgment."

"You need have no fear of that; for I assure you that you will find me a most impartial critic."

She pushed her book and writing materials to one side of the table, and reclining comfortably back in her chair, waited for Hilton to begin.

He picked up one of the packages, untied it, and after glancing over the pages to see that it was the right one, began to read in a clear, steady voice, Louise meanwhile maintaining an air of close attention and an unbroken silence.

The first chapter contained a somewhat elaborate description of an ancient English baronial hall of the time of James the First, which he had copied verbatim out of an old novel. The second was devoted to an account of the appearance, manners, and habits of life of its noble propietor, the Baron of Broadlands, his two lovely and accomplished daughters, the ladies Elfrida and Ethelinda, the names alone being changed, and their respective lovers, also purloined from the same source; and the third gave a description of a grand tournament gotten up by the aforesaid lovers for the especial delectation of their respective mistresses, for which he had drawn heavily from "Ivanhoe," making only such changes as seemed advisable, but into which he had committed the anachronism of introducing as the victor a valiant knight and trusty follower of Richard the First,—the incidents of

his story being supposed to occur within the first half of the seventeenth century,—retaining, even through inadvertency, his very name.

All had been plain sailing up to this point; but in the fourth chapter the complications commenced, and the plot began, literally, to thicken. The scene changed to a lonely and ruinous old tower on the Rhine, in one of whose upper rooms sat a dark-visaged and repulsive-looking man deeply brooding over some wrong he had suffered, in some unexplained way connected with the Baron of Broadlands, and in whose blood he very audibly and ferociously expressed his intention of imbruing his hands. Several times, indeed, he breathed forth slaughter and destruction upon the whole family, including the lovers, and devoted to irremediable ruin the baron's entire fortune and estates.

Leaving him to his gloomy meditations and sanguinary resolves, the reader was now transported, with all the ease and celerity of the enchanted carpet in the story, to a wild and desolate moor in Yorkshire; and there suddenly appears upon the scene an honest old farmer, one Obadiah Dumbedykes; though whence he came, or for what purpose, or why, indeed, he should have come at all, is not made apparent. He is first seen wending his way slowly and thoughtfully over the moor, pausing at times, sighing deeply, and occasionally shedding a tear, and mumbling to himself. "He was thinking," to quote the words of the novel as Hilton read, "of that luckless morning when he discovered at the bottom of his well, as he supposed, the gory head and one of the fingers of the Lady Blanche Melville, who was barbarously murdered by her husband in an uncontrollable fit of passion, and who afterwards cut her up into small pieces and distributed her promiscuously about the neighborhood; but who, on a closer examination, discovered them to be the head and finger of his own daughter, who had eloped from the paternal roof twenty years before with some gay Lothario, and of whom nothing had ever been heard until the grief-stricken father had thus brought to light the ghastly remnants of his long-lost and beloved child."

Up to this time Louise had preserved strict silence; but here, not a little to Hilton's astonishment and discomfiture, she broke into a loud laugh.

He had regarded this as one of his most touching and pathetic passages, and he could not help feeling a little nettled, to say the least, at the way in which it was received.

"Perhaps you think that's funny," he remarked.

"Awfully," she replied. "But forgive me, Jack," she added, in a

tone of contrition. "I promise not to offend again. But how did those things get into the well?"

"That's for you to surmise. You don't suppose an author is bound to explain everything, and leave nothing to the imagination of the reader? If he did, what would become of all the mysteries in the story?"

Hilton resumed his reading, and now entered upon his fifth chapter, in which, after disposing of Obadiah Dumbedykes by making him disappear as mysteriously as he had come, he returns again to the baronial hall of Broadlands.

But a sad change has come over the fortunes of some of its inmates. The fair Ethelinda is sorely persecuted by the attentions of the old and wicked, but immensely rich, Lord Melville, who, unknown to her, has a wife living in a distant part of the country. Her lover has been waylaid and carried off, none know whither, though more than suspected to be the work of agents of his rival, the wicked old lord. The lover of Elfrida has also to confront a rival suitor in the person of the Earl of Loch Lomond, a young Scotch nobleman, by whom, for a gross insult offered to him, he is challenged to mortal combat and run through the body, expiring shortly after in the arms of his second. After three times endeavoring unsuccessfully to poison herself, Elfrida finally resolves upon becoming a nun, and, accordingly, enters the convent of Saint Theresa in Italy, the Lady Superior of which happens to be her maternal aunt. And here followed a rather unnecessarily minute description of the convent itself, and the mode of life of its inmates, for which Hilton was indebted to several solid pages of "The Abbess."

In the beginning of the sixth chapter, a stranger arrives at the hall late one stormy night, and demands immediate audience of the baron, mysteriously intimating that his business is of a highly important nature, and will admit of no delay. On being admitted to the presence of the baron, he introduces himself by the name of Jean Gaspard; and, from the style of his dress, general air, and the peculiarly sinister and forbidding aspect of his countenance, has all the look of a professional cut-throat. He informs the baron that he is the possessor of a secret of the utmost importance to him, in which not only his daughter's happiness, but the honor of his family, is involved. This secret he offers to sell to the baron for a satisfactory consideration, which he names. But, considering the price exorbitant, his would-be purchaser refuses to pay it, and after wrangling over the matter some little time, they compromise for half the amount. He

then discloses to the baron the fact that Lord Melville, the suitor for his daughter's hand, already has a wife living in England; but, not doubting that he must be greatly desirous of promoting so highly advantageous a match, pecuniarily considered, and allying himself, matrimonially, with so illustrious a house as that of Lord Melville's, he offers for a further consideration to remove the old lady to the farthest wilds of Siberia, or through the quicker and surer means of poison.

This proposition the baron receives in high dudgeon. His sense of honor is outraged, to say nothing of the ordinary instincts of humanity, and in a sudden spasm of virtuous indignation he unceremoniously kicks his visitor out of the room. Thus ignominiously repulsed, the latter takes his departure, giving vent to a frightful explosion of Gallic oaths, and vowing dire vengeance upon the baron and his entire family.

Lord Melville, being confronted shortly after by the baron with the charge of being already married, vehemently denies it, and engages to convince him of its falsity. He takes leave of his host for the purpose of procuring, as he says, the necessary evidence to the truth of his words, but with the secret intention of going immediately home and murdering his wife in cold blood, and thus removing the obstacle that stands in the way of the gratification of his wishes. The old lady has stolen a march upon him, however; for having suffered long enough, she makes up her mind, from his brutality and infidelities, she hires four ruffians to rid her of such a monster; and, in consequence, Lord Melville, when about two miles from home, is waylaid and barbarously butchered.

IV.

"Pardon me, Jack," said Louise, as he made a pause here, "but—I don't quite understand. No doubt it is my own stupidity, but I somehow got the impression that Lord Melville had already murdered his wife. And—I should like to know whether this Jean Gaspard is in any way connected with the man in the tower on the Rhine, mentioned in a former chapter."

"I—I am afraid," replied Hilton, seeming a little confused, "that—that I have misplaced the chapters; a simple mistake in numbering them, but which I can easily correct."

"Or you might," suggested Louise, in a slyly humorous tone, "leave the reader to infer that it was a former wife he had murdered."

"A brilliant idea, certainly," laughed Hilton, in reply, "but I think I had better make the needed corrections. And, besides, I may have got the cart before the horse in other places. It would be best, I think, to look the story carefully over before I read any further."

"But, Jack, as Lord Melville has certainly been murdered, and before he had the opportunity of performing the office of executioner himself, I think you had better omit the fourth chapter altogether, as your honest old farmer Dumbedykes seems to be a somewhat incongruous element in the story. But read two or three chapters more, and we will then adjourn the entertainment to a future occasion."

In compliance with her request Hilton read the three chapters following. In the first one the abducted lover of Ethelinda turns up as the leader of banditti among the romantic wilds of the Apennines. A description of the scenery is given,—verbatim from "The Mysteries of Udolpho,"—followed by a brief account of the cave and habits of life of the robbers. In one of their excursions the band captures three or four stray nuns, who have wandered too far away from their convent and become lost among the fastnesses of the mountains. The leader is about to appropriate to himself, as his share of the booty, the best-looking one of the lot, when to his astonishment he recognizes in her the sister of his long-lost but still beloved Ethelinda. Mutual explanations follow. He learns of the death of his former hated rival,—though how she came by the information does not appear,—but believing he has forever lost the object of his affections, he makes honorable love to Elfrida, and urges her to become a sort of maid Marian to the band. Weary of the confinement and dull routine of her convent life, she gladly accedes to his proposals, and the day is set for their wedding.

But, unfortunately, the old love is still strong upon him. He is assured that Ethelinda still lives; that he has nothing more to fear from the machinations of an all-powerful rival, and he is animated by a new-born hope that she may yet be his. These reflections, and the overpowering desire awakened by them, gain at length such complete mastery over him that upon the night preceding the day fixed for his marriage he mysteriously disappears, to the surprise and consternation of his followers and the grief and chagrin of the deceived and abandoned Elfrida, who, rather than return again to her convent, accepts shortly after the offer of the next highest in command, and thus consoles herself for the loss of her treacherous lover.

The next chapters give an account of what befell the lover of Ethelinda from the time of his desertion of the banditti and the hapless

Elfrida to that of his arrival at the old Hall of Broadlands. He performs prodigies of valor, rescuing numerous distressed damsels from perilous situations; liberating captive maidens from enchanted castles, where they have been kept in confinement by wicked one-eyed ogres and ferocious three-headed giants and other chimerical monsters; encounters and puts to flight with his single arm numberless bands of robbers who assail him in lonely and gloomy forests; slays two or three dragons which vomit out at him fire, smoke, and brimstone; and, finally, saves a forlorn and beautiful damsel from the hands of an abhorred lover, who is carrying her off, by deftly cutting him in two with a single stroke of his sword. Her beauty and distress having first awakened his sympathy and compassion, he is soon sensible of a still warmer emotion arising within him, and pity yielding the supremacy to love, he becomes hopelessly enamored of her. But he thinks of Ethelinda, and endeavors to suppress his newly-awakened passion for the beautiful Ermingarde. But, unfortunately, she reciprocates his love, and declares with fervent and grateful lips and tears in her soft blue eyes that she will never leave her valiant and handsome deliverer. His various exploits prove him to be, indeed, a veritable second Amadis de Gaul, Orontes, or Palmerin, and like the true knights-errant which they were, he is still faithful to his one, peerless dulcinea; and this resolution, he fears, if persisted in, may necessitate some awkward explanations, and lead to yet more disagreeable complications when he meets his mistress accompanied by this beautiful stranger. He therefore tells her that she must don the habit of a page, assigning another reason than the true one; which she immediately proceeds to do,—though as to whence the garb comes or by whom provided the reader is not enlightened,—and so they travel on towards England, where they arrive without molestation or further adventure three weeks after. For most of which foregoing particulars Hilton was indebted to an old romance of chivalry.

On reaching the Hall the lover—whose name, by the way, happens to be Sir Percy Wyndham—is horrified by the intelligence that the baron was, about a year before, found foully murdered in his bed one morning. His head had been cut off, the rest of his body dismembered, and the various limbs laid out upon the bed with all the neatness and dexterity of some accomplished Jack the Ripper of the seventeenth century. Ethelinda, despairing of ever again beholding the lover of her youth, had become the wife of a certain old Lord Merrivale,—Hilton had inadvertently written it Melville, but Levison's criticism had enabled him to make the correction,—and upon seeing Sir Percy

faints away in his arms just as her husband enters the room. Rage and astonishment at witnessing so unlooked-for a spectacle takes full possession of him. He storms, swears, and demands an instant explanation all in one breath. Sir Percy, equal to the emergency, declares himself to be her long-lost brother. He gracefully accepts the explanation, apologizes for the rudeness of his behavior, shakes the young man cordially by the hand, and welcomes him back to England. But alas for the fickleness of woman! Ethelinda, at first charmed by the youthful grace and beauty of her lover's page, who is her master's almost constant attendant, soon falls desperately in love with Ermingarde. Not failing to notice Ethelinda's somewhat changed manner towards him and the apparent abatement in the warmth of her love, and discovering, moreover, that she has lost much of her early beauty, Sir Percy begins to cool off himself. The inevitable consequence follows. He soon transfers all his affections to his page, and arranges for a secret marriage with her, not a little rejoiced, indeed, at the turn which affairs have taken. And here—with the prospect of still greater complications in sight—Hilton ended his reading.

Louise thanked him; said she had found his story extremely amusing, and that as a literary mosaic it was certainly without a rival.

"Literary mosaic?" What covert insinuation might she design to convey by those words? Could she more than half suspect the truth? And "extremely amusing." He had intended his story to be more than merely amusing; to make it exciting, thrilling; an excitant to the higher and nobler emotions. And now to hear it spoken of as if it had been a purely humorous work,—it was not a little discouraging, certainly. But he screwed up enough courage to say, "And now, Louise, judging from what you have heard read of the story, do you feel competent to express an opinion, and tell me how you think it will strike the public? I desire your candid opinion."

With inward fear and trembling he awaited her reply; but as she remained silent several moments—which he was quick to construe as a somewhat unfavorable omen—he added, hastily, "But, Louise, perhaps you would prefer to hear it all before expressing an opinion. And I think myself it would be best."

Poor Hilton! in his gloomy foreboding his feelings were not altogether unlike those which a condemned criminal might be supposed to experience when pleading for a brief stay in the execution of his sentence.

"I will act upon the suggestion," replied Louise, whose keen sense of the ludicrous had been stimulated to an unwonted degree, and who

had really found no little enjoyment in its secret gratification. "You may leave the manuscript, and to-morrow you shall have the candid opinion that you desire." And with this promise Hilton shortly after took his leave.

The next evening but one—an unforeseen detention had prevented his earlier appearance—he took his way with throbbing heart and mingled emotions of hope and apprehension to the home of his beloved. She received him in the library with all that graciousness of manner which she knew so well how to assume upon occasions, and which had the effect of brightening Hilton up a little, though he could not resist the feeling that if the issue of his suit was to be determined by the fate of his story, he had little if anything to hope for.

But he put a brave face on the matter; assumed a cheerful and even gay air, exchanged a number of pleasantries with Louise, and then asked her, in a jocular manner, if she was ready to pass judgment upon him; though the poor fellow, if he had actually seen transcribed over her door Dante's famous lines above the portal of the Inferno, could scarcely have felt more secret trepidation and misgiving.

"Yes," she replied; "I have read your story through, and will now, as you have requested, give you my candid opinion of it. In the first place, it is painfully lacking in coherence and originality; two very serious, if not fatal, defects in any work of fiction. But to be more definite,"—her manner was becoming severe and her tone icy,—"the situations are in the main forced, most of the characters are grotesquely unnatural; the language extremely stilted, and frequently disconnected and irrelevant,—you seem, in fact, to have borrowed isolated phrases or expressions from different sources and put them into the mouths of your own characters without regard to the proprieties of time, place, or occasion; some of which, indeed, have a very familiar sound to me. You often become so hopelessly entangled in the intricacies of your plot—which in some instances seem to have not the remotest connection with or relation to each other—that you mix up characters, events, times, and places in utterly confusing and inextricable complications. Need I say more? No, Jack,—stick to the army. You will never make an author."

Poor Hilton! the airy fabric of his hopes and dreams had dissolved; shattered at one blow. And by the hand of her who had been its inspiration.

By a strong effort, however, he rallied himself, laughed, admitted the undoubted soundness of Louise's judgment, thanked her for her entire impartiality, and then carelessly remarked that he had, after all,

only indulged in composition as a means of whiling away the time which might otherwise have hung heavily on his hands; that his having spoken to her about publishing it was, of course, a mere joke, as she must so have understood it, for he didn't suppose she thought him bereft of all sense. In short, he spoke and acted in a way which would convey the idea that he considered the whole thing merely as a temporary diversion, and of no real importance whatever.

Louise smiled, but made no pointed comment in reply, merely observing, "I hope, Jack, you don't think me too severe. I only gave you, you know, what you asked for."

"I am glad it amused you, however, Louise," said Hilton; "I have that satisfaction, at all events."

He soon turned the subject,—that of literature seeming for the moment to have somewhat lost its charm for him,—and after conversing with her awhile upon different matters, he bid her good-night.

The following morning Levison called upon his friend, and found him in his room, seated at a table which was strewn with books and loose sheets of writing-paper; the materials which had served his purpose and now become useless. His visage was solemn and his air grave. There was, indeed, an absent, far-away look in his eyes, as if he were entirely unconscious of his immediate surroundings; and it seemed to require not a little effort for him to realize the fact that his most esteemed friend and trusted confidant, Charlie Levison, was standing before him, regarding him with a half-amused and half-sympathetic expression. He needed not to ask the question that was uppermost on his lips, for he read the answer in his friend's manner and looks.

"Well, old boy, where's your story?" he said, slapping him on the back to rouse him. He did not want to come to the direct question too abruptly; he would approach it by degrees.

"In the fire; or as much of it as isn't yet consumed is," replied Hilton, grimly. "The fact is, Charlie, I have made a confounded fool of myself; and that's all about it."

"Oh, pshaw!" exclaimed Levison, with a laugh, "you'll get over it. Try a poem next time. You may be more successful, and have fairer sailing on that tack. But wake up, old fellow, and tell me all about it. You're not going to withhold your confidence from me now, after having excited my curiosity thus far?"

"That's only fair, I suppose; but please excuse me now, Charlie; some other time."

"Well, Jack, you know faint heart never won fair lady yet. Take my advice: try a new tack, and trust to luck. But why don't you come to the point at once, without beating about the bush so?"

"I may take your advice," replied Hilton, "and try a new tack."

"The best tack for you, my boy," laughed Levison, "would be to tack-le her thus: My adorable Louise, will you accept of the hand and heart of your loving and devoted slave, Lieutenant John Randolph Hilton? A little formal, perhaps, but to the point."

"I could never survive the mortification of a refusal," said Hilton. "But I will think over what you have said,—and in the meanwhile, Charlie, here is my—promissory note for a hundred dollars, payable when I shall happen to be in possession of the requisite amount of funds."

T. H. FARNHAM.

*BRITISH NAVAL POLICY AND GERMAN ASPIRATIONS.**

PERHAPS it was inevitable that some commotion should be created by the Admiralty's announcement of the visit of the Channel Fleet and the First Cruiser Squadron to the Baltic. A section of the German press immediately tried to convince the German people that the countries which are washed by this sea have good claim to close it against other nations' warships, creating a *mare clausum*. This contention was, however, so preposterous that it was at once abandoned. It was possibly put forward to test the strength of public opinion in Scandinavia and Russia, and it entirely failed to meet with support. Neither Russia nor the Scandinavian powers regard German predominance with favor. The irritation in Germany caused by the British naval visit, following closely upon the Anglo-French fêtes at Portsmouth, in which the North Sea Fleets of the two nations participated, was largely due to lack of knowledge on the part of the Germans of the facts preceding the decision of the British authorities. The visit was planned in no hostility. It was arranged some time before the two emperors met in the Gulf of Finland, and prior to the Kaiser's announcement that he intended to visit King Oscar and the venerable King of Denmark. It is a political incursion, it is true, but no call will be made at any German war port, whereas German fleets have been at Berehaven and at Plymouth in recent years.

When the reorganization of the British fleet was carried out this spring, it was announced that the Channel fleet would in future cruise in the North Sea and in Scandinavian waters as well as in the English Channel. Since this reorganization was completed the bonds of friendship between Great Britain and France have been securely cemented, and consequently the Channel fleet has little or no purpose in cruising in the English Channel. A fleet should not carry out its sea training in a sea in which it is

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most unlikely it will have to fight. Thus, while the Channel fleet will be seen from time to time in the Channel, where it has its base, it will cruise more frequently in the North Sea, and repeated incursions into Scandinavian waters will be made.

Since the German people have chosen to embark upon a scheme of naval aggrandizement they must be prepared to accept with as good grace as may be the action which Great Britain, the supreme naval power of the world, has been called upon to take as a counter move, but in no spirit of hostility. The seas are all one, as Lord Selborne has told us, and the British navy will not abdicate its right to go anywhere it chooses. We have important trade interests in the Baltic, and, apart from other reasons, the presence of the Channel fleet in those water is essential.

It is to be hoped that the British people will not take German irritation too much to heart, because it is, after all, only human that they should feel a certain amount of annoyance. With the destruction of the Russian fleet Germany was left "cock of the walk" in the Baltic and adjacent waters, and no time was lost in marshalling the active fleet of the empire and taking it for a ceremonial cruise off the Scandinavian coasts. By the British visit in imposing force the effect of this demonstration has been immediately neutralized, and at a critical moment. Is it unnatural that the German people, proud of their new fleet and anxious to use it for the assertion of a pacific over-lordship, should feel sore? The Germans have watched with close attention the development of British naval organization in the past nine months, and they have realized its significance. They have seen the Home fleet given the title of Channel fleet and increased from eight battleships to eleven battleships, and they have recently learnt that it is intended to further augment its strength by the addition of four battleships which have just returned from China seas. These fifteen battleships, with six associated armored cruisers, will form in fact, though not in name, the North Sea fleet of Great Britain. The reconstituted Channel (or North Sea) fleet is more than equal in fighting power to the whole of the German active fleet. This truth has come upon the Germans as an unwelcome revelation after years of self-sacrifice undertaken in the confident anticipation that Great Britain was on the down grade, and that they had only to add to the strength of their naval forces in order to gain the complete mastery of the Baltic and the North Sea. They have been misled by the German Navy League

and by leaders who have advocated an active naval policy. They find that while they have been borrowing largely year by year in order to pay for their new ships, Great Britain has shown no inclination to abdicate her historic position. The German people, as they look upon the powerful Channel fleet cruising at their very doors, will be reminded that it is merely the advance guard of Great Britain. In the home ports are a dozen more battleships held on the leash, in commission and stored ready to sail at a few hours' notice and fight. Within a few days' steaming are nine battleships of the Atlantic fleet, which can sweep up the Channel and into the North Sea. Owing to the wisdom which has been shown in the direction of British foreign policy, this country is now on the friendliest terms with France, Spain, Portugal, and Italy, while evidences of a rapprochement with Russia are not wanting. For the present, Germany stands alone. In southern waters the British fleet has no probable objective.

After all the efforts which the German people have made, the British Fleet remains to-day more than twice as strong as the Fleet which the Kaiser has nursed with so much persistency; and on every hand British opinion supports the Government in its determination to maintain the two-power standard. Economically and geographically Germany is in a hole, and the ebullitions which lately appeared in the German Press were merely expressions of chagrin now that the German Government realizes that it has been checkmated by the British authorities. With the disappearance of the Russian Fleet and the *entente cordiale* with France, the British Fleet dominates the world in a manner and to an extent unparalleled in the past hundred years, and it is realized in the Wilhelmstrasse that the naval position of Germany for the present is well-nigh hopeless. All the plans for playing the part of "honest broker" have miscarried, and the German Fleet is left in a position of complete isolation. Ship for ship the German men-of-war in commission in the Baltic are weaker than those of the British Channel Fleet alone.

At a moment when the Admiralty at Berlin is forced to recognize the comparative weakness of the German naval forces, Prince von Bülow is occupied with the uncongenial task of endeavoring to make Imperial revenue balance with the rapidly increasing expenditure. The peoples of the States which form the German Empire have found that Imperialism is expensive; the outlay on the "little war" in South-West Africa is mounting up by millions sterling. The contributions of the States to the expenses of the Empire are in several cases in arrears, and from many quarters the Imperial Treasurer has

been informed that they cannot increase their quotas. It is at this moment (1) when Berlin is worried by extreme financial stringency; (2) when a crisis in the affairs of Sweden and Norway is revealed; (3) when the "little war" is developing into a campaign, muddled and expensive, and (4) when the Russian forces in the Baltic have practically disappeared, that the British Channel Fleet is proceeding on its cruise in Baltic waters, and neutralizing the naval predominance of Germany. The German people would be more than human if they did not feel some discomfiture at this dramatic revelation of the failure of the policy upon which they have placed their money, and in the pursuance of which they have year by year added to the debt of the Empire. In spite of all their efforts they are relatively little better off than they were before they embarked on the policy of expansion in 1898. They have toiled and sacrificed, but owing to the recent action of the British Admiralty, undertaken in no spirit of antagonism but merely in self-defence, they have made little headway. The British authorities, learning from the German handbook of method, have added to the strength of the British Fleet and at the same time materially reduced the expenditure. This is the situation as the Channel Fleet, with its attendant armored cruisers and torpedo craft, under five admirals, carries out its sea training in the Baltic, under the eyes of Northern Europe.

The completeness with which the British Navy dominates European waters is not accidental. It is the result of definite policy, wisely framed and rapidly carried out. Nine months ago the First Lord of the Admiralty sketched in outline a new scheme for the reorganization and distribution of the British Fleet. In the interval this scheme has been completed, and it is possible now to assess the value of the change which has been effected in the fighting weight and efficiency of the British Navy. The nation has failed to grasp the significance of the changes because they have figured so little in the newspapers. Have they not got the Army to discuss? So far as the intelligent discussion of naval questions is concerned, the House of Commons does not contain six members who are qualified to express an opinion, and even the few members who take an intelligent interest in naval affairs have either too little or insufficient information to enable them to become masters of the intricate details of the organization of what is, after all, the greatest Navy in the world. The fact that the fighting weight and efficiency of the British Navy have been more than doubled in the present year has called forth little praise, though a good deal of scepticism was uttered when the prophecy was made.

Much ignorant criticism was indulged in because the Admiralty decided that in the cause of good administration it was essential to take stock of the Fleet and reject from the fighting line those vessels which were not in a condition either to fight or run away. This aspect of Admiralty policy made an unfavorable impression upon the House of Commons, for the simple reason that sound business opinion has little weight at St. Stephen's. It is forgotten that naval architecture is a progressive science, and that the magnificent battleship which is the pride of the nation to-day will be condemned as obsolete fifteen or twenty years later, and that the time comes when, in view of the further application of science to the destruction of man, it is the truest economy to place old ships on the scrap-heap instead of frittering away large sums on their repair or reconstruction. The radical fault in the past—and this applies to all navies—is that constructors have failed to realize the limited life of a man-of-war, and have built ships as though they were to last for a century. Down to the adoption of the new policy of the Admiralty ships were built, manned, and stored on the same general principles as held good in Nelson's time, when vessels were the sport of "the unbought wind," were absent from any base of supplies for many months together, and could be patched up with advantage time and again, and their lives lengthened almost indefinitely. Regrettable as it may be to throw aside as useless ships built within comparatively recent times, this is the sound policy. After a lapse of ten or fifteen years guns, armor, and mechanical equipment become antiquated. The cost of repairs rises alarmingly after a man-of-war has been in the Service more than ten or fifteen years. Had the Public Accounts Committee had any grasp of the sound principles of financial administration they would have realized the ruinous policy which was being adopted in tinkering up obsolescent and obsolete ships at a ruinous cost to the country. By glancing through the Dockyard Expense Accounts they would have seen that this policy was casting upon the country a heavy burden of expenditure without adding to the efficiency of the Fleet. They would have called the attention of Parliament in 1903-4 to the continued outlay upon ships which under no circumstances could prove of much value in time of war. Business men throughout the country would have stood aghast had they realized that £114,704 was thrown away upon the refit of the twenty-year-old battleship Howe, that £32,135 had been devoted to a vain attempt to render the battleship Hood fit for the line of battle, and that no less than £77,000 had been laid out in useless alterations to the ancient battleship Colossus, built at Portsmouth two years

before Queen Victoria celebrated her Jubilee; while no less than £58,715 was frittered away on the cruiser Aurora, with her old soft armor and her inadequate fighting equipment. These are merely specimen items illustrative of the old policy.

Year by year the country was being led to devote to repairs large sums which could have been spent with far more advantage on the construction of entirely new men-of-war. In the first ten years of the life of a ship the expenditure on repairs is comparatively small; at the end of this period, owing to wear and tear (and when through the advance of science the vessel is losing year by year its usefulness for war purposes), the expenditure upon repairs increases at an alarming rate, and in view of the approach of the period when the vessel will be unfit to lie in the line with modern ships, a wise administration should hesitate to embark upon costly schemes of partial reconstruction, since, as a rule, it is impossible to modernize the fighting equipment owing to mechanical difficulties. The wiser course is to recognize that ships of war deteriorate rapidly, and to build definitely with this truth in view. Since it is recognized that a battleship's fighting life extends to about fifteen years only, it is rank wastefulness to build it as though it were to last for an indefinite period. It is the truest economy to recognize that naval construction is a progressive science, and that after a lapse of ten or fifteen years the country will have obtained the full return for the expenditure upon battleship or cruiser, and that then the cost of repairs should be kept to a minimum pending the date when the ship must inevitably be removed from the fighting list and her place taken by an entirely new man-of-war. Down to the adoption of the new Admiralty policy this economic truth was not realized; Parliament judged the strength of the Fleet by quantity rather than by quality, and congratulated itself on the frantic efforts which the Admiralty were making to tinker up obsolescent vessels which no Board of Admiralty, face to face with imminent war, would dare to trust with the defence of the Empire. The change of policy will result eventually in an economy of millions sterling in the Estimates.

In conjunction with this scrap-heap policy the Admiralty determined to act upon another almost self-evident principle of naval warfare—concentration. Years ago Nelson uttered the aphorism that war is a business of position, and Captain Mahan has told us:—

"Like the land, the sea, as a military field, has its important centres, and it is not controlled by spreading your force, whatever its composition, evenly over an entire field of operations, like butter over

bread, but by occupying the centres with aggregated forces—fleets or armies—ready to act in masses, in various directions from the centres. * * * Concentrated forces, therefore, are those upon which warfare depends for efficient control, and for efficient energy in the operations of war. They have two chief essential characteristics—force, which is gained by concentration of numbers; and mobility, which is the ability to carry the force rapidly as well as effectively, from the centre to any outlying field where action, offensive or defensive, becomes necessary."

This is a commonplace upon which war must be waged if victory is to be achieved. Down to the adoption of the Admiralty's new policy the necessity for concentration was not recognized. Scattered over the seas we had a number of isolated squadrons entirely composed of ships of secondary fighting value; the best of these vessels were without armor protection on their sides, and mounted no guns bigger than the 6-inch weapon which war experience in the Far East has shown to be comparatively useless, and the worst of them were so old and inefficient that even under the most favorable circumstances they could not emerge successful from a contest with any probable enemy. About 10,000 officers and men were thus locked up in the Pacific, in the North Atlantic, at the Cape of Good Hope, and elsewhere. They were not only in ships which could not fight when war occurred, but during the time of peace they had no opportunities to perfect themselves in essential war training because the custom was for these vessels to cruise singly, occupied in what was known as "showing the flag." Entered in the Navy and paid in order that they might defend the empire, these officers and men were cabined and confined in ships of no fighting value, and it was inevitable that when war occurred they would have had to follow the example of the Russians—interning their ships in neutral ports and giving their parole not to do any war-like acts. In this way the Navy in peace time was neglecting the essential training of this large personnel, equivalent to a third of the whole Japanese Fleet, with the practical certainty that in the event of war these officers and men would have become mere spectators of the naval operations. This policy was dangerous, unfair to the officers and men concerned, and grossly wasteful, since the maintenance of these vessels cast upon the country an unnecessary burden, besides robbing it of the services which the crews might otherwise render in battle. The Admiralty faced this anomaly courageously, and they realized that war is a matter of massed forces. The Pacific, North American, and South Atlantic Squadrons were disestablished, and the non-fighting ships in other divisions of the Fleet were recalled.

The ships were useless, but the officers and men were valuable. For the most part, these vessels, recalled from their lonely cruises in distant seas, were either put on the scrap-heap or taken to non-naval moorings, there to lie as England's forlorn hope.

The Board of Admiralty economized in two directions; first, they recognized that a ship of war has only a limited life; and, secondly, they decided that non-fighting ships in distant seas could exercise no influence on the course of war. With the officers and men thus set free the Admiralty were enabled to carry out the policy of concentration so effectively summarized by Captain Mahan and amply supported by all the teachings of history, and to reorganize the reserves of ships in the home ports.

As lately as December last Portsmouth, Devonport, and Chatham were crowded with an immense variety of vessels, old and new, in motley mixture, not a single one of which was ready for war. Year in and year out they swung idly round their buoys, interfering with the active life of the harbors, and an innocent source of pride to ignorant civilians. Each summer it was the custom to mobilize the Fleet for war. What followed? Immediately the drafting officers at the naval depots were at their wits' end to find officers and men to commission a portion only of the reserve ships. Owing to the employment of so many officers and men in the non-fighting forces in distant seas, the available resources of the Admiralty proved unequal to the demand, and each year there was the recurring outcry for more officers and men, with the result that between 1888 and 1894 the personnel of the Fleet rose from just over 60,000 to 131,000. In spite of this growth the number of officers and men available for fitting out for sea even the most modern of the ships in reserve at the home ports was insufficient, without entirely dislocating the whole of the naval organization. When the Admiralty issued its annual orders for mobilization all the men undergoing gunnery, torpedo, navigation, and signal courses at the various instructional schools had to be withdrawn and those establishments closed. Officers and men on leave after long periods of foreign service received instructions to report themselves at one or other of the ports for duty, and for a period of many days all was confusion and disorder. The departments which were responsible for carrying out the orders of the executive worked their hardest, but the system was bad, and it was impossible to do more than they accomplished by strenuous effort.

When the crews had been collected from all parts of the United Kingdom the ships were commissioned, and officers and men realized

that they had been drafted to vessels of whose mechanical and fighting equipment they were almost completely ignorant. Sympathy between the personnel and the ship itself is essential to war-like efficiency. During the previous twelve months the ships had received only casual attention, and the natural result was that their machinery was not in perfect order. After more or less numerous delays, by superhuman efforts the captains succeeded in getting their charges to sea for machinery trials. It is common knowledge that a large proportion of the ships failed to satisfy the Admiralty standard of efficiency, while others passed the test; but the records of the maneuvers show that many of these ships, specially commissioned from the reserve, broke down.

Improvements in the system of reserves were, it is true, made latterly, but the method of organization was radically wrong, and by no means could the ships in reserve be considered ready to do service in war. Under the most favorable circumstances from a fortnight to a month must have elapsed before all the vessels in reserve could have been fitted out for sea. In war time much may happen in a month. In face of this recurring difficulty and source of weakness the Admiralty decided to introduce an entirely new system. In his memorandum of December last Lord Selborne stated:—

"It will have been noticed that, whenever a portion of the Fleet has been specially commissioned for maneuvers, the only difficulties which have occurred during these maneuvers have been in connection with the ships so specially commissioned. * * * The increase in the number, size, and horse-power of the ships in commission has more than swallowed up the increase in the personnel, and consequently an adequate provision for the ships in the Fleet Reserve has not yet been made. * * *

"The following is the plan adopted for the reorganization of the Fleet Reserve. The fighting ships will be organized quite separately from the obsolete or non-fighting ships. They will each have a captain, a second-in-command, and a proportion of the other officers, including engineer, gunnery, navigating, and torepdo officers. They will have a nucleus of two-fifths of their war complement, but in that two-thirds will be included all the more expert ratings, especially the torpedo ratings and the principal gun numbers, and each ship will periodically proceed to sea for the purpose of gunnery practice and of testing her machinery. They will be grouped homogeneously at the three home ports according as their destination may be determined

for reinforcement in time of war. Each group so formed will be commanded by a flag officer, who will himself take the reinforcements in time of war to the fleet which they are to reinforce, and he alone will be held responsible that every possible step has been taken to reduce breakdowns of machinery to a minimum, and that the fighting efficiency of his ships when mobilized is without flaw. In addition, there will be a sufficiency of ratings kept at home to enable the Board to commission an emergency squadron without dislocating the schools or nucleus crews, or having recourse to a general mobilization."

The stocktaking of the Navy already referred to was carried out last year. With the banishment of obsolete ships disappeared the necessity for an outlay of several millions on dockyard, store-house and anchorage extension at several places, four and a half millions being saved at Chatham alone in proposed dockworks. Only vessels of real fighting value were retained at the ports. These were commissioned in January last, and within a few weeks the nation was provided with a new Fleet in reserve, but ready for instant service. In the early months of this year the three divisions cruised separately in order to give the officers in command time and opportunity to "shake down" their ships, and this summer maneuvers were held to test the new scheme. Under the superintendence of Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson tactical exercises were organized in the English Channel, the reserve divisions being directed to engage in mimic battles with the Channel Fleet and the First and Fourth Cruiser Squadrons in order to test the nucleus crew system, and give the Admirals an opportunity of showing their tactical ability.

Within a few days of the order being issued by the Admiralty two hundred fighting vessels were concentrated in the Channel ready for war. Never before had the British Navy assembled in such force, but owing to the absence of activity at the naval ports the maneuvers passed off without attracting much attention. During that week the whole of the British Navy in home waters was mobilized as if for hostilities, but because there was an absence of the confusion and disorder always associated with former mobilizations, and the training classes ashore continued as usual, the event did not create any sensation. In order to send the ships of the Reserve Divisions to sea practically no preparations were necessary, as each vessel had on board a sufficient crew to navigate her and fight, and each officer and man was thoroughly acquainted with the ship and her idiosyncrasies, and was familiar with his special duties. No extra men had to be drafted to the ships because the nucleus crew represented the mini-

mum required. Instead of proceeding out of port one by one, leaving behind a certain number of "lame ducks," as was the case in the past, the ships of each port left in battle order, each Division under its own Rear-Admiral.

As was anticipated there was a complete absence of all mechanical defects, and the ships of the Reserve Fleet took part in three pitched battles in the Channel against Divisions of the Channel Fleet and its associated cruisers. The reserve vessels were maneuvered with complete success and their guns well fought. One hundred and sixteen vessels forming the reserves in commission at the home ports were thus quietly despatched to sea, exercised, and dispersed without any of those breakdowns which were the inevitable accompaniment of maneuvers in former years. This huge assembly of fighting vessels completely demonstrated that the whole fighting force of the country is now ready to strike at a moment's notice with its whole strength, officers and crews being familiar with their ships. The maneuvers revealed that for the first time in the history of the British Navy the Fleet had been organized so as to enable it, in case of war, to strike first, and to strike with all its power. The strength of a fleet consists not in the number of ships, but in readiness to proceed to sea immediately, and fight instantly, on the declaration of war or before. Only by these means can England be sure that she can act upon her traditional policy of making her enemy's shores her frontiers, and thus crushing her foe, or foes, without interfering with the ordinary life in these islands and the progress of commercial and industrial activity.

Whilst thus organizing the Reserves the Admiralty also carried out their policy of concentration. It had become apparent to all observers of the trend of international affairs that the Mediterranean had ceased to be the prime centre of strategical importance. Hitherto Great Britain had concentrated in the Midland Sea her main fighting fleet. In consequence of the good relations existing between this country and France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, the assemblage of twelve battleships and a large number of cruisers in the Mediterranean became unnecessary. Owing to the growth of the German Fleet under the inspiration of the Kaiser, and its concentration in the Baltic, it was apparent that the centre of naval power, so far as Great Britain was concerned, as indeed for the whole world, had shifted from southern to northern waters, and a complete reorganization of British naval force was urgently necessary as a precautionary measure. Four battleships were consequently withdrawn from the Med-

iterranean and added to the eight battleships already entrusted with the defense of the English Channel and the North Sea, and the old Channel Squadron, brought up to a strength of eight battleships and renamed the Atlantic Fleet, was based on Gibraltar, becoming a pivot force which could swing round into the Mediterranean or into the English Channel and North Sea as the circumstances of war might dictate. With each of these three battlefleets a squadron of armored cruisers was associated, squadrons consisting of vessels of high speed, with armored protection on their broadsides.

This was the situation down to the battle of the Sea of Japan. With the destruction of the Russian Fleet by Admiral Togo the Admiralty were able to complete their scheme of redistribution. Directly the news was received that Admiral Rojdestvensky had been annihilated, orders were issued directing the return of the five battleships which had been sent to Chinese waters in order to neutralize Russian influence, and the two battleships which were on their way out to the Far East as reliefs were also directed to return home. The Admiralty thus had at their disposal seven modern first-class battleships, and there was no difficulty in effectively disposing of them. The Admiralty plan was as follows:—

Albion, Glory, Ocean, Vengeance, sister ships of 12,950 tons displacement, built in 1898-9, attached to Channel Fleet; Goliath, 12,950 tons displacement, built in 1898, attached to Mediterranean Fleet; Canopus, 12,950 tons displacement, built in 1898, attached to Atlantic Fleet; Centurion, 10,500 tons displacement, built in 1892, attached to Reserve in Commission.

In the meantime the Channel Fleet had been temporarily reduced to eleven battleships, but by allotting to Admiral Sir A. Wilson four of the ships recalled from the Far East, this force will be immediately raised to a strength of fifteen battleships, leaving nine battleships each in the Atlantic and Mediterranean Fleets. Never before has a British flag-officer been given a command so large in quantity and so imposing in quality as is thus placed under the orders of Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson, a born strategist and tactician, and an officer who has devoted himself with absolute singleness of purpose to the country's service. Should war occur before Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson has to haul down his flag, the country will realize that he is one of the great men which the nineteenth century produced. The Admiralty could not have had an officer better fitted for the command of this force, one of the gratifying features of which is that it is homogeneous, consisting of three groups of ships:—

The Exmouth, Russell, Duncan, Montagu, Cornwallis, and Albemarle, sister ships of 14,000 tons and 19 knots speed. The Triumph and Swiftsure, of 11,950 tons, and 19½ knots speed.

The Cæsar and Prince George, sister ships of 14,950 tons, and 17 knots speed, and the Revenge, of 14,150 tons, which will shortly be relieved by a sister ship to the Cæsar and Prince George.

The Albion, Glory, Ocean, and Vengeance, sister ships, of 12,950 tons, and 18¼ knots speed.

By these measures the redistribution of the Fleet has been completed and the gigantic triumph of organization which has been achieved may be judged from the following statement showing the forces ready for war in "the Near Seas" to-day and a year ago:—

North Sea, English Channel, and Atlantic as far as Gibraltar—September, 1905, Channel Fleet of 13 battleships and 6 armored cruisers; September, 1904, Home Fleet of 8 battleships, with 6 armored cruisers. September, 1905, Atlantic Fleet of 9 battleships and 6 armored cruisers; September, 1904, Channel Fleet of 8 battleships. September, 1905, Reserve Divisions (ready in all respects for war with trained crews), 12 battleships, 4 armored cruisers, 21 protected cruisers and 86 torpedo craft; September, 1904, none.

Mediterranean—September, 1905, 9 battleships and 4 armored cruisers; September, 1904, 12 battleships and 4 armored cruisers.

Totals of armored ships—September, 1905, 43 battleships and 20 armored cruisers; September, 1904, 28 battleships and 10 armored cruisers.

[In addition, there are now, as before, twenty-five torpedo-boat destroyers and twenty torpedo boats in full commission at the home ports, with eight submarines, but they are trained under a rear-admiral; the new Fourth Cruiser Squadron is available for home service, and every sea-going training ship is of war value, whereas in the past they were non-fighting ships.]

It is almost unnecessary to point the moral, even for foreign observers. The visits between the British and French Fleets which have occurred this year have indicated that in the present generation, at any rate, the English Channel will not be the scene of conflict. France has definitely abandoned all hope of challenging the supremacy of the English Fleet. The English Channel and the Mediterranean are now centres of concord and friendship, and since all causes of international difference between Great Britain and the Powers of Southern Europe have been completely removed, the Mediterranean Fleet itself may almost be regarded as an additional reserve to the

Channel Fleet, and the Channel Fleet itself can no longer regard the Channel as its cruising ground. It was a dictum of Nelson's that a fleet should cruise in the waters in which it will most probably fight, and since the English Channel and the Mediterranean are thus ruled out as probable scenes of conflict, it naturally follows that the Channel Fleet will in future be seen with increasing frequency in the North Sea.

This frontier of the British Empire has been threatened by the growth of the German Navy, and it is as natural that Great Britain should safeguard her interests in this direction as that France, Russia, and Germany should patrol their land frontiers with troops. The presence of the Channel Fleet in the North Sea is no more a menace to Germany than has been the old régime to France when the main fighting fleets of the British Navy cruised in the Mediterranean and the English Channel. A few years ago these waters seemed likely to be the scene of a gigantic struggle for naval supremacy. That danger is passed, and we have been celebrating its elimination at Brest and Portsmouth. Some allowance may be made for German irritation in these circumstances, and the British people will do well not to indulge in any wordy reprisals. In the struggle which Germany has been waging Great Britain has won, and she can afford to regard the consequent irritation with forbearance, and hope for the day when the rulers of the German Empire will realize that the British people have a well-founded admiration for the German Army and Navy, and for the German people and their methods. While safeguarding our own interests, we can afford to wait patiently for an awakening of a better feeling in the German Empire, with which we have so many natural ties. The German people need only cast back their minds to the successive years immediately succeeding the Kaiser's accession, when his Majesty was at Cowes, honored and popular, to understand the feeling of real friendship which might unite the two Empires. Germany has nothing which we covet; we have no cause of quarrel with her, and desire none. The policy of England is merely to hold steadfastly what she has won—and first among her possessions is the supremacy of the seas, the northern as well as the southern seas, the North Sea as well as the English Channel and Mediterranean. It is the old traditional policy, and by it we must stand.

ARCHIBALD S. HURD.

THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.

Thirteenth Paper.

(November 25th, 1904, to March 14th, 1905.)

THE CAMPAIGN IN MANCHURIA (Continued).

AFTER the October battles on the Spa-ho there was a period of comparative repose along the fronts of the two main armies.

The Japanese were gradually strengthening their position, however, and slowly pushing forward their right, on the upper Taitse-ho. Towards the end of November they occupied Taping-tu-shan (Dapintushau or Tapintishau, on other maps), about 80 miles, nearly directly east of Liaoyang, and about 20 miles directly south of Sintsintin, located on an affluent of the upper Hunho, pushing the Russians back on the latter place. They attacked Ching-ho-cheng (called also Tsin-ho-cheng or Tsian-ho-tsin), about 65 miles northeast of Liaoyang, at the same time, but were repulsed by the Russians under General Rennenkampf. The importance of this point lies in the fact that it commands the defile of Ta-ling (Talin or Dalin), a pass in the mountains forming the dividing line between the watersheds of the Hun-ho and the Taitse.

ATTACK BY RUSSIAN RIGHT.

(Jan. 25-Feb. 1, 1905.)

During the month of December and the first part of January the armies rested in winter quarters. The fall of Port Arthur on January 2nd, 1905, had produced a depressing effect on the Russian army, while it had correspondingly elated the Japanese. Soon after the surrender the main part of the besieging army, about 50,000 men under Nogi, had been moved northward to reinforce the Japanese left wing ,and attempt to effect a turning movement at the proper time.

The Russian position extended along the hills to the south and southeast of Mukden, from Chantan (about 25 miles southwest of

Mukden) on the Hun-ho, eastward across the railroad to the position of Putiloff, or Lone Tree, hill, on the Sha-ho (about 14 miles directly south of Mukden), thence southeast to Tu-men-ling pass, 6 miles northwest of Pensihu (or Bentsiku), on the Taitse-ho, thence northeastward over Wanfuling pass and as far as Ta-ling pass, the passes being all strongly held.

The Russian right was under Gipenberg, the center under Bilderling, the left (in the mountains), under Linevitch.

Kuropatkin's force, toward the end of January, numbered some 334,000, with 36,800 cavalry, 36,000 artillery, 1,598 field guns and 72 heavy guns.

His headquarters were located at Fushum (or Fushan), about 24 miles east of Mukden, on the Hun-ho.

The Japanese position extended from Ta-ping-ta-shan (about 80 miles east of Liao-yang), on the east, westward through Pensihu and over the Hun-ho to the Liao-ho, with detachments extending northward to the west of Mukden.

The Japanese extreme right was the new army of the East, under Kawamuri, called also the Yalu army, which had been landed in January. On the left of this column was Kuroki, the original right of the army. Nodzu's column had the center, and Oku the left. Nogi's army was masked in rear of the left for a turning movement at the opportune moment.

The Japanese force, under Oyama, numbered about 400,000 men.

Oyama's headquarters was at Shilihe, on the railroad, just south of the Shiliho, about 15 miles north of Liao-yang, and about 22 miles south of Mukden.

THE JAPANESE MEDICAL SERVICE.

The medical service of the Japanese army and its excellent equipment aroused the admiration of all observers during the Boxer troubles, and the efficiency has been fully maintained. The recent report from the P.M.O.* of Gen. Oku's army illustrated this matter very completely. He reported that there had been only 40 deaths from disease in this particular army since it landed in Manchuria on May 6 last, the return being made on Dec. 19. The figures showed that of the 24,642 cases treated up to Dec. 1, 18,578 recovered, 40 died, and 5,609 were sent to Japan. It is believed that

*Principal Medical Officer.

these figures are unequalled in the medical annals of warfare. There were 193 cases of typhoid and 342 of dysentery, but the number of beri-beri patients numbered 5,070. The other cases were not serious. The casualties sustained by the army from May 6 to Dec 19 were:—Killed.—Officers 210, men 4,917. Wounded.—Officers 743, men 20,337. Missing..—Officers four, men 402. Sixteen per cent. of the wounded died, 19 per cent. recovered on the field, and 65 per cent. were sent to Japan; 85 per cent. of the wounds were caused by rifle bullets, 8 per cent. by shells, and 7 per cent. by bayonet or sword thrusts. The largest percentage of recoveries was from chest wounds, while, as regards other wounds, the percentage of recoveries was larger from wounds in the head and abdomen than from injuries to other organs. This is attributed to the small calibre of modern rifles, the percentages in the other Japanese armies being, it is believed, about the same.

In the month of January the Russians took the initiative and advanced against the Japanese left flank to develop its strength and to determine the position of Nogi's army, or, in case the latter had not arrived yet, to turn this flank before his arrival.

The first movement consisted of a cavalry raid with a force of Cossacks, under Mishchenko, down the west bank of the Liao-ho. The Cossacks were repulsed with a loss of 62 killed and over 200 wounded.

Towards the end of January Gripenberg was sent out from the Russian right with a strong force to attack the Japanese left and turn it, if possible. Between January 25th and 29th, heavy fighting took place on the Hun-ho, in the vicinity of Sandepu and Hokjutai, or Hei-kou-tai (16 miles north of Liao-yang), in which the Russians made considerable progress at first. The attack was, however, repulsed, the Russians losing 12,000, the Japanee 7,000 men. Had this attack been properly supported by Kuropatkin, the Japanese position would have been a precarious one.

General Gripenberg was succeeded by General Kaulbars in command of the Russian right flank.

RUSSIAN LOSSES.

(To January 14, 1905.)

The Russki Invalid publishes a report by Gen. Trepoff, chief medical officer of the Manchurian Army, giving particulars of the officers and men sent up from the front, sick and wounded to Kharbin, Stretensk, Khavarosvsk and other places in the rear of the seat

of war, from the beginning of operations up to Jan. 14. The wounded officers were 1,710, and the sick 2,308, the wounded men 53,890, and the sick 72,531, making a grand total of 130,439. Of these, 107 officers and 3,900 men died in the hospitals; a total of 17,722 were permanently invalided, and 9,429 were sent to European Russia to recuperate. At the date of the return there remained 21,554 in the hospitals. Of the officers included in the return, 1,896 and of the men 75,831 had returned to the front cured. The total loss which the Manchuria army had suffered by the death, permanent invaliding, or return to Russia of those received in the hospitals was 1,336 officers and 29,822 men. The return does not, of course, relate to the losses at Port Arthur, nor apparently to many suffered in various parts in the theatre of war. Gen. Trepoff's return relates to those officers and men who came under the attention of his staff in the hospitals over which he had direct control. Accurate particulars of the numbers killed in action are not available.

ADVANCE ON MUKDEN.

(February 1-28, 1905.)

During the first half of February the armies were occupied in strengthening their positions and preparing for the great battle that was about to open.

The Japanese had made a number of attempts on the railroad in rear of the Russian right. For this purpose detachments extended northward around the right flank of the Russian line, even to the west of Mukden. On February 13th one of these detachments, from the vicinity of Fand-ja-tun (about 12 miles northwest of Mukden) attempted to damage the railroad line opposite that point, but the attack was repulsed.

On February 19th the general advance began with a forward movement of the Japanese right. Kawamuri's column, holding the extreme right, attacked the Russian extreme southeast positions, and on February 24th captured Ching-ho-cheng (about 65 miles northeast of Liao-yang). The line of advance of this army was through the difficult mountain country northwest of Ching-ho-cheng (called also Tsian-het-sin or Tsink-het-chen), along the road leading over Da-ling (or Ta Pass) and Sit-shuan-ling (Si-chuan Pass).

Meanwhile Kuroki advanced one division along the road passing through the passes of Tumen-ling (northwest of Pensi-hu, about

25 miles northeast of Lioa-yang), Hua-ling farther north, Wan-fu-ling (24 miles southeast of Mukden) and Kan-tu-ling (3 miles further north), on the road toward Fushun (24 miles east of Mukden).

On February 24th this division advanced without serious opposition, but on the 26th, in attacking Wan-fu-ling, it experienced serious resistance, and the advance came to a halt. On the 27th a driving snowstorm prevented further operations, and on the 28th the attack was suspended for the purpose of reconnoitering the position. Little further progress was made at this point for the succeeding seven days.

The advance of Kuroki's column, however, had turned the Russian extreme southeastern positions at Ta-ling (Ta Pass), and the latter was taken by Kawamuri's column on February 27th.

At the center of the Japanese line Nodzu's and the right of Oku's armies attacked the Russian positions in the vicinity of Putiloff (or Lone Tree) hill, south of the Sha-ho (or Shakhe, about 14 miles south of Mukden), and eastward of that point, with great energy. The battle raged along this central part of the line with varying success, while the Japanese plan of enveloping the Russian flanks was being developed.

By the advance of Kuroki on the Japanese right, Kuropatkin found his left seriously threatened. He therefore drew from his center and right to reinforce his left, and moved his reserves also in that direction.

This enabled Oku, on the Japanese left, to advance.

Meanwhile, the army of Nogi (from before Port Arthur) had been assembling in a retired position in rear of the extreme left of the Japanese line, and by February 20th was ready to advance, standing fully mobilized at Sha-pei-ho (or Siau-pie-ho), on the Taitse-ho, about 20 miles west of Liao-yang. On the 27th the cavalry, which had covered and screened Nogi's front, was withdrawn, and fell back to the bank of the Liao to protect his left flank.

On February 28th, Nogi advanced 15 miles northward, which brought him on a line with the rest of the Japanese army, thus extending that line westward, and giving it a length of over 100 miles along this front.

This closed the first period of the operation. Thus far only the Japanese right had become heavily engaged, the center having merely supported the advance of the right by an energetic attack.

THE BATTLE OF MUKDEN.

(March 1-10, 1905.)

The battle of Mukden opened on March 1st, with the energetic advance of the Japanese left, comprising both Oku's and Nogi's forces.

As we have seen, the advance of Kawamuri's column through the mountainous region on the eastern part of the field of operations, supported by Kuroki's energetic advance in the same region, had given Kuropatkin the impression that he was to expect Oyama's principal flank movement to the eastward, and he had therefore thrown his strength mainly in that direction.

The country to the eastward, however, is very difficult, mountainous and with few roads, and these easily closed at the numerous passes; while the country to the westward is an open plain, much better suited to a flank movement, and on that side the army of Nogi, from Port Arthur, could come up on line in a shorter time.

Nevertheless, since the railroad, as well as the main wagon road from Liao-yang to Mukden and Kirin, run northeastward, and Kuropatkin's army at the end of February was facing generally southeastward, a turning movement by the right flank of the Japanese would have promised greater results than one by the left flank, since, if successful, it would strike the Russian line of communications in rear of the army and make that army fight front to a flank, whereas an attack by the Japanese left flank merely tended to force the Russians back on their line of communications.

The superior fighting power of his army enabled Oyama to advance by either flank without endangering the other or his center.

When he found the Russian left so strong in the mountain passes he decided to make his principal attack with his left.

Oku advanced across the Hun-ho, beyond Sandepu (16 miles north of Liao-yang), and captured Chantang (about 26 miles southwest of Mukden), and advanced northward, taking one position after another, meanwhile Nogi's column advanced on the left of Oku's force and by March 3d his right was in touch with Oku's left. Nogi's left was hurried along the Liao endeavoring to reach Tieling (Tie Pass), 28 miles north of Mukden, where the mountain ridge crosses the railroad and the main wagon road, the line of communications of Kuropatkin's army.

On the night of March 2nd Nogi was three miles north of Mukden. The Japanese left, therefore, extended along a line parallel to

the railroad, to the west of it, from a point 12 miles below Mukden to a point three miles above it.

Kuropatkin, informed by this time of the danger threatening his right flank, was comparatively helpless, as he had all his strength concentrated on his left, where he expected the decisive action.

Kaulbars, on the Russian right, sent two divisions promptly to oppose Nogi's advance, but one started before the other, so that they struck Nogi in turn and not simultaneously. The first division came into action on the morning of March 3d, and quickly beaten back, fleeing northward; the second came up in the afternoon and made better resistance, but its fragments were soon thrown back on the main army.

In this action the Russians lost 3,000 killed, left on the field; the Japanese lost 300, killed and wounded.

Nogi's force was now within five miles of the railroad.

The Japanese general line, however, at this time, was somewhat precarious. As Nogi had advanced northward, Oku had to swing to the northeast, and one of his divisions was separated, across the Hun-ho from the main body. This angle was the vital point in the Japanese line, which Kuropatkin might have pierced had he had any reserves immediately available.

The two divisions of Oku's army were, however, attached to Nodzu's army, making the center a unit, while Oku himself took charge of the third division, beyond the Hun-ho, and all available reserves at this point.

The ground in this portion of the field was comparatively open, and being frozen, no field intrenchments were possible. Except for the collections of mud houses a mile or more apart there was no cover available except ruts or ditches. The villages, with each house set in a stone or mud-walled enclosure, formed the center of fierce combats.

The center of the attacks of both sides was at the point where Oku's line was broken, in the vicinity of the villages of Lanshanpu and Sahoudypau, about 14 miles southwest of Mukden. At this ponit the Japanese endeavored to rectify their line in support of Nogi, while the Russians hoped to break through there and thus isolate Nogi. These villages were taken and retaken several times, and finally passed into the hands of the Japanese on March 4. Oku was able to hold his own, however, and on March 5th and 6th was able to advance a little. Nodzu, with Oku's two divisions, at the center, also held his own. Kuroki and Kawamuri, on the right,

found themselves opposed to superior numbers and were hard pressed, but held their positions.

Nogi, on the extreme left, could make no progress on March 4th and 5th, but on the 6th he gained some ground to the north. Meanwhile, the Russian reserves, which had been sent eastward at the opening of the battle, had been sent back, and on the 7th fell upon Nogi. But he readily repulsed the tired forces, although they made three separate attacks.

Kuroki meanwhile had pressed forward and captured Ma-chun-tan (15 miles southeast of Fushun) on March 8th, and Tita (or Dita), 5 miles farther east, on the 9th, thus commanding the situation in this region.

The Russian line began to give way at this time, and the retreat soon followed. The Japanese right (Kuroki) began the pursuit on March 7th, but the Russian rear guard was not reached until the 8th, ten miles beyond the Sha-ho.

The natural line of defense for the Russians to fall back upon in their retreat, was the Hun-ho, parallel to which ran the branch railroad from Mukden to Fushan, a town of about four hundred houses, some twenty-four miles east of Mukden. The Japanese pressed on so hard in pursuit, however, that a part of Kuroki's force reached the Hun on the 8th, while on the 9th Nodzu and Kuroki had their entire forces there, and Kuroki even had a portion of his command across. The river was found frozen, another disadvantage for the Russians.

The Russians hurled their reserves on the Japanese left as fast as they came up. Oku and Nogi stood their ground, however, throughout the 9th, although the losses were fearful, and one brigade of Nogi's force was practically annihilated. The night of the 9th marked a crisis of the pursuit.

While Nogi was resisting the Russian attacks, Kuroki swung to the northwest, and, with the Imperial guards covering his flank, Nodzu crossed the Hun and moved forward rapidly. On the morning of the 10th of March Nodzu was well to the north of Mukden. Santaitsi and U-shun-tun (about nine miles north of Mukden, were taken and the railroad there destroyed.

On the morning of the 10th two of Kuroki's divisions were not yet across the Hun, and were severely engaged. The Guards' division, which had been attached to Nodzu's force to protect its flank, had become separated from these two divisions, and its advance was checked during the night of the 9th and the morning of the

10th; moreover, a sandstorm had broken the communications between the divisions. A staff officer was sent forward to the Guards' division, and he brought up of his own initiative all available reserves, and thus enabled the isolated division to move on and take part in the pursuit. The other two divisions then succeeded in crossing the river and also joined in the pursuit.

Kamamura's Yalu army was too far to the eastward to take part in the pursuit.

Meanwhile, the Russians had been moving north in columns along the railroad as fast as was possible with the transportation blocking the way. Many thousands of Russian troops were still left in Mukden and in its vicinity, who were of course cut of.

Mukden and Fushun were occupied by the Japanese on March 10th. The pursuit was continued until the 14th, when the remnant of Kuropatkin's army reached Tie Pass, a naturally strong position, which had been well fortified by the Russians before the battle of Liao-yang. At this point the Liao river crosses the road and railroad, cutting through steep cliffs.

But the retreat was only temporarily arrested at this point, for Kuroki's force had pushed on, and one of his divisions, on the 14th of March, attacked the Russian position on the Fan-ho (eight miles south of Tie-ling (Tie Pass), but was repulsed, with a loss of 1,000 men; on the 16th, however, he succeeded in driving the Russians back, and seized Tie-ling (Tie Pass).

The losses of the Russians in this battle, from February 19th to March 14th, 1905, according to Russian reports, were 2 generals (taken prisoners); 1,985 other officers and 87,677 men, of whom 15,000 were killed, 52,677 wounded, 8,000 captured, and 12,000 missing.

The Japanese reported, up to March 12, 26,500 Russian dead left on the field. At that time the Japanese casualties amounted to 41,222.

The Japanese total losses in the battle are reported as amounting to about 57,000.

The Japanese captured 33 field guns, 150 caissons, 60,000 rifles, and a large quantity of ammunition, supplies, horses, clothing and other property.

General Kuropatkin was relieved as commander-in-chief on March 17th, and was succeeded by General Linevitch, General Kuropatkin being relegated to the command of the 1st Manchurian Army.

The Japanese continued their advance, and on March 19th occu-

pied Kai-yuan (25 miles north of Tie Pass), and on the 21st entered Chang-tu-fu (15 miles northwest of Kai-yuan).

On April 2nd they drove the Russians out of Tsa-lu-shu (10 miles north of Chang-tu-fu), and advanced still farther north.

Linevitch sent 50,000 men to hold Kirin, and intrench about 250,000 in a position half way between Mukden and Kuan-tchen-tse (or Chan-chun, on the railroad, about sixty miles directly west of Kirin).

COMMENTS.

In general outline the campaign which ended in the battle of Mukden resembled the operations of Sherman's army in the Atlanta campaign. The Japanese army, holding the Russians at the front and center by vigorous demonstrations attempted to turn their position with one or the other flank. In the Atlanta campaign the Confederates retired in every case before they were enveloped, but in the Mukden campaign the Russians held on at the center until both flanks were turned.

Oyama, like Sherman, was enabled to make this form of strategy effective by his superior numbers.

In this campaign is again illustrated the power of the *offensive,* as opposed to the purely *defensive.* The Russians were forced to the defensive originally by their unpreparedness, and the Japanese never lost the initiative which they acquired at the beginning of the war, and managed always to have superior forces at the point of contact of the contending armies.

The tactics of the battle are more difficult to analyze because of the incompleteness of the data made public.

Some of the interesting features, however, have became known:

The Japanese made extensive use of the telephone during their operations. The frozen ground not admitting of the construction of shelter trenches, various devices were used for protection, some of the men being furnished with small steel shells, large enough to cover the head while lying down, and others carrying sand bags. Some of the Japanese even use half a dozen bricks taken from ruined Chinese houses and bound together with wire. When the Russian artillery had the range of a Japanese position, small ground mines, some distance from the spots where the shells struck, were exploded, and men with spades flung earth into the air to mislead the Russian gunners. The Japanese also pretended to be retreating from their own men toward the Russian lines, turning and charging as soon as they reached the wire entanglements. The heavy Japanese artillery played

a prominent part in the victory. Eleven-inch guns were utilized in a field action, and in the battles on the plains westward eight-inch and five-inch siege cannon worked havoc in the Russian lines.

The fact that the Russians lost 33 field and mountain guns, and no guns of heavy caliber, indicates that they withdrew the latter soon after the opening of the final great battle, in order to prevent their being captured. Their absence from the field proved fatal, however, at the critical moment when they were most needed.

Colonel Federoff, of the Russian Artillery, writing in the Russki Invalid, says that the Japanese concealment of their guns, has been so successful that it has been very difficult to discover them, except by well-trained observers. He is assured that the Japanese have made good roads of approach to their gun positions, in order to facilitate ammunition supply. In the latter actions the Russian artillery has caused the Japanese guns to seek shelter further behind ridges or elevations and to fire with much higher angle of elevation. Colonel Federoff feels sure that the Japanese place their guns at considerable intervals for purposes of concealment. Evidently to this matter of concealment the greatest attention has been devoted, and on several occasions hidden batteries have unexpectedly opened fire at the very moment of the Russian attack. The colonel says that the Japanese place men in elevated positions in the houses of villages, or on natural elevations, or in trees, who are constantly employed in observing the Russian positions, and adds that the Japanese are constantly digging to strengthen their position, and he likens them to moles working in the earth.

Bayonet attacks were frequent during this campaign, as well as at Port Arthur, and the *hand grenade* was again effectively used by the Japanese.

It appears from a communication in the Novoe Vremya that the Japanese have not been content to let their troops remain idle during the long pause which followed the battle of the Sha-ho in October. On several occasions Russian scouts in that region have discovered the Japanese engaged in maneuvers and in special exercises. In particular they found the infantry practicing the attack of entrenchments and in breaking through accessory defences. The Russian journal remarks that the Japanese, therefore, only do in fighting what they have been previously taught to do, and adds that such training is extraordinarily valuable to the troops, and is the pledge of success. It is particularly important, inasmuch as some new methods have been introduced in the course of the war, that troops should be exercised

in preparing for them. The Novoe Vremya recalls that the Japanese regulations of 1902 specially recommended the employment of shelter trenches on the offensive, and, even in some circumstances, of zigzag approaches to the positions to be attacked. A great deal of time has also been devoted to training in night attacks, which were effectually employed on the Sha-ho.

Field intrenchments, however, were extensively used whenever the ground permitted, and an intrenching implement has become as important and necessary a part of a soldiers equipment as the rifle itself.

Recently the Militär-Wochenblatt instituted a comparison between the Japanese and German armies in their ability to employ the spade intelligently. The supply of engineers in the Japanese army is larger in proportion than in any European army, and the men, having great manual dexterity and being accustomed in many cases to the use of the spade from childhood, their skill is thus turned to the best possible account. On a war footing a battalion of engineers, comprising three companies, forms part of each Japanese division, in which, for every 16 companies of infantry, there is a company of engineers. In Germany the proportion of engineers is about one company to 24½ companies of infantry, and on a war footing, one engineer company to about 50 of infantry. In addition, each Japanese battalion includes a small detachment of sappers, being men specially selected as fit to instruct and direct the men in defensive works. The Wochenblatt remarks that the work of the Japanese is facilitated by the lesser stature of the men, trenches being smaller than in European armies. The Japanese are well provided with tools, including a large number of axes and long-handled shovels.

The Revue de Cavalerie is disappointed that the Russians have not made any effective use of their mounted forces in operation of wide extent, more especially as their cavalry, which is numerous, and has a high reputation, had to meet the cavalry of an enemy known to be inferior in quality, and capable, as was supposed, of only feeble resistance. The Japanese lines of communication have been drawn out to a great length, and have presumably grown weaker, but still the Russian cavalry have failed to take advantage of the opportunities offered to them. Evidently, says the Revue, there must have been serious faults committed either in the organization and distribution of the cavalry, or owing to a false conception of its duty and employment on the part of those who have commanded it. It is a curious fact, not widely known, that the Russian cavalry sent to the seat of

war at the beginning of the operations included only a very small proportion of active and regular troops. They were for the most part composed of Asiatic Cossacks of the second and third lines, corresponding almost to the reserves and territorial troops of other continental states. Of these troops, in the autumn of 1904, there were in Manchuria 207 squadrons, but they possessed no real aptitude for the work to be done, while most of the officers and non-commissioned officers did not know their men. The Japanese, though they are weak in the cavalry arm, were more wise in sending to the front the best troops they possessed. At the same time, it must not be suppossed that the Japanese reconnaissance has been executed by the cavalry, their minute knowledge of their adversary having resulted from their widespread and thorough system of espionage. The conclusion seemed to be that the Russians made the cardinal error of despising their adversaries, and of sending inferior troops to do work which they were incapable of.

The following orders, issued to his army by General Oku, illustrate the general tactics of the Japanese:

1. Artillery fire is the best method of preparing an attack; but, even when heavy guns are used, firing at the enemy's positions is alone, comparatively useless, so long as it is not taken advantage of for an infantry advance. The infantry must move forward, no matter how slowly. Advance and artillery fire must harmonize.

2. Positions once occupied must never be abandoned. If a strong counter-attack is expected, prepare for it with machine guns and hand grenades. The former are especially useful in such cases, but they require perfect cleanliness and oiling, and constant care to effect small repairs at once, even in the hottest of the fight. Pay special attention to the oiling cylinder and the loader. Machine guns must never be alone.

3. Troops advancing to the attack must carry sand-bags to construct defensive positions, as at this season the frozen ground cannot be broken. When strong positions or machine guns are met with, a small force of artillery, preferably of mountain guns, must be brought up without horses.

4. If the attack is along a greatly extended front, the villages must be used as fortified points to economize men, and a thin line only must be kept between them. The reserves will thus always be strong and serviceable.

5. Whenever new positions are occupied, a report on the enemy's dispositions and the nature of the ground must at once be made.

Constant study of these two things is of the utmost importance as a means to victory. The greatest attention must be paid, above all, to the movements of the troops co-operating on the flanks; you must constantly yourselves judge of the situation, and act accordingly. Soldiers who think of their own interests, not of their comrades, do not understand the art of war.

6. When troops remain a long time in one place, useless objects accumulate in the soldiers' personal kit, and this interferes with swift movement. Let everything unnecessary be thrown away. Your aim must be to move rapidly. Never, in any circumstances, give arms or ammunition up to the enemy. If you cannot carry them away destroy them, even at the risk of your lives.

*SOME MILITARY REMINISCENCES OF THE REBELLION.**

In the early part of June, 1862 (being at that time in command of the post at Lebanon, Tennessee, which had been captured from General John H. Morgan on the morning of the 4th of May by the First Kentucky Cavalry, under Colonel Frank Woolford; the Seventh Pennsylvania Cavalry, Colonel Sipes; and four companies of my own, the Ninth Pennsylvania Cavalry), I received an order from General Don Carlos Buell directing me to move with my command back into Kentucky, and to take post at Glasgow or some other point near the southern line of the State, and to keep a strict guard upon the roads leading from East Tennessee; the order also suggested that a company should be detached from my command to scout eastward along the south line of Kentucky to keep in check a guerilla named Hamilton, who, with about a hundred and fifty men, kept that part of the State in continual alarm. Acting upon this, I ordered Captain Hugh McCullough, a most excellent officer, with his company, "I," Ninth Pennsylvania Cavalry, to perform this duty, and with the remainder of my command, Company "C," Captain W. H. Harris; Company "E," Captain John G. Detwiler, and Company "M," Captain James Bell,—the whole command numbering about two hundred and thirty men fit for duty,—I marched for Glasgow, where I arrived on the following day just as it was growing dark; and was in the act of putting my men into camp, when a courier reached me from Captain McCullough's command, informing me that his detachment had met the enemy under Hamilton early that morning, and had fought a fierce battle, in which Captain McCullough and four of his men were killed and ten badly wounded, and that Hamilton and his men, though outnumbering McCullough three to one, had been defeated and driven from the field with heavy loss. Under the circumstances I ordered boots and saddles to be sounded, and in a few minutes was marching to reinforce Company "I," which I found at Tompkinsville,

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near the Kentucky and Tennessee line, where I arrived at daylight on the following morning, having made a march of thirty miles during the night. I soon satisfied myself that Tompkinsville was a much better position than Glasgow from which to watch the roads leading from and into East Tennessee, and accordingly went into camp and informed General Buell of my position, with which he was much pleased, and in reply to my note directed me to inform General Boyle, who was then in command at Louisville, and to call upon him in case I should require reinforcements.

Monroe County, of which Tompkinsville is the county seat, though one of the southern tier of counties in Kentucky, does not belong to the Blue Grass region, the soil being generally thin, and rich men and slaves few. The citizens almost to a man were loyal, and I was enabled to obtain information of the movements of the enemy with less difficulty than in almost any other part of Kentucky. Indeed, it was the most loyal community I ever was among in any part of the South. I consequently engaged several as scouts, who penetrated into Tennesse and were constantly on watch on the various roads by which Kentucky could be penetrated by any invading force of the enemy. At the time I was ordered into this part of Kentucky, General Buell had begun to suspect the designs of General Braxton Bragg, who had collected the remnants of General Albert Sydney Johnston's army, after the defeats of Shiloh and Corinth, at Chattanooga, while General Kirby Smith, with twenty thousand men, was at Knoxville, in East Tennessee.

In this position the month of June slipped away and July opened most oppressively hot, but without any signs of an invasion. However, on the evening of the 7th of July I received information from a trusty scout that Colonel John H. Morgan, with his regiment, had crossed the Cumberland Mountains at Sparta, and that he was marching towards the town of Celina, directly south of my position on the opposite side of the Cumberland River, and that he intended to make it his headquarters for that night, and would probably move on my position the next morning. Knowing that after the long march he had made his men would be much worn out, and consequently that they would sleep very soundly, I determined to anticipate him, and myself to become the attacking party. I at once mounted my command and crossed the Cumberland River some five miles east of him, and moved on Celina, determining to attack at dawn on the 8th,

and if possible put an end to his raid. In this movement I was entirely successful, and captured the town of Celina, but unfortunately did not find Colonel Morgan and his command there, nor could I hear the least information as to his whereabouts. After sending out scouting parties who returned without any information, about noon I recrossed the Cumberland and reached my old camp at Tompkinsville just as it was growing dusk in the evening. After posting strong guards on the threatened roads, the tired command retired for the night.

On the morning of the 9th the bugle call was sounded, and in a few minutes the men were grooming their horses, when, more than a mile out on the Hamilton Ferry road, I heard the sharp report of a carbine, and in a few moments another and another following in quick succession, and soon found that the pickets were being driven back by a force much stronger than their own; but, though compelled to retreat, they fought every foot of the way, thus enabling me to have my command fully prepared for the coming fray. Supposing I had only Colonel Morgan's regiment to contend with, I felt little fears as to the result, as my men had twice met him before and felt sure of a victory. At the distance of three-quarters of a mile from my position there was a bare hill over which the Hamilton Ferry road passed, and just as the sun had fairly risen I could see through my glass the columns of the enemy marching by fours, and when the first body reached the foot of the hill it went into line of battle and another appeared on the hill, and as it crossed I could distinctly see that they had two pieces of brass artillery with them. This was rather more than I had expected, but in an instant afterwards the head of another column appeared on the hill, and I discovered that my poor little command would have to fight four regiments and two pieces of artillery. To now retreat without fighting could not be thought of, as Morgan had planted his artillery and was about to open on my position. The leading regiment of Morgan's command, which proved to be the Eighth Georgia, commanded by Colonel Hunt, was the first to charge, and it came up gallantly until Colonel Hunt, at the head of his men, fell from his horse with his thigh shattered by a ball, and some twenty of his men killed or wounded. The attack was again renewed, and finding myself outflanked, I ordered a retreat on the Burkville road, and taking command of my rear guard, my horse was shot from under me, and I found myself a prisoner of war in the hands of Colonel John H. Morgan.

As Morgan contemplated a long raid into Kentucky, he proposed either to take me along with his command, or to take my parole to deliver myself a prisoner at Knoxville, East Tennessee, to General Kirby Smith, and not thinking it a pleasant jaunt to be thus raiding through Kentucky, I acceded to his proposition and gave my parole, he agreeing to furnish me with a good horse upon which to make the trip of about one hundred and fifty miles. And just here let me record the fact that I was treated by Colonel Morgan with the greatest kindness and consideration. In the North he was looked upon as a guerilla; but the truth was that he was a gentleman regularly mustered and commissioned in the Confederate service, and afterwards rose to the rank of major-general and commanded a division of cavalry till his death at Morristown, Tennessee, in an action with our cavalry. Having given my parole, and being furnished with a horse, I started on my long journey to Knoxville. As it happened, three of Morgan's men had become too sick to go farther, and a fourth, whose horse had broken down, was also allowed to go to the rear, and thus I had four companions, and they had a prisoner,—one of my scouts that had been captured, whom they were to deliver to the sheriff of White County, Tennessee, to be placed in prison at Sparta till he could be tried as a spy.

We left Tompkinsville some time in the afternoon, and moved very slowly, as the spy prisoner was on foot, and just before dark reached the northern bank of the Cumberland River, and encamped for the night, with nothing to eat or any covering but our clothes; but as the weather was very warm and the ground dry, we were all quite comfortable.

The strangeness of situation kept me from sleeping, and probably about ten o'clock the moon rose as bright and beautiful as I ever saw it. The three sick men were fast asleep by this time, but the other was awake, with his gun in his hand, guarding the prisoner spy, whose hands they had bound behind him and whose legs they had also tied, and he seemed to be sleeping. As time wore on I noticed that the guard, though sitting bolt upright with his double-barrel shot-gun on his lap, was fast asleep. As I had not given my parole not to help any other to escape, but only not to escape myself, I slipped my hand into my pocket, opened my knife, and in a moment cut the cords that bound the prisoner, and, as I was close to him, whispered, "Crawl to the river, get out of sight and to the woods as soon as you can." He took my advice and crawled to the brow of the steep bank, and by some

mishap fell over its brow some ten feet to the sand below; but this made so much noise that the sentinel was awakened and jumped to his feet, and in his half-asleep condition sang out, "Who comes there?" Fearing that he might, on missing his prisoner, make an examination of the river bank, I called out, "I see some one on the top of the hill." By this time he found that his prisoner was missing, and at once roused up the other sleepers and started with them on a search towards the top of the hill. In half an hour they returned, but without the spy, and I felt very much relieved to find that I had contributed to his escape. The next morning we forded the Cumberland and took the road towards Sparta. I soon made myself acquainted with the names of my companions, and found them to be country boys from Southwestern Georgia, good, unsophisticated sons of small farmers who had made themselves homes in the old Cherokee and Creek country, and who longed to be again with their families and as far away as possible from the Confederate army. They had no heart in the conflict, but the draft had made them soldiers.

It was the evening of the third day when we reached Sparta, and by this time my four companions and myself had become so intimate that they looked up to me almost as their commanding officer. As we rode slowly along I talked to them of the old flag, of our glorious Union, of how we whipped the English in the Revolution and the War of 1812, of General Jackson at New Orleans, and General Scott with troops from every State in the Union, of the capture of Vera Cruz, the battles of Contreras, Cerro Gordo, and Chapultepec, and the capture of Santa Anna and the City of Mexico. How our men, soldiers from the North and South, fought shoulder to shoulder, brothers in arms, brothers in heart, one people, one family, one great and glorious country. This naturally led to the causes of the war we were then waging, and I drew as striking a word-picture as I was capable of doing of the dastardly attempt of a few of the discontented leading men of the South to break up this our common country, and bring upon us the contempt of all the leading nations of the earth, who would point the finger of scorn at us as a nation which could not rule itself, with a constitution that was but a rope of sand to be broken by the first internal jar caused by the ambition of some unscrupulous leader backed by the jealousy of some one part of the people. All except one agreed with me; but he suggested that "You uns oughtent have come down to steal our niggers." I

looked at him a moment, and said, "How many niggers do you own?" He answered promptly, "No one, sir." I than asked, "How many does your father own?" and he promptly said, "No one, sir." "Then," I remarked, "I don't see what interest you have in this quarrel. If you own no negroes we cannot possibly steal any from you. Your only interest, then, is to get yourself killed or wounded fighting, as you suppose, to help some rich slaveholder to keep his negroes and lord it over you poor white men." They all seemed to see it in that light, and we were ever after fast friends.

Unlearned men as they were, they did not understand the meaning and force of a parole, and some miles before we reached Sparta, while we were all sitting at a beautiful spring that issued from the mouth of a cave, and were eating a slight lunch, one of them said to me, "Major, you be a great fool to go to Knoxville, for they will put you in jail when you get there. Hadn't you better, now, turn and go to Nashville to your friends? We talked it all over and will say nothing about it, and we don't think that any one would hurt you before you got there." I tried to explain my position and my promise to Colonel Morgan, but they met all that I could say with the remark, "They'll put you in jail when you get there." I assured them that, whether they put me in jail or not, I could not break my parole; but they still failed to see the point of my argument, and almost insisted upon my going to Nashville.

That evening we entered Sparta. I had been there before, about the 12th of May, following Colonel Morgan's command, and many of the people remembered me, and soon quite a little crowd was assembled; but not an unkind word was spoken, though all were anxious to hear the news of the little battle that I had fought with Colonel Morgan. Pretty soon an old gentleman, Mr. Vass, who was the chief burgess of the town, came up and, recognizing me, shook hands and invited me to his house to supper and to spend the night. I gladly accepted his invitation and spent a most agreeable evening, as quite a number of the young ladies of the town called to see Miss Vass, and the time was enlivened by sprightly conversation, and several of the ladies joined in singing some of the war songs of the South, followed by "Home, Sweet Home," in most excellent voice, by Miss Vass. General Dibbrell, C.S.A., who lives at Sparta, told me some years ago that Mr. Vass died some years after the war, and that his daughter married and moved to California.

War is cruel and makes savages of very many; but there are hearts that are not hardened by it, deep feelings of humanity that

soar aloft over war and, like the glory that surrounds the setting sun, gild with their soft radiance everything they touch. Strange to relate, the mountain region of Tennessee, whose people were comparatively poor, and who had the least interest in a worldly point of view in the war, was found to be the most excessively disloyal.

After parting with the kind friends found at Sparta, we took the direct road towards Knoxville over the Cumberland Mountain, which rises to the height of one thousand feet about four miles to the east of the town. On the top of the mountain, and overlooking Sparta, are a set of springs formerly much resorted to by the people of the South, where there was a large hotel building. This was occupied by Captain Bledsoe and his partisan rangers, and he had collected some five or six men of the Confederate army who from some cause had been absent from their commands. These he determined to forward under guard of the men whom I had with me, and from time to time other Confederates who had been absent on leave and whose time had expired joined us, and by the time we reached Kingston, on the Tennessee River, the party must have numbered about twenty.

Leaving Kingston, we had two days' march to Knoxville, and on the evening of that day reached the house of a farmer on the eastern side of a wooded ridge about half-way between the two places, and in East Tennessee. Here we stopped for the night, and had a good supper of fried bacon, eggs, and hoe-cake, which (as I now look back upon it) I think I enjoyed more than any other meal I ever tasted. There is no sauce so delightful as a good appetite. Here one of the delightful incidents of my captivity occurred. The long, fatiguing marches and the good supper hastened sleep, and soon my escort and myself were all enjoying that luxury. As the weather was very warm, I lay down directly inside of the door leading from the front of the house, with my feet almost touching the sill, and about twelve o'clock was awakened by something gently pulling at one foot, and when fully awake I could see a hand and arm thrust from behind the door-post from the outside, and, finding that I was awake, a face appeared, the hand quickly covering the mouth, indicating caution. As every one in the room was soundly snoring, I quietly got up and stepped in my stocking feet on the large stone that constituted the stoop, and found that it was the farmer's daughter, the young lady who had prepared for us the supper. Beckoning for me to follow her, she led me round to the back of the house, where she

whispered to me that they were loyal people; that her brother had been drafted into the rebel army, but, to avoid going to fight against the Union cause, he had taken to the woods, and would sometimes come home at night for provisions. He had done so that night and found the house full of soldiers; but his sister was able to communicate with him, and had informed him that I was a Federal officer—a prisoner—being taken to Knoxville, and to save me he had two horses in the woods back of the barn; that I should join him, and that he would accompany me back to Kentucky, guiding me across the Cumberland Mountains by paths upon which we would not find guards. I tried to explain to her my position, but she did not seem to understand, and to satisfy her I accompanied her to where her brother—a fine, manly, stalwart youth of about twenty—was seated under the branches of a large oak close on the edge of the woods. He took my hand with a strong grip and at once said, "I cannot stay here, and must get into the Union lines, and as you are a prisoner I will take you with me." I had again to explain and refuse, and I have no doubt they thought me the biggest fool out of an insane asylum. I thanked both over and over again, and then went back to my couch on the floor. Upon my arrival at Knoxville I at once reported to General Kirby Smith, and found him a most affable and agreeable gentleman. He at once suggested taking my parole not to leave the city, which I acceded to, and he also directed that I should have a cot at his headquarters, and take my meals at the Bell House, where himself and staff boarded. Thus I was made very comfortable.

While in Knoxville, on parole, I felt a desire to call upon Mrs. Parson Brownlow, who, with her daughters, had been permitted to reside at their old home, while the parson was at the North, and his two sons, James and John, were both commanding regiments in the Union army. I made my call, and was most kindly received by the family, to whom I was able to give information as to the health and whereabouts of the boys, as their mother called them. As I was returning from this visit, I was handed a note by a slave, asking me to call at a house designated on one of the side streets, and within two squares of General Smith's headquarters, to which he piloted me. Upon entering I was met by a lady evidently of Hebrew birth, whose name I have now forgotten, who conducted me into a parlor neatly furnished, in which there were collected some ten or twelve Union ladies who desired to meet me. On one side of the room was festooned a large flag

containing the stars and stripes, and on a table in the centre a delightful collation was spread, with several bottles of native wine made from the Scuppernong grape. I spent a delightful hour with those ladies, and parted with them after partaking of their bounty and pledging eternal fealty to our common flag in beakers of their most excellent wine. Their kindness I can never forget, though their names have long since faded from my memory.

In a few days, however, I saw, from the *Richmond Whig,* that a cartel for the exchange of prisoners had been signed between the Union and Confederate commanders, and knowing that the Shiloh prisoners were at Madison, Georgia, I suggested that I should be ordered to that point, hoping thus to be sooner exchanged, and to be again with my command on active duty in the field. To this General Smith acceded, and, furnished with a pass on the railroad, I boarded a train for Atlanta, and the day following reached Madison and reported to Captain Calhoun, who had charge of the prisoners. Here, for the first time since my capture, I came in contact with an officer who was wanting in all the elements that constitute a gentleman. He took my letter from General Smith and, without noticing me further, ordered a corporal to take me to my quarters, which I found were in a large brick factory building surrounded by a high board fence, with a yard about forty feet wide all around the building. I also found some five hundred fellow prisoners, most of whom had been taken at Shiloh, with a few who had been taken at Murfreesborough by General Forrest. They were all officers, and ranked from two brigadier generals down through all grades to second lieutenant. On the ground floor of this improvised jail there were some three hundred Union men from East Tennessee and Northern Georgia, whose only fault was that they were not secessionists, and loved their country too well to take up arms in such a cause. Many of these were old, too old to be put in the ranks, but who refused to swear allegiance to Jefferson Davis and his Confederacy.

As I approached the gate leading to the prison yard, I was saluted with the cry of "Fresh fish," a term applied to all newcomers; but in a few moments I found that I had quite a large number of acquaintances, and selected a soft plank on the third floor as my abiding place, with about one hundred and fifty fellow officers. I had not been half an hour in this building before a dray came trundling into the yard and stopped at the door, and I saw two or three men carrying the corpse of one of the East

Tennesseeans who had died that day. They deposited it on the dray, and then the dray passed out of the grounds to the place where it was to be interred. I found from the other prisoners that the death rate in the prison was from one to two daily. If a prisoner got sick, the want of medicine and proper attention, with the bad character of the food furnished, almost insured speedy death. The prisoners—many of whom had been there from early in March—were almost to a man despondent; their sallow, elongated faces and lank bodies told a tale of suffering not to be mistaken, but which, up to that time, was new to me.

The food furnished to the prisoners during the whole term of my imprisonment consisted of large fat sides of bacon, so imperfectly cured that they were filled with skippers and maggots. These sides were thrown into a large caldron, and, when boiled, constituted, with corn bread made of the roughest and dirtiest meal, our breakfast. The only other food received during the day was about 4 o'clock P. M., when the water in which the sides of bacon had been boiled would be thickened with some of the same corn meal, and after boiling for a few minutes would be furnished as a sort of soup, of which each prisoner received a tin cup full. Hunger is a most excellent sauce, and unpalatable as this vile mixture of corn meal, greasy water, skippers, and maggots was, there was not a man in the prison but would be ready to quarrel if his cup was not filled to the brim. I do not mention this in a spirit of fault-finding, for I soon discovered that the men who guarded us were fed upon the same food, but, being on the outside of the prison, they had many opportunities of supplementing their rations by other things, while we were compelled to be content with what the government furnished.

Among the prisoners was one of the largest men that I ever saw in the army,—Colonel Quinn Morton, of Missouri, six feet six inches high and weighing two hundred and fifty pounds; a brave soldier and most jolly, good-natured gentleman. I was at once attracted to him, and in a few days we became intimate. The question of how to amuse the despondent prisoners, and thus call off their minds from this constant dwelling upon their hard fate, was discussed, and resulted in Morton and myself, the next day, setting an example to the others by playing a game of "Mumble-the-Peg." Quite a large number soon gathered around us, and when it fell to my lot to draw the first peg (driven down as it were into the very earth) with my teeth, and as I rooted about with my nose and mouth trying to get a hold, the boys began

to shout; and when I got hold, pulled the peg, and began my race to drop it, all joined, and we had a most exciting contest of speed round the enclosure of the prison. The thing took, and in the afternoon almost all the prisoners were playing "Mumble-the-Peg." From this "Leap-Frog" and many other games and amusements were started, despondency to a great extent disappeared, and exercise began to harden the muscles that had become flabby for want of work; bloodless cheecks became red with exertion, and soon health took the place of despondency, and not another death took place for the remainder of our term.

Early in October an order reached us that the prisoners be shipped to Richmond for exchange, and during the day a special officer named McDonald appeared, provided with an order to take me by ordinary train with himself, for exchange. Thus I escaped the long, tedious ride in dirty box cars by Augusta, in which the other prisoners were carried to Richmond. Mr. McDonald exhibited to me his order, in which "for exchange" was clearly written; and, knowing that a man about to be exchanged would not be likely to attempt to escape, he treated me as a fellow passenger, allowing me every liberty that I could have desired. He was in no hurry to get back to Richmond, and, either for business or pleasure, stopped over a day at Atlanta, and another day at Knoxville. During both these days he allowed me perfect liberty, and I roamed through both cities at my own sweet will. At that early period of the war the idea of our ever attacking Atlanta had never entered into any Confederate brain, and consequently there were no earthworks nor fortifications at either place; but there was at each a camp of instruction, where recruits were received, drilled, and then forwarded to the armies in the field.

After leaving Knoxville the train moved slowly, often stopping at sidings for hours to allow other trains to pass, and it took two nights and one day to reach Richmond, which we entered just at daylight in the morning. My conductor and myself took breakfast at the Exchange Hotel, and about ten o'clock reported at the headquarters of Major General W. H. Winder, provost marshal general of the Confederacy. I was at once struck with this man's appearance,—short, stout, with white beard and hair, a bullet head, and low forehead, with steel-gray eyes and general tigerish expression of the face. Nothing of the bold, manly, leonine character, but plenty of the cunning characteristic of the tiger was plainly to be seen. His first words to me were, "You

expect to be exchanged?" I answered, "Yes, sir, the order bringing me here states that it is for exchange." To this he remarked, "I won't exchange you. Charges have been made, and I will send you before a commission to try you." I asked, "Upon what charge?" and he replied, "You will find that out when you are arraigned." Feeling a little nettled, and as there was a story in circulation that he had been accused of cowardice, I remarked that there was one crime that I could not be accused of, to wit, cowardice. He flushed red as a gobbler's wattles, and, calling a corporal, gave the order, "Take this fellow to Castle Thunder." By some mistake of the officer I was landed in Libby Prison, then filled with the officers who had been with me in prison at Madison, Georgia, and who in a few hours were on their way to City Point to be exchanged. Being without money, and not having received my pay for nearly a year, I asked that when they reached Washington some one should call upon the paymaster general and get him to forward me one hundred dollars in gold, which could be done by the flag-of-truce boat. They started, and I was left alone, the only tenant of Libby. Curiosity prompted me to make a tour of inspection of the place, and I wended my way from cellar to garret, finding the place the most dirty and awful charnel house that probably ever existed. The floors were at least two or three inches deep with dirt, reeking with miasma and smells of the most sickening character, while vermin (graybacks and fleas) were represented by tens of thousands, and in a few minutes I was covered from head to foot. No one can at this day imagine my feelings unless they have been in like circumstances; but happily for me the mistake that was made was soon discovered, and the guard, returning, conducted me to Castle Thunder.

Upon opening the door into the castle, the first object that met my eyes was the familiar face of Colonel Palmer, who had commanded General Buell's body guard, and now was colonel of the Fifteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry. I at once extended to him my hand, with the remark, "Old fellow, I am so glad to meet a friend!" But he drew back quickly, remarking, "My name is ———. You are mistaken." At once seeing that something was wrong, with all the composure that I could assume, I said, "Yes, I see that I am mistaken. I took you, at first, for a friend in the far West whom I have not seen for years," and added, "Excuse me for my mistake." It was not long before the colonel and myself succeeded in having an explanation.

After the battle of Antietam, General McClellan desired information as to the movements of the enemy, and Colonel Palmer and a Methodist preacher (whose name I have now forgotten) volunteered to cross the Potomac and find out whether General Lee was about retreating. While at a mill not far from the battleground, a few of the enemy's cavalry pounced down on them. The preacher succeeded in swimming the stream and escaping, but the colonel was captured. He was in citizens' clothes and suspected of being a spy, and was taken to Richmond. The name he gave, and his occupation as a mining engineer, and assumption of the rôle of a strict Quaker, misled the enemy, and though they kept him in prison for about a year, they finally discharged him, and he returned to Tennessee and again took command of his regiment, fighting gallantly till the close of the war. This officer resided for many years at Denver, Colorado, where he made a large fortune, which he now enjoys at Newport, Rhode Island.

The charges that General Winder threatened me with turned out to be made by a rebel colonel, Gardenheyr, who resided at Sparta, Tennessee, and whose property I had guarded some months before when I was there with my command. The charge was that I had compelled the people to cook dinner for my men, under the threat that I would turn them loose upon the people unless my demand was complied with. The truth was, my men had made a long forced march from Lebanon, Tennessee, after Colonel John H. Morgan, and had been without rations for more than twenty-four hours, and when I reached Sparta I notified the people that my soldiers were hungry and without rations, and asked that they be fed, so as not to be compelled to forage, and that I would protect their property. This they at once assented to; the men were dismounted in the street, each standing at the head of his horse, and not a single straggler allowed. The people soon came loaded with provisions, the men were fed, and my command marched away, not having done the slightest damage to the inhabitants or their property.

While in Castle Thunder I was visited by Colonel Wood, whom we had captured at Lebanon, in May, when we so badly defeated Colonel Morgan, and he told me that he had been specially exchanged by the United States for me, and had been for some time in Richmond. How long I would have been left in prison I cannot tell, had it not been for an article in the *Richmond Whig* which, early in December, 1862, gave the names of all the prisoners then in Castle Thunder, and mine among the others. This falling

under the eye of the Rev. Dr. Thomas Moore, of the Presbyterian church at Richmond, it struck him that I might be his old friend, and he came down to the prison to see me. He was astonished to find me in such a place, and, upon hearing my statement, called for paper and asked me to put it in writing, which I did, and which he promised to lay before the War Department. This was Saturday, and on Monday following an order came to the prison to discharge and exchange me. I was at once called, and Captain Alexander, who had charge of the prison, read me the order, closing with the remark, "You can go, sir." I at once asked whether there was a flag-of-truce boat at City Point, and was told that there would not be one till Thursday. The weather was cold, and there had been a slight snow during the night; and my clothing being in rags, my shoes almost falling from my feet, and without money, I was in no condition to be turned out into the wintry blast. Under the circumstances I asked for a guard, as I had determined to call upon Mr. James A. Seddon, the Secretary of War; but the captain declined to give me one, and told me I could get a policeman to accompany me. Just then he seemed to remember he had a note for me, and handed me a sealed letter from Mr. Seddon, telling me that he had supposed I was exchanged two months before, and expressing sorrow at my treatment. I handed Captain Alexander the note to read, and again demanded a military escort, which he then accorded me, and, tattered as I was, I called upon the Secretary of War and sent in my card,—a piece of rough brown paper with the inscription, "Thomas J. Jordan, Major Ninth Pennsylvania Cavalry, U. S. A." I was at once admitted, and after shaking hands with this fine old-fashioned Virginia gentleman, I stated to him that I had a request to make which would probably surprise him, as I supposed no one had ever made such a one before. It was to be allowed to remain in Castle Thunder till a flag-of-truce boat should again visit City Point. This he at once acceded to, and gave me the necessary order to Captain Alexander. I then bid him good-by and started to visit General Winder, whose office was some squares off. He was not then engaged, but was reading one of the city papers. As I approached he looked up, and I told him who I was, and that I had called for my package of gold. In truth, I did not know that any had been sent, but I thought I could annoy him a little, if nothing more. He denied most positively ever having received any package for me, and as I insisted,

he began to be very angry, and we both became a little excited. Just at that moment General Ould and an assistant entered and were attracted by our dispute. Stepping forward (as we had been friends years before in Washington), the general shook hands with me, and learning the cause of the dispute, remarked, "Yes, general, there was a package some two months ago passed through by flag-of-truce boat directed to Major Jordan." Upon this General Winder turned quickly to a large safe in his office, and at once put his hand on and produced my package of money, remarking that he had entirely forgotten the circumstance.

The impression left upon my mind at the time, and which continues to this day, was that, knowing I was about to be discharged, he thought that once without their lines he could appropriate my money and no one be the wiser of the transaction. A man who was heartless enough to ill-treat, starve, and order poor prisoners to be shot down for small infractions of his cruel orders, would think he was doing God service by stealing their gold. I pocketed my money and was about to leave his office, after shaking a good-by with General Ould, and thanking him for his kindness, when General Winder extended his hand to me, which I refused. Upon which he remarked, "You are not angry, are you?" My reply was, "General Winder, if you ever fall into my hands I will hang you;" and I left him.

On my way back to Castle Thunder I stopped at a tobacco store and purchased a wheelbarrow load of chewing and smoking tobacco and pipes, which I distributed to my room-mates as a parting gift, which you may depend upon was duly appreciated and many a poor fellow's heart made glad. On Thursday morning, which I think was the 9th of December, the flag-of-truce boat having reached City Point, I was, with a few others, placed on board the cars and reached City Point about eleven o'clock. The roll of prisoners was for the last time called, and I stepped on board the boat a free man.

The resignation of Colonel E. C. Williams and the death of Lieutenant Colonel Thomas C. James, within thirty days, placed me at the head of my regiment, with which I continued till the end of the war.

Time wore on. Chattanooga was gained; the battle of Chickamauga and Mission Ridge had been fought; the East Tennessee campaign against Longstreet was concluded; the battles of Dalton, Resaca, Allatoona, Kenesaw Mountain, New Hope Church,

and Peachtree Creek had been fought, and Atlanta had been won, and again we took up our line of march, this time "with Sherman to the sea." After passing Waynesborough, Georgia, the army was concentrated to a great extent between the Savannah River on the left and the Ogeechee on the right as we moved on Savannah, distant about seventy miles. One day, having the advance, I sent out a small scouting party under a sergeant, with orders to move as close to the Savannah River as possible, and to give me any information that he might be able to obtain. About noon I halted the command to rest the horses and allow the boys time to make a little coffee, and while this was going on the sergeant came in with his squad to report, and handed me a neat officer's sabre that he had captured. Upon unsheathing it I saw engraved on the blade the words, "Presented by the citizens of Richmond to Major General Winder for his valuable services as provost marshal general of the Confederacy." Upon questioning the sergeant, he told me that at a little hut in a large swamp bordering the Savannah he had found an old white-haired man, who told him that he was a merchant, and resided at Charleston, which was about to be surrendered to the United States forces, and, fearing to become a prisoner, he had left and was now trying to reach some relatives with whom he could stay in Georgia. As there was nothing about him that looked military, he believed the story, but by chance he espied this sabre standing in the corner of the room, which the old man said belonged to his son, who was wounded and in hospital, and that he had brought it along to prevent it falling into the hands of the enemy. His story was so plausible that he deceived the sergeant; and though he confiscated the sabre and horse that the old man had ridden, he allowed him to remain. I at once ordered him to go back and if possible arrest the man, telling him that it was General Winder. He did not report again till dark; but the old man had fled and crossed the Savannah in a dugout, and was then safe in South Carolina. After the fall of Savannah, when the army started North, I crossed the Savannah in advance with my brigade of cavalry at Sister's Ferry, some thirty miles north of the city, and after various skirmishes with the enemy at Blackville, Salkehatchie, and Aiken, turned sharply to the right and directed the head of the column towards Columbia, South Carolina, which was approached just as day was dawning. General Geary and his division came up, and as soon as it was light enough to see

across the river to the city, a procession was observed marching from it, which was supposed to be the enemy retreating. Upon this we opened a few guns to hasten the retreat, and were afterwards informed that it was a funeral procession burying General Winder, who had died the previous day. Columbia fell, Raleigh fell, Richmond fell, and Lee and Johnston surrendered, and the war was over. Personally I have many reasons for thanking Providence, but for none do I feel more thankful than for the escape of General John H. Winder.

T. J. JORDAN,

Brigadier General, U. S. Vols.

SERVICE SALAD.

THE RELIGION OF THE AMERICAN NEGRO.

No one doubts, I suppose, that in the negro people, whether in Africa or America, we have a child race. The old slave system of the Southland snatched the ancestors of this race from savagery only one or two hundred years ago. A century or two is not a long period in the social evolution of any people, especially one whose early abode was in the African jungle beneath a tropic sun. And so we should expect to find among the masses of the black people, as we do, many clear marks of their inheritance. Dense ignorance and superstition, a vivid imagination, volatile emotion, a weak will power, small sense of morality, are universally regarded as the most prominent traits of the negro in those sections of the country, notably some parts of the black belt, where he appears in his primitive simplicity. In other parts of the South, where the influence of real education has been at work, the mental and moral character of great numbers of the blacks would not so exactly fit this description. Both slavery and emancipation days have brought to them ideal and aspiration. The culture of the white race has been imitated. They are in possession of much of what may be spoken of as the Anglo-Saxon consciousness. Many members of the negro race have shown capacity for high thought and heroic deed. But in general there has not yet been time enough for more than a superposition of higher elements upon their inherited mental, social and religious nature. Of true mental development in the race as a race there has been little. Civilisation and savagery dwell side by side in the same spirit, and the result is often flagrant contradiction in thinking, in feeling, in conduct. According to the chance of the moment, the one or the other shows itself with its appropriate accompaniment of utterance and act. I once spent part of an August evening on the top of Lookout Mountain in the north-western corner of Georgia, listening with a company of friends to an old hermit darky's account of his religious conversion. He was a powerful giant of a black man, sixty-seven years of age, a recluse, but known favorably by the dwellers all over the mountain. He spoke to us on the porch of our hostess's residence, in the darkness, with only a flickering light shining in his face. He had reached the climax of the recital, was in a considerable state of ecstasy, and was very anxiously seeking to impress us all with his spiritual experience, when suddenly his dog began barking furiously just behind him and utterly broke the continuity of his thought and of his speech. I think no one of us will ever forget the dash of savagery that came into his face as he turned with flashing eye and foaming lip upon that canine intruder. It was a startling transition, revealing the crater of primitive passion just underneath the crust of religious culture and nurture.

The most prominent activity of the negro race in America is relig-

ion. Of course I mean religion of a certain type, which can only be understood when viewed historically and in the light of the mental development which these people have attained. A little time ago, comparatively speaking, their ancestors were practising primitive rites on the African west coast. And the slave ships brought to the West Indian sugar fields, and to the Southern States ultimately, a people who were saturated with superstition. Many accounts have been written of negro Voodooism which have no doubt been much exaggerated. Voodooism was a cult in which the snake was regarded as a sacred animal, as it has been in various parts of the world. It is a phase of the animistic faith of the early children of nature. It seems certain that this rite, among others, existed in Hayti in early slavery times and that mixtures of Voodooism and other rites with Christianity were common in the old plantation days in the South. The practice of charm and magic is well-nigh universal to-day among the mass of the black race in the lower Mississippi Valley. This phenomenon is reflected clearly in the negro's religious experience—he must have some sign of conversion. The sun must stand still at the moment of the great change, or the moon must exhibit a strange transformation of color, or a star must twinkle in a peculiar way.

The childlikeness of their conception, even in a more advanced stage, is shown in the growth of such a sect as the "sheep-calling Baptists" in parts of Alabama, with whom the communion is observed two hours before day. They meet out in the woods or sometimes in the church. The people gather inside and then disperse among the trees and the bushes outside. The preacher dons his robe, and in the character of a shepherd goes forth to gather in his sheep. "Coo-oo Sheep! Coo-oo-Sh'p — Cooshy-Coo-oo-Sheep!" he calls, and the men of his flock from their place in the forest answer. "Ba! Ba!" and the women from the bushes answer likewise, and they follow him into the church. They employ two kinds of bread in administering the sacrament—the black bread for the outsider who is "not of this fold," and the white bread for the true sheep.

With the American negro the church is the exclusive social centre, and in the South practically every man and woman of the race is a member of the church. Thoroughly religious animal as he is by nature, with extraordinary emotional endowment added thereto, he would find it difficult to withstand the almost constant tide of revival that sweeps over his community. Every religious meeting has a tendency to fall at once into the revival form, and anyway he cannot escape those great gatherings of the country people at camp-meeting each year when the crops are "laid by."

The negro preacher is a figure of singular interest. The descendant of the medicine-man of the African clan, "he early appeared on the plantation and found his function as the healer of the sick, the interpreter of the unknown, the comforter of the sorrowing, the supernatural avenger of wrong and the one who rudely but picturesquely expressed the longing, disappointment and resentment of a stolen and oppressed people."* He became the leader in the early quasi-Christian institutions which preceded the negro churches, and

*"The Souls of Black Folk." Dubois, p. 196.

finally the pastor of the regularly organised societies. Since the days of freedom, the colored preacher, as the most prominent man in the community, has often been not only the spiritual leader, but the political boss, the idealist on the Sabbath, the very practical opportunist during the week, whose claims to morality, either political or personal, would not bear minute investigation. Of course I am speaking not of the city pastors of the Border States, where are to be found cultivated, intelligent and thoroughly moral men in the younger generation, nor would the representation be an accurate one if applied universally anywhere, but there is no doubt about the type. The colored minister has been the social radical, proclaiming the equality of races according to the Scriptures, always the emotional orator swaying his audiences at will, expounding the doctrines of depravity and damnation and too often illustrating them in his daily practice, appealing to the instinctive emotions of fear and hate as well as love, the mourner, the shouter, the visioner, rioting in weird pictures, his preaching an incoherent, irrational rhythmic ecstasy, his thinking following absolutely the psychological law of the blending of mental images. Here is a primitive man with primitive traits in a modern environment.

And the religious method? Like that of the Indian ghost-dance, emotional and hypnotic to the core. The sound of religious music, the personality of the preacher, are like tinder to the nature of the black man. He is in the highest degree suggestible.

I once attended a simple "experience meetin'" of black people in Tenessee in which these influences were very visibly at work. At the outset the interest was not intense, and I noted several colored people on the fringe of the crowd sound asleep. Testimony flagged a little, and the leader called for that expression of tense emotional excitement known among the negroes as "mournin'." One speaker was floundering in a weltering chaos of images and seemed likely to sink without anybody to rescue him, when the leader arose and with animation on every feature shouted to the audience, "Mourn him up, chillun!" And the audience began—all except those who were asleep—at first soft and low, but rising higher and higher until they fell into a rhythm that carried everything before it, including the disciple who had been floundering for words in which to phrase his religious experience. But he had trouble no longer. Images flashed through his mind with great rapidity and found quick expression on his lips. He spoke in rhythm, and the audience rhythmically responded. He was speedily in full movement, head, arms, feet, eyes, face, and soon he was lost in ecstasy. And the contagion swept everything before it. Even the sound sleepers on the fringe of the crowd were caught and carried into the movement as if by a tide of the sea. At the very climax of the meeting a woman rose to her feet and moved forward to the open space in front of the pulpit, evidently under the compulsion of the lyric wave. Having reached the front, in one wild burst of pent-up emotion she fell rigid to the floor and lay there motionless during the rest of the service. She was not disturbed. Like the devotees of the ghost-dance, she, too, was believed to be enjoying visions of the unseen world.

But the most perfect example of this extraordinary suggestibility

of the colored race that has ever come within the range of my investigation is one that I am now about to relate. I would not print it if I did not believe it to be absolutely genuine. It is such a perfect illustration because it dissociates the hypnotic element so completely from any true spiritual element, and shows the power of suggestion in its nakedness. In a little town between Cleveland, Tennessee, and Chattanooga, it was the purpose to give a donation to the colored minister. One of the brethren in the church volunteered to make a collection of the offerings from the various homes of the members, and an old colored woman, somewhat well to do, lent her cart and a pair of steers to this brother to facilitate the gathering of the donation goods. After he had been throughout the neighborhood and secured a reasonable load of groceries, provisions and clothing, he drove off to Chattanooga and sold everything, including the cart and the steers, pocketed the proceeds and departed for Atlanta on a visit to his relatives. Consternation and then indignation reigned supreme in the home community when it became known that he was gone. After some time the culprit drifted back, in deep contrition, but having spent all. Indignation once more rose to a white heat, and it was determined to give him a church trial without waiting for any legal formality. The day was set, the meeting was crowded; the preacher presided, and after a statement of the charges, announced that the accused would be given a chance to be heard. He went forward and took the place of the preacher on the platform. "I ain't got nuffin to say fo' myse'f," he began in a penitent voice, "I'se a po' mis'able sinner. But, bredren, so is we all mis'able sinners. An' de good book says we must fergib. How many times, bredren? Till seven times? No, till seventy times seven. An' I ain't sinned no seventy times seven, and I'm jes' go' to sugges' dat we turn dis into a fergibness meetin', an' eberybody in dis great comp'ny dat is willin' to fergib me, come up now, while we sing one of our deah ole hymns, and shake ma hand." And he started one of the powerful revival tunes, and they began to come, first those who hadn't given anything to the donation and were not much interested in the matter anyway, then those who hadn't lost much, and then the others. Finally they had all passed before him except one, and she stuck to her seat. And he said, "Dar's one po' mis'able sinner still lef,' dat won't fergib, she won't fergib." (She was the old lady who lost the steers.) "Now I sugges' that we hab a season ob prayer an' gib dis po' ole sinner one mo' chance." And after they had prayed and sung a hymn, the old lady came up, too!

At many of the "big quarterlies" and the "protracted meetin's" which are held in the South, there are scenes of frenzy, of human passion, of collapse, of catalepsy, of foaming at the mouth, of convulsion, of total loss of inhibition, compared with the scorching heat of which the Indian ghost-dance seems at times only a pale moon. To be "mad with supernatural joy"* is with the negro the great test of supernatural presence. The influence of the demon worship of their ancestors in the African forest is still interwoven with the mental prepossessions and the nervous organisation of the race.

There are a few of the primitive

*"The Souls of Black Folk." Dubois.

phenomena which particularly distinguish the religion of the negro so interesting as to warrant our observing them a little more closely. The group of motor manifestations, the rhythm, the shout, the "falling out," are exceedingly characteristic. High feeling, discharging itself in muscular action, and discharging itself rhythmically, is everywhere a spontaneous manifestation of children and of child races.† If this feeling discharges itself through the muscles of the vocal organs, we have the shout. If through the feet, we have the dance. The sacred dance is, of course, not so common among the negroes as among the Indians. But it is quite common. I have had several instances of it brought to my attention. There is a small sect near Granada, Mississippi, who sing and preach and dance in turn. A correspondent writes me that there is a church near Appomattox in which great preparations are made for revival every September. Certain of the membership are specially trained for the "flower dance," which takes place in the church and is not unlike the Red Indian variety in its form and in its effect. In the country districts of Alabama we hear of the "roper dance," which consists of an excited embrace of the sexes followed by a march around a central figure who claps his hands and shouts vociferously. My informant avers that this procedure takes place at the close of the meeting, and in many cases results in gross immorality. The Primitive Orthodox Zion Baptist Church at Yamassee, Florida, holds a "Rocking Daniel" dance at the close of the communion service. The membership form a circle in front of the pulpit, in the centre of which the leader stands. They move around the leader in single file, singing "Rock Daniel, rock Daniel, rock Daniel till I die." Then they fall into regular step and gesticulate and shout till exhaustion supervenes.*

No one who has listened to a typical negro preacher or a typical negro congregation has failed to observe the rhythmic cadence into which they unconsciously drop. Rhythm is the line of least resistance for high emotion. A change in tone level is a rest to the muscles which are producing the vociferous effects. The same phenomenon has appeared among the Hard Shell Baptists, the Friends and the early Methodists, and has always the same significance.

When the emotion is very violent, muscle contraction becomes abnormal and we have the phenomenon of "falling out." This circumstance is held by probably the major part of religious colored people as the clearest evidence of divine grace and conversion. It used always to be a necessary attestation of the "call to preach." Booker T. Washington in his autobiography describes the process as it took place in his early home in West Virginia. "Usually the call came when the individual was sitting in church. Without warning he would fall upon the floor as if struck by a bullet, and would lie there for hours, speechless and motionless. If he were inclined to resist the summons, he would fall a second or third time. In the end he always yielded to the 'call.'" This of course fostered a tendency to the oversupply of ministers. Mr. Washington speaks of one church

†Cf. Spencer, "Principles of Sociology" (2-1), p. 17 f.

*"The Negro Church, a Social Study," p. 67.

with which he was acquainted which had a total membership of about two hundred, eighteen of whom were regular preachers. One of the surest evidences of the growth of intelligence, civilisation and good sense among the blacks is the considerable decline in the number of those who are thus "called to preach." Under the influence of education and enlightenment, the grade of ministers is steadily changing for the better. But the great majority of the older and the untrained men still depend upon mere noise and hypnotic excitement for the conversion of their hearers. Anything else with them is degeneration. "It's all book-larnin'," they say, "dey ain't no Holy Ghos' in it at all."

In the earlier days fasting among the negroes was a common custom precedent to conversion. Dr. Charles T. Walker, of New York City, a distinguished preacher of the colored race, known as the "black" Spurgeon, a man of intelligence and cultivation, assures me of this, and once described to me his own experience. The incident is also related in his biography. On Wednesday in a certain week in the month of June, while he was hoeing cotton, he decided to become a "seeker." He followed the usual custom. When he reached the end of the row, without saying a word to anybody, he jumped over the fence and went into the woods. Without eating or drinking, without seeing any one, he remained in the woods until the following Saturday afternoon, when he was "happily converted." The custom of fasting, as many know, has a primitive origin and is very widespread. It was not an invention. It was often a grim necessity. But the hunger of the savage brought him vivid dreams and visions, and seemed to give preternatural acuteness to his spirit. And then fasting grew to be an institution. The Indian boy regularly fasts about the age of puberty. He goes off into the forest, as young Walker did, until his vision comes. Whatever then appears to him is his supernatural friend, his Manitou. Of course the abnormal mental excitement is caused primarily by the lack of food, but everywhere among primitive peoples it is ascribed to a possessing divinity.*

A very certain though unsavory bit of evidence of the negro's primitive state is found in the great gulf still fixed in his consciousness between religion and morality. Average ecclesiastical leadership is not yet skilful enough safely to bridge the abyss. It was only recently that the following was published in a Southern newspaper over a negro bishop's name.† "But through His death and resurrection we may commit sins of lying, stealing, Sabbath breaking, getting drunk, gambling, whoring, murdering and every species of villainy, and then come to God through our resurrected Christ and enter heaven in the end."

The great gulf is revealed especially by the absence of sexual virtue to so marked a degree, and by the overpowering propensity to petty theft. The wide prevalence of the crime of lynching among the whites of the South testifies eloquently to the reign of lust among the blacks, and as for petty thieving, it is so common as often to excite only humorous comment. A colored house-girl, "seeking religion" under the guidance of a colored "mother in the gospel," will

*Cf. Spencer, "Principles of Sociology" (1-1) p. 239 f.

†Cf. The Outlook, July 30, 1904, p. 745.

abstract a pound of butter from the day's churning of her employer, and carry it as a compensation to her "mother" for helping her to "come through," without a glimmering of the real nature of her act. This appears to be unmorality rather than immorality. Long ago the great Englishman Jowett spoke of the "ages before morality," by which he meant the time when ethics in the modern sense of the relation of man to man was not born, although religion was born and was flourishing. And the negro still lives in those ages, and has the undeveloped ethical sense.

I have been speaking of the American negro type, and not of all negroes. Wherever the influence of Hampton and Tuskegee and other institutions has permeated, the leaven is at work that will some day no doubt regenerate the whole lump. There is something intrinsically noble in a race which has manitested such an original genius for beautiful music. Nothing like it has appeared in any other population element on American soil.—F. M. DAVENPORT, *in Nineteenth Century.*

Brigadier-General W. F. DRAPER.

Was born in Lowell, Mass., on the 9th of April, 1842. His father, George Draper, was a man of remarkable strength of character, energy and intellect, leaving a record of usefulness excelled by few of his contemporaries. General Draper is descended from Revolutionary stock, one of his ancestors, Abijah Draper, of Dedham, having been a soldier in the war for Independence. He received his primary education in the public schools, and early began his preparation for entering Harvard College. His efforts in this direction were, however, frequently interrupted by his being compelled to resort to means for his livelihood, his skill as a machinist causing his services to be readily employed. His aspirations for a collegiate education were destined to receive a serious check by the breaking out of the Civil War. Catching the spirit of patriotism which swept through the country at this crucial period in the history of the country, he enlisted on the 9th of August, 1861, in a volunteer company which his father, George Draper, had been largely instrumental in raising. Subsequently this company was incorporated with the Twenty-fifth Massachusetts Volunteers, and the son was chosen as its Second Lieutenant. His first important duty was in connection with General Burnside's Expedition to North Carolina, during which he became Signal Officer on the General's Staff, and participated in the battles of Roanoke Island, New Berne and Fort Macon. During this service he was promoted to the grade of First Lieutenant, and in August, 1862, he was commissioned Captain and transferred to the Thirty-Sixth Massachusetts Regiment, joining his new command just after the battle of South Mountain, September 14, 1862. This victory of McClellan's immediately preceded the more important battle of Antietam, in which Captain Draper took an active part. He was also present at the battle of Fredericksburg, being, a short time after that disastrous campaign, transferred on special duty at Newport News, Virginia. His regiment having been transferred to the West, it was for a time engaged in the arduous duty of pursuing Morgan's Cavalry, a predatory organization which had been inflicting unusual damage on the Federal lines. In the discharge of this duty the regiment rendered most effective service, and was in June, 1863, sent to reinforce General Grant's Army at Vicksburg, participating in the siege and capture of that Confederate stronghold, and in the subsequent march to Jackson and the fighting in that locality. From the severity of this active campaigning the regiment was reduced from six hundred and fifty in June to one hundred and ninety-eight in September. In August, 1863, the regiment returned to Kentucky, marching through Cumberland Gap into East Tennessee. The siege of Knoxville and the battles of Blue Springs, Campbell's Station and Strawberry

Plains were fought in rapid succession, Major Draper being in command of the regiment after the 10th of October, Colonel Goodell having been wounded.

In the spring of 1864 the regiment was sent to Annapolis, Maryland, and, after being partially recruited joined the Army of the Potomac, under General Grant. On the sixth of May, in the battle of the Wilderness, while leading his regiment in a charge over a Confederate rifle pit, he was shot through the body and left on the field. After the position had been successively captured and recaptured, he was finally rescued and sent to a hospital in Washington. He received his commission as Lieutenant-Colonel from this date, and served as Colonel of his regiment until the close of the war.

After partially recovering from his wounds he joined his regiment in front of Petersburg, and was in command of a brigade during the severe engagement at the Weldon Railroad. A month later his division was engaged in the actions at Poplar Grove Church and Pegsam's Farm, suffering heavy losses and becoming separated from the rest of the command. Colonel Draper's regiment was the only one of the brigade that came out of these actions with its organization complete, bringing off its colors with those of several other regiments. On this occasion Colonel Draper received a slight wound, which, however, did not disable him. On the twelfth of October, his term of service having expired, and his wounds being of a troublesome character, he accepted his discharge and returned home, having received the brevet of Colonel and Brigadier General for "gallant service during the war."

Both regiments with which Colonel Draper was connected were characterized as "fighting regiments," the Twenty-Fifth Massachusetts losing seventy per cent. of its number in killed and wounded in one engagement, that of Cold Harbor, while the Thirty-Sixth Massachusetts, in the campaign beginning with the Wilderness, had every field and line officer except one, and seventy-five per cent. of the enlisted men killed or wounded.

Soon after the close of the war General Draper became engaged in the manufacture of cotton machinery in which he attained great success, and he is now at the head of the firm of George Draper & Sons, being besides President or Director in numerous manufacturing, railroad or insurance companies. He is a mechanical expert and inventor, with a record of over fifty patents. He is a well known writer on economics, and was for one year president of the Home Market Club.

General Draper served for three years on the staff of Governor Long, and made a strong fight for the Gubernational nomination in 1888. He was subsequently elected to Congress from the Eleventh Massachusetts Congressional District.

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

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CONTENTS

Page.

I. The Strategic Importance of the Pacific Ocean. By J. P. WISSER, Major, U. S. A. 401

II. A Personal Narrative of the Wreck of the Vandalia at Samoa, March 16, 1889. By HARRIE WEBSTER, Rear-Admiral U. S. Navy 407

III. An Eighteenth Century Episode in Viennese Court Life. By S. I. DE ZUYLEN DE NYEVELT 437

IV. The Strategy and Tactics of the Russo-Japanese War. Fourteenth Paper. 455

V. A Few Remarks upon the New Militia Law in the United States. By GEORGE-NESTLER TRICOCHE 471

VI. Our Contemporaries. By JOHN P. WISSER, Major U. S. A. 480

VII. Editorials 500

VIII. Service Salad 503

IX. General LUCIUS HENRY WARREN 512

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

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EDITED BY L. R. HAMERSLY, Jr.

NOVEMBER, 1905.

THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE PACIFIC OCEAN.

FOR over five centuries the great struggle of the civilized world *to find the shortest route to the Far East* and to acquire the trade of that great region has been carried on and the struggle still continues.

The center of ancient civilization and the scene of the world's trade in ancient times was on the shores of the Mediterranean, whence three great trade routes led to the Far East: that from Genoa through the Dardanelles, over the Black and Caspian Seas, across Asia to India; that from Venice across the Isthmus of Suez, through the Red Sea and across the Indian Ocean; and finally, the middle route from Antioch down the Euphrates, through the Persian Gulf. The fall of Constantinople and its occupation by the fanatic Turks laid the caravans and ships open to attacks by brigands and pirates, and thus endangered these routes over land and inland seas.

The discovery of an all-sea route to India then became the great hope of Italy. Before the route around Africa was discovered, however, Columbus found the way by the west, a route which will be perfected only when the Panama Canal is opened. In consequence of this discovery all Europe changed front from east to west, and the world's progress has been steadily moving in the latter direction since that time.

Meanwhile, America has been colonized and the United States has grown into a world power, and still the civilized world is striving westward. Over half a century ago, Thomas H. Benton, one of our great statesmen, while advocating the building of the Pacific Rail-

road, said, pointing with prophetic finger westward from the nation's capital:

"*There* is the East, *there* is India."

Since then the western continent has been spanned by a dozen railroads, and yet the route to the Far East is neither wide enough nor short enough to satisfy the world's great nations. The Panama Canal must complete what Columbus began—the shortest, easiest route to the Far East, by way of the west.

Columbus' discovery opened the Atlantic to the world's trade, but in spite of the discovery of the all-sea route to the east around the southern end of Africa, and the opening of the far shorter all-water route by way of the Suez Canal, the development of the Atlantic as a sea route was only a step in the westward tendency.

To-day, the statesman looking westward over the ocean from Europe sees the broad Pacific glimmering on the farther side of America, and the prophetic words of Marquis Ito ring unpleasantly in his ear:

"The center of world history is moving inevitably towards the Pacific Ocean."

The growing importance of the Pacific Ocean as a factor in World History and International Politics is being recognized by all nations, but only dimly by our own.

An English writer of note (Dr. T. Miller Maguire) recently remarked that:

"European policy and civilization west of the Niemen are almost played out, and the future of International Politics depends on sea-power and America and Asia."

The Panama Canal will at last open the way that Columbus tried to find. After more than four hundred years of human endeavor, his dream will have been realized: this will apparently be the last step in the solution of the problem, for no further geographical change seems possible, and the Pacific Ocean will thus inevitably become the principal scene of world history in the future.

The nations of Europe, particularly Great Britain and Germany, have anticipated this tendency, and have endeavored to secure their sea routes across this ocean by obtaining possession of important strategic points. A glance at their position and our own on this new field of operations will not be out of place, and presents, indeed, an interesting study.

In a recent article in the British *United Service Magazine,* discussing the position of Australia in the Pacific, we find the following suggestive statement:

"Race consolidation must precede colonization, as is seen in the records of Portugal, Spain, France, Holland and England, to go no further back, and, in more recent times, America and Germany. The time arrives in the life of a people, as the histories of America and Australia show, when the nation, having completed the task of setting its house in order, is confronted with the no less important problem of guarding the approaches to it."

All the great nations of Europe have set about the solution of this problem. It remains for us to do the same. The Pacific is pre-eminently the water way for the United States, as a glance at the map will show. No other nation, except Great Britain, has such close relations to this commercial field of operations. It will, therefore, be well for us to secure our position in it, strategically, as well as commercially.

GREAT BRITAIN IN THE PACIFIC.

Great Britain has two principal lines of communication across the Pacific to the Far East, both from Vancouver, British Columbia; one direct to Yokohama, thence to Hong Kong and Singapore, the other to Sydney, Australia, via Hawaii and Fiji. The line of communication to Vancouver from England, by way of the Atlantic Ocean and the Canadian Pacific Railway is a long one, but since England's sea-power on the Atlantic can readily keep the water route open, and since Canada, moreover, may be regarded as the ultimate base of operations in the Pacific, and British Columbia as the direct or immediate base, the Pacific routes are fairly secure, especially as the all-sea route from England via Cape Horn is still available. The only nation that could threaten the land route is the United States.

The harbor of Esquimault, at the southern point of Vancouver Island, constitutes an excellent naval base, available at all seasons, and the coal fields of Nanaimo, in the northeastern part of the island, furnish an inexhaustible supply of this requisite for modern warships.

The *first* of the above-mentioned lines of communication passes between the Aleutian Islands and Hawaii, over a portion of the Pacific almost entirely free from islands for a distance of 4,320 nautical miles, to Yokohama. There is no harbor of refuge along this extensive storm-swept route. Both the Aleutian Islands and Hawaii flank this line of communications. The treaty of alliance with Japan constitutes the long chain of Japanese islands, terminating with the island of Formosa, a portion of British territory for war purposes, with splendid harbors and adequate coaling stations.

Hong Kong is not only a coaling, repairing and outfitting station, and a harbor of refuge, but also a strong intrenched camp. Singapore, the gateway between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, has an excellent harbor with coaling and docking facilities.

The route from Hong Kong to Singapore is in no way threatened by the flanking position of French Indo-China, since the French themselves admit that they have not secured their position on the sea side here by substantial naval bases. Neither is the route westward from Singapore threatened in any way.

The *second* of the above-mentioned lines of communication across the Pacific is 6,764 nautical miles long. In time of peace coal is taken in at Hawaii, but in time of war with the United States, the latter would flank this line as well as the northern one.

The Fiji Archipelago possesses good harbors as well as coal.

The route to the Fiji Islands is flanked by the Samoan Islands (owned by Germany and the United States) and by the French Archipelagoes of New Hebrides and Caledonia. All these possess good harbors, and Caledonia has a well fortified port, available for the largest battleships, at Numea (or Port de France).

The great advantage of this second line of communications is the fact that Australia, at the farther end of it, can serve as an immediate base of operations in the Far East. The position of Samoa and New Hebrides, however, especially the latter, renders the line to England or British Columbia insecure.

The article above cited, in discussing the importance of these islands, brings out the following points, which are interesting to our own people as well as to the British:

"These islands, valuable as they are in themselves, are likely soon to be of immensely enhanced importance. The opening of the Panama Canal will bring them right into the line of traffic on one of the world's great waterways. Their importance is accentuated by the fact that Malekula and Sandwich Islands possess two of the finest harbors in the whole of the Pacific—harbors so excellent that their present commercial worth is trifling to their future value as prospective naval bases. * * *

"The value of territory in the bulk, as of land in the block, is to a great extent regulated by position. The mere area of the islands of the Pacific, though very considerable in the aggregate, is not of nearly such importance to Australia as the fact that they lie scattered about the paths leading to our home.

"Too much stress cannot be laid on the fact that soon the Panama Canal will be opened to trade. The rapid increase of tonnage through

the Suez Canal gives some indication of what may be expected in the ordinary course of events of the present gigantic undertaking. Right in the track of vessels homeward bound from Sydney, by way of the Panama Canal, lie the New Hebrides. * * *

"If the present war is demonstrating one thing more than another, it is that the best of fleets, without naval bases, is shorn of half its value as a fighting force. Coal, while it immensely increases the radius of a ship's action, shortens its life at sea—when there are no fortified bases to serve as coaling stations. It must always be a wise policy on our part to see that no foreign power, especially one with the splendid fighting traditions of the French mercantile marine, makes good its further footing in these waters. * * *

"The Australian people, in common with the rest of the world, have had brought home to them what a few ships can do in creating a scare on the high seas. The Rurik, the Rossia, and the Gromoboi, operating from Vladivostok, in spite of the overwhelming strength of the Japanese Navy in those waters, inaugurated something like a panic. It is only necessary to remember the superiority of Havannah Harbor and Port Sandwich to Vladivostok as naval bases, their position on the Pacific route to England, and British interests in respect of shipping, which exceed beyond all comparison those of all other nations, to realize our responsibilities in the matter."

The Galapagos Islands, off the northwest coast of South America, are also under consideration as a British naval and coaling station, preparatory to the opening of the Panama Canal.

THE UNITED STATES IN THE PACIFIC.

The principal line of communications from the United States over the Pacific to the Far East runs from San Francisco via Hawaii, Wake Island and Guam to Luzon, in the Philippines. The western coast line of the United States, with the splendid harbor of San Francisco, the ports in Puget Sound, and the smaller harbors of Santa Barbara and San Diego, constitutes a magnificent base of operations. San Francisco, the metropolis of the Pacific, and the terminus of a number of trans-continental railway lines, is the most important strategic point on this coast, and Seattle, on Puget Sound, is rapidly developing into a port of similar importance. The latter, however, is not so secure as the former, inasmuch as Admiralty Bay and the Straits of Fuca are common property of Great Britain and the United States, and each flanks the positions of the other on this line. San Francisco, on the other hand, is quite secure from any flank

attack, and yet its position flanks the southern British line to Australia.

The western coasts of the United States, together with the Aleutian Islands, the Hawaiian group and Guam, have a splendid strategical position in the Pacific, and with proper fortifications, naval and coaling stations, and the requisite garrisons, can control the great ocean of the future.

But, as indicated above, the mere possession of a naturally strong strategic line or position is nothing; it must be made available for warships. The *expansion* of the United States is as inevitable as its *growth* has been, indeed, expansion is but a continuation of natural growth, as the world's history proves. Admitting, therefore, the propriety of, and even the necessity for, our interest in the Far East, it behooves us to secure our position there.

The cable to the Philippines and that to Alaska, recently opened, have placed all the elements of this strategic position in communication one with another. It only remains to place the more important strategic points in a state of defense and to equip them with the necessary stores and material.

Foremost among these stand the Hawaiian Islands, some 2,100 miles from San Francisco, practically isolated on the great commercial routes, not only of the present, but also of the future. The fortification of this point is absolutely essential, not only to preserve our communication with the Philippines and the Far East, but also to protect our Pacific Coast and its trade. It must also be fitted out as a naval base and coaling station.

Guam, the next stepping-stone in our line of communications, must also be fortified.

In the Philippines themselves strong fortifications must be erected at Manila and in Subig Bay, and the latter must be fitted out as a strong naval base, capable of supplying and repairing the warships of a large fleet.

In the Aleutian Islands one or more of the best harbors must be organized and fortified as naval bases. Kyska Island (near the 180th meridian) has the best position strategically, and has been selected for that purpose by the naval board.

The history of the world shows us that we cannot avoid the responsibilities resulting from our growth and development, and it indicates the Pacific as the future field of commercial (and therefore necessarily of military) operations.

A PERSONAL INSPECTION OF THE WRECK OF THE VANDALIA, AT SAMOA, MARCH 16, 1889.

THE Vandalia was wrecked in the harbor of Apia, on the 16th of March, 1889, in the gale which wrecked also the flag-ship Trenton, the U. S. S. Nipsic, and H. I. G. M. S. Adler, Olga, and Eber. Of the above-named vessels the Nipsic and Olga were gotten afloat and are still bearing the flags of their respective nations.

This narrative must bear a personal character for a reason which will appear during its progress, and as my means of observation up to the time of going on deck were limited to my immediate surroundings, I write in the first person.

During Friday, the 15th of March, 1889, the weather had turned stormy, and gusts of fierce wind weighted with rain came down over Apia Mountain, indicating a gale of wind on the south side of the island, but as one result of the direction of the wind was a perfectly smooth sea in Apia harbor, but little fear was entertained of the outcome, and, although the barometer kept going down in a most abnormal manner, the aspect of the weather was not regarded as at all dubious. Towards night, however, the rain increased in violence and the wind shifted from south to north and east, blowing directly into Apia harbor, and, as the barometer continued slowly falling, orders were given to secure everything for bad weather, so that by sundown of the 15th we had sent all the light yards down, secured topmasts, secured the battery for sea, and lighted fires under four of the six boilers. One other boiler was already in use for distilling.

Everything was in good condition in the engineer department, and at ten o'clock that night, when I turned in, no thought entered my mind of the momentous events the next day had in store for the ship.

Once or twice during my sleep I waked up sufficiently to note that the motion of the ship was somewhat more irregular than was usual even in Apia, where often a heavy swell makes in from

the Pacific Ocean of sufficient strength to make it unsafe to keep between-deck air-ports open. At one o'clock Chief-Engineer Greene called me to relieve him, which I did, and took my station in the engine-room within a few minutes after being waked up.

The chief was in the ward-room, and sitting not far from him was Paymaster Arms in his night-gown, and to my mind, as I passed through on the way to the engine-room, looking very much alarmed. I never saw the paymaster again, save a momentary glimpse through a hatch-hood about daybreak of that day. The engines were running slowly when I reached the engine-room, and after satisfying myself that everthing was in good order I took my place on the upper platform, from whence I could overlook nearly the entire department.

The motions of the ship at this time were very violent, so that, between pitching, rolling, and bringing up against the anchors, a firm footing was next to impossible. Things went on in this way without notable incident until about four o'clock, when the wind seemed to increase in violence, the sea rising at the same time in direct proportion, and some one from the deck in answer to my inquiry for "news" said that one or two merchantmen had apparently foundered at their anchors, and that the Eber and Adler, two German men-of-war, seemed to be in danger of going on the reef, but that it was too dark to speak with much certainty of anything.

About 5.45, or perhaps near six o'clock, a tremendous shock was felt, and for an instant we all thought below that the ship had struck. Almost before, however, the idea could be put into words an immense mass of water came pouring down through the engine-room hatch, deluging everything and nearly carrying me off my feet into the moving machinery below. From this we understood that a sea had boarded us from forward, swept aft with almost resistless force, filling the decks more than hatch high with water, and finally drowning out the cabin, after throwing every one about the decks on their "beam ends."

One of my men, an old oiler, named John Myers, was on the topgallant forecastle at the time, and before he knew what had happened to him found himself tossed aft in the swirl of water, bringing up against the cabin bulkhead more scared than hurt. From this time we were boarded by seas continually, and the engine-room was flooded with sea water so frequently that an attempt to escape the deluge was hopeless, and, divesting myself of

everything save my shoes, an undershirt, and pair of trousers, I stood in my place of vantage, overlooking everything in the department, giving orders when necessary, watching the steam-gauge, the clinometer, and waiting for events.

Gradually, as the situation grew more desperate, the steam in the boilers was increased until a final pressure of sixty pounds was reached, and the speed of the engines was, from time to time, augmented, and by observation and the reports of my men from hour to hour I was able to inform Captain Schoonmaker and Lieutenant Carlin, who occasionally appeared at the engine-room hatch, that everything was going on satisfactorily, and that I had no reason to fear any untoward event in my part of the ship. I have characterized the motion of the ship as "violent" when I entered the engine-room at one o'clock, but that word is inadequate to express the state of affairs as daylight began to clear the scene for observation.

A constant grip of something was essential to safety, and an occasional lurch of unusual force would cause even the firmest grasp to waver for a moment.

Soon after daylight word was passed down to me that the Nipsic was ashore, the Eber on the edge of the reef, and the Adler apparently drifting towards the same perilous point. So far, I was told, our anchors had not dragged, and if the engines held out it was thought that no great danger need be feared for the Vandalia.

As the day wore on, however, the Olga and the Calliope, German and English men-of-war respectively, seemed to be running amuck around the harbor, and to avoid collision with the former, which would have been fatal to both, our chains were veered to to their full extent, and that seemed the turning-point in our fight for life. Beginning at that time, I believe, the Vandalia commenced dragging her anchors, and as every fathom dragged brought the two anchors nearer and nearer together, lessening their practical holding power, and as the gale instead of showing signs of slackening its force increased to a hurricane, the sea keeping pace with the wind, it became evident that we were fast approaching a desperate strait.

As the ship would roll and careen until the deck was almost perpendicular, from my vantage in the engine-room I could catch glimpses of the sea, the weather, and whatever else could be seen in the few seconds offered for observation. During one of these

glimpses I saw a ship almost on top of us, pitching and tossing like an egg-shell, and at the same instant I saw her keel as far aft as under her mainmast, by which some idea can be formed of the terrible state of the sea. This vessel was the English warship Calliope, and a moment after a rush of our men forward past the engine-room hatch on deck indicated some approaching calamity, and a fierce shock, shaking the ship from stem to stern, told that the Calliope had struck us. The blow threw every one from his feet, and it seemed as though some fatal injury must have been done to one or both ships.

But as our starboard quarter-galley was the only sufferer, and as I saw the Calliope a moment later on the port beam, it was evident that the end was not yet come. One of the doleful effects of this collision, however, was the breaking of a water-gauge glass on one of the boilers, and as the steam and water poured out under a pressure of sixty pounds it became quite an undertaking to shut it off. For some time this could not be done, for it must be understood that the motion of the ship was so violent that it was almost impossible to keep one's feet even with something to hold on by. So, fearing a catastrophe and being unwilling to assume any extra risks, I ordered the fires hauled from that boiler and gave the order to disconnect it from the rest of the battery. The straining of the ship, however, had been so great that the power valve could not be operated, and for a while it seemed as though disaster was about to overtake us for lack of steam, the boiler operating as a sort of condenser for part of the steam formed by the other boilers. By the time all of these events had occurred, and the steam pressure had fallen in all boilers to twenty-seven pounds, the accident was repaired, fires relighted in that boiler, and for the remainder of the time, and until the ship struck, the engines worked with a steady pressure of sixty pounds. During all these hours it must be borne in mind that we had nothing to eat or drink, for the decks were full of sea-water, the galley was afloat, the sea had made its way down the hatches, and spoiled the drinking water in the ship's tanks, so my men found themselves in desperate straits from hard work, heat, hunger, and thirst. Not a man, however, showed the white feather, but every soul, from the machinist, Gibson, who stood so faithfully at his post, to the coal-heavers in the bunkers, did his duty promptly, obeyed every order with alacrity and intelligence, and showed from the beginning that disposition to obey orders, which kept

them at their posts, until I ordered them to leave, after the ship struck. Some of the men, especially one or two of the water-tenders, began to show signs of giving out, so about 8:30, it must have been, though, to tell the truth, my idea of time during that forenoon is somewhat hazy, I succeeded in gaining access to the surgeon's dispensary, where I got sufficient stimulants to serve out about two ounces to each of the men in the fire-room, who seemed in need of it, and the effect, without exception, was good.

And so the day wore on, the pangs of hunger and thirst added to the other miseries of the occasion. An occasional jerking motion told that the anchors were dragging, so it seemed but a question of time when the Vandalia would follow the Nipsic, Adler, and Eber. The last-named vessel had entirely disappeared, while the Adler was high, but not dry, on the reef, on her beam ends, the sea battering her bottom to pieces with every wave.

Several times during these perilous hours I heard such blood-curdling messages from the deck as this: "For God's sake, Webster, give her more steam: we're lost, we're lost." Then again: "Open her out; we're on the reef; go faster, go faster." From Captain Schoonmaker and Lieutenant Carlin, however, I heard nothing but an occasional inquiry as to the situation, and once I remember the captain asked how long I could keep up the speed at which the engines were then running, and my reply that I could keep it up all day seemed to afford him much satisfaction. This was the last time I saw him, for not long after this the final catastrophe came. During the morning, and probably not far from 9:30, one of the sailors shouted down the hatch that the Calliope was trying to put to sea, and we all felt relieved, for up to this time she and the Olga had been like bulls in a china shop, smashing into everything left afloat in the little harbor.

As will be perceived, my record so far has been limited to the few events occurring in my especial domain, the engine-room, and to such hasty glimpses caught of the scenery as the rolling of the ship offered, so my account thus far contains no very stirring episodes.

By these glimpses I could see that the air was thick with blinding spray and spoon-drift, and, as I had cause to know later on, the water was thickly charged with sand brought from the bottom through the violence of the waves and the force of the wind.

Ten o'clock approached, and from various signs it became apparent that the final event was not far off; but still the engines

maintained their regular speed, still I was able to report "no water in the bilge, everything working well," and still my men clung to their posts without a murmur or a whimper.

Several of the marine guard, headed by Sergeant Coleman, came down during the forenoon as volunteer firemen and coal-heavers, and, to their credit be it said, they stayed at their posts to the very last, only going on deck with the rest of the men when ordered to do so.

And so the minutes flew by, until about 10:30 o'clock, with a crash, which sent everybody sprawling, the Vandalia struck bottom, and in an instant it seemed as though pandemonium was let loose. The roaring of the gale, the lashing of the waves, and the loud cries of command on deck were almost overpowered by the creaking and groaning which seemed to come from every timber in the ill-fated ship. The order to stop the engines was hardly given and obeyed before a second order was bellowed down the engine-room hatch to "abandon ship,"—that most terrible phrase. Here the discipline and steadiness of the engineer department showed itself, for as soon as the order to stop the engines was given everything was done exactly as it would have been had the ship been coming to anchor, and when I went into the fire-room to give the order to abandon the ship the men were still there, and only left in obedience to command. Passing through the fire-room, I saw that several of the glass water-gauges had been broken by the shock of going aground, so that it was impossible to live there, but I was able to see that every man was out of the department before I tried to make my escape. Before going on deck I saw every part of the engine-room and fire-room, and sent every man on deck I saw. Subsequent events proved that everybody got on deck in safety.

On my way up to the engine-room ladder from the fire-room, I rapidly opened one of the main safety valves to prevent an explosion,—a needless precaution as it turned out,—and then hesitated for an instant whether to try and save anything from my room.

Of course, it must be understood that all of these events occurred in less time than it takes to write them, for the ship was rapidly filling with water, and the sea was making a complete breach over her.

Several times during the morning it had occurred to me that it might become necessary to attempt to reach the deck through the engine-room hatch, so to prepare for the struggle which must then ensue I had slipped my naked feet into a pair of unlaced

shoes, which could be kicked off at the proper moment. But, as has been seen, resort to such an extremity was not called for.

Before going further into the narrative portion of this recital, an account of a few incidents during the hours from 1 to 10:30 A. M. may not be out of place. Many times during the latter part of the forenoon the pitching of the ship was so violent that the screw would be lifted entirely out of water, and the engines, relieved of all load except their own friction, would go tearing around at a terrifying velocity until the stern, settling into a wave, as the bow reached cloudland, the instantaneous increase of load on the propeller would cause the engines to stop quite still, on one occasion for more than ten seconds, when they would resume their normal speed until another avalanche of water would come over the stern.

From the manner and frequency with which the engine-room was deluged with sea-water I judged that during most of the forenoon the ship must have been drifting broadside to the wind and sea. Subsequent events confirmed this. In addition to the onset of the volumes of water pouring into the engine-room, those who, like myself, were compelled to weather the storm the best we could, were almost suffocated by the quantities of steam given off by the various pipes and portions of the engines deluged with water which were hot enough for the purpose, and it seemed once in a while as though we must abandon our posts from this cause alone.

Can one imagine a worse combination of circumstances than this? A helpless ship drifting on a reef before a hurricane of wind, the engine-room alternately filled with blinding water and suffocating steam, almost no prospect of escape, should she fill before striking, and, above all, almost total ignorance of the situation on deck. Fortunately the very inability to know the desperate straits towards which the ship was speeding was, perhaps, a good cause for the courage and lack of panic exhibited by the engineer force under my command. At all events the idea that we were like rats in a trap, down below as we were, never seemed to strike any one of us. And now, the last duty having been performed and all my men being well on deck, I come to the period of my own escape to the upper air, and, as I fondly hoped, to safety and the companionship of my fellow-officers. During all the hours from the time I entered the engine-room until now I had held no communication with any of the other officers except through the engine-room hatch, and, mingled with the reassuring words and looks of

Captain Schoonmaker and Lieutenant Carlin, were the direful predictions, objurgations, and alarming words poured through the same opening from various others on deck, who were far from being so cool and hopeful as those two officers.

My final struggle was determined by the fact of the apparent impossibility of getting on deck by way of the after hatch, the water pouring over the stern and port side of the ship in such volumes that I felt the desperate condition of my affairs, and, guided by what little light came down the fore hatch and accompanied by a fireman named Melville, I struggled forward on the berth-deck, the violent motions of the ship as she thumped the bottom with every sea throwing us to the deck every few feet as we stumbled onward. On my way towards the hatch I noted the fact that the berth-deck was filled with a blinding mist, which must have come from the pipe supplying steam to the capstan-engine under the topgallant forecastle, but through the dim light I recognized Ensign Heath, who had come below for some purpose in connection with his duty. Determined that no reflection should rest upon my memory as an officer in the event of this being my last day upon earth, I called Heath's attention to the fact that all of my men were out of the engine-rooms and fire-rooms and requested him to remember this to my credit should he be my survivor. He hurriedly promised to remember my request, and, in point of fact, reminded me afterwards of my reporting to him under such circumstances the fact that the engineer department was under discipline and obedience to the bitter end.

Reaching the hatch immediately abaft the break of the forecastle, I managed to scramble on deck not far from the galley, and in common with every one else in my neighborhood, seized a lashed hammock, many of which were under the forecastle, as a sort of life-preserver at the last extremity. Many of the crew were huddled together under the starboard side of the forecastle and for a few minutes it seemed as though we were in a place of safety, for although the water was pouring over the topgallant forecastle and threatening to engulf the ship with every surge, the spar-deck was comparatively free of water, probably two feet deep, and the port forward pivot port still maintained itself against the blows of the sea.

Soon, however, as the ship settled more and more, and as the sea rose with each interval of time, the port bridle ports were stove in, the port pivot was carried away, and before we could realize

what had happened we found ourselves up to the neck in water and a wild scramble began for a place on the topgallant forecastle.

Casting aside my hammock as a needless incumbrance, I made a dash for the starboard ladder leading to the forecastle, but while doing my best to escape from the beating waves, which all at once seemed to take complete possession of the ship, I lost my footing, was cast headlong into the waterway, and in my wild struggles for something to hold fast to, I must have clutched ropes or other objects in such a way that pretty nearly all of my finger-nails, softened as they were by the hours of soaking they had undergone, were turned back, all unconsciously to myself at the time, and, as I had kicked my shoes off at the first sign of a struggle for life, my feet became badly bruised during my struggles; and when at length I managed to secure a rope made fast at its upper end, and clambered to the topgallant forecastle, I found I had been considerably bruised, but so far as I could ascertain no bones were broken.

For the first time I was able to see for myself the situation so far as the Vandalia was concerned.

The majority of the officers were aft on the poop-deck, some of the men had gone aloft, some were in the rigging, and not a few were in the same situation as myself. Once in a while a man would take his life in his hands, and, jumping overboard, make a brave attempt to reach the shore. I believe, without exception, these men were drowned, for the sea was constantly increasing, while the strength of the men were as steadily growing less. A short distance inside of the Vandalia lay the Nipsic, driven up on the beach and abandoned by her crew and officers.

We were lying approximately broadside to the beach and about two hundred and fifty yards distant, where we could plainly see the natives and men and officers from the Nipsic passing to and fro in vain endeavors to render some assistance to their endangered fellows. Soon the ship began to fill with water and a miscellaneous quantity of floating objects came pouring up through the hatchways,—chairs, mattresses, pieces of lumber, hammocks, all the débris of a wrecked ship, soon filled the decks, and, floating away over the bulwarks, which by this time were just awash, covered the sea with floating wreckage, dangerous to swimmers, and indicating the sad fact that the Vandalia was a doomed ship.

Our situation was desperate to the last degree, and as the seas began pouring over the topgallant forecastle it became evident that a higher perch was necessary, so, with Hobson's choice before me,

I clambered to the fife-rail of the foremast, and, securing a position on the lee side of the mast, prepared to hold on for dear life.

The position was one filled with peril, for the seas, mountains high, engulfed all that part of the ship every few minutes, and as I was standing barefooted on the coils of rope cast over the pins of the fife-rail, one bare arm thrust through the starboard Jacob's ladder, the other hand grasping some of the running rigging leading aloft, I found my situation sufficiently painful. With me, and in precisely the same plight, were five or six of my men, prepared to "stand by the wreck" while life endured.

Some distance up the starboard fore rigging crouched Assistant Surgeon Cordeiro and Lieutenant Culver, while somewhere aloft, and exposed to the full fury of the blast, Surgeon Harvey was clinging, naked from the waist up, the fierce gale having torn his shirt off some time during the forenoon.

Soon after acquiring a foothold on the fife-rail the ship began to heel slowly over towards the sea until it seemed certain that she was going to capsize or be beaten to pieces by the waves, which grew in violence the longer the gale continued.

My heart sank within me as this thought passed through my mind, for in the face of such a sea as was then running, filled as it would be with the most dangerous wreckage, the chance for rescue was too small to be reckoned on.

Just as it seemed that the next sea would tear the ship to pieces, the movement stopped and slowly began to retrogade, until at length, reaching approximately an even keel, the ship settled on the bottom, and that fear at least was over.

Slowly the hours passed, and to all appearances the gale was no nearer an end than at the beginning, while the sea, steadily increasing, began to sweep an occasional man overboard, and to go overboard now meant certain death.

Some of our men tried to swim to the Nipsic, and once in a while the attempt was successful, but the larger part of those trying the desperate venture were carried by the current out past the range of vision, and with two exceptions were drowned long before reaching any considerable distance seaward.

These two exceptions were Chief Engineer Greene and Naval Cadet Wiley, both of whom were drifted sufficiently near shore to be rescued by the Samoans through the surf. And here it may be proper to add one more to the many testimonials of the bravery, judgment, and skill of these Samoan warriors. Apparently with no thought for self or fear of death, these brave savages stood

ready to peril their lives in rescuing the unfortunates cast upon their shores. And it is worthy of record, in this connection, that during the continuance of the gale no distinction was made between friend and foe, all feeling of enmity being set aside in the interests of a true humanity.

During all of this day, which it seemed would never end, the rain poured in torrents, the spoon-drift between the seas flew in sheets, and every few minutes a wave, high enough to hide the mast-head, would engulf us, and during its progress all we could do was to hold on, stop breathing, and wait for its passage.

The hours grew interminable, and as the sun was invisible, no correct notion of time could be formed, and it was only when distinct objects began to assume indistinct outlines, indicating the decline of day, that we were aware that we had been clinging for dear life nearly eight hours. During this time one of the men at my side seemed to lose his courage, and as each sea swept over us with increased force he became dazed and hopeless, and finally, turning to me, said, "The next sea that comes I am going to let go," and as the wait was not very long between seas, he soon disappeared over the side and was seen no more. Once during the afternoon the Vandalia swung sufficiently close to the Nipsic for several of our men to essay escaping to the latter ship by way of the foreyard, which lay across our forecastle, its starboard end touching the Nipsic at this time. A few escaped in this way, and then, the ships drifting apart again, no further opportunity for rescue in this manner offered itself. A second-class fireman belonging to the Vandalia, named Callarito, succeeded in getting on board the Nipsic, and at once made arrangements to save as many lives as possible by letting down ladders, ropes, and boatswain's chairs to the water's edge, and was thus the means of saving several.

This man also succeeded in passing a line from the Nipsic, by which a hawser was hauled across and made fast to the foremast of the Vandalia, but no opportunity was afforded of constructing a traveling bight or breeches-buoy on account of the heavy and frequent seas, so I think it was of no avail in saving any, and finally, through the motions of the two ships to and fro, the hawser was snapped in two.

While this hawser was still extended between the two ships, Mr. John Roche, our pay-clerk, came floating by, having either been swept overboard or made a desperate attempt to reach the beach, drifted quite near the ship, and, although pretty nearly ex-

hausted, heard our cries to catch the hawser, and for a few minutes held on by one arm. The line, however, being in a continual state of see-saw, or alternate tautening and slacking, soon shook him off, and, folding his arms, closing his eyes, and without making another effort, he sank out of sight and was drowned under the very eyes of his shipmates. Several narrow escapes from drowning occurred during those weary hours, one man having been swept overboard twice, but each time he succeeded in clutching some of the floating cordage hanging from the foreyard and so crawled aboard. He is still alive.

Once in a while our hearts would be cheered by an apparent lull in the tempest, or a tiny patch of lighter clouds would pass over, when we would imagine for a few moments that the gale had blown itself out. But no such good fortune attended us, and the only change would be a fiercer blast, a heavier sea, and a blacker cloud to quench what little hope remained, leaving nothing but that phase of courage called "grit." All efforts to send lines from the shore had proved fruitless,—the single attempt to send a line from the ship resulting in the death of the brave men who made the effort.

The after part of the ship was apparently breaking up, the cabin had been completely gutted, no figures could be seen aft except in the rigging of the mizzenmast, and the poop-deck looked as though ready to break adrift from the ship at any time, as it, in truth, did finally. With every surge of the ship the foremast would apparently almost unship itself from the keelson, in which event the chances for life of all those on and around it were very slim indeed. One notable thing struck me at the time, and that was the absence of all human cries or shouts during the whole day. Not a cry was given by the number of men who lost their lives during the wreck, and the only sound which filled the ears of the survivors was the roar of the wind, the crash of the waves, and the hissing of the foam as it came hurtling from the crests of the waves driven by the hurricane towards the beach; and so the day came to a close, and the end of the gale and rescue seemed as far off as ever. During the last hour of daylight the body of a drowned man washed upon the bridge just forward of the smoke-pipe, and one of the stiffened arms becoming entangled with a stanchion, he swung to and fro directly under our eyes, until at last an exceptionally heavy sea tore him adrift and the awful object disappeared over the rail to be seen no more.

By the violence of the waves our smoke-pipe was bent con-

siderably out of the perpendicular, and stood as though ready for the final plunge; but it did not go overboard, and was used afterwards to replace the one lost from the Nipsic. Of course every boat had long since been torn from its davits, and with the other floating objects from the ship served to line the beach for miles up and down the coast.

As the daylight faded away the outlook was certainly forlorn in the extreme. Although the weather was warm and the water, under ordinary circumstances, of an agreeable temperature, the submergences to which we had been subjected for so many hours seemed to have taken all the heat from our bodies, and the immediate effect of a sea passing over us was that of chattering chilliness, and before any degree of warmth would begin to pervade the body another engulfment would send the most atrocious chilliness through one, until it seemed as though from very cold and stiffness one must let go. Few words were exchanged between us as we stood close-pressed together, making what lee we could of the mast, and to tell the truth there was very little to talk about.

I remember thinking to myself, "What a lot I shall have to tell about if I am saved."

Darkness comes on apace in the Tropics when the sun once goes down, and before we knew it the night had settled down, which seemed to have no promise of daybreak to any of us. But relief was coming from a direction and in a manner little imagined. It must have been not far from seven o'clock in the evening when I described the dark hull and few twinkling lights of the flag-ship Trenton, of whose whereabouts we had been up to this time ignorant. If we had felt hopeless before, the appearance of the Trenton slowly dragging down on us filled us with despair, for but one result could happen should she come in contact with what was left of the Vandalia,—quick and total destruction. So the few faint hopes of clinging to the rigging until morning seemed dead beyond resurrection by the certainty of the fate bearing down on us from the gloom to windward.

The progress of the Trenton was very slow, and as at times the drift would seem to cease altogether, it may, perhaps, be imagined with what solicitude the approach of our destroyer was watched. Slowly drifting down before the wind and sea, the big ship loomed up against the waves which broke over her bows until about eight o'clock, it must have been, she had approached sufficiently near to see figures in her rigging and on the rails. Soon a

cheer came over the waves, given, we heard later, by order of Admiral Kimberly as earnest of their appreciation of our desperate situation.

I think every man who heard that cheer must have shed tears. I know the little group of which I was one wept for a few minutes as though impossible to restrain the feeling which is difficult to describe. Before the flag-ship struck us, which she did finally, the order was given on board her to throw a rocket line across us, which was done, and in a few minutes a hawser was made fast to our foretopmast head, the other end being secured to the Trenton. Soon after striking us, which occurred shortly after eight o'clock, the Trenton began to swing slowly around, bringing her nearly parallel to the Vandalia, the sterns nearly touching and the bows separated by some forty feet or more.

As this took place hope began once more to find a place in the Vandalia, for the flag-ship made an effectual breakwater against wind and sea, and a rescue seemed quite a near possibility. As soon as the hawser between the two ships was properly secured some of the sailors began going aboard the Trenton in that way, hand over hand, but on testing my ability to do the same I found sufficient strength was not left to make the attempt. Abandoning the place I had up to this time occupied I clambered into the port forerigging, wondering in what way rescue and safety would come to me. Nor had I long to wait. The officers and men of the Trenton, in spite of the fact that their ship was a wreck as well as the Vandalia, used every exertion in rescuing us from the fate which seemed ready to overtake both ships.

About 8:30 my attention was attracted by the chief boatswain's mate of the Vandalia, Winchester, calling out, "Here's a chance for you, boys," and, illustrating his words by crawling to our port foreyardarm, caught a rope thrown from the forecastle of the Trenton and was speedily on the deck of that vessel. Feeling that here was a chance I descended from my station in the rigging, and making my way to the end of the yard was fortunate enough to catch the bight of a line cast from the Trenton, and in a second or two I swung violently against the side of that ship at the water's edge, without, however, breaking any bones.

Finding it impossible, with the remnant of strength left, to draw my own weight up the side of the vessel I managed to cry out my situation, when the man at the other end of the line drew me up a couple of feet, enabling me to get astride the torpedo boom. From there it was not a difficult task to clamber up through

the starboard forechains by the aid of one of my coal-heavers, who had preceded me in this pathway to safety, and soon I felt comparatively safe on the deck of the Trenton. My progress up the side of the vessel was made slow and painful by the sensation that there was barely strength left for the feeblest effort, and I remember the feeling of surprise at my inability to move my hands and feet quickly. They seemed made of lead, heavy and uncontrollable, and on stepping over the low rail to the forecastle of the Trenton my strength deserted me and I fell to the deck, unable to help myself for some little time. After a brief rest, however, I found my way aft in anxious search for water, for it will be remembered that the last opportunity those on the Vandalia had for food or drink had been at six o'clock on Friday evening, and here it was 8:30 o'clock Saturday evening, a period of not less than twenty-six and a half hours, without sustenance of any sort.

The rest of the story is soon told. The officers of the Trenton, from the admiral down, vied with each other in acts of kindness, and, although in desperate circumstances themselves, should the gale continue much longer, we felt perfectly safe and thankful that things had turned out no worse. During the night the creaking and grinding of the Trenton banished sleep from the rescued, but about three o'clock Sunday morning the gale began to subside, and, as on account of the narrow entrance and reef-locked character of the harbor the sea speedily went down, by daylight the harbor of Apia was fast resuming its wonted calm, and the perils of the wreck were over.

Abler pens than mine have told of the weary waiting for relief to come, and there remains for me but the task, which is a pleasure, as it is also a duty, of recording here the names of those men in my department who so nobly stood at their posts in the midst of appalling dangers for so many hours; obedient, zealous, brave, their names deserve imperishable record. But for the skill and attention to duty of these men the wreck of the Vandalia would have occurred sooner and would probably have been even more disastrous in loss of life. My official report, made to Lieutenant Carlin, commanding the survivors, records these names, which I here repeat:

Machinist Adam Gibson, Machinist J. B. Collier, Boiler-maker Charles Bowren, Oiler John Myers, Oiler Thomas Langon, Oiler James L. Fair.

The condition of things on board the Trenton while the half-dead survivors of the Vandalia's officers and men were being slowly rescued was far from cheering. The gale continued with

steadily-increasing violence, the sea as a consequence growing higher and higher with each hour of wind, until it seemed at times as though we had but delayed the inevitable end and that our last hours were steadily growing nearer as the old ship groaned and staggered with each onset of wind and sea.

No lives had been lost on the Trenton, but we learned for the first time, after getting on board, that the fires had been put out before noon, and that in spite of the steady drain of the pumps the water in the ship could not be reduced below the dangerous depth of some six or eight feet.

Every part of the ship was dripping with sea-water, and the appearance of the men and officers gave ample evidence of the terrible day of work and danger passed through. Every soul on board must have been soaking wet for hours, the fresh-water tanks were rendered brackish and unfit to drink through the terrible seas which had boarded the ship at intervals all day, and, as no fire had been possible for the same reason, nothing beyond a few sodden hardtack had been eaten by any one since the night previous. The ship was hard and fast aground a short distance to seaward of the poor Vandalia, and every once in a while a sheet of foam and water would come pouring over the port hammock rail from stem to stern, deluging the decks and increasing the misery of those obliged to face the gale, the spray going as high as the cross-trees, and, as I remember, at times extending as far as what was left of the Vandalia.

As was feared by those clinging to the rigging of the last-named ship, the collision of the Trenton had resulted in so demolishing the port chains and stays of the main and mizzenmasts of the Vandalia that in less than forty-five minutes after the shock these two masts went by the board, breaking off a short distance above the deck and falling over the starboard side.

Fortunately no lives were lost by this occurrence, although several very narrow escapes were made by those who, from long exposure and consequent weakness, were partially disabled and almost incapable of helping themselves.

There were but few men forward, the larger part of the crew being aft at work on the pumps, essaying, as was found out later, to pump the ocean dry, a large hole in the stern allowing ingress of water many times faster than one pump could draw it out.

After having been dashed several times by the sea as it occasionally poured across the deck, I managed to get as far aft as the main hatch, down which I made my way in search of food and

water. Several of the ship's officers passed me on the way, but I felt no surprise at not being recognized, for in the semi-darkness prevailing close inspection was impracticable.

Crossing the gun-deck, I passed the admiral's pantry, and experienced a pleasant surprise by being addressed by the steward, a Chinaman named Ah Fat, who exclaimed, "Hello, Miss Lebs; you all light? S'pose you hungly?" On receiving an assurance that not only was I hungry, but dying with thirst, this Chinese Samaritan opened a can of mutton and poured out a glass of water from the small store remaining in the admiral's water-cooler, and, with the addition of a crisp hardtack, I felt comparatively comfortable. Nor did the good offices of Ah Fat cease here, for, noting the scant condition of my wardrobe, he promptly got a pair of pajamas and a Chinese blouse and undershirt, so that in a brief space of time hunger and thirst were somewhat appeased and dry clothes had taken the place of the sodden garments in which this eventful day had been passed. This kindness and attention arose from the fact that we had been shipmates on the Iroquois, three years before, where he was the ward-room cook.

A few minutes after this feast in the admiral's pantry I entered his cabin, where were already Lieutenants Carlin and Wolson and Ensign Gibbons, all from the Vandalia. Carlin was pretty badly bruised, having been knocked about a good deal during the day, and Wilson, after nearly losing his life in the attempt to escape from the Vandalia to the Trenton, was stretched out on a lounge at the after end of the cabin in a complete state of misery, retching violently, and so weak as to be hardly able to stir.

The stern of the Trenton was on the edge of the terrible reef which she had skirted for so many hours while drifting down towards the shore, and as a frequent sea would cause her to surge and settle again on the bottom, the most doleful groans and noises seemed to come from every timber of the doomed ship. These noises, added to the steady roar of the gale, the thunder of the waves as they struck the oaken sides of the ship, and the loud voices of command mingling with the regular thump and thud of the deck-pumps, made a combination of noises easier to imagine than to describe.

About eleven o'clock, with an extra heavy surge and the rattle of a green sea on deck, the cabin air-port was partly torn from its fastenings, and in an instant the water came pouring into the cabin, effectually disposing of all sleeping on the deck.

For the first time I learned of the death of Captain Schoonmaker, Lieutenant Sutton, and the drowning of Paymaster Arms, the latter not having been seen for several hours previous to the wreck of the Trenton.

I had seen Pay Clerk Roche go down quite early in the afternoon, so there were four officers gone and no one knew how many of the crew.

The loss of Captain Schoonmaker left Lieutenant Carlin in command of the survivors, he having been the executive officer.

And so the night wore on, the gale showing no signs of abatement, while the sea, steadily rising, had reached a pitch when it seemed that no greater violence were possible. The waves were laden with sand from the bottom of the harbor, although the depth of the water was not less than nine fathoms (fifty-four feet).

The two articles of clothing I removed, when Ah Fat came to my assistance, were filled in every fibre with mud and sand, forced into them by the long buffeting of ten hours in the rigging exposed to every wave.

About three o'clock on the morning of the 17th of March, which was Sunday, the strength of the gale seemed to abate, and from that hour the violence of the sounds throughout the ship steadily decreased, and by daylight the great gale was over.

Before going further in my narrative of events it may be well to note the uniform kindness and hospitality of every one on board the flag-ship Trenton. In spite of the increasing peril of the ship, the apparent certainty of the total wreck of the vessel before morning, the officers of the admiral's ship let no occasion pass of offers of comforts, dry clothes, and assistance of every sort at their command.

The gale having abated, by daybreak the sea had subsided, and instead of the tumbling mass of water and the howling wind to which our eyes and ears had for so many hours been accustomed, the long, regular swell from the Pacific Ocean alone told of the recent hurricane, if we except the sights which met the eye in every direction on reef and sea and shore. Directly beneath the starboard side of the Trenton lay the submerged Vandalia, the foremast still in position, but most of its rigging carried away, the stumps of the main and mizzenmasts barely appearing above the water covering the entire ship, save a bit of the poop-deck rail and a portion of the topgallant forecastle; off on the port quarter lay the German man-of-war Adler, on her beam ends, high up on the reef, her propeller and rudder gone, much of her copper stripped from her bottom by the violence

of the waves after being wrecked. In close proximity to the German ship were great blocks of coral broken from the reef during the storm and now left by the waves as landmarks of the force of the terrible sea prevailing. In various places the masts or some portion of the upper works of several merchant vessels bore mute and sad evidence of loss of life and property. Directly astern of the water-covered Vandalia, and not so far from the starboard quarter of the Trenton, lay the broadside of a schooner which had been dashed to pieces on the reef during the night, and which, after making the tour of the reef-locked bight containing the wrecks of the two American men-of-war, had stuck fast on a protuberance of the jagged reef and remained fixed for weeks afterwards. Directly opposite the Trenton and Vandalia and between them and the beach lay the Nipsic, boats gone, smoke-pipe gone, rigging broken, lying keeled over to port, a picture of helplessness and disaster.

Far off towards Matafele, with her bows pointing towards the mouth of the Vaisigano River, lay the German warship Olga, hard and fast on the coral sand bottom, but beyond a few broken ropes and a general appearance of untidiness, looking, at this distance, not much the worse of the perilous experiences of the past forty-eight hours.

The beach as far as the eye could reach, both towards Matafele and Matouto, seemed a mass of wreckage, a prominent object directly opposite the American ships being the oramental bow and figure-head of the lost German man-of-war Eber. This vessel had been one of the first of the war vessels in port to go on the reef, and had struck the jagged edge, hung for a moment, and then had capsized and gone down with all hands on board. Four or five men and one officer were washed ashore through the surf with life enough remaining to pull through.

As soon as the members of the flag-ship's band could recover their wits and instruments, equally scattered by recent events, the strains of well-remembered airs were once more heard on the morning air, and as the daylight strengthened and the Sunday sun beamed upon the disconsolate crowd gathered upon the deck of the Trenton, more or less congratulations were exchanged between the survivors, and already plans began to be discussed for the immediate future. In obedience to the admiral's order, I, as acting paymaster of the Vandalia, prepared to go ashore by the first opportunity to make arrangements for the messing and shelter of our men. The first craft to approach the ship was a native boat manned by the crew of that noble Samoan,

Chief Suamanatafa, he being at the steering oar. Into this boat I was speedily lowered, a rope being passed around and under my arms, and so I left the Trenton, as it proved, for the last time, for I never set foot on her decks again. As the chief skillfully guided the boat through intricacies of the reef from the stern of the ship we passed quite close to the starboard side of the Vandalia, and I noted the fact that her poop-deck had been entirely torn loose from the stern of the ship and by a strange irony had floated about until stranded on the topgallant forecastle, the opposite end of the ship. The landing on the beach was effected without incident, there being no surf.

Several of the officers of the Nipsic were on the beach, as also pretty nearly all of the population of the town, native and foreign.

Mr. Gurr, an English resident, at once had me taken to one of the large general furnishing stores with which Apia was supplied, and in spite of the day, speedily had me in fair business condition,—with a light straw hat, a pair of thin trousers, soft socks, a pair of canvas shoes, and a Chinese sort of blouse.

On the way from the beach oft-repeated native expressions gave evidence of the real commiseration felt by these gentle savages.

The procurement of a comfortable barrack for the crew of survivors was accomplished by noon of that notable day, and a short message in writing to Lieutenant Carlin brought all of the Vandalia men ashore the same afternoon, the night being passed in a native church edifice not far from the landing.

Rations in plenty were assured from the stock on hand in various stores and magazines, means for replenishment from Auckland being at once perfected, to be put into operation by the next steamer of the fortnightly service from that port. Of necessity the police regulations were of the strictest order, and a set of orders was speedily formulated by Admiral Kimberly, drawn with especial reference to the novelty of the situation, and which experience proved to be amply sufficient for the maintenance of order during the weary weeks which followed the wreck. The crew of the Nipsic returned to their ship when it became evident that the injuries to her hull and bottom were not of so serious a nature as was at first feared, so that the Trenton's crew and the survivors from the Vandalia were the two bodies of Americans living ashore.

The German survivors we came in contact with but seldom, for the best of feeling did not exist between us, and their headquarters were more than a mile distant up the shore of the bay and not far from Munuluu point.

Naturally great care was taken to prevent the occurence of anything like an epidemic, and one of the first things attended to was the quality of the drinking and cooking water. The river called the Vaisigano ran not far from "Camp Vandalia," as our barracks were called, and at first is was hoped that this stream, coming, as it does, directly from the mountain range dividing the island of Upolo in an east and west direction, would be available for these purposes. A few cases, however, of stomach-trouble among the men gave cause to suspect the water, so search was made for another source of supply. Fortunately this was not hard to find, and a spring of perfectly safe and—for that climate—cool water was discovered, and thereafter a "watering party" was one of the first of the daily items in the routine carried out by the officer of the day.

Bringing water, sweeping the street for some distance each way from the barracks, removing the multitudinous debris constantly accumulating and the collection of eatables from the various stores able to supply our requisitions, employed quite a large percentage of the Vandalia survivors, and for those not so employed a daily drill and inspection kept every man and officer from idleness, and tended greatly to the contentment and average health enjoyed during the long wait for relief.

Of fruit there was a comparative dearth, the gale having destroyed great numbers of banana plants, and the white man does not take kindly to taro. The alligator pear, so nutritious and toothsome, was not in season, and the medical staff discouraged the use of cocoanut milk.

After the first few days succeeding the wreck the dietary comprised beef both fresh and salt, canned salmon, rice, hardtack, fresh bread, salt fish, canned meats, principally colonial mutton, a frequent ration of fresh pork, beans, tea, coffee, sugar. pickles, and an occasional "blow-out" on "plum duff," that pudding dear to a sailor heart, with plenty of plain sauce.

A German baker living not far from headquarters had the contract from all the fresh bread required, and it must be said that in the main his efforts to supply a good article were crowned with success. An occasional delegation of hungry and disgusted men would pay a visit to my quarters, filled to the brim with some grievance, fancied or real, and if the latter, inquiry and rectification sent them back to their barracks satisfied in spite of themselves, for the average sailor delights in suffering from an unrightable wrong. Usually, however, the "growl" would have for motive the quality, quantity, or appearance

of the bread ration. No little diplomacy was required to convey the idea that the market facilities were not of the best, that our straits were desperate, and that "the good time coming" was probably not far distant. The fact that their officers were no better off than they were, in the matter of food, went far to rendering the men more amenable to reason than usual.

While on the topic of food, I must not forget to recall the constant kindness and generosity shown us by our consul, Mr. W. Blacklock, and Captain Hamilton, an American, for many years a resident of Apia. These two seemed to feel that too much could not be done for us. Fruit, cocoanuts, and limes were constantly being supplied by these two Samaritans in quantities sufficient for the whole crew. To Mr. E. W. Gurr, an Englishman from the colonies, belongs the credit of always having a huge bowl of kava, the native beverage, on tap, and if the drain on the supply caused an empty bowl, a fresh supply was always brewed, and it was the general understanding that Gurr's kava was always ready.

Perhaps a few words relative to this peculiar drink may not be amiss at this point. Tava, or "kava," as it is pronounced by the Samoans, is made from the root of a bush of that name belonging to the peppermint family, and is among the few plants cultivated by the natives of these islands.

The native method of preparation is for girls to chew the root into fine bits, and after this process it is soaked in water, being squeezed and mixed by hand until all of the juice or active principle is extracted, when the mass is strained through a thick sponge of native fiber and the completed fluid is ready for use. Nowadays, however, the kava root is frequently beaten up fine or grated on a piece of perforated tin, out of deference, it is supposed, to the wishes of their white friends, the subsequent process being the same as formerly. The effect of a cup of kava is about as refreshing as that of a cup of hot strong tea, and very much of that nature, except that, unlike tea, it has at night, a slightly soporific effect. Its taste reminds me of what I imagine would result from a mixture of some clean-tasting soap and a little peppermint,—not at all disagreeable after one or two trials, and always refreshing. The hospitality of the natives always made its first manifestation with an offer of a cup of kava.

Throughout our enforced stay on the island of Upolo not an instance can be recalled of aught but kindness and hospitality from the natives. And the hospitality was not of the servile, cringing sort, but rather as a friendly feeling of one man towards another, for they bore themselves as equals. Fortunately for our health and comfort the

climate is the perfection of the tropical type, hot, but not insufferably so, an occasional fierce thunder shower clearing the air for a day or two. During the night the temperature falls rapidly, so that by about three o'clock in the morning a blanket was a necessity for comfort. The winds during our stay seemed to blow from all points of the compass, never blowing strongly from one direction long, and seldom falling to a dead calm. The lightning during the occasional thunder storms, both by night and by day, was something terrific, the flashes being often so vivid and frequent that is seemed as though some damage must be done somewhere not far off. But I have never seen any evidence of injury to buildings or trees.

Surrounded as the Samoan group is by the vast Pacific Ocean, it is not remarkable that dampness was the pervading sensation, and in clear weather the dews are phenomenal. Partly from the salubrity of the climate and partly from the simplicity of their diet the natives seem to suffer from few diseases, and beyond an occasional light fever, induced by exposure, and some stomach troubles, brought about mostly by intemperance in eating or drinking, our men continued well and healthy throughout our detention on the island.

The period of waiting, after the departure of Lieutenant Wilson for Auckland, New Zealand, in search of a relief steamer to take us to San Francisco, seemed never-ending, the routine of duty being supplemented by the hope, daily renewed, that before night the smoke of the coming steamer might darken the spot in the horizon so anxiously watched by hundreds of eyes. Long before the return of Lieutenant Wilson with the welcome relief, the Monongahela, United States store-ship, called in at Apia, en route to the coaling-station at Pango-Pango, and by her we got some mail, and the Australian mail-steamer from San Francisco to the colonies passed by, leaving late papers and letters, whereby we were informed of the effect produced on the world at large by the stirring events of the 16th of March.

Of course our constant association with the natives gave no little insight into their characteristics, and it is a pleasure to remember the many instances of honor, bravery, and manliness exhibited by those savages.

At the time of the wreck we found many wounded warriors ashore being treated in a native church, used as a hospital, they being victims from the battle-fields of the preceding December in the combat between the German forces and those of King Maleatoa. Among the wounded were several women, for it appears that as brave as are the men the women are their equals, for during various battles between the natives and the Germans the wives, mothers, and sisters of the

Samoan warriors maintained their places in the fighting rank, feeding the hungry, bringing water to the thirsty, and assisting the wounded to the rear, taking their chances with the braves in the forefront of the fight.

In their silent and patient endurance of pain these natives remind one strongly of the North American Indian, undergoing the most painful operations and treatments without a murmur or sign of distress beyond an occasional grunt. The women and girls, in common with their sex throughout the world, possess a natural aptitude for nursing the sick, and, under the instructions of Surgeon Derr, of the Nipsic, and two or three missionaries at Apia, the female relatives of those wounded men speedily became adept in dressing the wounds of their warriors, and became of no little assistance to the limited hospital staff.

Wandering about the straggling huts forming the native village of Apia, one was constantly saluted with "kalofa," meaning pretty much the same as the Hawaiian "aloha," "good-day," "God bless you," and in general an expression of friendliness and good wishes. Sometimes, and more frequently from acquaintances, this salutation became "kalofa, ali," "ali" being the Samoan equivalent for "sir" or "chief." On parting, the word is "kofá," strongly accented on the last syllable. "Kalofa" is also used as a commiserating or pitying word, when the accent is changed, and it becomes "kalofa," lengthening out the first "a" considerably. Their language is soft and musical and not difficult to acquire. A large proportion of the natives can read and write, and those able to do so are fond of writing poetry, dedicating it to a friend. During our stay in Apia several odes and dedication pieces were composed and written by natives and presented to the various officers with whom the writers were acquainted.

Frequent bathing is a marked characteristic of the Samoan, both male and female, but, contrary to the generally received idea, their bathing is done in fresh water where practicable.

Not far from Apia, a short distance up the Vaisigano, the principal stream of the island, was situated a large and deep pool, bordered with volcanic rocks, and here could always be found a group of natives taking the daily bath. Men, women, and children all plunge in at once without a thought of immodesty or impropriety. As soon as a white man would appear, the native women would set up a wild cry for "sopo," "sopo," meaning soap. The Samoan substitute for this essentially civilized product consists of a thick-skinned orange, the flesh of which was charged with an exceedingly acid juice, which, rubbed on the head and body, was capable, with fresh water, of mak-

ing a plentiful lather, and seemed to possess the same detergent properties as soap.

Although the native Samoan is provided by nature with an abundant poll of jet black hair, local fashion has decreed that its color must be changed to a seal-brown and sometimes to a dusty brick-red. To effect this a smearing of coral lime, slacked in water, is applied about once a week and allowed to remain over night. By this peculiar custom the color of the Samoan head is quite different from that provided by nature. The lime, of about the consistency of common whitewash, is thoroughly applied to the hair, each particular hair being carefully smeared until the entire head is a mass of white. Unlike the Fijian, the Samoan keeps his hair quite short. Both sexes wear the hair in pretty much the same style, save that the women do not bleach the hair to the same extent as the men.

The men are, as a general thing, tall, well-formed and muscular, and, as evidenced by their aid in transferring the heavy guns of the Vandalia and Trenton to the beach, they are capable of long and severe labor, and this is the more remarkable when it is considered that their food is mostly vegetable.

The work of removing the guns from the Trenton was a very difficult undertaking, but under the constant supervision of Lieutenant-Commander H. W. Lyon, the executive officer of the ship, the work was accomplished without notable accident, and the guns, after being cleaned and plugged, to prevent moisture from lodging in the rifling, were parked ashore not far from the beach, and, together with the major part of the Vandalia's guns, were left for such disposition as the Navy Department chose to make of them. A considerable portion of the paymaster's stores was recovered from the Trenton, but in a sadly damaged condition, having been for some time under water.

An examination of the Vandalia by a diver disclosed the fact that the ship was full of sand to about two feet above the level of the berth-deck, so any attempt at getting out her stores was useless.

During these days of waiting, the work of preparing the Nipsic for a voyage to Auckland went steadily forward, a jury rudder having been completed in a short time after the ship got afloat.

Having lost her smoke-pipe during the gale, the Nipsic managed to secure a portion of the one belonging to the Vandalia through the hard work, perseverance, and skill of the engineer officers of the Nipsic and Trenton.

As the month of April came on, the anxiety to get away from the scene of the wreck increased in intensity, and the prospect of that event formed the chief subject of conversation.

No word, however, was received from Lieutenant Wilson, who, as has been said, was in Auckland trying to charter a rescuing steamer, and the danger of some serious epidemic breaking out grew daily more imminent. So when rumors began to circulate that the next Australian steamer would take away as many of the survivors as possible, speculation was rife as to the probable number she would receive.

Finally, on the 30th of March, the steamer appeared in the offing, and in a short time it was understood that the sick and wounded, to the extent of thirty-five persons, were to go at once. Ensign Ripley, Assistant Surgeon Cordeiro, several cadets, and thirty men were transferred to the steamer, lying some three or four miles off shore, in the short space of one hour and a quarter. As she disappeared below the horizon bound for Honolulu and San Francisco, the feeling of homesickness among those left behind assumed almost alarming proportions, but routine duties, the great penacea for such feelings, speedily dispelled the gloom which bade fair to settle over our little community, and by the next day an occasional reference to the good luck of "those fellows" was the only sign that disappointment still rankled in the hearts of a few.

To eke out the steady diet of beef, mutton, and pork, several attempts were made at fishing, but it was speedily found that, although there were plenty of fish in the sea, none could be caught with a hook. The fish here will not bite, and after numerous attempts, all ending in failure, the native method was found to be the only successful one.

The fish which come in from sea to feed on the reef at high water are frequently caught in the crevices with which the coral is seamed, and, standing at the end of the crevice nearest the deep water, two or three natives keep up a furious splashing with poles and paddles, and the fish, being alarmed, flee into the hands or nets of other enemies on the lookout in the shoaler water.

The sea constantly dashing on the sea-face of the reef fringing the part of the island abreast of Apia was a never-ending source of admiration, for the long, steady sweep of the Pacific is here brought to a sudden stop, with the result that a tremendous surf beat with steady persistency day after day the whole year through.

At night its steady roar was audible, reminding one of a distant waterfall.

The domestic life of the Samoan is of the very simplest type. Nature provides everything required to sustain life, and the clothing worn is of the scantiest possible description. The women do the simple cooking required in the preparation of taro and bread, fruit for eating, braid mats, fans, lava-lavas (an apology for the only attempt at clothing worn by the women), make the necessary kava, while the man cares for the children as far as is necessary, and twice a day sees that the family is assembled beneath the hut roof for prayers and hymn-singing.

This is true, however, more of Pango-Pango than of Apia, the white man's influence at the latter place being somewhat against the practice of the simpler domestic virtues. By the time the sun is well above the horizon the leading man, or chief, of a hamlet, standing at the entrance of his hut, sings in a loud voice, the opening lines of a hymn, and soon from all directions come answering voices, scattered through the forest, until the whole village is awake and the air is vocal with the rich, heavy voices of the men mingling with the higher but sweet notes of the women and children.

The Samoan voice is soft and flexible, and lends itself easily to the simple music taught by the missionaries, and an experience of the sort attempted to be described can never be forgotten. At night, after the sun has left the quick dusk so peculiar to the Tropics, a similar worship is carried out, but the morning devotion is the most touching and picturesque. In some households the obiquitous kereosene lamp illuminates the family at night, but with a great many the old-fashioned method is still pursued of having a shallow hole in the floor at one corner of the hut, where the dried shells of cocoanuts make a bright blaze of considerable duration, without smoke or smell.

On occasions of ceremony or going into battle the Samoan warrior paints his face and body, from the waist up, in the most fantastic manner, in some respects not unlike our Indians, and with beads made of nuts and necklaces of shells and fish-teeth gives one the same impression as the fetichman of Africa.

Of musical instruments the native Samoan is scantily provided, the only thing worthy of the name being the huge hollowed log which, on being beaten with a big mallet or beetle, gives forth a clear, resounding note, which can be heard a long distance.

At the intersection of several of the roads leading into Apia one of these drums was located during our stay, and at nine o'clock each night two of the leading men would belabor it for a few minutes as a signal for all natives to retire for the night from the public highway on pain of arrest and confinement for the night in the native calaboose.

As soon as it was known that Admiral Kimberly was desirous of saving as much of the battery and stores as was possible from the Trenton, King Mataafa made offer of assistance, to the extent of the whole able-bodied force under his authority, and it was largely through the efforts and working capacity of these stalwart natives that such a large quantity of the Trenton's stores were recovered.

On the 13th of April several officers of the Vandalia, accompanied by Captain Farquhar and Photographer Davis went to Vai le le, some four or five miles from Apia, with a properly-inscribed headboard for the grave of Captain Schoonmaker.

The grave is in a beautiful spot near a lime hedge, in full view of the Pacific Ocean, on a high bluff in the flower garden of Captain Hoofnagle, superintendent of the German plantation. The photographer got several excellent pictures of the grave, and as the sun went down we all returned to Apia. From this date on the time seemed to pass more rapidly than before, for from one source and another began to arrive rumors that the chartered steamer coming to our relief had been secured by Lieutenant Wilson and would soon be along, and of course even an untraced rumor of that kind put no little life and hope into the hearts of the waiting survivors, but it was not until the 28th of April, on the arrival of the colonial steamer Lubeck, that any certainty was felt that our rescue was near at hand.

On that day, however, a letter was received from Auckland to the effect that by the last day of the month we might expect the steamer Rockton, of the Union Company's line, she having been secured, and was to have sailed the day succeeding the departure of the Luback.

So here was nearly the end of our weary exile, and on all sides the eagerness of preparation gave strong evidence of the desire for relief. The next day, April 29, the Rockton arrived and came to anchor in the little harbor of Apia at 1:30 p. m., and was at once the centre of all eyes and hopes.

Official word was sent to all officers that the steamer would sail during the forenoon of May 1.

"Day after to-morrow" seemed so close at hand that, after such a period of waiting and watching, it seemed almost too good to be true, and I have no doubt that many a man rubbed his eyes a second time to make sure that he saw aright. But there she was, and scarcely was the anchor down than she became the centre towards which all boats and canoes converged as though endowed with a special magnetism. All during the day of the 30th and far into the night boatload after boatload of personal effects, curios, stores, provisions, and articles rescued from the Trenton were being taken off to the Rockton, until it seemed that there might be no room left for those whose good fortune it was to sail for San Francisco on the morrow.

In view of the continued unsettled state of affairs in the group and the necessity for some authoritative head of the situation, Admiral Kimberly decided to remain until such time as he felt that his absence would not lead to lawlessness. As a further assurance of peace and safety to the American interests, the efficient marine guard of the flagship, under command of Captain Huntington, and a few sailors, was directed to bear the admiral company, his personal staff being of course included in those who would assist him in carrying on the government until a man-of-war should reach Apia from the coast. Leave-taking occupied pretty nearly all of the scant hours remaining of Samoan exile, and as the sun went down on the 30th of April we all realized that the last act in the drama of the wreck was about to be played.

But few of the officers slept on the Rockton that night, but bright and early on the morning of May 1, Apia was astir, and by nine o'clock everything was ready for a start, and the bay was covered with the native canoes, whose owners came alongside in full force to say kalófa to the Amelikas. At 10:30 a. m. the anchor was weighed, and as the ship slowly moved towards the open sea the band of the Trenton played everything known, while the "squilgee" band of the English man-of-war Rapid played "Auld Lang Syne," "The Girl I Left Behind Me," and various other airs appropriate to the occasion, while the sailors on the Nipsic gave us three cheers, and the crowds of natives on the beach and afloat waved lava-lavas and shouted until they must have been hoarse.

Notwithstanding the excitement of the day, the ship's company speedily settled down to the ordinary routine, and the long voyage to San Francisco began with smiling skies, smooth sea,

and pleasant anticipations. In spite of the natural pleasure at the ending of the long and wearisome imprisonment of forty-four days succeeding the wreck, a certain feeling of sadness pervaded us all, I think, for nearly every one left behind some friend whose "kalófa" would never again sound in our ears, and the dreariness of the life in Apia had been greatly relieved by the constant and daily kindness and hospitality bestowed by the noble savages fast disappearing below the horizon.

The date of our departure was Wednesday, May 1. Inasmuch, however, as that was by Australian time, the next day was also Wednesday, May 1, which brought us once more into touch with our part of the world. The voyage was totally uneventful, the part of the ocean over which the course lay being unfrequented by either sailing craft or steamers, and a great part of the way seemed a veritable ocean desert, devoid of fish or birds.

The average speed was about nine knots an hour, and about midnight of May 4 the ship crossed the equator and we imagined the gentle breeze felt cooler. During the evening of May 8 the north star became visible for the first time above the horizon.

The few sick with which we sailed from Apia began to improve at once, and with the exception of two or three very sick men the crews of the two ships were kept in fair health. As the month slowly wore away it became evident that about the 20th would see the ship in San Francisco.

A continuance of fine weather enabled the Rockton to do her best, and on the morning of May 20, in a thick, dripping fog, the vessel steamed through the Golden Gate, and as the sun dissipated the mist, the smoke and chimneys of San Francisco came into view, with Alcatraz Island and the brown hills of Saucilito on the other hand.

Without any considerable delay the Rockton was headed for Mare Island, where our coming was anticipated by every man, woman, and child in the navy-yard. Cheers and tears greeted the incoming steamer as she came to abreast of the navy-yard, and by two o'clock in the afternoon the shipwrecked crews and officers of the Trenton and Vandalia were safely ashore recounting their adventures to sympathetic ears and filled with thankfulness that the wreck and its sequences were things to be talked about as of the past.

HARRIE WEBSTER,

Rear Admiral, United States Navy.

*AN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY EPISODE IN VIENNESE COURT LIFE.**

THE unique episode of Court life in the eighteenth century, that is associated chiefly with the names of the Emperor Joseph II. and of the Princess Eleonore Liechtenstein, is probably as little known outside Austria as if the actors were not a great European ruler and a remarkable member of the proudest aristocracy in the world.

The subject of this sketch belonged to a côterie of five great ladies, who for more than twenty years enjoyed the friendship of the lonely and sad-hearted Emperor. A collective friendship of this sort does not at first sight appear either romantic or dangerous; yet at one time, through no conscious effort on her part, the Princess Eleonore did awaken feelings of a more tender nature in the young Emperor. It is not the least extraordinary feature of their mutual relations that, without the usually inevitable alternative of a complete rupture, the sovereign's attempt at courtship ended simply in his tacit acceptance of the fact that the lady would remain his friend only on condition of being nothing more.

The Princess Eleonore Liechtenstein was the daughter of Prince Aloys I. of Oettingen-Spielberg, one of the numerous German princes who wielded almost absolute sway over their Lilliputian dominions. He is described as a kindly and cultured man, but apparently he did not concern himself much with his motherless daughters. His wife, a daughter of Duke Leopold of Holstein-Wisenburg, died soon after the birth of Eleonore, leaving her husband, besides this infant, only one other child, a daughter, Leopoldine. When Eleonore was four years old, the sisters were sent to a French convent near Strassburg, where they remained nine years. There they learnt French and almost forgot their mother tongue, which Eleonore afterwards much regretted. They did not learn much besides, except church embroidery and to 'set'

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relics, but the nuns' training must have been wholesome, for both sisters afterwards gave proof under most trying circumstances of sound religious principles and of a sobriety and excellence of judgment not very common in that age. They both, too, had that appetite for good reading which, if genuine, is not in need of artificial stimulus. In 1758 they went back to the paternal 'schlosz' —in those days of bad roads, slow communications and aristocratic isolation, scarcely a lively residence for young girls. Two years afterwards a great change took place in their life. One of their mother's sisters, who had married the Duke of Guastalla and had no children, died and left them, besides money, large properties in Lombardy and Moravia. They had suddenly become great Austrian heiresses. Their father at once took them to Vienna and presented them to the Empress Maria Theresa, who was their kinswoman, her grandmother, the Duchess of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, having been born at Oettingen. The young girls found other relations among the Austrian aristocracy, and were readily adopted in Viennese fashion as the "Poldi" and the "Lori" by the young "princesses" and "contessen" of society. They naturally saw a great deal of the charming family group of which the beautiful Empress was the centre. Visitors to Vienna will recall the countless portraits in public and private galleries of Maria Theresa with her mild-faced husband and some or all of her thirteen children, in which all these fair-haired, handsome, stately, young people look so like each other that one suspects that one brother and one sister must have sat for the rest. In 1760 none were yet married, and the court was the scene of gaieties of all descriptions, in which the Oettingens shared.*

Within the year both sisters were married: Leopoldine to Count Ernest Kaunitz, son of the famous Chancellor Prince Kaunitz; Eleonore to Prince Charles Liechtenstein. The Liechtensteins were "Reichsfürsten" (Princes of the Empire) and among the first noble families in Austria. The head of the house (Prince Wenzel), uncle to Eleonore's husband, was a great personage. His joint properties in Germany, Moravia, and Styria comprised twenty-four towns, 760 villages, forty-six castles and 164 farms, and were inhabited by a million of people. He had filled great offices under Charles VI. and Maria Theresa, and helped to save the monarchy in the critical times of the War of

**Aus dem Hofleben Maria Theresias.* Nach den Memoiren des Fürsten Joseph Khevenhüller. Von Adam Wolf. And other works.

the Austrian Succession. His nephew was a brave and distinguished soldier, an honorable and fair-minded man, but absorbed in his profession, fond of the company of men, and, though he appears to have fallen in love with the young heiress, as he was intended to do by persons interested in both parties, he was scarcely the man to satisfy the natural cravings for sympathy of an ardent young creature such as Eleonore was. It appears to have been rather due to her sterling worth of character than to the existence of any very ideal feelings between them that the marriage on the whole turned out happily. Eleonore had the sense of duty and proud scorn of the smallest breach of wifely loyalty that still characterise most of the ladies of the old Austrian nobility. But she wore the stern panoply of virtue with easy, natural grace, and from all accounts must have been a very fascinating woman. She was not, indeed, a striking beauty, but very pretty and, though small, perfectly well-proportioned in figure. She had a lovely complexion and much play of countenance, and combined great dignity of deportment with perfect ease of manner. Her extreme liveliness, her eager interest in life, her easy flow of talk, her impulsiveness, and the freshness of her thoughts and impressions gave perpetual charm and variety to her society.

During her early married life the Princess Charles—"die Karlin," as she was familiarly called in society—spent some part of the year in her own home, Meseritsch, a castle in Moravia, built on a rocky eminence. She was often alone for months together with her husband and the children, who soon brought additional happiness and fulness to her life. She loved an open-air life; she was strong and active; rough roads and steep mountain paths had no terrors for her. She often accompanied her husband on long, shooting expeditions, and occasionally had a shot at the big or small game that abounds in that thinly populated country. Her strong taste for reading developed in these quiet times, and we hear of her listening with delight while her husband read out some current epoch-making book, such as Gil Blas or Montesquieu's Esprit des Lois, while, unsentimental as she was, she confesses to having wept in secret over the sorrows of Clarissa.

It is from her voluminous letters to her dearly loved sister that these details are taken. Their correspondence was particularly full and uninterrupted during the Kaunitzes' long residence at Naples, where the Count filled the office of Austrian Minister

from 1764 till 1778, the true reason of this appointment being that the discerning eye of Maria Theresa saw in the discreet, young Countess, a fitting guardian to her giddy daughter, the Queen of Naples.

It was during these years that a crisis took place in Eleonore's married life, that put the utmost strain on her principles. A friend and comrade of her husband, Count Odonell,* became passionately attached to her, and paid her the flattering homage of a man of rare tact and delicacy. He was even older than her husband, who was her senior by fifteen years, but an extremely fascinating and agreeable man. Eleonore was flattered and touched, and suddenly became aware that her own heart responded all too readily to the feelings she had quite unconsciously awakened. She soon perceived that her husband's jealousy was aroused, and though she was able to set his mind at rest, her own remained a prey to secret thoughts of her admirer and to the consequent reproaches of a sensitive conscience. Her letters to her sister show the conflict through which she passed. Those of Leopoldine are models of wisdom and tenderness. She cannot bear to show the full extent of her anxiety, but still warns her sister against possible danger. "Do not think, dear sister, that an attachment of this kind can remain undecided; it progresses without our being aware of it. * * * Trust in God, keep very busy, avoid solitude." * * * Elenore acted on this advice, and she was finally rewarded by a complete victory over herself. Count Odonell, when he saw that his attentions were endangering the young couple's happiness, behaved like a man of honor and sought safety in voluntary banishment from Vienna. The Empress, who probably had some inkling of the matter and was not loth to meddle with the private concerns of her subjects, at his request relieved him of his court appointment and sent him, as Governor of Transylvania, to the very utmost limits of her empire. Three years later he returned to Vienna, and then frequently met the Princess Eleonore, who no longer felt any embarrassment in his presence. He died the following year.

Though Prince Charles appears to have been subject to occasional fits of jealousy, his wife's conscience ever after this episode was quite clear, and a few words of good-humored banter

*I have been able to identify this gentleman with Connell O'Donell (died 1771), son of Hugh of Larkfield, co. Leitrim, who married Flora, daughter of John, Count Hamilton, Austrian service, mentioned in Burke.

on her part sufficed to restore harmony between them. He must, however, have often tried her patience severely, for though he was not at that time rich for a man of his rank, he was very extravagant and lost large sums of money at cards, so that they were frequently in financial difficulties. His father's death in 1771 put an end to this. He succeeded to the large "seigneurie" of Krumau, in Moravia, with a population of 22,000. This became the usual summer home of the Princess and her children, while the Prince joined them whenever his military duties would allow.

The winter and spring were always spent in Vienna, where Eleonore, both from her position and the natural ascendency of her cleverness and exuberant vitality, soon became one of the leaders of society. She shared this leadership, as has been said, mainly with four other ladies. They formed a côterie so distinct and so well known in contemporaneous society that they were simply designated as "the five ladies" or the "Fürstinnen." Professor Wolf gives a rather quaint summary of the traits they had in common: "They were all married, of unblemished reputation, pious, faithful to their husbands and to their father confessors, fearless in speech and action ("freimüthig"), not averse to amusement, of lively parts and amiable disposition, and closely united by bonds of blood and friendship."*

Theirs, indeed, was the perfect ease and freedom of intercourse that can only exist where people's antecedents are very similar and they have many things in common. To some minds such intercourse is more attractive than the greater variety and freshness of more mixed society. It may be incidentally remarked that to this day society in Vienna makes on strangers the impression of being merely a large côterie of this description, with a fringe of outsiders, belonging to the lesser nobility or to the official world, who are frigidly tolerated.

"The five ladies" were the Princesses Clary and Kinsky, both daughters of the "Reichsgraf" Hermann von Hohenzollern-Heckingen, and cousins to the Oettingen sisters; the Princess Leopoldine Liechtenstein, nèe "Comtesse" Sternberg, whose husband, the eldest brother of Prince Charles, became, on his uncle's death, the head of that great house; the Princess Eleonore, and, on her coming to Vienna, the Countess Kaunitz, who afterwards became the Princess of that name. The Princess Clary, whom to

*Fürstin Eleonore Liechtenstein: 1745-1812. Nach Briefen und Memoiren ihrer Zeit. Von Adam Wolf. 1875.

know was to love, as Eleonore said, had been a great beauty in her youth; she was the eldest of the society, and in some sense its head and secretary, to whom the Emperor Joseph usually addressed the letters he frequently wrote to the "five ladies." The Princess Kinsky, a good-humored, gay, rather garrulous lady, kept a great house in Vienna and entertained on a great scale. The Princess Leopoldine Liechtenstein also saw much company; her parties were reputed to be the most brilliant in Vienna. She was of a more cautious and reticent disposition than the other ladies, and a more unmixed admirer of the court.

The ladies lived close to each other in Vienna in the old aristocratic quarter of narrow streets and handsome though often dingy "palaces," as the houses of the nobility are called. They met at least once every week; later, when the Emperor had become an habitual visitor, three or four times, usually between eight and ten in the evening. Cards were never played, though this was the general custom in Vienna as in most capitals at that time; there was no music and seldom any reading aloud, in no case when the Emperor was present. The sole amusement was conversation, which, to judge from the letters that have been preserved, ran on a great variety of topics: current events, court incidents, general conditions, the literature of the day. A picture represents the five ladies as sitting at a round table, the Emperor being in the act of entering the room; they are dressed very simply, each is engaged in some piece of needle-work, and a small lamp on the table appears to give but scanty light to the apartment.

The côterie naturally attracted general notice, the more so as no other woman ever had access to it and the ladies' husbands kept aloof on principle. The aged Prince Khevenhüuler, the French Ambassador Durand and his successor Breteuil, appeared a few times, but the ladies showed them very plainly that their company was not desired. Prince Kaunitz also made some vain attempts at ingratiating himself. Only three men found favor with the ladies, and they retained it as long as they lived: Field-Marshal Count Lascy, Count Rosenberg, who held an important place at court, and the Emperor Joseph.

That monarch found one of the few pleasures of a singularly unhappy life in the society and friendship of the "Fürstinnen." The general features of Joseph's strong and interesting personality and of his checkered reign are known to all readers of history Overwhelming as were the difficulties with which he had to con-

tend, impossible as was the task he set himself of substituting the action of his sovereign will for the slow process of historical evolution, yet his difficulties were increased by his personal failings. A man cannot conciliate the instincts of an absolute monarch with the aspirations of an ardent reformer, nor the strongest sense of justice in the abstract with the arbitrary violation of old rights and liberties whenever they prove inconvenient.

In the letters published by the historian Arneth* and in those now appearing under the auspices of the "Historische Commission der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften,"† most of which by the way are written in appalling French, we have interesting glimpses both of the real nobility of his mind and of its perhaps inevitable limitations. In writing to his brother Leopold, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, his great friend and confidant, he alludes "to the task God has given him in placing him in the service of fifteen millions of men."

The strain of optimism that generally runs through men of reforming tendencies was apparently wanting in Joseph. The following passage of a letter to the Grand Duke Paul of Russia—the later Emperor of that name—and his wife, reveals the mind of a benevolent and despondent autocrat, who, in spite of vaguely liberal tendencies, cannot rid himself of the sense that his subjects are helpless minors whom it is their sovereign's duty to make good and happy:

"24 Février 1781.

"* * * Vous voulez bien aussi m'encourager sur les difficultés de mon nouvel emploi. L'idée de pouvoir faire du bien et de rendre heureux ses sujets est sans doute le plus beau et le seul côté flatteur de la puissance, tout comme il est l'aiguillon le plus puissant pour tout âme sensible et honnête, mais quand en même tems l'on sçait que chaque fausse dèmarche occasionne le contraire, que le mal est si facile et si rapide à faire, et que le bien est si difficile et tardif, et que même de sa nature il doit l'être, ne pouvant s'opposer que lentement pour ètre solide dans un vaste Etat, alors cette douce illusion se diminue de beaucoup, et il ne reste plus que la satisfaction qu'on porte avec soi, et par laquelle on o la douceur incomparable de se savoir en bonne campagnie

*_Maria Theresia und Joseph II. Ihre Correspondenz sammt Briefe Josephs an seinen Bruder Leopold._ Herausgegeben von Alfred Ritter von Arneth. 1867.

†_Joseph II. und Graf Ludwig Cobenzl: Ihr Briefwechsel._ Herausgegeben von Adolph Beer und Joseph Ritter von Fiedler, wirkl. Mitgliedern der Kais. Akademie der Wissenschaften. Wien, 1901.

on est seul, et de le chercher, toute considération personnelle à part, et de ne faire que ce que le bien général de l'Etat et du grand nombre exige."

Another extract from this letter is worth quoting as expressive of a wish to get beyond the shams of life and of that sense of having a Providential mission to fulfil that has possessed so many arbiters of the fate of others:

"S'il y a trop de philosophie à tout cela, si j'ai trop ôté le manteau royal, la couronne et le sceptre, et que j'ai fait voir à Vos Altesses Impériales le souverain tout déshabillé et devant son valet de chambre, qu'Elles me pardonnent aux principes que j'ai toujours eu, de remonter à la source primitive de chaque chose et de tâcher de voir sans fard et sans apprêt chaque être et chaque chose dans son état naturel. Je ne m'en trouve pas pour cela plus malheureux, non. Chaque être, me dis-je, est créé pour remplir une place pendant un certain intervalle d'années sur le globe. Eh bien! Je suis une de ces marionettes pue la Providence, sans que j'aye pu choisir ni demander ni la rechercher, s'est plu à mettre à la place que j'occupe, afin que je fasse mon temps."

The reader of the life and letters of Joseph II. is frequently reminded of a great ruler of our own times. His strenuous activity, his extreme mobility, his devotion to military matters, his remarkable versatility, his attention to detail, his fondness for the rôle of musical and dramatic critic, above all a strange mixture of cynicism with genuine idealism, are so many points of resemblance with William II. of Germany.

In his domestic relations Joseph was no less unfortunate than in his public life. His first wife, Isabella of Parma, whom he truly loved, died of smallpox after a three years' marriage, which would have been happy but for the young princess's singular presentiment of an early death. He lost his only child, a daughter, at the age of seven. He married a second time to please his mother, but could not bear his second wife, Maria Josepha, a daughter of the late Emperor Charles VII., who was a good, well-intentioned woman, but perfectly devoid of any charm of person or mind. His caustic answer to his mother, when she begged him to write oftener to his wife during his frequent absences, speaks volumes for his poor estimate of her:

"Le 5 Juillet 1766.

"Elle (Marie Thérèse) pardonnera si je n'écris point à mon épouse; mais vent et pluie ne sauraient seules remplir une page; si jamais je trouve matière, je le ferai."

When Maria Josepha too, died of smallpox in 1767, it was popularly believed that she was not really dead, but had retired to a convent to escape the misery of her married life.

During the fifteen years in which Joseph shared the government of the Austrian lands and of Hungary with his mother (1765-1780) there was perpetual friction between them, with occasional crises of a serious nature and proposals to resign from both sides. As early as 1765 Eleonore writes of him as "that poor prince, truly to be pitied, who never will be happy himself, nor make others happy."

It was in 1770, when he was twenty-nine years of age, that the Emperor, besides going a good deal into general society, began occasionally to frequent the little circle of ladies, which had already formed itself, and in which he was at first only admitted on sufferance. Gradually he got into the habit of coming more frequently till he became the centre of the little company. When harassed and preoccupied, as was often the case, he was not inclined for animated conversation, and the ladies were at a loss how to rouse and amuse him. On other occasions he would himself encourage them to speak their minds freely on all kinds of subjects, and enjoy the lively repartee which was never wanting when Princess Eleonore was present. While they however, as good and true women, took themselves and their opinions very seriously, it is well they were happily ignorant of the Emperor's view of these conversational skirmishes, as expressed in a letter to his brother Leopold in reply to the Grand Duke's evident caution against female society:

"Le 13 Mars 1775.

"Je pense comme vous, et je crois aussi que de s'y attacher est le comble du malheur; mais de les voir, de les fréquenter, de voir leurs petites manigances, cela est amusant, et j'avoue que je m'en donne souvent la comédie. Ce sont des brise-raison pour la plupart, et comme souvent elles ont de l'esprit, il est plaisant de voir comment elles habillent leurs sophismes et préjugés toutes les fois qu'on vient, la raison à la main, leur démontrer autre chose. C'est alors qu'au moment qu'elles sentent qu'on les mettrait, comme on dit, les pieds à la mer, qu'elles s'emportent, * * * enfin tournent la conversation."

The Emperor, however, was not always as cool as in this letter he represents himself to be. Eleonore was four years younger than he was—a brilliant young woman at the most seductive age;

her liveliness and gaiety cheered him, and her independent spirit was not the least of her charms. He fell under her spell; his manner changed; he was by turns reserved and cool, or eager and devoted, like every man who truly loves and cannot declare his love. The Princess became aware of the feelings she had awakened. She was both flattered and startled, but this time only her vanity, not her heart was touched. Countess Kaunitz was extremely alarmed, and sent her much good advice, which the younger sister appears to have always taken in good part. Her husband, who at this time was usually with his regiment at Pressburg, showed signs of displeasure. Eleonore behaved admirably; no crisis took place, no dramatic scenes occurred; with the natural dignity of every good woman and the supreme ease of manner of one of high descent, she gave the Emperor to understand that the only change which could come in their mutual relations would be to place a greater distance between them. Proud as she was of being the daughter and wife of German "Reichsfürsten," she purposely emphasized her position as "subject" with regard to Joseph. When the Emperor ventured to propose a secret correspondence, she indignantly refused, adding that if he wished to write it must be by post, and that the best news he could send her would be that of her husband's promotion in the army. She did not join the annual party at the Imperial castle of Laxenburg, and was much relieved when her husband took her to their new home at Krumau. In 1772 the Ernest Kaunitzes came to Vienna, and the presence of her sister was an additional safeguard to Eleonore.*

The best proof of the discretion shown by the Princess Eleo-

*Though Wraxall, the contemporaneous traveler and author of *Memoirs of the Courts of Berlin, Dresden, Warsaw, and Vienna, in the years* 1777, 1778, 1779, is not generally considered a reliable authority, there is no reason to doubt his testimony to both the charms and the virtue of Princess Charles Liechtenstein. He says: "Her person is pleasing, and though her features cannot be esteemed regular, their expression is admirable. Her mouth is peculiarly beautiful, and over her whole figure is diffused an air of modesty, intelligence, and dignity rarely blended in any woman. She possesses, besides an enlarged and cultivated mind, a fund of amusing conversation and powers of entertaining, as well as improving, very superior to the generality of her sex in Vienna." He adds that "her sense of what she owes to her family and herself, added to a religious and serious turn of mind," were her safeguards amid the dangers of her position. "She is the object of his affection and friendship," but nothing more. "It is in her conversation that Joseph finds the most pleasing relaxation from public business, as well as from private disquietude."

nore lies in the fact that she continued to enjoy the favor of the Empress Maria Theresa, who frequently invited her to intimate gatherings at Schönbrunn and Laxenburg. Eleonore was not as anxious for these invitations as the Empress doubtless supposed. Though there is no doubt that she was perfectly aware of the prestige which the Emperor's friendship gave her, she was all through life impatient of the artificiality and the restraints of court life. As a very young woman she writes to her sister on receiving an invitation to Laxenburg: "I would have liked to refuse, but could find no prètext for doing so. For me to live at court would be a sure means of sending me to another world; what *gène,* what embarrassment, what ennui! One can never say what one really thinks or feels."

In her letters from Laxenburg in 1786, where a large and brilliant company was assembled and they were "swimming in amusements," as she expresses it, she says: "I am immersed in court life. Wit, feeling, and fancy are forbidden things at Laxenburg, but the whole world is enchanted. * * * I would like to tell you something new, but nothing breaks the monotony of our life. It is dreadful to be always with sixty people, whose thoughts you don't know." In another place she says: "During my whole life the atmosphere of a court was antipathetic to me." This antipathy was largely due to her proud and independent character. On one occasion (1779) the Emperor came to Eisgrub, the seat of the head of the Liechtenstein family, where Eleonore was staying; she had some real or fancied cause of displeasure against him, and treated him with such coolness that he left that same night. A lady of this description is not likely to feel happy amid the prescribed round of pursuits and pleasures of a residence at court.

The independence that was a salient trait in the Princess was, however, curiously blended with a remarkable craving for the shelter and safeguard of her husband's presence and authority. In a letter to her sister dated the 30th of June, 1772, she deplores her separation from him, and says: "It is a bad thing; I get accustomed to a certain independence while yet I am made to wear a yoke ('mit meinem ganzen Wesen für des Joch geschaffen bin')."

Prince Charles was no less independent than his wife, and he quarrelled more than once with his imperious sovereign. Eleonore invariably took her husband's part. This added to the complications of her singularly checkered relations with the Emperor.

In 1780 the Empress Maria Theresa died, and Joseph was at length able to execute fully his long-cherished schemes of reform. It does not lie within the scope of this paper to enumerate the various daring and radical measures taken by Joseph to introduce a strong centralized bureaucratic government, with equal justice for all, toleration of the Protestant and Greek religious bodies, and German as the official language of the Empire. These measures concern us only in so far as they affected the Emperor's relations with the "five ladies." As might be expected, they met with scanty approval. The Princess Eleonore was the "leader of the opposition." Her mind and that of the philosophical Emperor ever remained at opposite poles. The movement known as the "Aufklärung," which had so deeply influenced him, always appeared to her as an emanation of the evil one. Clever as she was, she committed the mistake which Anatole France qualifies as a mark of stupidity: "rien n'est bête comme de bouder l'avenir." Her attitude of mind towards the future was "sulky." Besides, as a German "Reichsfürstin" she clung to the feudal and federal institutions of the Empire, to the autonomy of its various States, with their chartered privileges; her pride no less than hereditary instincts revolted against absolutism and the mechanical rule of a subservient bureaucracy. It is more surprising that her womanly sympathies were apparently not awakened by the Emperor's "passionate pity" for the sufferings of the poor, to which all his biographers bear witness. There is no reason to suppose that this was owing to lack of kindness of heart; it was probably due to the same causes that make most of us more callous than we should be to sorrows that do not come under our immediate notice, and also in some measure to a recoil from the sickly sentimentality and unreal philanthropy of the school of Rousseau.

The ladies were, however, most deeply grieved by the attitude of Joseph towards the church. It is, perhaps, not generally known how very near he came to playing a part similar to that of Henry the Eighth with regard to Rome. As an instance of the strained relations between the Vatican and the Emperor, his action on one occasion may be cited. He sent back a letter he had received from the Pope unanswered, with the remark that it could not possibly have emanated from his Holiness, and that he hoped the author of the forgery might be duly punished. Although this particular incident may not have reached their ears, the constant friction between Joseph and the Papal See was apparent enough

to fill the mind of devout Catholics with alarm. Joseph the Second considered it his duty to sweep away abuses in the church as well as in the State. Here, too, he took no half-measures. In eight years he suppressed 700 convents and reduced the number of "religious" by 36,000. (True 1,324 convents remained in existence, with 27,000 monks and nuns.) He opposed the influence of the Papacy, and forbade his Austrian subjects to go to the German college at Rome. He made severe laws against unworthy priests, reduced the incomes of the higher clergy, regulated public worship, and ordered the removal of side altars, votive offerings, and unnecessary ornaments in the churches.

The ladies looked upon these and similar measures either as persecutions, such as the early Christians suffered, or in any case as acts of intolerable interference with church matters. Perhaps vague fear of a complete rupture with the Pope like that of the Church of England in the sixteenth century added to their anxiety, for Countess Kaunitz wrote to her sister (7th of July, 1781): "When a sovereign decides on dogmatic matters he establishes a royal primacy like that in England."

Neither her arguments nor the more passionate protests of her sister ever had the smallest influence with the Emperor. It is worthy of notice, however, that in her opinion of the Jesuits, Countess Kaunitz came nearer to agreement with Joseph than on most matters. In 1769, on the death of Pope Clement the Thirteenth, she wrote: "May God give us a good Pope! The Jesuits are intriguing to get a Pope after their pattern. Truly it would be better for religion and peace if they did not exist. God certainly does not need the Jesuits. Twelve poor fishermen founded our religion. * * * It is an insult to God and the church to believe that this or that order is indispensable."

The Emperor had indeed good cause to distrust the Jesuits. Their bitter hostility was one of the main causes of the revolution in the Austrian Netherlands that broke out in 1786 and ended in the final loss of that troublesome possession to the Austrian crown in 1789. These latter years of Joseph's reign were crowded with misfortune of all kinds.

His health, which had been slowly failing, broke down completely during the unfortunate Turkish campaign in 1788. He insisted on sharing in the hardships of his men, and suffered severely from exposure, fever, and, more than all, from want of success that attended his arms. He was obliged to return to

Vienna in the autumn of that year, leaving the command of the army to the far more competent hands of Laudon. Hungary, which more than any other part of his heterogeneous empire, had resented the attempt at amalgamation, was in an increasingly dangerous state. The unfortunate Emperor was obliged in his "paternal love," by a formal act of repeal dated the 28th of January, 1790, to cancel all the changes he had made since 1780, and also to send back the crown of Hungary from Vienna to Pesth. It is a melancholy thought that the same problems which Joseph the Second vainly tried to remove rather than to solve more than a century ago, have baffled the more patient and statesmanlike efforts of Francis Joseph and his advisers, and that the declining years of that monarch are equally saddened by heart-breaking disillusion and gloomy forebodings.

The repeated blows of fortune "slowly pushed the Emperor into his grave," as an Austrian writer expresses it. In all history there is scarcely a more pathetic figure than that of Joseph the Second dying in the prime of life—he was only forty-nine—with the agonizing sense of apparent failure in almost everything he had undertaken for the good of his people, shunned even by his brother Leopold, who refused to come to Vienna and share the government with him; by his sister Christina, who with her husband Duke Albert of Saxony had been governor of the Austrian Netherlands and could not forgive him the unwise policy which she believed had led to the revolution, surrounded only by his nephew Francis, the gentlemen of his household, and male attendants. The news of the taking of Belgrade on the 6th of October, 1789, was the last ray of sunshine in his life. Yet he writes sadly to his brother: "Yesterday a Te Deum was sung; incredible numbers of people were in the streets and gave way to rejoicings such as I have never witnessed. This lasted the whole night; every house was illuminated, bands of musicians marched through the streets, and I, unable in my miserable condition to rejoice at anything, went to bed at eight o'clock, but my cough kept me awake. In this way I spend my wretched existence." And in December he writes in a similar strain: "I am the most unhappy of living men; patience and resignation are my only motto."

The five ladies assembled daily to discuss the reports from the Emperor's sick-bed, and several of them accompanied the clergy to the entrance of his room when they brought him the Sacraments of the dying. The last note which he wrote was addressed

to them and brought by Count Lascy on the evening of the 19th to the house of Princess Franz Liechtenstein, where they were gathered. Early the next morning death released their imperial friend from his sufferings.

Even at this supreme moment the Princess Eleonore scarcely did him justice. Her reference to him in a letter to her daughter shortly before his death is painfully tinged with bitterness, for which, however, she had special cause, as will be shown presently. Later in life, when time and experience had softened the asperities of her character, and also when she had learnt to judge him by comparison with his feeble successors, she spoke with more appreciation. The following year already she wrote thus to her daughter: "The poor late Emperor often made us furious, but what spirit, what life, what fire, what sense of justice he brought into everything! At that time there was always something new to talk and write about; now everthing seems struck by paralysis."

The same campaign that certainly hastened the death of the Emperor made Princess Eleonore a widow. When war broke out with Turkey, Prince Charles got an important command in Croatia, but his troops were insufficient; he could not even rely on a portion of them—the Croats. He accomplished little, and was obliged to make one of those backward movements which the enemy is apt to interpret as a flight. He fell ill and had to resign his command. His wife, accompanied only by a man and a maid, undertook the difficult journey to Agram, where he was lying. He recovered sufficiently to be taken back to Vienna, but his health was broken and he suffered bitterly from the Emperor's evident displeasure. His appointment as titular field-marshal without a word of mention of his forty-one years of military service could not allay his sorrow nor his wife's anger with the Emperor. The Prince lingered on till the 21st of February of the following year, when he died, to her great grief. In a letter of condolence of Countess Kaunitz the Emperor, however, spoke emphatically of the loss that he and the State had sustained in the late Prince.

The end of the reign of Joseph closed the brilliant epoch of the life of Eleonore. The ladies' soirées continued for a time, but they had lost their chief interest and significance. The Princess ceased to play a conspicuous rôle in society. She, however, saw her old friends very frequently, and remained in touch with the world of

politics and fashion by numerous personal links. Her sister's only child, Josephine Kaunitz, married the then rising statesman, Count Clement Metternich. The match was considered a poor one for the great Austrian heiress, for the Metternichs were "outsiders," being of old Westphalian nobility. The bride's aunt, however, was very partial to the astute diplomat, who paid her becoming homage, but she did not fully trust him, and scarcely approved of his appointment as chancellor at the early age of thirty-six.

As the mother of six children, of whom five were sons, there was no lack of color and interest in Princess Eleonore's widowed life. Her imperious disposition enhanced the difficulty of her relations with her high-spirited sons, who objected to have their careers and their wives chosen for them by their mother. They were all born soldiers, but Prince Charles, the eldest, was forced into the civil service, and Wenzel, the second, into the church. Both were desperately wild. Charles settled down for a time after his marriage, and held important appointment under the Emperor Francis, but he afterwards got entangled in an affair of honor with a North German church dignitary whom he met at the house of the Jewish banker Arnstein, whose wife, a charming and perfectly virtuous woman, held a much-frequented salon, celebrated afterwards as a favorite resort of Wellesley, Talleyrand, Humboldt, and Nesselrode during the Congress of Vienna. (That it was at the same time severely shunned by the ladies of the Austrian aristocracy need not be said.) Prince Charles was killed in this duel, leaving a young wife and child. Wenzel, after being a scandal to his cloth for some years, at length was relieved of his vows and became as good a soldier as he had been a bad priest. The other three brothers at once adopted the profession of arms, and during the long series of wars with the French, which with intervals of ignominious peace lasted for nearly twenty years, the Princess was scarcely ever without a mother's poignant anxiety for her soldier sons. In 1794 one of them—Francis, a lad of eighteen—died of his wounds while in captivity with the French. The others were frequently wounded or made prisoners. They were all three in the army which capitulated at Ulm, that Austrian Sedan, in 1805. It may easily be imagined what Princess Eleonore's sufferings were during those terrible years, and how keenly her pride and patriotism were wounded by the downfall of

the German Empire and the humiliation of Europe under the galling tyranny of Napoleon.

The chief joy of her declining years, as indeed of her whole life after that child's birth, was in her only daughter, Josephine; married in 1782 to Count Harrach, a distinguished and cultured nobleman, who managed his large properties in Bohemia, Moravia, and Austria proper in an enlightened and public-spirited manner. His wife appears to have been a delightful woman, with a fine mind and character, and marked musical talents. (The Emperor Joseph was so charmed with her voice that he wrote a paper on the art of singing, "Réflexions sur le Chant," especially for her.) The marriage was happy but childless, and Josephine devoted much of her time to her mother, who lost her dearly loved sister in 1795. In spite of some differences of opinion, the relations between mother and daughter were marked by the mutual tenderness that is a source of exquisite happiness in the somewhat rare cases where it exists in perfection. The expressions of passionate affection quoted by M. Wolf put the reader in mind of Madame de Sévigné's letters to the less responsive Madame de Grignan. A couple of extracts will suffice to show this side of Eleonore's nature:

"Only a word, my beloved daughter, to tell you how heavy my heart is because you are gone—you, my joy, my happiness, my life.

"God be with you on your journey, and make you happy. As regards myself, you know that my thoughts and wishes are always with you. Our love, my precious child, my only, my best friend, be our comfort, our support, our refreshment, and all in and with God, for apart from Him there is no happiness."

In a woman of such healthy sincerity as the Princess Eleonore, there is no doubt that an utterance such as the last quoted was not an empty figure of speech. Her religion was not merely a round of outward observances. She was always an obedient daughter of the Roman Catholic Church; but if she had been a narrow bigot, she could not have made the following striking statement: "When one sees the bishops, how they think only of money and lands, one must acknowledge that religion is only preserved by a miracle." Comparatively early in life she wrote (in 1792): "Happiness lies only in ourselves; we seek it in vain

in the bustle, the distractions of the world, in rank and wealth; as regards myself, I can sum up all philosophical reflections on this subject in these two sentences: "Gloria in excelsis Deo, et in terra pax hominibus bonæ voluntatis." And in 1801: "I endeavour to make this my task, to look at matters with prayer, gentleness, and consideration, and to promote whatever is good."

She died peacefully, after a short illness, on the 26th of November, 1812. In spite of mental limitations and some faults of character, she is, taken all in all, a noble figure, noble in her obedience to duty, in her independence of judgment and conduct, in her life-long struggle with those elements in her strong and passionate nature which she knew to be hostile to the high principles that she professed with unquestionable sincerity.

S. I. DE ZUYLEN DE NYEVELT.

THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.

MAJOR JOHN P. WISSER, INSPECTOR GENERAL.

FOURTEENTH PAPER.

(February 8 to June 4, 1905.)

NAVAL OPERATIONS.

THE operations on land have been followed to include the great battle of Mukden, and now it remains to consider the naval operations of the second year of the war, culminating in the decisive action in Corea Straits, or, as Admiral Togo has officially designated it, the battle of the Japan Sea.

The first year of the war left Japan in complete control of the sea in the vicinity of the theatre of operations, and the only port remaining to Russia in that region was Vladivostok, and that was closely blockaded by the Japanese.

The Russian Baltic Squadron (as it was popularly called), or the Second Pacific Squadron (its official designation at home), took nearly eight months to get together, and after four months afloat was still 6,500 miles from its destination.

We have traced its progress through the first year of the war, and will now follow its course to the final action off Tsushima.

THE SECOND PACIFIC SQUADRON (CONTINUED).

The Second Pacific Squadron, under Rear-Admiral Rojestvensky, the first sections of which had sailed from Libau, in the Baltic Sea, on October 14, 1904, was constituted as follows:

First Battleship Division (Rojestvensky).—Kniaz Suvaroff (flag), Borodino, Alexander III, Orel.

Second Battleship Division (Folkersam).—Sissoi-Veliky (flag), Osliabya, Navarin, Admiral Nakhimoff (armored cruiser). [Did not leave Libau till February 15, 1905.]

First Cruiser Division (Enquist).—Aurora (flag), Dmitri Douskoi, Oleg.

Second Cruiser Division.—Almaz (flag), Svietlana, Jemtchug, Izmurud.

Torpedo Flotilla.—Korea (cruiser), three destroyers, Kitai (cruiser), four destroyers.

Auxiliary Vessels.—Ural (cruiser), Don (cruiser), Volga (cruiser), Orel (hospital ship), Kamtchatka (repair ship), colliers.

The second section of this squadron, under Captain Dobrotvorsky, had sailed from Libau on November 16, 1904, and comprised (besides the Oleg, Izmurud and five destroyers of the above list) the auxiliary cruisers Terek, Dnieper and Rion.

The squadrons under Rojestvensky and Folkersam had assembled at Nossi-Bé, on the west coast of Madagascar, having sailed southward from Djibuti Bay, French Somali Land (near the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb) on December 15, 1904. On February 4, the squadron under Dobrotvorsky left Djibuti Bay for Madagascar.

The third section of the Second Pacific Squadron did not leave Libau, to join Rojestvensky, till February 15. This squadron, under Admiral Niebogatoff, comprised the following warships:

Nicolai I (battleship).
Admiral Nakhimoff (armored cruiser).
Vladimir Monomach (armored cruiser).
Admiral Apraxine (coast defense ship).
Admiral Seniavine (coast defense ship).
Admiral Ouchakoff (coast defense ship).
Three transports.

The Russian fleet, therefore, numbered in all eight battleships, three armored cruisers, three coast defense ships, and six protected cruisers.

There were also with the fleet ten torpedo boats (although only seven appear to have been present at the battle in Korea Straits), eleven transports, and not less than twenty-four chartered coaling steamers.

Moreover, in Vladivostok were the armored cruisers Rossia and Gromoboi (or Gromovoi), undergoing repairs, and which might possibly have joined the fleet.

The Japanese fleet, at the end of the first year of the war was in even better form than at its commencement, the guns and boilers having been repaired, and in part newly replaced. The material losses of the Japanese fleet for the year had also been comparatively inconsiderable.

This fleet, at this time, comprised the following vessels:

Battleships.—Mikasa (flag), Asahi, Shikishima, Fuji.

Armored Cruisers.—Asama, Tokiwa, Idzumo, Iwate, Yakumo, Adzuma, Nisshin, Kasuga.

Protected Cruisers.—Takasago, Kasagi, Chitose, Itsukushima, Hashidate, Matsushima, Naniwa, Takachiho, Akitsushima, Niitaka, Tsushima, Suma, Akashi, Idzumi.

Besides a number of unprotected ships of no great fighting value, and a large flotilla of torpedo boats.

Several of the Russian warships, which had been sunk during the war, were being with a view to their utilization by the Japanese. The Variag, sunk at Chemulpo at the beginning of the war, was thus raised by Japanese salvors and afterwards repaired, and it was expected would be in commission in the spring of 1905.

Admiral Togo hoisted his flag on the battleship Mikasa on February 6, 1905, and sailed for the Pescadores. Japan had completed her preparations for the encounter with the Russian Second Pacific Squadron, and the naval campaign of the second year of the war opened.

The Japanese had at first considered the advisability of meeting Rojestvensky's fleet near Madagascar, with a view to defeating it before it could be reinforced by the squadron of Folkersam, or later by that of Captain Dobrotvorsky, but this plan was soon abandoned.

As early as the beginning of December, two Japanese cruisers, the Hong-Kong-Maru and the Nippon-Maru, had been sent out on a scouting expedition to Singapore. Thence they proceeded to the Bay of Diego-Garcia, in the latter part of December; thence south along the Madagascar coast as far as the heights of Mauritius; then turned back through the Bay of Diego-Garcia to Sumatra, examining its western coast up to the Straits of Sunda.

This reconnaissance showed the Japanese the difficulties of prosecuting a naval campaign 5,000 miles from the base, and, in spite of its strategical advantages, the plan to attack Rojestvensky at Madagascar was abandoned.

The Japanese decided to await the Russian fleet in home waters, and contented themselves with sending out scouts in observation, which kept Togo informed of every movement of that fleet.

In gun-power the two fleets were fairly well matched, as will appear from the following comparison, the advantage, however, being with the Russians:

Russia.—Battleships, 8; armored cruisers, 6; protected cruisers, 6.

Japan.—Battleships, 4; armored cruisers, 8; protected cruisers, 14.

Armored Ships (main guns).—Russia, 12-in., 26; 10-in., 7; 9-in., 12; 8-in., 13; 6-in., 131; 4.7-in., 10. Japan, 12-in., 16; 10-in., 1; 8-in., 30; 6-in., 160.

Protected Ships (main guns).—Russia, 6-in., 26; 4.7-in., 18. Japan, 12-in., 3 (old); 10-in., 4; 8-in., 6; 6-in., 34; 4.7-in., 87.

The Russian armored ships had greatly the advantage in the high-power guns (12- and 10-inch), having nearly twice as many of these pieces as the Japanese. The medium caliber guns (9- and 8-inch) were nearly equal. In low caliber guns of the main battery (6- and 4.7-inch), however, Japan had the advantage.

The Japanese protected ships, on the other hand, had greatly the advantage over the Russian in every caliber of gun.

The first object of the Russians was to reach a port where they could coal fully and re-equip their ships, and put them in good condition for a naval battle. Vladivostok was the only port where this could properly be effected, although the French ports (France being an ally of Russia's) might serve as temporary havens for rest and recuperation.

From Madagascar to Singapore by the shortest way is 3,400 miles, and would require at least a month for the passage by the Russian fleet, but Vladivostok is still many miles beyond that point.

The problem for the Japanese fleet was, *first,* not to allow Rojestvensky's squadron to get to Vladivostok, by its overthrow far away from friendly shores, and *secondly,* to maintain the blockade of Vladivostok.

To intercept Rojestvensky, Admiral Togo, with the main forces of the Japanese fleet (4 battleships, 4 armored cruisers, several smaller cruisers, and a large torpedo flotilla) cruised in the vicinity of Formosa and the Pescadores. To watch the east coast of Japan, Admiral Kamimura with his squadron (2 armored cruisers, 4 protected cruisers and a division of destroyers) cruised near the islands of Sin-kin. Close to the shores of Borneo, Admiral Shimamura, with 3 protected cruisers and a torpedo flotilla, watched the eastern waters of the Malay Archipelago. In Malay and Sunda Straits and the Sea of Java, another division (composed of 3 auxiliary cruisers, 1 protected cruiser and 13 torpedo-boats) cruised to guard these waters.

To blockade Vladivostok two divisions were told off: the squadron of Admiral Uriu (2 armored cruisers and a division of torpedo-boats), cruising close to the Straits of Sangari, and another squadron the Chin-Yen (3 protected cruisers and a torpedo flotilla), cruising in Corea Straits.

This was the general system for the service of security and information on the part of the Japanese, but changes were made from time to time. On March 15, 1905, for instance, a Japanese squadron, consisting of the protected cruisers Kasagi (flagship of Admiral Dewa) and Chitose, and the converted cruisers America, Maru and

Yawate Maru arrived off Singapore, while 18 other warships lay some 20 miles further out.

The squadron, under Admiral Niebogatoff, passed through the Suez Canal on March 25, 1905, arriving at Jibutil on April 5, and left for the East on the 7th.

Rojestvensky left Noissi-Bé on March 16, passing Singapore on April 8th, and anchoring in Camranh Bay, a fine harbor on the coast of French Cochin-China, about 40 miles north of Saigon on April 14th. Here he coaled and replenished his stores and provisions.

On April 22d, yielding to pressure from the French Government, he left Camranh Bay, and proceeded to Hon-koke Bay, 50 miles further north, where he anchored on May 2d.

Admiral Niebogatoff passed down the Straits of Malacca on May 4th and Singapore on the 5th, joining Rojestvensky on the 9th.

On May 19th the entire Russian squadron left Hon-koke Bay steaming north. On May 26th some 17 of their colliers and volunteer fleet arrived off the mouth of the Yang-tse, and on the 27th the Russian squadron was sighted by Admiral Togo's fleet in the Straits of Corea, and the action began toward evening off Okino-Shina, to the southeast of Tsushima.

NAVAL BATTLE IN THE SEA OF JAPAN.*

(May 27-28, 1905.)

The naval battle in the Sea of Japan will go down in history as the greatest naval action since Trafalgar, the victory of the Japanese will remain forever one of the brightest pages in her history, and to the rest of the world the engagement stands as the latest example of a decisive naval battle on a large scale with modern war material.

Rojestvensky decided to take the direct route to Vladivostok, through the Straits of Korea.

Togo, after the Russian fleet of Port Arthur had been destroyed, saw no necessity for advancing very far against the Second Pacific squadron; whether its strategic object was the harbor of Vladivostok or the Japanese fleet, it was not necessary to intercept it beyond a point where it could become an active agent by interfering with the Japanese communications with the theatre of war. He, therefore, selected the harbor of Masampho, on the southeastern coast of Korea as his base of operations. This gave him a position at the division in

*Officially so styled by Admiral Togo; also called the *Battle in Korea Straits.*

the Korean Straits, made by the Island of Tsushima, more advantageous than Kiusiu Bay (at Nagasaki) would have offered, and if the Russians had decided to turn off toward Port Arthur, he would have occupied there an advantageous position in their rear. The waters were favorable for the use of torpedo-boats, and the position was far enough from Vladivostok to enable the Japanese to reap the full rewards of victory.

Togo awaited the Russians, therefore, in a well-prepared position.

Rojestvensky, on leaving the mouth of the Yang-tse, where he had coaled, detached most of his fleet of transports and colliers, and steamed northeastward directly toward his enemy. Only a victory in battle could give him an opportunity to replenish his coal supply, consequently this was his only proper course of action.

But his method of advance was extremely faulty in that he advanced into the straits without sending out any scouts for reconnaissance, and in double column (with auxiliary vessels and torpedo-boats as a third column between the two main columns), without men at the guns, even without having his ships cleared for action.

By this carelessness the battle was practically lost before it actually began. The lack of proper war preparation, in the broadest sense of the term, was the decisive factor in this battle, rather than inferior armament, or inferior fighting power of the individual ships engaged, or inferior numbers and poorer composition of the fleet.

At 5:30 a. m., May 27, 1905, Togo received at Masampho, where he was lying in wait with his main squadron, a wireless message to the effect that the Russian fleet was in sight. The Japanese scouts had detected the Russians between Quelparts Island and the Goto Islands (on the Japanese coast opposite), about 50 nautical miles from the southern end of Tsushima.

Togo at once ran out with his ships, directing his course on the northern end of Tsushima. The Japanese fleet of 4 battleships and 8 armored cruisers was divided into two fighting squadrons of six ships each (I squadron, 4 battleships, 2 armored cruisers; II squadron, 6 armored cruisers, 5 ships each), while the 14 other cruisers were separately organized (a third squadron, for example, being organized of slow, but well-protected cruisers, to serve as a decoy for the Russians), and there were, besides, 5 divisions of torpedo-boats and other small vessels. The latter, on account of the heavy sea, were forced to seek shelter on the coast of Tsushima, but were able to take part in the action later in the day.

The weather at mid-day was somewhat foggy, limiting the view

to about five miles, and the sea rather rough, but later in the day it cleared and the sea became calm.

The third Japanese squadron, composed entirely of slow but well-protected cruisers, had been sent out in advance to reconnoitre, passing down the west channel, and to draw the Russians into the Korean Straits. A small cruiser had been attached to this squadron to serve as a despatch boat. This squadron, at 11:30 a. m., sent a wireless message to the main Japanese squadron announcing that "The enemy is heading into the East Passage." The third squadron then turned back before the Russian fleet and joined the main squadron at 1 p. m. The latter, headed by Togo's flagship, the Mikasa, was heading in single column southward down the East Passage of Korea Straits.

The Russian fleet had seen *in its rear* the Japanese scout cruiser, which had sent the first wireless message from the vicinity of Quelpart Island, and had observed it steaming along parallel to the Russian fleet, but out of range. Moreover, at 11:30 a. m., the Japanese third squadron, to the northwest of the fleet, approached so close that the Russian battleships fired on it till it went about and was soon out of sight. All these indications of the near presence of the Japanese did not induce Rojestvensky to change his formation.

Soon after 1 p. m. the Japanese adopted the formation designed to surround the Russians, the main and second squadrons turning more to the westward, while the third squadron held more toward the east side of the straits.

The Russian fleet, steaming directly into the middle of the channel, was sighted at 1:45 p. m., in latitude 34° north, and was apparently completely surprised by the Japanese fleet, the main body of which, on account of the foggy weather, the green and blue color of the ships, and the back-ground of the Island of Tsushima, had been very difficult to detect. At this time the weather had cleared somewhat and brought the Japanese fleet in plain view.

The action took place to the southeast of Tsushima, near Okimoshima.

The main Japanese fleet, coming into view on the port bow of the Russians, turned to port and covered Rojestvensky's leading ships with heavy fire at long range. The Russians had previously opened fire at very long range, but the Japanese did not reply till they were at about 8,750 yards, but then with well-directed shots. Later, in the course of the action, the range of the fighting ships reduced to 2,200 yards.

The movement of the Japanese fleet was met by Rojestvensky turning the ships of his left column, or battleship squadron, to starboard.

In this first phase of the battle, there resulted, therefore, for the eight Russian battleships, which Rojestvensky commanded from on board the Knias Suvaroff, a running fight, in which they were surrounded in front by the Japanese ships, which were in an advantageous position from the very outset, and of superior speed, and forced further and further from their course over to the coast of Kiusiu. This necessarily brought the two right columns into a very precarious situation; the lines were broken and thrown into disorder, and had great difficulty in carrying out the order to give way to the right.

Moreover, they were fired on by the third squadron, which had been detached to the starboard of the Russians at the beginning of the action.

Several cruisers, which had formed the continuation of the battleship line of the left column, and which found no effective use there, were detached for their support. None of the Russian torpedo-boats, which steamed into the fight, however, wedged in as they were in this méleé, reached any of the Japanese ships, so far as known.

This first, purely artillery, phase of the battle, during which the Mikasa had dropped to No. 4 in the main column, which was thus commanded from its center, lasted about three hours, and cost the Russians five battleships (Kniaz Suvaroff, Osliabya, Borodino, Alexander III and Navarin), which sank, riddled with shell, or were so greatly incapacitated as to fall an easy prey to the torpedo-boats.

The battle remained stationary for a considerable time, the faster Japanese vessels surrounding the head of the Russian columns, pouring in broadside after broadside, as the Russian battleship squadron turned in a flat curve to starboard, compelling the latter to remain covering the smaller vessels, transports and torpedo-boats.

At about sunset, but before dark, the first Japanese torpedo-boat attacks took place, the Russian squadron meanwhile changing course to the north, with a view to breaking through the Japanese line. Disorder in the Russian columns, however, prevented the execution of this movement for some time.

The Osliabya had her conning tower struck at the very opening of the engagement, and Admiral Folkersam was killed. The ship sank at 3 p. m.

The flagship Kniaz Suvaroff began sinking in the course of the afternoon, and Admiral Rojestvensky, who had been seriously wounded during the action, was with his staff transferred to the torpedo-

boat Buini, which had already taken on board 200 from the Osliabya, but the Buini, finding navigation difficult, the Admiral and his staff were transferred to the torpedo-boat Biedovy.

Towards evening the Japanese destroyer Sazanami captured the Biedovy to the south of Urleung Island, off the Korean coast, taking Admiral Rojestvensky and his staff, another admiral, and about eighty Russians, prisoners. The Buini afterwards sank.

The Japanese torpedo-boats continued their attacks during the night.

The Russians lost on the 27th the following ships, which were sunk: the battleships Kniaz Suvaroff, Borodino, Alexander III, Oliabya and Navarin, the cruiser Almaz, and the special-service steamers Kamptchatka and Ural, besides a number of smaller ships, while the Sissoi Veliky, Admiral Nakhimoff and Vladimir Monomach suffered heavily.

After dark, Niebogatoff, who had taken command, started with three battleships (Nicolai I, Orel, and Sissoi Veliky), two coast defense vessels (Admiral Seniavine and Admiral Adraxine) and three cruisers (Vladimir Monomach, Izumrud and Admiral Nakhimoff), steaming at fourteen knots in a northeastern direction for Vladivostok. These were the only Russian vessels still well in hand. Several of these ships, however, soon indicated that they could not keep up, and as the column became thereby drawn out, the Japanese directed three successive torpedo-boat attacks against it, putting completely out of action one battleship (Sissoi Veliky) and two armored cruisers (Admiral Nakhimoff and Vladimir Monomach).

The Russians, by the use of their searchlights, at first kept the Japanese torpedo-boats at a distance, but as their use also revealed at the same time the positions of the Russian ships, the attack finally succeeded. Moreover, the Japanese fighting squadrons were also thereby informed of the direction taken by the Russian ships, and were thus able to pursue in time.

The engagement and pursuit continued through the night of the 27th, and on the morning of the 28th the Japanese combined squadrons attacked at Liancourt Rocks (about 200 miles northeast of Tsushima Island) what was left of the squadron of Niebogatoff, consisting of the Nicolai I, Orel, Admiral Seniavin, Admiral Apraxine and Izumrud. The latter escaped, while the other four surrendered during the afternoon. Niebogatoff and about 2,000 Russians were taken prisoners.

The pursuit was stopped for a time to receive the surrender, but

while the Japanese were engaged in the disposition of the surrendered ships, they discovered to the southwest the coast-defense ship Admiral Mehakoff, and despatched the Iwate and Yakumo in pursuit. The latter called upon the Russian ship to surrender, but as she refused, they sunk her at 6 p. m., rescuing the crew of 300 men. The cruiser Dmitri Donskoi was also observed at 5 p. m., in a northwestern direction, and was attacked by the Japanese Fourth Division and the Second Destroyer flotilla. Next morning (29th) she was found aground on the southeastern shore of Urleung Island, off the Korean coast.

The Sissoi Veliky, Admiral Nakhimoff and Vladimir Monomach, which had suffered heavily during the afternoon of the 27th, and were unable to follow Niebogatoff's fleeing squadron, were attacked at night by the Japanese destroyers and torpedo boats, and put completely out of action. They were discovered on the morning of the 28th, drifting near Tsushima Island, by the Japanese converted cruisers Shinano Maru, Yawata Maru, Tainan Maru, and Sado Maru, but sank before they could be captured.

On the morning of the 28th, the Japanese cruiser Chitose, cruising northward, found and sunk a Russian destroyer. At noon on the same day the Japanese cruiser Niitaka and the Japanese destroyer Murakumo attacked another Russian destroyer, which finally went aground.

At 9 a. m. on the 28th, the Svietlana was discovered off Chekuten (or Chaguchien) Bay, Korea (about 50 miles south of Gensan), and sunk by the Japanese ships Niitaka and Otowa.

The Aurora, Oleg and Jemchug escaped, arriving at Manila on June 3rd. They had suffered considerable damage in action, and serious losses in killed and wounded.

The destroyer Bodry was towed into Shanghai on June 4th by a British steamer, having been picked up at sea.

The small cruiser Almaz and the destroyers Grozny and Bravi managed to reach Vladivostok.

The Izmurud was destroyed by her own crew, while on her way to Vladivostok.

The Russian transports left at Wusung were there interned for the rest of the war, and their crews paroled.

In the entire battle the Russian losses in warships were as follows:

Sunk.—Kniaz Suvaroff, Borodino, Alexander III, Sissoi-Veliky, Osliabya, Navarin, Admiral Mehakoff, Admiral Nakhimoff, Vladimir Monomach, Dmitri Donskoi, Svietlana, Izmurud, destroyer Buini, two other destroyers.

Captured.—Nicolai I, Orel, Admiral Apraxine, Admiral Seniavine, destroyer Biedovy.

Interned.—Oleg, Aurora, Jemtchug, destroyer Bodry, all the transports.

The Russian losses in men were 6,143 prisoners (including Admirals Rojestvensky and Niebogatoff) taken by the Japanese, and about 14,000 killed and wounded (including Admiral Folkersam).

The Japanese took several thousand prisoners besides the 2,000 taken by the main force on the 27th. They lost three torpedo-boats (34th, 35th and 69th), sunk, and their total casualties were 524 killed and wounded. None of their larger vessels were incapacitated for action or seriously injured.

COMMENTS.

The general purpose of the Russians in sending out a Second Pacific Squadron was to turn the scale in the war in the Far East. For eight months Rojestvensky had labored hard to improve the condition of his fleet for the coming struggle, but the opposing factors were too great to be readily overcome, namely, the national spirit, which is not inclined to naval exploits or seamanship of the highest order, and the defective method of training resulting from this lack of inclination or aptitude, in which the true naval spirit was wanting.

The Russians needed a port near the theatre of war, to be used as a base of operations, and Vladivostok was the only one available for the purpose, although it is situated somewhat disadvantageously for the strategic defensive, which was the course of action decided upon by the Russians. The main purpose of the fleet, acting from this base, was to be the breaking of the communications of the Japanese with their army fighting in Manchuria.

But Rojestvensky mistook his proper objective. This was not Vladivostok, but the Japanese fleet. The only effective means of opening the way to Vladivostok, and render this port available as a base of operations for his fleet, was to wrest the command of the sea from the Japanese, and this could only be accomplished by annihilating their fleet. Without that victory Vladivostok was worth nothing.

Rojestvensky, however, acted correctly when he decided to take the direct route to Vladivostok, which would necessarily bring him in contact with the Japanese fleet under Togo, instead of attempting to reach Vladivostok by any round-about way. Nevertheless, his purpose in advancing through the Korea Straits and throughout the action there, was not (as it should have been) to destroy the Japanese fleet (or inflict as much damage as possible), but to break through

the Japanese line and reach Vladivostok with a fair proportion of his ships. If he succeeded in that he was satisfied. This is an entirely false principle. It lacks the spirit of the offensive, and even if successful can lead to no decisive results.

This mistaken view of the proper mode of action, regarding Vladivostok as the strategic object of the advance, affected even the gunners, who failed to reach their adversaries with their projectiles. The fact that the Japanese torpedo-boats were able to attack even by daylight is sufficient evidence of the inadequacy of the Russian gunnery, not to speak of the slight injury inflicted on the larger Japanese warships.

The heterogeneous character of the Russian fleet in composition led to the defective organization adopted, which courted disaster. If the squadron of five first-class battleships and four new cruisers, which were all ready at the beginning of autumn, 1904, had sailed from Libau in September, it could have reached Port Arthur, steaming at from 14 to 15 knots, by the end of October. But the slow vessels, of comparatively small fighting value, added to the fleet, served to delay its progress, and in the actual combat led to a formation which proved disastrous. The coast-defense ships, on account of their small coal capacity, were also an element of weakness, and in the battle only added to the trophies of the victor. In the event of victory they might have served a good purpose, but in the opening of the action they could with advantage have been left behind.

Rojestvensky labored under the additional disadvantage of having no able leaders under him, upon whom he could rely for proper initiative and clear judgment in action.

Togo, the leader on the Japanese side, has shown himself a master in the art of war. His tactics in the battle were similar, in general outline, to those of Nelson at Trafalgar, but he had (like Nelson) the kind of subordinate commanders required by such tactics, namely, experienced and well-trained leaders, who instinctively appreciate the plans of the commander-in-chief and the spirit of his orders, and are capable of executing them intelligently even when separated from him. The independence of action which Togo could thus allow his subordinate commanders secured that flexibility so necessary for taking full advantage of tactical situations, without endangering the possibility of simultaneous and concerted action on the part of all when required.

Togo, with a fleet inferior in battleships, although superior in armored and protected cruisers and torpedo boats, practically annihilated, in a period of about forty hours, the Russian fleet. In fact,

according to Togo himself, the battle was virtually decided in thirty-seven minutes.

Let us review the elements which brought about such a result.

1. ORGANIZATION.

The composition and organization of the respective fleets have been described in the course of the narrative, and the weak and strong points in each have already been referred to.

Rojestvensky's fleet was heterogeneous in composition, and was burdened with a number of slow vessels of little fighting power. Togo's fleet, on the other hand, was homogeneous, the ships of each squadron of practically equal speed, gun power, and armor protection, and the whole in efficient fighting condition.

Rojestvensky kept his fleet concentrated for the advance and attack, and under his direct and immediate command. Togo, on the other hand, divided his fleet into three separate squadrons, independent in action, although operating in conjunction one with another, and with a common purpose in view. The great extent of the field of operations prevented Togo from exercising personal command over its entire surface.

2. RECONNAISSANCE.

The system of reconnaissance of the Russians was very deficient. On the way to the scene of the battle little information of the Japanese fleet was obtained, and on entering the Straits of Korea there was no reconnaissance made worthy of the name. In consequence of this neglect the Russian fleet was taken completely by surprise by Togo's I and II squadrons, the III squadron having been taken as the main Japanese force in the straits.

The Japanese, on the other hand, had sent scouts out as far as Madagascar, and had complete and constant information of all the movements of the Russian fleet, its composition and character, from the time it assembled on the Madagascar coast until it approached Korea Straits.

The Japanese also made full use of wireless telegraphy in connection with their scout ships. The information that the Russian fleet was approaching the Korean Straits was sent by this means by a scout boat in the vicinity of Quelpart Island, and Togo received (at 11.30 a. m., May 27, 1905) the important message, that Rojestvensky was entering the Eastern Passage, by wireless telegraphy, from one of the ships of the decoy (III) Squadron. This last message, if sent by

despatch boat over the distance of several miles separating the III squadron from Admiral Togo, would have taken at least half an hour to deliver, and the foggy weather prevented visual signals at long distance entirely. The first message, however, would have taken at least two hours to deliver by despatch boat, and might have given the entire action a different character, as the Island of Tsushima, some fifty nautical miles long, might have been placed between the two fleets.

This illustrates the value of this new and important aid to reconnaissance. The greater the range of naval guns the more important it is for the combatants to assume the proper tactical formation as early as possible, even before the opposing fleets have sighted each other, and this can only be done by timely information, such as scout ships with wireless apparatus can furnish.

3. TACTICS.

The tactics of the two opposing fleets have already been commented on. Rojestvensky's formation in closed double column was particularly unfortunate in the theatre of operations here presented, namely, the Eastern Passage of the Korean Straits.

The success of Togo's enveloping formation was dependent partly on Rojestvensky's defective formation, and partly on the configuration of the sea area, and the adoption of the formation was facilitated by the configuration of the land and water area, and the favorable position occupied by the Japanese fleet. No new lessons in naval tactics are taught by the Japanese movements. The skillful use made of the opportunity, however, is entirely to Togo's credit.

The fire direction of the Japanese was also noteworthy. The Russians fired generally over their targets, while the Japanese gunnery was remarkably accurate even at long ranges. But this is more a matter of training of personnel than tactics. By their superior fire direction, however, the Japanese were able to concentrate their fire on particular ships or groups of ships, and thus greatly increased the tactical value of their artillery.

4. FIGHTING POWER AND SPEED.

Fighting power and speed are closely connected.

The value of speed is generally overrated. It came into play in this particular case on account of the peculiar conditions. An increase of speed, with a given displacement, can only be attained at the sacrifice of fighting power, but even with increase of displacement, no greater

weight should be attached to speed than it deserves. Relatively, speed is really a part of fighting power, since it can increase fighting power by enabling the latter to act from a more favorable position, but it cannot supply fighting power, when the latter is wanting, consequently, in a battleship no part of the fighting power should be sacrificed for speed.

Under the conditions of the battle here considered, had the Russian line been able to maneuver freely to starboard, or had it not been taken by surprise, it could have avoided being enveloped by the Japanese for an indefinite time by merely changing course, and during this time fighting power and not speed would have been the decisive factor.

TORPEDOES.

The use of torpedoes in this action was facilitated by the fact that the Japanese awaited the Russians in a previously selected and prepared position. The effectiveness of their action resulted from the narrow field of action, and was due to the combined action of battleship and torpedo-boat. By daylight torpedo-boats can act effectively only when the ships attacked are held in place by the attack of battleships, the latter keeping their artillery occupied or silencing it. The disorder of battle, as in this case, may also offer opportunities.

The night attacks of the torpedo-boats had been well prepared by the weakening of the Russian artillery in the battle of the preceding day, by the losses in men, and by the partial destruction of the communications and defenses aboard ship.

Torpedo-boats, therefore, cannot replace battleships, but can only supplement their action.

5. GUNNERY.

The accurate shooting of the Japanese gunners was the most striking feature of the battle. Even at long ranges they were able to fire so accurately as to completely demoralize the Russian gunners at the very outset. Moreover, the rough sea prevented the Russians from using their heavy guns effectively, whereas the Japanese, on account of their better training under all conditions of weather, were enabled to fire so accurately as to strike the Russian ships below their armor belts, as the sides of the vessels below the water-line became exposed by rolling in the heavy seas.

The Japanese were well trained in the use of the torpedo as well as the gun, and the manner in which both these weapons were em-

ployed points to long and persistent schooling both of officers and men.

6. PERSONAL ELEMENT.

The completeness of the Japanese victory must be ascribed in great measure to the difference in character, national spirit, training and discipline of the crews of the two fleets.

These are elements which have always acted, but which are more powerful in their effects to-day than ever before. To-day the fight is between weapons which operate at a distance, and their effect no longer depends on brute courage, but on coolness, training and experience.

In addition to the instruction and training in time of peace, the constant cruising of the Japanese during this war made their crews more skillful and their ships more efficient, while the Russian officers and men, confined to port, both at home and in the theatre of operations, deteriorated, and lost what skill and nerve they originally possessed.

A FEW REMARKS UPON THE NEW MILITIA LAW IN THE UNITED STATES.

By George-Nestler Tricoche.

(Paris: Henri Charles Lavauzelle, Military Publisher.)

Translated from the French by Captain Girard Sturtevant, 5th Infantry, for the Second Division, General Staff, U. S. A.

When a country with militia is at the same time a federative republic, the laws governing the organization of its army are brought into fatal contact with a dangerous obstacle—the spirit of independence of the various states, jealous of their respective prerogatives. Even in Switzerland, where service is compulsory, the central power had to have centuries of struggles before it could bring about a relative uniformity between the troops of the different cantons.

In the United States, where the militia is made up of all the volunteer national guard organizations of the different states of the Union, the attempts made up to the present time to obtain, not a uniformity of organization, but merely a concise and clear definition of the relations between the central administration and the State military authorities, have always failed; and although it seems scarcely credible in such a progressive country, they were employing in this regard, only a few months ago, the methods of 1792. However, at the beginning of the last century, the danger in such chaotic military institutions might have been recognized. In 1812, at the time of the war with England, several States absolutely refused to furnish the contingents asked of them; in the same war, at the Battle of Queenstown Heights, militiamen were seen in the heat of action refusing to go into Canadian territory, under the pretext that nothing in the Constitution compelled them to cross the frontier. More than eighty years after these events, during the Spanish-American War, the same evil is found again under forms as varied as deplorable: at one time the militia gets broken up, losing its best elements who go and get mustered in in the new volunteer regiments; at another time the units of the national guard want to pass *en bloc* into the service of the United

States, but asking at the same time to be allowed a certain autonomy —and then in face of the reservations made by the central administration, are seen withdrawals like that so noticeable and so much commented upon of the 7th New York, the regiment of millionaires. In one case the demands of the local militia are granted at Washington, thanks to political influence; in another, on the other hand, they are ignored, and the State keeping its drilled and equipped troops unemployed, furnishes the federal government with emergency regiments, without the shadow of instruction and lacking arms and uniforms. Yet again, perhaps by thoughtlessness, perhaps as a result of intrigues and jealousies, the War Department calls for artillery from states whose national guard does not admit of any on a peace footing, and declines the services of excellent batteries well officered, like those of New York. Many other instances were seen during that war.

These, moreover, are the events of 1898 that best brought out the faults of the system, by showing the great differences between the militia of the different states, the effectiveness of certain regiments, the pitiful, or ridiculously backward condition of certain others, and the waste that certain states were making of the appropriations made for them by the United States for military purposes.*

I. The Militia Bill of January 21, 1903, provides that the militia be composed, generally speaking, of all male citizens between 18 and 45 years of age, able to bear arms, and is divided into two great classes—the Organized Militia (or National Guard) and the Reserve Militia.

The maximum and minimum ages therefore remain the same as in 1792. It is to be noticed that Section I of the bill is not meant to apply to persons whose religion does not admit of warfare in any form. One may question the fitness of such an exception, which might cause the military authorities great embarrassment in case of a general uprising.

*It is only just to add that for some time efforts have evidently been made in the states where the military organization is comparatively satisfactory, to conform to the methods followed by the regular army, and also a tendency to specialization, in other words, to the transformation of units of the line into troops of special branches of the service: thus, in the national guard of New York the 13th and 22d Regiments (Infantry) have become respectively foot artillery and engineers.

If one considers that the militia organizations like those of the United States are of little benefit—when they are not a menace—in offensive action, it is natural that the authorities wish to see them become, in as great a measure as possible, local, or stationary troops.

II. The organized militia consists, as the reader has doubtlessly inferred, of the already existing units of the national guard of the various states and territories and of the District of Columbia. But—and this is the important point of the bill—*these troops must have adopted, by or before* 1908, *the organization, equipment, and system of discipline employed by the regular army.*

Here also is an exception; it is in favor of the organizations existing more or less continuously since 1792. These organizations, it must be said, are not very numerous; nevertheless, the board at the War College charged with the interpretation of the bill, in its report of the 13th of last March, does not conceal its aversion to "old-fashioned units, principally ornamental, and distinguished especially by extraordinary uniforms, equipments, and evolutions. * * *"

III. As it is important to discourage the forming of those small units that have a tendency to spring up within the principal organizations of the national guard with the sole aim of giving commissioned offices to a certain number of privileged individuals, the Bill authorizes the President of the United States to fix the minimum strength of the companies, batteries, and troops. The explanatory report cited above suggests the following figures:—

Infantry: 65 men to a company;

Cavalry: 65 men to a troop;

Field Artillery: 120 men to a 6-gun battery, 80 men to a 4-gun battery;

Coast Artillery: 120 men to a company;

Engineers: 100 men to a company;

Medical Department: 83 men to an ambulance company, 54 men to each field hospital.

As for the Signal Corps, its popularity rather causes a fear of an abnormal development, uselessly draining elements that would give more valuable service in the other branches.

The board asks that its strength may not exceed 1½ per cent. of all the organized militia of each state.

IV. In case of invasion, disorder, etc., the President has a right to call into the service of the United States, in whole or in part, the militia of the states or territories; provided the length of this service *shall not exceed nine months.*

This last provision is of manifest importance, for it dispels all doubt as to the obligations of the militiaman towards the Federal Government, while, at the same time, it assures an equalizing of duty.

Organized regiments will pass *en bloc* into the federal service, and there will be no future probability of seeing states, for the needs of the moment, raise regiments like those of which there was so much cause for complaint during the war of 1898.

V. In order to have a right to their share of the annual federal appropriations, each state will have to show that all its troops have been assembled in their quarters at least twenty-four times for drill or target practice, that they have taken part in practice marches and exercises in some of the problems of minor tactics, or remained in a camp of instruction at least *five days;* finally, that they have been regularly inspected.

The five days' field service per annum are, in the minds of military men, entirely insufficient. Yet they constitute a certain amount of progress, since at the present time certain states limit themselves to an annual encampment of three days, or even an encampment every other year. It seems to us that it would have been wise to specify in the bill that the five days shall be devoted exclusively to maneuvers; for in some localities they deduct from the period of *encampment* the day of arrival, the day of departure, one day for parade—entirely useless—and sometimes, it must be admitted, excursions to neighboring towns, and picnics.*

VI. Section 13 of the Bill, a very important one, prescribes that the arms, etc., will be furnished gratis to the militia by the federal government.

This was evidently the only way of securing uniformity in this regard.

At the time of the war of 1898 no state was able to furnish troops provided with the rifle of the regular model; and at the present time all the national guard organizations combined possess scarcely more than 4,000 magazine rifles of the calibre used in the regular army. The remainder of the arms consist of five different types (two Springfields, one Lee, one Winchester repeater, the Krag-Jorgensen, and the Remington-Lee repeater).

The situation of the artillery is still more deplorable.

VII. A new provision, also, is that of Section 15, placing under the charge of the Treasury Department the expenses necessitated by the participation of the militia in the regular army maneuvers.

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*The same desiderata are found in Canada, where the period of encampment for rural organizations, however, is twelve days. See "Les milices fracaises et anglaises au Canada" (Henri Charles-Lavauzelle, editor).

Great importance is attached in the United States to these exercises, which alone are capable of perfecting the instruction of the National Guard. However, assuming the extreme scattering of the regular troops over an immense territory, there are but very few points where any extensive maneuvers may be had, and these points are, so to speak, inaccessible to the militia of the great states—New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, etc.). There is evidently nothing serious to be expected from Section 15 of the Bill before a new distribution of the regular organizations has been obtained.

VIII. In the United States they are still imbued with that idea that the volunteer regiments, raised directly by the federal government, would constitute the nation's principal strength in case of war.

This point of view is a right one if we consider only the regular army, evidently too small to be utilized otherwise than as picked troops in the various army corps. But, besides the regulars, are also the militia, whom the President, as we have seen, is authorized to call into the federal service for nine months.

The raising and whipping into shape of volunteer regiments calls for more time than is available with the process of modern mobilization. Unreliable as the *National Guard,* or organized militia may be, it will always be necessary to count upon them, and them alone, to support the regulars in the first engagements. It is for this very reason that the present law endeavors to increase its efficiency by modeling it as much as possible after the regular army. However, the January bill especially provides for the obtaining of officers for the *volunteer regiments;* it institutes certain examinations which may be taken by "old soldiers" or militiamen of long service, as well as former students of private military academies.* The candidates who take the examinations will be able to follow special courses in the military schools of application for the different branches of the service.

If one recalls the scandalous nominations of *volunteer officers* in 1898, one will comprehend the scope of this attempt—we do not say reform, for "there's many a slip 'twixt the cup and the lip."

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These are, briefly, the principal provisions of the new *Militia Bill.*

*In some states the best students of these establishments receive commissions as lieutenants of militia.

One may consult on this subject "Les academies militaires privees aux Etats-Unis" (Henri Charles-Lavauzelle, editor).

Its advantages, as far as the country's defense is concerned, are manifest; though, as we shall see presently, they are far from being as great as one might reasonably hope.

The States, in any case, for their part, will gain by having in their service for domestic emergencies, troops more effective than those they have to-day.

What would now be the penalty of the militia law?

There is none possible towards a refractory state except the refusal of the federal appropriation. First of all, then, it is necessary to rely upon the patriotism of the different states of the Union.

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The militia law, we said before, is not complete.

(a) In the first place, we do not find in it the section relative to the creation of a national volunteer reserve of 100,000 men, composed of former soldiers of the regular army. That was an innovation that the military authorities particularly desired. But the paragraph was stricken from the text upon the objection of a senator, who remarked that the said paragraph was out of place in a bill pertaining exclusively to militia. So that the "Third line of defense," as it was called, will not materialize.

(b) On the other hand, it is to be regretted that the bill simply fixed a minimum effective strength. It ought to have established first of all a minimum standard of efficiency for these different units.

(c) In the third place, nothing prohibits militiamen from passing individually into the volunteer regiments. The result is that at the time of any mobilization the militia may find itself stripped as before of its best elements, attracted by the prestige attached to the volunteer regiments.*

(d) A want, very great, in our humble opinion, is the absence

*General W. Carter, who, in the *United Service Magazine* of February, 1903, expresses this same opinion, remarks furthermore that according to the terms of the bill of April 22, 1898, these volunteer regiments are now raised for two years, and no longer for three, as formerly. This he deplores, with reason, for it is, in short, contrary to the teachings of the Civil War. At that time a constant renewal of the units in the different corps was the source of bitter regret.

In a country where politics enter so completely into its military institutions, the raising of volunteer regiments becomes, as one may imagine, an occasion of intrigues, harmful to discipline and contrary to the interests of recruiting. Consequently, it is desirable to make these operations as little frequent as possible.

in the bill of any regulation concerning the passing of militiamen into the regular service, in case of war. The *mustering in,* as it is called, is under the supervision of the legislation in force, one of the longest and most complicated operations; it requires, among other formalities, the individual medical examination of every militiaman, because the physical standards in the service are not the same for the various national guards as for the regular army. In addition to the time required for this, the rejection by the United States Army surgeons of men belonging to militia organizations is apt to cause great perturbation in the interior economy of the regiments just when the latter have the greatest need of cohesion.

Will this objection disappear in 1908, when the militia organization will have to conform to that of the regulars?

The law is silent on this point, which is not to the credit of those who established it. In the meantime, many things may happen in five years; the least prudence would have required at once of the states and territories that the future enrollments in their respective forces be made in conformity with the rules prescribed for the federal army.

(e) There is no provision for the second portion of the militia, the *reserve militia,* which, therefore, becomes a snare and a delusion.

(f) The difference in pay between the militia and the regular army continues as before. Hence during the participation of the former in the maneuvers, rifle competitions, etc., of the latter, the members of the national guard organizations receive only the pecuniary allowances of the regulars; and the states will have to give their men the difference, which will not tend to make these combined exercises very popular among the several legislatures, already so parsimonious as regards the local military appropriation.*

(g) The militia bill in no way deals with the nomination or promotion of the militia officers. This is because the United States Con-

*Let us remark, in passing, that far from showing a disposition to improve the militia, certain states have already claimed a right to have a part of the expenses of their annual encampments borne by the Federal government. For that purpose they had conceived the idea of gathering the militia in one of the United States military posts; whence, the regulars and the militiamen being united, at least apparently, they would have to receive, it was said, the same allowances. The War College board foiled this little scheme by stipulating formally that the matter of compensation came under the central government only in case of combined maneuvers ordered by the Secretary of War. This little incident certainly shows the spirit of the local military authorities.

stitution expressly reserves to the different states the right to regulate these matters. That is one of the weak points of the system.*

The importance of this subject would have fully justified an amendment to the constitution. It seems that it would have been possible, while allowing the principle of election to continue, to require guarantees from the candidates for commission.

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In conclusion, we must mention a few apprehensions that have been manifested recently by military journals and various critics concerning the operation of the law.

The opinion has been advanced that being obliged to organize militia infantry regiments of twelve companies each was going to cause great difficulties in the organizations whose armories are scarcely adequate at present for ten companies. In the United States, where these armories are costly buildings, organized in certain respects on the model of clubs, it couldn't possibly be a question of a change of quarters, as if it concerned mere drill-sheds (English or Canadian).

The difficulty is not insurmountable, for there is nothing to prevent forming the new units by drawing upon the already existing units, and, consequently, without sensibly increasing the total strength upon a peace footing.

The next question is, What is going to be done with the surgeons of militia now attached to the staffs with the rank of colonel?

Nothing absolutely necessitates touching upon such an unimportant part of the machinery in time of peace. In case of war, the creation of volunteer regiments will afford opportunities for employing these surgeons if they desire to remain in active service.

More serious is the objection based upon the confusion brought into the general organization of certain branches by the necessity of their conforming to the system adopted for the regular army.

The cavalry, for example, will have to be organized into regiments, or disappear. Now, in some states there are only separate squadrons, often at considerable distance from one another. Of course, it is not impossible to give to it as a whole the name of *regiment of detached squadrons;* but this does not seem to answer the aim of the bill, which demands, first of all, a grouping of the units so as to perfect the technical instruction of the regiment. On the

*In Canada the promotion of officers is at the very least, saved from the arbitrariness and caprices of politicians.

other hand, in the large cities, New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, etc., the present separate squadrons are picked troops, composed of young men who are wealthy, intelligent, and admirably mounted; to join them in order to form a regiment, with squadrons picked up at random, and formed of shop clerks mounted on miserable dray horses, would be striking a dreadful blow to the institution. Soon there would be left in the militia cavalry only the elements that used to make up the grotesque regiments of New York twenty-five or thirty years ago, regiments that were a perfect farce.

The cavalry question, we know, is one of the most troublesome ones in the militia forces. In the United States, except in the South, where horsemanship is held particularly in esteem, the recruiting of this branch of the service has always had great difficulties to contend with.

It now remains to be seen what the various states are going to do to support the federal government in its patriotic efforts to give some value to the militia. Up to the present time Pennsylvania has been the only one to show any initiative and good will. A recent bill, in fact, has just directed the formation in that state of a cavalry regiment of twelve troops, as well as a medical corps.

OUR CONTEMPORARIES.

AN analysis of the contents of the principal military periodicals, systematically classified under a few general heads for the convenience of the reader and student, comprising extracts and comments, in which special attention is given to the most important and valuable articles.

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION.

1. The Militia in 1905.—*Jour. R. V. S. I.*, July.
2. Organization of Army Corps, etc., Staffs in the German Army.—*Same.*
3. The Engineers of the Spanish Army.—*Eng. Jour.*, Sept.
4. The Underpaid Army Officer.—*Unit. Serv. Mag.*, Aug.
5. The Case for the N. C. O.—*Same.*
6. Imperial Federation.—*Same.*
7. Cavalry Regiments.—*Same*, July.
8. The Armory System in New York.—*Same.*
9. A Permanent Army on Permanent Principles.—*Same.*
10. Organization of Field Batteries in the Militia.—*Jour. M. S. I.*, Sept.-Oct.
11. Infantry Drill.—*Same.*
12. The distribution of the British Fleet.—*Mar. Rund.*, April.
13. The Military System of Norway.—*Ind. Vol. Rec.*, July 15.
14. Indian Army Reform.—*Same*, June 30.
15. Funston's Plan for a Reserve.—*A. and N. Jour.*, Sept. 9, 16.
16. Annual Report of Brig.-Gen. F. D. Grant.—*Same*, Sept. 23.

The *first* of these articles is a well-digested discussion of the value of the British Militia, and has some interest for all other armies, moreover, the article furnishes some very interesting information:

"Many things have happened since 1897, much that we all foresaw and much that was unexpected.

"The total abolition of the militia has been proposed by the Secretary of State for War, and though this drastic step is apparently postponed, the mere fact that it can be seriously brought forward, shows how utterly the services of the militia during the South African

war have been forgotten since its termination, as they were ignored at the time. * * *

"When the war broke out in 1899, a Militia battalion was at once embodied of each territorial regiment which had both its Regular battalions abroad. This embodiment was extended as fresh troops were dispatched to South Africa, until on May 1, 1900, the whole of the Militia was embodied for the first time for 46 years. In fact, the embodiment was more complete, as certain units were not called up during the Crimean War. Meantime, in the autumn of 1899, the Militia Reserve of many regiments had been called up and incorporated with Regular units—mostly their own Line battalions, but in some cases with other regiments.

"Early in 1900 a further development took place. When the war broke out, as has always been the case, the militia commenced to volunteer for service abroad, and many battalions as complete units embarked both for the Mediterranean and for South Africa.

"In October, 1900, those units who were embodied at home were gradually disembodied until almost all the Militia had been so treated.

"Meantime a very large number of Militia officers were doing duty, both at home and abroad in every sort of position, and we do not hear of them in any way failing to carry out the various duties entrusted to them; in fact, towards the end of the war, the entire work of the depots, and many of minor staff appointments, both in South Africa and at home, was being carried out by Militia officers.

"In 1901, many Militia units provided mounted infantry detachments for South Africa, and we do not hear of them being otherwise than satisfactory.

"In all 16 artillery and 3 engineer companies, and 2 sections, and 68 battalions, composed of 1,691 officers and 43,875 of other ranks, were employed abroad during the war. There were also 13,598 Militia Reserve men incorporated with the Regular Army, making a total of 59,164 of all ranks.

"Besides these a very large number of Militia officers did duty with Regular units and in various staff appointments in South Africa, and a considerable number of non-commissioned officers and men volunteered for mounted infantry, and were incorporated in the companies raised and sent out towards the end of the war.

"I may also remark that during the war 2,760 Militia officers were given commissions in the Regular Army—an acceptable addition of men with some military knowledge which could not have been provided from any other quarter, and 40,755 Militiamen enlisted in the Regular Army. * * *

"Finally, I would again express my earnest hope that the Militia may be enlisted for general service in the event of national emergency. It has been brought forward several times in this Institution, many years ago by the late Sir George Walker, then by Lieutenant-Colonel Holden, and in 1897 by myself. In 1896 I asked the opinion of all commanding officers, and an overwhelming number were even then in favor of it.

"The advantages to the country are so apparent that it seems waste of time to go through the arguments. The unfairness to the Militia, as matters now are, is equally incontestable.

"The fleet is our chief as well as our first line of defense, and as long as it is strong no man will fire a shot in the United Kingdom.

"But the fleet has its limits. It cannot carry the war into the enemies' territory, which is the only way in which a war can be finished. The French fleet disappeared off the ocean in 1805; but it was not till 1814 that a land campaign which lasted six years put an end to the war.

"How many weeks did it take for a war with 80,000 farmers to necessitate our supplementing the largest Regular Army we ever sent abroad by tens of thousands of Auxiliaries of all descriptions?

"A very short time ago, with the exception of Canada, every portion of the Empire was divided by vast distances from any European foe. But in the last few years this has ceased to be the case, and moreover, we have had quite lately lessons in the practicability of moving gigantic armies which we should take home to ourselves.

"Should an army invade our distant possessions, it will be no question of a few thousand men struggling painfully through deserts, but of hundreds of thousands fully equipped and provided, delivered fresh from the train but short distances from our frontiers.

"A numerous army available for foreign service will be required to deal with such a crisis. Where is this army to be found? The Regular Army must always be small, and is even now being largely reduced for economical reasons. The Yeomanry and the Volunteers even, in the most critical period of the late war, could only provide detachments. The Militia can, this very day, supply 100,000 men. It is, even under present conditions, fairly trained and well disciplined, and above all, it is properly encadré; it is administered on military lines, and it has a military system. With but small expense it could be increased much in quantity and still more in quality.

"If open liability for foreign service in time of need was substituted for the present unsatisfactory and unfair conditions, the

Militia would acquire a new status. It would be better appreciated by the public, and it would respond handsomely to the encouragement.

"Whether you retain the Militia or abolish it, and found a new force on its ashes—whether you adopt compulsory service or trust to voluntary enlistment—a force trained on similar lines, but liable to foreign service in case of emergency, is the only method by which you can obtain sufficient numbers to enable you to oppose with success the huge armies of modern States.

"The history of the Militia is bound up with the history of the Empire. It has behind it long records of honorable service. No newly raised force can succeed to these traditions, and I hold that it only requires fair encouragement and intelligent administration to be equal to any duty the country may call upon it to perform."

The *second* article is a brief outline of the organization of the staffs of Army Corps, etc., in the German Army, and a summary of their duties:

"The German Army is territorial; the Army Corps is the administrative unit, and the Divisions and Brigades which go to form it are invariably quartered in the territorial district. The greater part of the Staff work is done at the headquarters of the Army Corps. The Staffs of the Divisions and Brigades are small and their work unimportant. To explain the German system, it has therefore been necessary to devote the greater part of this paper to the Staff of an Army Corps.

"THE STAFF OF AN ARMY CORPS.

"Strength.

"The staff duties in an Army Corps are conducted by the 'Chief of the Staff,' who is usually a colonel, brigadier, or major-general.

"He has under him 1 field officer of the General Staff; 1 captain of the General Staff; 2 adjutants, field officers or captains; 1 'attached' field officer; 3 to 6 military law officials; 1 corps intendant; 1 corps surgeon; 1 senior military chaplain; 1 corps veterinary surgeon, and a subordinate personnel of registrar, clerks and orderlies.

"It will at once be observed that the combatant staff of a German Army Corps is considerably smaller than that of a similar unit in any other Army, either in peace or war. General Janson states:—'That the Staff should be occasionally overworked is looked upon as a slight disadvantage compared with that of having idlers on the Staff, who merely get in each other's way or invent work to give themselves importance.'

"It will also be noticed that there are no Artillery or Engineer officers on the Staff. The Field Artillery is placed entirely under the Divisional generals, while the Fortress Artillery and Pioneers (Engineer troops) are, as far as technical instruction is concerned, under the Inspectors-General of these arms.

"Marches, movements by rail and steamer, large maneuvers, choice of maneuver ground, mobilization, fortresses and other defenses (purposes in war), frontier protection, reconnaissances, maps, Staff, Infantry and Cavalry tours, Staff rides, theoretical winter schemes, everything bearing on the scientific education of officers, information on foreign armies, the drill books of the various arms, questions of organization and public law as far as they concern the Army Corps.

"The Chief of the Staff is responsible to the General for the whole of the work of the Staff; that it is done correctly and in accordance with regulations. When a question arises which cannot be settled by a reference to the regulations, it is his duty to examine it and lay his view before the General, but he has no right to insist on his view being considered. If the question has been examined and reported on by one of the Staff, as may often be the case in matters concerning Sections III. and IV., the Chief of the Staff is still responsible to the General for the action proposed, unless the latter expressly declares that his opinion is not required. Subordinates must therefore submit all their work to the Chief.

"The First General Staff Officer has the most work and the most responsible work of the command. To him are entrusted defense schemes, mobilization, preparation for and the planning of the autumn and other large maneuvers. He, therefore, has much communication with the Corps Intendant, and also with the Corps Surgeon. He informs them of all they should know, without special directions from the Chief of the Staff.

"Organization questions and such as refer to Military Conventions with the other States of the Empire are also usually allotted to the senior General Staff officer.

"He is, as already mentioned, the representative of the Chief of the Staff in the latter's absence; he must, therefore, be fully cognizant of all important matters dealt with by other sections, which have not been discussed at the Staff meetings. His position is more laborious and less easy and independent than that of the General Staff officer of a division. On account of the large responsibilities of the post, the first General Staff officer is generally selected from among the senior officers of the General Staff.

"The Second General Staff Officer does the rest of the General Staff work; he must always be ready to replace the first General Staff officer, and must, therefore, keep himself *au fait* with the work of Section I. It is advantageous, both for the purpose of assisting the first General Staff officer and instructing the second, if part of the mobilization work is assigned to the latter; but it is very difficult to give him a defined task in it. His own work is usually light, but this is no disadvantage, as his position is really that of a learner.

"The staff of a division is usually composed of:—1 major or captain of the General Staff; 1 adjutant, major or captain; 2 military law officials; 1 divisional intendant; 1 divisional surgeon; 2 or 3 chaplains (Lutheran and Catholic).

"With a subordinate personnel of:—2 permanent clerks, assistant clerks, 1 printer, orderlies.

"The staff of a brigade consists of one Adjutant (a captain or lieutenant), one or two clerks, and some orderlies. As the brigade has no General Staff officer, as in other Armies, the Adjutant has, in a small measure, many General Staff duties, particularly in the planning and conduct of the brigade maneuvers. In these matters the Brigade Adjutant requires a thorough training. The Brigadier cannot, however, expect an officer new to the post to be a complete master of the subject, and must give him much instruction, particularly as regards the planning of maneuvers."

The *third* article contains a brief account of the organization and duties of the Engineers in the Spanish Army.

The *fourth* is an article that will appeal to all army officers, no matter of what nationality:

"Ere Hawke did bang Mounseer Conflans,
  You gave us beef and beer;
Now Mounseer's beat we've nowt to eat,
  Since you have nowt to fear."

"So sang the disgusted sailor-heroes of Hawke's squadron after their splendid victory in Quiberon Bay, which dispelled the terrible nightmare of invasion that had hung over England for many a year, and annihilated France as a sea-power for close on three generations. From this it would appear that the British national character a century and a half ago was marked by that same besetting sin of a short memory which is one of its chief blemishes now.

"When a few short years ago our Army was engaged in the difficult, and what, indeed, at one time looked like the impossible, task of banging the Boer, John Bull was full of repentance for his

sins of omission in the past, and loudly proclaimed in the market-place all that he was going to do directly this war was over to rectify the shortcomings of his Army, and to protect himself in the future from the risks and worries born of inefficiency. But at last the Army succeeded in accomplishing the banging process, or, rather, in inducing the Boer to consider himself banged, and the old gentleman's tone changed as if by magic. Everything was as right as it could be, 'splendid heroes every one of them;' 'bound to pull through everywhere, irrespective or in spite of bad systems and insufficient training;' 'no other nation could have done so well,' and so on. And the vain old man proceeded to pat himself on the back and to distribute honors broadcast, after which he fell to musing once more over his own greatness. * * *

"If * * * you want thoroughly enthusiastic officers, thirsting for knowledge, zealously following out the changes and developments in military art, discussing and deliberating over all that makes for their own greater efficiency and the advancement of the service; officers to whom promotion will come as a real reward, and the praise of a superior as a source of pride, you must put your hand in your pocket and pay like anybody else who desires a good article. And the country has emphatically declared that this is the type of officer that it does desire. Certainly it is the type that is absolutely essential to the organization and maintenance of an efficient professional army.

"No, the country should be made to understand that unless it is prepared to make a substantial increase in the present rates of pay of all the commissioned ranks it must not expect to effect any radical reform or improvement in the corps of officers, which is equivalent to saying in the Army generally, since the excellence of an army depends almost entirely upon that of its leaders and instructors, whose ideas it imbibes and whose example it copies.

"It is nonsense, too, to try and liken the conditions of service in our Army with those prevailing in continental armies, and to maintain that the officers of the former draw high rates of pay in comparison with those serving in the latter. Apart from the fact that the expenses of the British officer are out of all proportion to those of his continental compeer, and that whereas the States does almost everything for the latter and his family, with us the State does nothing; it has to be also remembered that the mere position confers solid social and other advantages on the continent, whilst with us it is nowadays very much the reverse.

"Economy is at present once more the order of the day in the military department; and there are, undoubtedly, many directions in

which a scandalous waste of public money could be prevented, but it is very poor economy to allow your brand-new machinery to become clogged and thrown out of gear at the outset merely because after spending vast sums on perfecting it blind, parsimony leads you to withhold the money necessary to ensure its lubrication.

"Well, the plain issue before the country is this. Is the present baneful parsimony to continue, and in that case the Army to remain officered as it now is by non-professionals who regard it as a club; or are terms to be offered sufficiently liberal to be found worth accepting by industrious and ambitious men, who have their own way to make in the world, and who know that the making of it lies in their own hands, and who will then see that the Army offers them as good inducements as the other professions and callings? At present they know that it does nothing of the sort, and take their brains and their keenness elsewhere."

The *fifth* article relates to the same subject as regards the non-commissioned officer:

"The indisputable fact that non-commissioned officers nowadays are not so distinct a class, and are not treated with the same measure of respect as formerly, may be attributed by some to two things: (1) The general spread of education, wherein the private is often as intelligent as the non-commissioned officer, and (2) the fact that modern conditions of warfare are tending to largely make the former an independent unit. But those reasons are far from conclusive, since the qualifications for promotion have progressed with education, and a proportionately greater professional capacity is demanded in the non-commissioned officer. Though no justification can ever exist for such a state of things as that described when viewed in the essentially military sense, the true explanation is to be found in the fact that in all schemes for improving the soldier's lot the non-commissioned officer has been overlooked—as a non-commissioned officer. He has merely received the same consideration as the private, thus tending to divide the Army into two great classes only, namely, officers and rank and file. But so great is the gulf between officer and private that a connecting link, the sergeant, is necessary to maintain a just equilibrium.

"To render the Army sufficiently attractive to the better and more educated class of recruit, the higher non-commissioned ranks should possess outstanding and alluring advantages.

"The superiority of the officer's power over the non-commissioned officer's, lies less in his rank than in his inaccessibility—springing

from his social position; and though the non-commissioned officer might not always come up to the former's social standard, the fact that he was always trending towards the rank could not fail to appreciably increase his dignity and power."

The *sixth* article relates to British federation of colonies and mother country; the *seventh* discusses the organization of Cavalry Regiments, with special reference to depot squadrons; and the *eighth* describes the New York armories.

The *ninth* article is a plan for securing a proper army for Great Britain, and contains some interesting statements:

"Owing to its particular circumstances, the wide separation of its component parts, its vast sea-borne commerce, and, perhaps above all, the absolute dependence of the inhabitants of its central depot, the United Kingdom, on food drawn from across the seas, the British Empire must provide for itself sufficient naval power to ensure the command of the sea against any probable combination of enemies. This is our first requirement, and every Government in its turn aims at its fulfilment.

"From a proper understanding of the term 'command of the sea' two corollaries follow. No amount of naval power could possibly ensure a preponderancy of naval power at all times in all places. A nation, then, that has command of the sea, may yet lose it in certain places, but only temporarily. An invasion over sea on a large scale postulates for its success a permanent and unbroken sea communication with a land base. Hence our command of the sea precludes the possibility of invasion, while it admits the possibility of raids.

"Secondly, the command of the sea gives us the power of transshipping land troops without serious difficulty from any one place to any other.

"Next comes the consideration of the requirements of the British Empire in the matter of land forces.

"In time of war there must be sufficient troops at home and in the Colonies to repel any of the raids mentioned above. There must be an army in India ready to act on the defensive or on the offensive-defensive against any attack by Russia on its frontiers; and there must be troops at home ready to be used out of England offensively against other Powers. Our organization must enable us to repair the wastage of war.

"There is one 'condition' of the British Empire that bears on questions connected with land forces. This condition is that with us Conscription is out of the question.

"But a certain Reserve there must be; a Reserve ready at once to fill up the gaps which occur at the front during the first period of the war.

"A new fact that has considerable bearing on the question of this Reserve is the Anglo-Japanese alliance. This alliance has every appearance of becoming a fixed part of our national policy. As long as it is in force, we are secured from the danger of having to face without allies more than one country at a time. In case of a single-handed war with Russia, our troops at home and their reserve would all be available to reinforce the Army in India. In the case of a war with any other country, our reserve for our Indian Army would be available, if necessary, as a reserve for our other armies.

"In the event of a war between England and Japan on one side, and Germany and Russia on the other, it is unlikely that Russia could press us hardly in India if Japan engaged her in Manchuria or Siberia. It is possible, however, that at the outbreak of war, if Germany and Russia acted with energy, we might have to find reserves for the whole of our Army simultaneously. A reserve equal to a quarter of all War Units put into the field at the outbreak of war should be sufficient.

"The number of efficient troops required at any one moment, divided up into Serving Soldiers and Reservists, stands as follows:—

	Serving Soldiers.	Reservists.	Total.
To repel raids (30 per cent. Reservists) ..	14,000	6,000	20,000
For offensive purposes outside England (30 per cent. Reservists)	70,000	30,000	100,000
Army in India	75,000	—	75,000
Army in Colonies (20 per cent. Reservists)	40,000	10,000	50,000
	199,000	46,000	245,000
Reserve (quarter of whole)	—	61,250	61,250
Totals	199,000	107,250	306,250

"These, then, are the numbers of efficient soldiers that must always be in existence. Terms of enlistment must be found which will provide these numbers with certainty."

The *tenth* article is a well-digested essay on a subject of great interest to us, and the plan proposed would appear to promise great improvement in our militia field batteries. The *eleventh* and *twelfth* articles explain themselves by their titles.

The *thirteenth* article (to be continued) contains an interesting, though brief sketch of the army of Norway.

The *fourteenth* relates to Lord Kitchener's measures in India:

"When Lord Kitchener was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army he brought to that great position the prestige of the most competent reformer that the British Army had produced, and to this day distinguished politicians, such as Lord Rosebery, voice the feeling of a large section of the nation in regretting that his great abilities had not been retained for the solution of the problem of the Home Army. All things considered we have no doubt that many distinguished soldiers in India, to-day, keenly regret that scope for Lord Kitchener's energies was not found in Pall Mall. However that may be, the fact remains that this specially accredited chief, after proving the higher organization of the Indian Army 'on the anvil of experience,' has emphatically and sweepingly condemned it. One of the cherished platitudes of the Indian Press has been that, whatever the defects of the British Military machine, its Indian compeer was complete and armed *cap a pie* for any foe.

"The work which has been done since Lord Kitchener took the reins has familiarized us all with efforts to reduce such factors as these, and with a striking series of reforms aimed at placing the Indian Army in a condition to take the field as a real army against the frontier which is directly and deliberately threatened by Russia. The initiation and carrying through of these projects, which are on a bolder scale of reorganization than India has known since the mutiny days, have naturally furnished great experience of the working of the organization at headquarters."

The *fifteenth* article is one of special interest to us, and deserving of the most careful consideration:

"It is earnestly to be hoped that Brigadier-General Frederick Funston's plan for the creation of an Army reserve, which appeared in the Army and Navy Journal last week, may be widely published in the daily press. The subject is one of increasing importance to the nation, and it should receive the most careful consideration and discussion. With that object in view it is desirable that the matter should be brought to the notice of the people at large and studied

by them. It is for them to say whether we shall have a reserve, and in order that they may reach a correct conclusion it is necessary that they should consider the question intelligently, fairly and with due regard for the interests which it concerns. General Funston has presented the subject in clear and simple terms, and in the light of the information which he has supplied, the project can be investigated with the care and understanding which it deserves.

"It should require little argument to convince intelligent, fair-minded citizens that a reserve is needed. Our military system is one-sided and unevenly developed. While the Army of to-day, man for man, is equal to the best in the world, it is only a skeleton army after all, whose energies would be largely required in training the masses of raw volunteers on the outbreak of war. The Army is widely scattered, and will continue to be.

"If on the outbreak of war the Government were able to call into co-operation with the Army a large body of citizens who had received army training, had learned how to shoot and take care of themselves generally in camp or on the march, the military tasks awaiting solution would be greatly simplified and the sacrifice of life and treasure required would be largely reduced. How to develop such a body of men and keep them in readiness for an instant response to a call to the colors is the question which the General Staff has taken up for consideration, and which General Funston so ably discusses in the paper to which we have alluded.

"General Funston's theory is that the reserve should not be liable to be called out for duty in supporting any State in suppressing resistance to its authority, nor to enforce the Federal laws within the continental limits of the United States. It should be called out only by direction of the President in the event of a foreign war or the imminence of such a war, or in case of a general insurrection against American authority in our insular possessions. Under those restrictions the reserve would be only remotely a part of the Army—but little more closely, in fact, than an equal number of ordinary citizens except that the reserves would have been previously trained and be subject to the first call to the colors. In time of peace the members of the reserve would pursue their customary vocations, with no responsibility except to keep the Government posted as to their whereabouts, and be ready to respond to a summons to duty on an hour's notice. In a word, the reserve would simply be a large body of citizens specially selected, passed through the Army for purposes of instruction and discipline and then returned to civil life under conditions obligating them to present themselves for service in any emergency

requiring the Government to increase the peace strength of the Army to meet the peril of a foreign war. The notion that the existence of such a provisional force in the great body of American citizenship would constitute any menace to our institutions or amount to any damaging violation of national tradition is purely fanciful. Military training and military organization have never been dangerous to American institutions or to the security of civil authority. It is the mob that we have to fear in this country, not the orderly organization of citizens banded by an oath-bound obligation for the defense of the common welfare.

"General Funston estimates that his plan would, in the course of a few years, develop a reserve of 135,000 men, all of whom would have spent one year or more in the Army."

The *sixteenth* article discusses the Post Exchange, desertions, the Coast Artillery and other important matters of organization and administration:

"It is distressing that the prosperity of the keepers of vile resorts is due to the activity of good and worthy though misguided citizens, who have succeeded in abolishing the canteen in the Army. With the re-establishment of the canteen, which was the soldiers' club, the influence of these demoralizing resorts, near Army posts, would be greatly reduced and many of them would soon disappear.

"In view of the preponderance of Coast Artillery in the department—numbering 253 officers and 6,531 men—General Grant pays special attention to that arm of the service, the crying need of which, he says, is an increase both in the commissioned and the enlisted force. He cordially approves the recommendation for an increase submitted by his immediate predecessors in command of the department, Major-Generals Corbin and Chaffee, and continues: 'The conditions noted by General Corbin have since become more acute. The authorized numbers of artillerymen are not only inadequate, but the duties imposed are so onerous as to cause an exodus of enlisted men from the Artillery, some of them enlisting in the other arms of the service where they get the same or better rates of pay for less difficult work. * * * Coast Artillery troops, to be efficient, require careful instruction of such nature that a long period is required to impart it. In time of war with a maritime power, these soldiers will be needed to defend the coast line immediately on the commencement of hostilities. There is no time available then to train coast artillerymen. It is absolutely necessary, therefore, that all coast artillerymen shall have been trained before hostilities begin.'"

MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING.

1. Military Education in the United States.—*Engr. Jour.*, Sept.
2. Result of Bad Shooting.—*Unit. Serv. Mag.*, Aug.
3. Entrenching and Range-Finding.—*Same*, July.
4. The Training of the Soldier.—*Same*, Sept.
5. The Evolution of Modern Signaling.—*Same*, Sept.
6. Longeing and Training at Obstacles.—*M. S. I.*, Sept.
7. Infantry Drill.—*Same.*
8. Remarks on Maneuvers.—*Same.*
9. Military Service in Europe.—*Same.*
10. Rifle Shooting: Lord Roberts' Appeal.—*Ind. Vol. Rec.*, July 15.

The *first* of these articles is well explained by the following notice which appeared in the *Army and Navy Journal:*

'Brevet Col. H. J. Foster, of the English army, British Military Attaché at Washington, has written a report on 'Military Education in the United States,' which, with the permission of his official superiors, has been published in the Royal Engineers' Journal. He deals separately and at length with each branch of the elaborate system of military instruction now in vogue in the United States, and his conclusion is that our Army is 'resolved to learn its work and ready to go to school with that object.' He ventures the opinion that the course at the General Service and Staff College at Fort Leavenworth covers rather too much ground for the term allotted, and is also inclined to believe that the four-year course at the Military Academy is too long. Of the West Point institution, however, he speaks in the highest terms, his view being in full accord with that of other British officers who have studied the academy and its methods. 'There can be little doubt,' says Colonel Foster, 'that the best result of the four years at West Point is the formation of character in the sense of enthusiasm for the Army and the position of an officer in it, and of a high sense of duty, discipline and military virtue. The strictest veracity is learnt, and the integrity of a West Point officer has rarely been questioned among the 4,000 cadets who have entered the Army. Another excellent result is the homogeneity of the quality of the officers of the U. S. Army, and their unrivalled camaraderie, which continues till the end of their career. West Point is a religion deeply implanted, and common associations unite officers of all ages and of all arms of the Service. An obvious drawback to West Point is the absence of ground for field training, which is only slightly attempted.

There seems to be too much parade, stiff drill, marching past, and ceremonial. All this is a relic of the past century, and is due to the great conservatism of the academy. The course of four years also seems too long for young men between eighteen and twenty-five years old, subjected as they are to a high degree of restraint and confinement and hard work with their brains. The fact that a half, or even two-thirds, of those who enter are removed during their course shows the inexorable nature of the curriculum. But while severe on the individual, it accounts for the high standard of discipline and education attained.' "

The *second* article refers to the bad shooting of the Russian infantry in the late war.

The *third* article describes the Wemyss multimplement (a pick, mattock, spade, chopper, saw, file, hasp, bill and cooking plate combined) and the Elcho range-finder (a telescope two feet long, with a range-finding diagram in the focus of the eye-glass). The article is illustrated.

The rest of the articles under this head are all important and interesting, but we have space only for a brief reference to the last, Lord Roberts' appeal for national interest in rifle shooting:

"In another column we give the text of the appeal which has been issued by Lord Roberts to the British Nation, in which he urges the vital necessity of rifle shooting as a national pursuit and the establishment of obligatory physical training. The veteran Field Marshal once more enlarges upon the necessity for a high degree of marksmanship in the soldier, and his conviction that the British forces in the South African campaign were far from reaching that standard. As to a large section of the men that served with the Auxiliary Forces in the field, as they had had no previous training whatever in the use of arms, they naturally acquired experience in a manner painful to themselves and dangerous to the army as a whole.

"Lord Roberts quotes that final dictum of the Royal Commission on the South African War which has many times appeared in our pages. 'The true lesson of the war is, that no military system will be satisfactory which does not contain powers of expansion outside the limits of the Regular Forces of the Army, whatever that limit may be.' With this opinion Lord Roberts expresses his entire agreement. The Boer War necessitated great improvisation, but (and here we look towards the frontier of India) it should be remembered that the nation is liable to other and even more serious contingencies than

those we had to face in South Africa. Such a crisis would no doubt bring forward men—but the men must be riflemen,—and Lord Roberts, therefore, holds strongly that it is a matter of importance not only to the Regular Army and the Auxiliary Forces of the United Kingdom, but to the Empire at large, that rifle shooting should be made a national pursuit."

MILITARY HISTORY, STRATEGY AND TACTICS.

1. The Value and Significance of Port Arthur.—*Kriegstech. Zeit.*, 7.
2. The Fire Direction of Infantry.—*Same.*
3. The Possibility of Our Fleets and Harbors Being Surprised.—*Jour. R. U. S. I.*, July.
4. Irish Regiments in the Service of France, 1690-1791.—*Same.*
5. Artillery in the Russian War.—*Same.*
6. A Short Sketch of Napoleon's Campaign in Italy, 1796-7.—*Engr. Jour.*, Sept.
7. The Battle of Trafalgar.—*Unit. Serv. Mag.*, Aug.
8. The Russo-Japanese War.—*Same*, July, Aug., Sept.
9. Minor Expeditions of the British Army, 1803-15.—*Same.*
10. The Transmission of Orders and Intelligence in War.—*Same*, Aug.
11. The Japanese Trafalgar.—*Same*, July.
12. The First of the Great Drives.—*Same.*
13. Military Engineering in War.—*Same.*
14. Naval Battle Tactics.—*Same*, Sept.
15. The Passing of Port Royal.—*Same.*
16. Field and Siege Operations in the Far East.—*M. S. I.*, Sept.
17. Why General Bonaparte Was Selected to Command the Army of Italy.—*Same.*
18. Operation and Maintenance of a Railroad in War.—*Same.*
19. Attacks Upon Fortified Harbors.—*Arty. Jour.*, May.
20. Defense of Port Arthur.—*Same.*
21. The Siege of Port Arthur.—*Ind. Vol. Rec.*, July 31.
22. Strategical Employment of Cavalry.—*Same*, June 15.
23. The Battle of Mukden.—*Same.*
24. The Battle of Mukden.—*A. and N. Jour.*, Aug. 26.
25. Admiral Togo's Report.—*Same.*

We select a few of these articles for comment:

The *third*, for example, by Commander Lord Ellenborough, R. N., has some matter of general interest:

"The failure of Admiral Togo's attempts to bottle up the Russian fleet in Port Arthur with sunken merchant-ships, and of the American attempts to close the harbor of Santiago, has shown that it is by no means easy to block the entrance of a fortified harbor by sinking vessels in certain selected spots while under a storm of shot and shell, and that it would be much easier to perform this operation in time of peace.

"Portland and Portsmouth are particularly exposed to this form of attack.

"There are other methods by which an unexpected attack may be made and which would be attended with but little danger to the assailants in time of peace. For instance, vessels with the appearance of merchantmen might very well enter such estuaries as the River Thames, steam up as far as Tilbury, turn round again, and strew mechanical mines on their way down. The Solent might be blocked in a similar manner from the Needles to the Nab. A vessel might enter Portland Roads, look as if she wanted a pilot, throw mines overboard, and steam out again.

"The French papers say that their submersible vessels can remain under water for 12 hours without causing discomfort to their crews. This means that during the winter months they can remain beneath the surface all day, and only come up to breathe at night. The North Sea is probably quite broad enough to protect us against their incursions, but the Channel certainly is not.

"The question also arises as to how far submarines may be allowed to make use of neutral bases, such as Ostend or Flushing, and what methods could be adopted to prevent them from creeping about in neutral waters among Dutch and Belgian islands within a three-mile limit. Some modifications in International Law will probably have to be made.

"Port Arthur experience also shows that ships at anchor at roadsteads such as Spithead or Plymouth Sound, would be very liable to be attacked by torpedoes. The 18-inch torpedo now coming into general use is a far more effective weapon than the 14-inch torpedo used at Port Arthur on the 8th February. The 18-inch torpedo has a greater range, and would, I think, probably sink any battleship it might strike, instead of merely disabling her for a time.

"Whether we are at war or whether we are at peace, all the forts that protect our naval anchorages should be constantly kept on a war footing, as ready to open fire as if they were ships in commission. Precautions that were not required ten or twenty years ago, have become indispensable now that new weapons and new methods of

warfare have been invented. When war does come, it will probably give as little notice as an earthquake."

The *fifth* article, containing General Rohne's remarks on the field artilleries of the recent war, is noteworthy:

"Field artillery has had, according to reports received, a great influence on the results of the actions which have taken place. The Japanese artillery especially has played a great part in the successes gained.

"This fact has given occasion to the opponents of the re-armament of the German artillery to assert that the Q. F. gun of the Russian artillery has not shown itself to be superior to that of the Japanese.

"The details of the present war are not yet known in sufficient detail to justify such general conclusions. No doubt the successes gained have often been due to the action of the Japanese artillery, or at all events has been prepared and led up to by their artillery.

"But this has been due to various reasons:—

"The Russians were in numerical inferiority on the Yalu, 15,000 Russians with 46 guns, against 54,000 Japanese with 258 guns.

"At Wafangou, 36,000 Russians with 94 guns faced 42,000 Japanese with 200 guns.

"The Russian artillery in Eastern Asia is chiefly armed with the Putiloff Q. F. gun, pattern 1900, which is defective. It gives good ballistic results, so far not attained by any other field gun (throwing a projectile weighing 6.55 kilogrammes (14.4 lbs.), with a m. v. of 589 metres (1,932 f. s.); but this is the very cause of the weak point of the gun. The ballistic results are attained at the sacrifice of mobility, for the gun weighs 1,019 kilogrammes (21.6 cwt.), in action, and with the limbers as much as 1,884 kilogrammes (37.8 cwt.). A weight such as this would be serious enough in countries like Europe, where there are plenty of roads, but is a most serious drawback in the mountainous districts of Manchuria.

"The gun is not placed—as other Q. F. guns—in a cradle, upon which the recoil acts parallel to the axis of the gun, but rides upon the top carriage, on which the elevating gear is adjusted, and which takes part of the recoil, which is controlled by a hydraulic buffer.

"The gun is not returned into position by the expansion of compressed air, nor by recuperative springs, but by rubber rings, upon which it is impossible to rely.*

"It follows that the gun does not remain stationary when fired.

*The Putiloff gun, pattern 1902, however, seems to have recuperative springs.

The nominal rapidity of firing (17 rounds a minute) can only refer to unaimed shots, as the gun's lack of stability renders careful laying necessary, which considerably reduces the rate of fire. At the most, it would be possible to fire some 11-12 aimed shots a minute, and even this would hardly be possible under service conditions.

"The fact that officers and men had little or no practice with the new gun had a great effect upon the action of the Russian artillery. The order introducing the new gun was only approved by the Tsar in May, 1904—several months after the commencement of hostilities.

"Numerous instances have been mentioned in which the action of the Japanese mountain artillery was decisive. This tends to show that field guns were not used in the difficult ground, or could not be got up into action in good time. If this were so with the Japanese, it would apply still more to the heavier matériel of the Russians. It is known that the Japanese mountain artillery is considerably superior to that of the Russian."

The *seventh* article, by vice-Admiral Colomb, is a critical examination of Nelson's great battle.

The *eleventh* article, by Admiral Fremantle, is a splendid account of the recent battle of the Sea of Japan.

ARTILLERY AND FORTIFICATION.

1. The New Austrian Field Gun.—*Kriegstech. Zeit.*, 7.
2. Ehrhard Field Guns with Independent Line of Sight.—*Same.*
3. Mechanical Principles Applied in Warfare.—*Unit. Serv. Mag.*, Sept.
4. Artillery, Torpedoes and Mines in the French Navy.—*Mar. Rund.*, April.
5. The New Field Guns.—*Ind. Vol. Rec.*, June 15.
6. The Importance of Port Arthur.—*Krieg. Zeit.*, 7.
7. Walled Enceintes.—*Engr. Jour.*, Sept.
8. Prevention of Dampness Due to Condensation Magazines.—*Same.*
9. Military Engineering in Peace and War.—*Unit. Serv. Mag.*, July.

MILITARY GEOGRAPHY.

1. Formosa and the Pescadores.—*Mar. Rund.*, April.
2. German Plans for a Naval Base in the Far East.—*Arty. Jour.*, May.

WARSHIPS.

1. French Cruiser Chanzy.—*Jour. R. U. S. I.*, July.
2. Speed.—*Unit. Serv. Mag.*, Aug.
3. The Navy of the U. S.—*Mar. Rund.*, April.
4. The French Naval Budget for 1905-6.—*Same.*
5. The British Naval Budget for 1905-6.—*Same.*
6. Submarines.—*Arty. Jour.*, May.
7. Battleship Africa.—*Ind. Vol. Rec.*, June 30.
8. Changes in the World's Navies.—*Jour. R. U. S. I.*, July; *Mar. Rund.*, April.

SMALL ARMS AND EQUIPMENTS.

1. The Small-Caliber Recoil Loader.—*Krieg. Zeit.*, 7.
2. A Revolver Grip.—*Same.*
3. The Short Rifle.—*Unit. Serv. Mag.*, Aug.

EDITORIALS.

ANNUAL REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL SAMUEL S. SUMNER, COMMANDING THE PACIFIC DIVISION.

The annual report of General Sumner, commanding the Pacific Division, is remarkable for its terseness, its clearness and the emphasis laid on the important questions affecting the Army, with entire subordination of all unimportant matters.

The report discusses mainly the subjects of Desertions, Coast Defense and Post Schools for enlisted men.

In regard to the first General Sumner remarks:

"These desertions equal 14½ per cent. of the average enlisted strength in the Department of California, and 14 per cent. in the Department of the Columbia. In addition to the foregoing there were 111 desertions from unassigned recruits while en route to the Depot of Recruits and Casuals, Angel Island.

"In the cases in which desertions from any organization seemed excessive and persistent, the usual letters were written to commanding officers directing careful investigation and report of the circumstances, and application of such methods as would tend to remedy the fault. These reports in all cases have indicated that no material defects in administration existed, and the causes assigned are generally as indeterminate as in past years, when the cause of each desertion was made a matter of special investigation.

"The total desertions for the last year were slightly in excess of those for the year before, which were about 13 per cent. in each department."

The question of desertions remains a grave one for the Army, and it is believed by many officers that a higher reward for the apprehension of deserters (thus insuring more frequent apprehensions) and a severer punishment on conviction, would solve the difficulty. The causes are so various that it is difficult to classify them, but in general they are connected with facility of escape from the authorities, comparative freedom from apprehension and light punishment on conviction.

On the subject of Coast Defense, particularly of the Pacific Coast, washed by the ocean which promises to be the future

scene of the world's contentions, General Sumner makes the following pertinent comments:

PRESENT CONDITION OF THE RANGE AND POSITION-FINDING SYSTEM OF THE COAST ARTILLERY.

"This is not satisfactory, and measures should be taken to render it so. There have been several boards sitting within the limits of the division, at various times, since 1898, to settle the different questions connected with the range and position-finding problem, but, notwithstanding, the matter is not yet settled. The intricacy of the problem involved is admitted, but its solution is rendered more difficult by the seeming fact that those upon whom this burden has been thrown have not been able to definitely determine the questions involved. In its original report, the last board that passed upon the subject from the harbor of San Francisco, Cal., proceeded upon principles which were in no inconsiderable degree afterward decided to be erroneous. In its second and revised report, proceeding under additional instructions emanating from the War Department, this board proposed to cut down, by a very large per cent., both the number of position-finding stations and the expense attending the installation of the system. But the second no more than the first report was unanimous. In this state of facts, the Division Commander, my predecessor, in forwarding the second report, invited attention to this want of unanimity among the members of the board. Since then nothing has been heard at these headquarters regarding the subject. This condition of affairs is unfortunate, and it is recommended that the matter be left no longer than absolutely is necessary in its present undetermined state."

In regard to Post Schools for enlisted men General Sumner's report contains a valuable essay. The subject is of vital importance to the Army, especially since the experiences of the war in the Far East have taught their lessons to the nations of the world:

POST AND GARRISON SCHOOLS.

This subject has been given careful study by the General Staff officers on duty at these headquarters.

THE CONDITION OF THE POST SCHOOLS.

"In the first place, regarding post schools for enlisted men other than for non-commissioned officers, the method of conducting them varies greatly. There are doubtless numerous causes for this. The fundamental ones, on which all others rest, are two: First, diverse opinions as to

whether attendance should be voluntary; second, whether the schools are to be conducted, primarily, for the benefit of the lesser or the better educated enlisted men. This involves a question of policy that the War Department only can determine."

The great question in regard to schools for the enlisted men is, whether they are to be conducted so as to teach only common school subjects, thus making the Army a kind of common school for the soldier, or to teach merely military and professional subjects in order to improve the soldier and the service.

For many years past the soldier received an education gratis in the Army, which was supposed to make it an inducement to enlist, and at the same time improve him as a citizen, but the requirements of modern war make it very doubtful if this is the best way of improving the time of his present short term of service.

The General Staff of the Army appears to be of the opinion that the soldier should be taught only his profession while in the service, and this opinion General Sumner concurs in.

The other points referred to in the report relate to the Organized Militia, Target Practice and the Absence of Officers from their Commands. In regard to the last-mentioned evil, General Sumner recommends the more general utilization of retired officers for all duties for which regular officers are now detached from their commands.

The entire report is embodied in eleven small printed pages, but covers all the more important points of military administration.

SERVICE SALAD.

AGNES SOREL.

From Nineteenth Century.

So much glamor has attached, and rightly so, to Joan of Arc, the soldier-savior of Charles the Seventh of France, that another woman—Agnes Sorel, Charles's good angel of a less militant order—has been almost entirely overlooked, and, where she has been remembered, has been treated by the few with the honor due to her, and by the many merely as Charles's mistress. Whereas Joan of Arc may be likened to the archangel Michael with slashing sword, Agnes Sorel may be compared to the archangel Raphael, the guardian spirit of humanity. To her it was given to be the great inspirer of Charles, and whatever good this weak king and ungrateful man did for his country may assuredly be in large measure attributed to her influence, just as the greatest merit that can be recorded of him personally was his devotion to her whilst she lived, and to her memory after she had passed away. Agnes Sorel came, as it were, between the ebb and flow of the late Middle Ages and the Renaissance, when chivalry, not as a passing emotion, but as an education, still lingered in men's relations with women. Respect for womankind had grown in the Middle Ages in France under the double influence of religion and chivalry, of which the cult of the Virgin and the cult of the woman were the outcome. In honor of both, men strove in tournament and fought in battle. With the cry "For our Lady," or "For God and my Lady," men hurled themselves into the thick of the strife as if the goddess, whether divine or human, in whose name they made venture, had made her champions invulnerable. And, in a manner as it would seem of action and reaction, the goddess became humanized, and the woman deified. The former tendency may be traced in miracles attributed to the Virgin, in holy meditations, and, later, in the "Mysteries," and the latter in tales of chivalry, where love is treated as a gift from heaven, and the recipients of it are idealized. Stories which seem to contradict this, and to refute all accepted ideas of chivalry and honor, are frequently original only in details, the bases being borrowed from Oriental tales. Buddha's country, the land of the Zenana, supplied much material of an exaggerated nature which in the West became mere caricature.

It is always difficult to determine the origin of anything so subtle as a sentiment, especially one which gradually pervades and influences a people. It is, in its way, at first like a soft breeze, of which we can only see the effect. But as we try to discover some definite, if only partial, reason for this interchange of simple human relations between the Virgin and her votaries, we remember that St. Francis, the embodiment of exalted human sentiment, had lived, and that scholasticism was on the wane. Hence *spirit,* which had so long been restrained, and which is ever in conflict with *form,* again prevailed, and mankind discovered that a loving Mother had taken the place of a stately Queen in the Heavens. This attitude towards the Virgin is revealed in the miracles attributed

to her agency. It is also shown in one of the greatest works of piety of the thirteenth century, the *Meditations on the Life of Jesus Christ,* of St. Bonaventura, which, tnrough the medium of the "Mysteries," introduced into sacred pictorial art some of its most dramatic and appealing scenes. Where is there to be found anything more tenderly human than the incident of "Christ taking leave of His Mother" before His journey to Jerusalem to consummate His mission?

This note of womanly element in its fairest form, gradually insinuating itself more and more, and permeating life, art, and literature, is the key to the right understanding of the position which woman, not only as an individual but also as a class, was henceforth to take in the civilized world.

Before turning our special attention to Agnes Sorel, let us recall the condition of France at the beginning of the fifteenth century.

When the lunatic king Charles the Sixth died in 1422, and Charles, his son, at the age of nineteen, succeeded under the title of "King of Bourges," Paris was held by the Burgundians, who were in league with the English. The Dukes of Burgundy and of Brittany were alike vacillating in their policy, being at one time attached to the king's party, and at another allied to the English. With the exception of a few castles, the strongholds of lords loyal to the Crown, the English possessed the whole of France north of the Loire, from the Muese to the Bay of Mont St. Michael. Hither the Duke of Bedford was sent as regent for the English king, Henry the Sixth, then ten months old, who, by the terms of the Treaty of Troyes (1420), was the lawful king, the right of succession having been conferred on his father, Henry the Fifth, when he married Catherine, the daughter of Charles the Sixth of France.

Charles the Seventh divided his time between Bourges and Poitiers, where the government was carried on, and the places he dearly loved, Loches, Chinnon, and Tours, in which he sought the solitude he craved for. But even in these seemingly peaceful retreats, his lethargy and indolence were disturbed by perpetual intrigues, which it must be admitted were largely fostered by his own caprices and fickle affections. Meanwhile a cry of misery was arising from the war-devastated land. Churches and convents, castles and cottages, were all fallen into ruin, and brambles grew in the untilled land where once had waved golden corn. As Alain Chartier wrote at the time, "Les pays champestres sont tournez à l'estat de la mer, où chascun a tant de seigneurie comme il a de force." Men of all conditions, from the proudest lord to the poorest peasant, joined in spasmodic and detached efforts to drive out the English, but with the result that they did little else than harass them. Want of cohesion was the characteristic of the national resistance, until, from a small village in the east of France, there appeared a deliverer in the person of Joan of Arc. Instantly, as if her sword were a magic wand, all the fighting men, impelled and inspired by the strength of her personality, rallied around her, and victory was assured.

The story of the siege and surrender of Orleans, of the crowning of Charles in Rheims Cathedral, of Joan subsequently falling into the hands of the Burgundians, who sold her to their allies, the English, of her shameful trial and cruel death, are facts so well known, that they may well be passed over here as briefly as

possible. Suffice it to say that, except for a time, even the triumph of this maiden-patriot did little to rouse the indolent king, who speedily returned to his selfish life in Touraine. War, pillage, and anarchy again devastated France. But gradually a change came over Charles. He seemed to awake as from a stupor. Dissolute and self-seeking favorites were dismissed, and the king was surrounded by able and high-minded men. He bestirred himself to make a final peace with Burgundy and Brittany, and to take a part in the war which was still smouldering, though there were signs of its approaching end.

What was the secret of such a change? When we consider the king's life before he came under the influence of Agnes Sorel, and his relapse into indolence and debauchery after her death, we can only attribute it to her sympathetic and wise guidance. Joan of Arc represented the popular element, Agnes Sorel the aristocratic. Joan of Arc aroused the people to united action by her enthusiasm and success, Agnes Sorel completed the consolidation of the kingdom by inspiring and sustaining the king. Perhaps no one man could have accomplished such a revolution. It took two women to do this, and what they did was not of mere passing worth. Phœnix-like, France arose from the ashes of the Hundred Years War, and it was Agnes Sorel, as priestess, who stirred the embers which hid the new life.

Voltaire, generally more ready to scoff than to approve, wrote thus of Agnes Sorel:

Le bon roi Charles, au printemps de ses jours,
* * * * * * * * *
Avait trouvé, *pour le bien de la France,*
Une beauté, nommée Agnes Sorel.

Was it for the good of France? Let us disregard prejudices and examine facts. Even then, if all that is known of her were written, it could only bear to this rare personality the resemblance which a faint reflection does to reality.

Agnes Sorel was born about 1410, in the Castle of Fromenteau, in Touraine. Her father, Jean Soreau, or Sorel, was lord of Coudon, and belonged to the lesser nobility. It was in this beautiful country of forest and meadow-land, of silvery rivers and meandering streams, that Agnes lived until about her fifteenth year, her education being principally religious, for religion naturally held the first place in a society which still retained faith in the supernatural. It was customary at that time for girls of noble birth to complete their education either at Court or at the castle of some princely person, for such places were considered excellent schools of courtesy and other virtues for the daughters as well as for the sons of the nobility.

It was to the Court of Lorraine that Agnes was summoned as maid-of honor to the Dutchess Isabelle, wife of René, Duke of Anjou and Lorraine and Count of Provence, a prince distinguished for chivalry and learning. The intellectual and chivalrous atmosphere must have been peculiarly congenial to the sympathetic and versatile nature of Agnes Sorel. We can picture her listening to the Duke René reading his latest poem to one or two of his brother poets in the castle pleasuance, or discoursing on philosophy or statecraft, or attending some brilliant pageant or sumptuous *fête*. Chivalry, though dead as an institution, still survived as a recreation, and, as an appeal from the past to the cultured imagination, and René, mediæval knight that he was in sentiment, dearly

loved the gorgeous spectacle of a tournament, with the knight jousting in honor of his chosen lady. At this Court Agnes also came under the influence of Yolande of Aragon, widow of Louis. King of Naples and Sicily, great-granddaughter of King John of France, mother of the Duke René, and mother-in-law of King Charles the Seventh, a woman renowned for her extraordinary political capacity. All these ties, and the remembrance of the French blood in her veins, emphasised Yolande's domonant passion—the love of France—and it may well be that in this patriotic atmosphere Agnes Sorel became imbued with a like passion, which later she was to develop in all its perfection, rivalled only by her devotion to the well-being and glory of her royal lover.

Patriotism was a virtue of recent growth in France; for, in order to thrive, it requires unity of idea, and during the Middle Ages the only idea common to all was Christianity, which from the nature of its teaching of humility and fraternity, does not make for patriotism. It may cement the structure, but it does not form the basis. It was only after years of suffering and unrest that men learned to sink their individual and local interests in those of the nation as a whole. Then, and only then, could patriotism arise, and only under such conditions could it flourish.

How long Agnes lived at the Court of Lorraine (one of the most refined and cultured Courts of the time), and how her first meeting with the king came about, is certain. It is impossible that she may have been at the coronation at Rheims, in 1429, or that she may have accompanied Isabelle of Lorraine to Tours, in 1431, when the latter went to beseech the king to use his influence to deliver her husband from prison. We should like to think that it happened in the latter way, for this would lend additional interest to the exquisite miniature in the Bibliothèque Nationale (at one time in the Book of Hours of Etienne Chevalier, now for the most part at Chantilly), which it seems probable represents Agnes Sorel as a youthful shepherdess, with the Castle of Loches in the background, and Charles the Seventh riding towards her. As has been already suggested elsewhere,* this may have been a poetical rendering of their first meeting. We at least know for certain that from the year 1432, when Isabelle went to Naples during the captivity of her husband, Agnes was no longer in her service. It seems more than probable that she had already attracted the notice of Charles, and that in this year she took up her residence in Touraine, no doubt gaining her influence over the king at first by her beauty, which all her contemporaries proclaim, and afterwards by that mysterious combination of ability and grace, of intelligence and physical vitality, which held him captive for nearly twenty years. During this time she, like a true woman, and no ordinary place-hunter, made his devotion to her react upon himself, for the good of his country and to his own honor. She not only counselled him wisely herself, but persuaded him to surround himself with wise counsellors.

Of these counsellors, and the able and devoted men who served the king in divers ways, some few stand out more prominently than the rest, because of their position of intimacy in the royal circle, and their special and enduring frendship with Agnes Sorel. Such were Etienne Chevalier,

*Athenaeum, June 25, 1904.

treasurer of France, Pierre de Brézé, of a noble Angevin family, and sénéchal of Normandy after the expulsion of the English and Jacques Cœur, the king's goldsmith and financier, whose house at Bourges, with its angel-ceiled chapel, still delights the traveller.

Etienne Chevalier was for some time secretary to the king, and, after filling one or two smaller posts connected with finance, was made treasurer of France, and member of the grand council. In addition to administrative capacity, he possessed a brilliant intellect and a great love of art. It is to his initiative that we owe the only suggestions in portraiture of Agnes Sorel. It was to him also that the king confided the supervision of the erection of the monuments to her memory at Jumièges and Loches—Jumièges, where she died in 1450, and where her heart was buried, and Loches, her favorite place of sojourn, and to whose church and chapter she had made large gifts. To Loches her body was borne in royal splendor, and laid to rest in the choir of the church, where her simple tomb, long since removed to a side chapel, may still be seen. We can imagine the loving care with which Etienne Chevalier watched, and possibly even gave suggestions to, the sculptor as he worked at her recumbent effigy representing her with a Book of Hours in her hand, her feet resting against two lambs, and her head guarded by two angels with outstretched wings. Perhaps this stone effigy was the one true portrait of Agnes, but the head and face were partially destroyed a few years after the Revolution, and restored in their present form in 1806, so that little of the original now remains.

This tomb has a strange and chequered history. Soon after the death of Charles (1461), the Chapter of Loches made request to Louis the Eleventh to have it removed to a side chapel, since they considered it unfitting for the dust of such an one to repose in the choir. Louis, using his subtlety to better purpose than was his wont, replied that, if they removed the tomb, they must return her gifts. Naturally these worthy ecclesiastics silenced their consciences, and kept the tomb where it was. In the reign of Louis the Fourteenth it was removed to its present position in the side chapel, and in 1793 it was rifled, her dust cast to the winds, and the features defaced. But what matter? Agnes had done her work, work which had to be done, and which she alone could do.

Another of the little band of chosen spirits of which Agnes was the soul and centre was Pierre de Brézé, lord of Varenne and Brissac, who early showed himself a man of affairs, and was admitted to the king's council when he was but twenty-seven. In war, administration, and finance he proved himself equally trustworthy and skilful, and to these qualities he added others of a brilliant intellectual nature. He advanced from one post of trust to another, until the king himself presented him with the keys of the city and castle of Rouen. Thus he became sénéchal of Normandy, an honor which remained in his family. One of his descendants, Louis de Brézé, was the husband of Diane de Poitiers.

Jacques Cœur, whose life was so intimately associated with the Court during Agnes's lifetime, and so sadly marred and ended after her death, was the son of a simple merchant of Bourges. Following in the wake of many adventurous and ambitious merchants of the time, he journeyed

to the East, and amassed a large fortune, which he placed at the disposal of the king. This enabled Charles to carry on the war in spite of his impoverished exchequer, and to make a final and successful effort against the English. But, like many another on whom Fortune has smiled, evil tongues and envious hearts began, ere long, their vampire work, and after the death of his friend and patroness, Agnes Sorel, Charles made no effort on his behalf, but left him at the mercy of his calumniators in the same base and heartless way in which he had abandoned Joan of Arc. Jacques, his goods confiscated, and his life in danger, was obliged to fly the country, and died fighting, in the Pope's service, against the Turk.

Of the beauty of Agnes Sorel there can be no doubt, for all contemporary chroniclers and poets tell of it. Even the Pope, Pius the Second, allowed himself to descend from his frigid heights of supposed indifference to feminine charm to add his tribute of praise to the general homage. Considering that there are so many types of physical beauty, appealing to as many different temperaments, there must have been something rare and remarkable in Agnes to have attracted and held bound all who came in contact with her. We can but conclude that this unanimous judgment could only have been the result of that mysterious union, so illusive, so indefinable, of spiritual with physical beauty. The records of the time merely tell us that she had blue eyes and fair hair in abundance. The only picture we can judge her by—for the miniatures, by Fouquet, at Chantilly, from Etienne Chevalier's Book of Hours, though exquisite in delicacy, are too minute for much characterization—is, even if we accept it as the original from Fouquet's hand, an overcleaned work in the Museum at Antwerp. This, or the original painting, formed a wing of the diptych painted to adorn the tomb of Etienne Chevalier and his wife in the cathedral of Melum, the other wing—now in the Royal Museum, Berlin—representing Etienne Chevalier himself, in the attitude of prayer, his patron saint, St. Stephen, beside him.

Of the miniatures at Chantilly, the whole series of which forms a most tender and rare tribute to friendship, only brief mention can here be made. The most simple and beautiful in sentiment and design is that of the *Annunciation*, in which the seated Virgin, in the likeness of Agnes Sorel, with bowed head receives the angel's message. The scene is laid in a Gothic chapel, with statues of the Prophets all around, and Moses, holding the Books of the Law, as the central figure of the group. This assemblage of Old Testament seers certainly typifies the Old dispensation, whilst the Annunciation prefigures the New, and to us the whole may not unfitly form an allegory of the new order which Agnes Sorel was to help to bring about. In another miniature—*The visit of the Magi*—Etienne Chevalier himself, as one of the kings, kneels before the Virgin, here also represented in the likeness of Agnes. And so on, throughout the series, in all the scenes of the Virgin's life, we find her bearing the features of Agnes until an older and sadder type becomes necessary in the *Crucifixion*, the *Entombment*, and the *Announcement of the Death*, and the *Death*, of the Virgin. When, however, death has transfigured age and sorrow, the likeness of Agnes reappears in the *Assumption*, the *Coronation*, and, the crowning glory, the *Enthronement*, of the Virgin.

There is only one unanimous opinion concerning Agnes Sorel, and that is as to her beauty. For the rest, it would seem as if prejudice and flattery held the scales. The mean is difficult to discover, and perhaps it is only possible to get somewhere near it by studying results—the remarkable change in Charles's life and conduct from the time when Agnes appears to have first come into his life, until her death.

In the face of conflicting records, it is no easy matter to determine when Agnes Sorel first became the king's mistress. In 1435, when the Treaty of Arras was concluded between Charles and the Duke of Burgundy, Cardinal de Sainte-Croix (afterwards Pope Pius the Second) was Papal legate at the French Court, and aided in the negotiations. He tells in his memoirs that the relation between Charles and Agnes was known publicly at the time, and that the king could do nothing without her, even having her at his side at the royal councils. The trustworthiness of this statement has, however, been so questioned, that it seems safer to endeavor to arrive at the truth from other sources. It is an admitted fact that in 1433 the manner of Charles's life entirely changed. Though doubtless the politic Yolande, Charles's mother-in-law, and Marie of Anjou, his wife, exercised some influence over him, the change was so sudden, and, while it lasted, so radical, that it is difficult to see in it merely the outcome of this home influence, which had already existed for some years, and which continued after the death of Agnes, with the same almost negative result. In that year the infamous favorite, La Trémouille, who had been the king's evil genius for six years, was dismissed, and soon after we read of favors granted by the king to Agnes's relations. From that time Charles ceased to spend his time, as it were, in dreamland in the fair Tourine country, and engaged himself in affairs of State, listening to and accepting wise counsels, favoring the restoration of schools and universities—which, in the uncertain state of the country, had almost ceased to exist—and encouraging the final efforts to expel the national enemy, even at times personally joining in the fight. If we see in this the guiding spirit of Agnes, the secret of her influence is not very difficult to discover. Apart from her beauty, which, with Charles, would be a potent factor, Agnes had a woman's insight and skill in her relations with him, ever holding up to him the glory and obligations of kingship, at the same time herself entering, with all the vitality of her extraordinary nature, into his favorite pastimes. We know that in one or other of her many residences near Chinon or Loches, she and the King often spent the evening playing piquet or chess (the latter being his favorite game), and then, on the morrow, rode forth together to the chase. So the days were passed in work and simple outdoor pleasures, Agnes taking no recognized public part in the king's life, but devoting herself heart and soul to the task she had in hand. But besides these relaxations of peace, there was also the reality of war; for the war still lingered on, though feebly. The English had lost their ally, the Duke of Burgundy, as well as Bedford, the able Regent, and there was no fit man to take the latter's place. Paris opened her gates to Charles in 1436, and in the following year Charles, after having reigned fourteen years, made his first State entry into the capital of his kingdom, mounted on a white charger, the sign

of sovereignty. In 1444 a treaty was concluded at Tours with the English, and, to make the compact doubly sure, Margaret of Anjou, a niece of the king, was married to Henry the Sixth of England. For about a month the Court and its princely visitors gave themselves up to *fêtes* and pageants, and it was during this time of rejoicing that the position of Agnes was officially recognized. She was made lady-in-waiting to the Queen, and took a prominent part throughout the festival. Charles gave her the royal castle of Beauté, on the Marne, near the Bois de Vincennes, "le plus bel chastel et joly et le mieux assis qui fust en l'Isle de France," desiring, as was said, that she should be "Dame de Beauté de nom comme de fait." From the time of her public recognition she appeared with the king at all the brilliant festivities celebrated in honor of treaties and marriages. She also sat in the royal council, a position which, as a king's mistress, she was the first to occupy, though we know that Henri the Second took no step without first conferring with Diane de Poitiers, and that Madame de Maintenon sat in Louis the Fourteenth's privy council.

The change which came over France after the Treaty of Tours was marvellous, alike in its extent and its rapidity. Commerce was again resumed between the two nations; men and women once again ventured without the city walls, to breathe, as it were, the fresh air of liberty; and those who had been called upon to fight returned to their work in the fields or the towns. We cannot better voice the feeling of the people than by borrowing the song of a poet of the day:

Le temps a laissé son manteau
De vent, de froidure et de pluie,
Et s'est vêtu de broderie,
De soliel rayant, clair et beau;
Il n'y a beste ne oiseau
Qu'en son jargon ne chante ou crie:
Le temps a laissé son manteau.

Now that Agnes had assumed a definite *rôle* at Court, she lived principally at Loches, where the king assigned to her "son quartier de maison" within the castle, and also gave her a residence without the walls. Here she shone like a radiant star; for although the king did not have much personal influence on the movement in art and letters, his Court was the meeting-place of many distinguished and intellectual men. Among them we find the name of Alain Chartier, the poet, and sometime secretary to the king, and one of the ambassadors who went to Edinburgh to ask the hand of the little Margaret of Scotland for the Dauphin. We remember him now chiefly in connection with the charming story told of this girl-wife of the Dauphin Louis. Betrothed to Louis when she was a child of three, and sent to France to be brought up at the Court, she was married at twelve to this boy of thirteen, who could not possibly appreciate her simple, sweet nature which endeared her to all others. One day as she was passing with her ladies through a room in the castle, she saw Alain Chartier lying on a bench asleep. She approached quietly, and kissed him, much to the surprise of her attendants that she could "kiss so ugly a man." And she made answer: "I did not kiss the man, but the precious mouth whence so many beautiful and fair words have issued." Poor little poetess! Fortunately her life was a short one. She died when she was just twenty-one, with these words on her lips: "Fi de la vie de ce monde, ne m'en parlez plus."

The last scene of Agnes's life was pathetically interesting. Her end

came almost suddenly. The king, listening to advice, had resolved to continue the war in Normandy, and, at the instigation of Agnes, if we may believe the words of a courtly writer of the time, had himself gone to the front. Rouen was taken, and Charles entered in triumph. The streets were decked with flowers and branches, and the houses hung with rich draperies, and everywhere the leopards and quarterings of England had been replaced by the *fleur-de-lis*. Charles, preceded by a gorgeous procession of archers, each company arrayed in the livery of its lord, and carrying his special banner, followed, under a canopy, on a horse caparisoned to the ground with blue cloth sprinkled with *fleurs-de-lis* of gold, surrounded by princes and the principal captains and officers of the Crown. Slowly he made his way to the cathedral through the shouting multitude, and to the sound of many fiddles and the fanfare of trumpets. There he descended, kissed the relics as he knelt beneath the great portal, and then entered its hushed and solemn dimness to return thanks. But scarce had the air ceased to ring with the plaudits of the people when the report of a plot against the king, devised by the Dauphin, is said to have come to the ears of Agnes, and she hastened to the king at Jumièges, whither he had retired for a short rest during the unusual and inclement winter. Here, stricken by a mysterious sickness, by some attributed to poison, she died in February, 1450, in her manor of Mesnil, near the Abbey of Jumièges. The king was with her to the end, and could only be induced to withdraw when her lifeless form sank back in his arms. So died this wonderful and fascinating woman, who had lived and labored for her country through perhaps the most critical period of its history.

Bearing in mind the condition of France at the time of Agnes Sorel's accession to power, the extent of the influence she admittedly exercised in the counsels of the king, and the great change which came over the royal fortunes, and the fortunes of the country, during the years of her ascendency, it is scarcely possible to refuse to her some share in the recognition so lavishly bestowed upon the other great woman of that time —Joan of Arc. The one may be said to have been the complement of the other. Both were necessary to the needs of the day, and the glory of successful accomplishment should be shared between them.

ALICE KEMP-WELCH.

GENERAL LUCIUS HENRY WARREN.

Soldier, lawyer; born in Charlestown, Mass., Oct. 6, 1838. Married Jane Maria, daughter of Amor Hollingsworth, of Milton, Mass., Oct. 1, 1868; son of Judge George Washington Warren, of Boston; traces his descent in the sixth generation from John Warren, a descendant of the Earl of Warren, who came over with Sir Richard Saltonstall in Winthrop's fleet and settled in Watertown, Mass. His mother, Lucy Rogers, was a daughter of Jonathan Newell, M. D., of Stowe, a descendant of the martyr, John Rogers. Graduated from Princeton College 1860, received degree of A. M., 1865, Harvard University, LL. B., 1862. Admitted to the Massachusetts bar, July 28, 1862; Philadelphia bar, May 17, 1879. Enlisted in the Thirty-second Regiment, Massachusetts Volunteers, July 30th, 1862; following August was commissioned Second Lieutenant, and in December, First Lieutenant, "for bravery at Fredericksburg." Major United States Colored Troops, 1864; Lieutenant Colonel of same 1865; honorably mustered out Jan. 25, 1867. Commissioned First Lieutenant Thirty-ninth United States Infantry July 28, 1866; Captain, July 31, 1867. Resigned Oct. 15, 1871. Brevetted Lieutenant Colonel, Colonel and Brigadier General United States Volunteers "for gallantry in front of Petersburg," and Major and Lieutenant Colonel United States Army "for gallant and meritorious services during the war." Joined Second (Griffin's) Brigade, First Division Fifth Army Corps; present with Porter's Corps at Second Bull Run; engaged at Antietam and Fredericksburg; commanded company at Chancellorsville; as company's commander participated in the various skirmishes and battles of the army of the Potomac (except Gettysburg, when in hospital); on duty as Judge Advocate, winter 1863-1864; took part in the sieges of Petersburg and Richmond, being twice wounded; was in command of regiment most of the time, and often of the brigade, and upon the evacuation of Richmond, April 1, 1865, commanded the first colored troops that entered. In May, 1865, was with troops sent to Texas, under Gen. Sheridan, to look after Maximillian, the Emperor of Mexico; in command at Brazos, Santiago, 1865, and the District of Indianola, Texas, 1866. In July, 1867, being in command of company and Post at New Ibera, La., while suppressing a mutiny, received seven bayonet wounds in left arm; in January, 1868, appointed Aide de Camp to Brevet Major Gen. Robert C. Buchanan, United States Army, commanding Department of Louisiana and Texas, and became Acting Assistant Adjutant General on his staff during the reconstruction period. Resigned Oct. 15, 1879. Practiced law at Philadelphia bar from 1879 to October, 1886; since then has been living in Europe.

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VOL. VIII.—DECEMBER, 1905.—NO. 6.

CONTENTS

Page.

I. The Strategy and Tactics of the Russo-Japanese War. By Major JOHN P. WISSER, Inspector General. Fifteenth Paper..... 513

II. Peking, August, 1900. By Col. G. K. SCOTT MONCRIEFF, C. I. E., R. E. 523

III. Official and Social Military Etiquette. By W. R. HAMILTON, Major, U. S. A..... 537

IV. European Theory Baffled in the Russo-Japanese War. Translated by CECIL STEWART, Captain Fourth U. S. Cavalry..... 573

V. Our Contemporaries. By JOHN P. WISSER, Major U. S. A..... 582

VI. The Anglo-Japanese Fleets in Alliance. By ARCHIBALD HURD..... 604

VII. Editorials..... 615

VIII. Service Salad..... 620

IX. GEORGE PECK, Medical Director, U. S. N..... 623

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MEDICAL DIRECTOR GEORGE PECK, U. S. NAVY.

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THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.

MAJOR JOHN P. WISSER, INSPECTOR GENERAL.

FIFTEENTH PAPER.

(March 10 to September 5, 1905.)

LAND OPERATIONS.

THE operations at sea to include the great naval battle in the Sea of Japan, May 27-28, 1905, were described, and it now remains to follow briefly the operations on land after the great battle of Mukden, and the actions of the Peace Commission which brought the war to a close.

By the battle of Mukden, southern Manchuria (its richest and most populous part), including its capital, fell into the hands of the Japanese.

After the crushing defeat of the Russians, the Japanese kept up a vigorous pursuit of the scattered remains of Kouropatkin's army, and this pursuit only stopped beyond Kai-yuan. The Russians were compelled to abandon an immense amount of war material and transportation (carts and wagons) at a point about 15 miles north of Mukden, and in the vicinity of Mukden itself they had buried a number of their guns, which the Japanese afterwards dug up.

On March 14th the Japanese delivered an attack on the centre of the Russian positions at Fau-ho, south of Tie-ling, which was repulsed with a loss of 1,000 Japanese. Later, however, the latter continued their advance, and, by pressure all along the

line, succeeded in occupying Fie-ling early on the morning of March 16th.

On March 17, 1905, Kouropatkin was relieved as commander-in-chief of the Russian forces in the Far East, and was succeeded by General Linevitch. Kouropatkin, however, retained command of the I. Manchurian army. To General Linevitch fell the arduous duty of reorganizing the defeated army under the pressure of uninterrupted pursuit by the Japanese.

On March 19th the Japanese occupied Kai-yuan (20 miles north of Tie-ling), and on the 21st entered Chang-tu-fu, 30 miles north of Kai-yuan. Here the pursuit practically ceased, and a more deliberate and general advance commenced, forcing the Russians farther and farther north.

Ai-shiu-kan (33 miles north of Tie-ling) was occupied by the Japanese on April 2, and a part of their force from Chang-tu-fu drove the Russians out of Tsa-lu-shu (10 miles north of Chang-tu-fu) about the same time, and then advanced to San-tao-kan.

Linevitch occupied Kirin with 50,000 men, and the rest of his army (about 250,000) was intrenched in a position half-way between Mukden and Chang-shun.

The Russian line stretched from the road between Mukden and Kirin across the railway near Feng-hwa to the Pekin and Bodune road on the west, covering a front of about 40 miles, extending about 8 miles west of the railway, with Mishchenko's cavalry on the extreme right, while the left stretched from Kaulbar's command eastward to a point about 50 miles south of Kirin; the hills to the north of Kirin being heavily fortified.

The IV Russian army corps had arrived.

The Russians destroyed railways and bridges to impede the advance of the Japanese.

Mischenko, on the Russian right flank, after four days of operations against the Japanese left, was defeated, and retired about 20 miles to the north-west.

Rennenkampf, after an offensive movement against the Japanese right, was also defeated and suffered heavily.

The Japanese line steadily advanced, the subdivisions remaining practically in the same relative positions: Oku and Nodzu in the center, Nogi on the left, Kuroki and Kamamura, as well as Hasegawa, on the right.

Reinforcements were hurried up from the coast, a great fleet of Chinese junks being impressed to carry on the transportation on the rivers.

The Japanese completed the railway as far as Tie-ling.

On June 16th, Mishchenko, with 5,000 cavalrymen, had a severe engagement with Nogi at Lang-hu-mo-peug, 20 miles south of Feng-hwa (Linevitch's headquarters before he left for Kirin). The Russians were driven back with serious loss, and the Japanese continued their outflanking movement.

Meanwhile, the progress of peace negotiations put an end to active hostilities on a large scale, and the opposing armies remained in their respective positions.

LAND EXPEDITION.

(June 24-July 30, 1905.)

On June 24, 1905, an expedition started from Yokohama, Japan, for the island of Sakhalin, where a landing was effected in the southern part, at Aniwa Bay, and the southern half of the island surrendered to the Japanese on July 30, 1905.

PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.

The peace negotiations followed promptly after the Battle of the Sea of Japan.

The St. Petersburg correspondent of Collier's writes as follows on the subject:

"Immediately after the battle of Liao-Yang, a little more than a year ago, Mr. Roosevelt sounded both Powers as to whether they would make peace. Japan informed him of her terms. Russia decided to fight on. The battles of the Sha-ho and Mukden were fought. After each, the President approached both belligerents and urged them to make peace. It was done tactfully—in the case of Japan, with no intention to apply pressure to force her to stop the war; in the case of Russia, with a delicate consideration of the smarting wounds from which she was suffering. After Mukden the President found Japan's terms more severe than they had been after Liao-Yang. While Rojestvensky's fleet was still "in being," he urged Russia to enter into peace negotions with Japan. The Czar, with that obstinacy which is the predominant feature of his character, preferred to send his untried ships against the battle-scarred veterans under Togo's command. When Rojestvensky was defeated the President moved quickly. He went from Russia to Japan, from Japan to Russia. He sought to induce them to enter into negotiations. He found Japan willing, Russia sullen. He used Germany and France. He was suc-

cessful in the end, and addressed to the belligerents his formal appeal of June 8, in which he begged them to make peace, directly and exclusively between themselves, in the interest of humanity and civilization. He bridged over the distrust and suspicion which divided the fighting states; he communicated to one the names of plenipotentiaries appointed by the other; he favored Europe as the place of meeting, but Japan refusing and Germany urging, he assented to the United States as the scene of the Conference."

The plenipotentiaries of the two nations, appointed to determine the conditions of the treaty of peace were Baron Rosen and M. De Witte, on the Russian side, Baron Komura and M. Takahira, representing Japan.

The navy yard at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, was designated as the place for the conferences, and there the plenipotentiaries met on August 7, 1905, and continued in session until the terms of peace were agreed upon, which was not until August 29, 1905, now historic, although the treaty was not signed until September 5, 1905.

THE TERMS OF PEACE.

Japan secures the recognition of her preponderance in Korea and the restoration of Manchuria to China, which are the two points on which she went to war.

In addition, she gains the lease of Port Arthur and Dalny, with their adjacent lands and waters, the Manchurian Railway from Port Arthur to Kouang-Tcheng Tse, about ninety miles south of Harbin, the southern half of the island of Sakhalin, up to the 50th parallel of latitude, and fishing rights in Russian waters in the Sea of Japan, the Sea of Okhotsk and Behring Sea. Russia and Japan are to conclude a commercial treaty, with a most-favored-nation clause.

THE GREAT LESSONS OF THE WAR.

The lessons of the war have been referred to from time to time during the discussion of the events which furnished the subject-matter of these lessons; in conclusion, a résumé of the greater of these lessons may not be out of place.

I. STRATEGY.

The important principles of strategy emphasized by the war may be summarized as follows:

1.—Preparedness. The superior preparedness of Japan, in organization, training, and material, was one of the great factors determining her success. The policy of a country cannot be divorced from the military preparations which it implies; in violating this principle, by failing to keep pace in her military preparations with the diplomatic firmness which she maintained, Russia committed the great mistake of the war.

2.—Command of the Sea. Throughout the war the struggle to obtain or retain command of the sea continued, and when Russia lost all hope of regaining that command, the campaign was practically ended.

3.—The Offensive in Strategy and Tactics. The great advantage of the offensive, in contradistinction to the defensive, in war, is again exemplified. Japan carried the spirit of the offensive into all her operations, at sea and on land, while Russia was imbued with the paralyzing spirit of the defensive.

4.—Across any portion of the sea which is still in dispute by the opposing fleets, or only partially under control, attacks against the enemy's land domain cannot be made.

The control of the sea must be sufficient to enable the attacker to begin and carry out his attack, and also to hold the captured points.

Japan secured sufficient control of the sea to land her first land forces in southern Corea, but by blockading the Russian fleet in Port Arthur soon made her control of the sea so complete as to enable her to land her forces first at Seoul, and later at the mouth of the Yalu in northern Corea.

5.—The Russian fleet in being at Port Arthur was the cause of great efforts made to reduce that fortification. The Japanese operators were absolutely dependent on the control of the sea, and if the Russians could have sent another squadron to the Pacific to reinforce the fleet at Port Arthur and thus obtain the preponderance of sea-power, with Port Arthur as a base, Japan's campaign would have fallen. Even the small fleet in being at Vladivostok was a source of much trouble to the Japanese.

6.—Co-operation Between Land and Sea Forces. The mutual co-operation between the land and sea forces, so necessary for success of operations beyond sea, appears to have been attained by Japan without any difficulty.

7.—The Necessity of Fortifying Important Harbors. Port Arthur will pass into history as one of the most memorable of the world's fortified harbors. The command of the sea in the Far

East was essential to both contending nations: to Russia, because her single line of railways was inadequate for the prompt supply of the troops in the theatre of operations; to Japan, because all her operations were over sea operations. Port Arthur was the only port, free from ice for the greater part of the year, available as a base for the Russian fleet.

8.—The Defensive in War. The Russian purely defensive spirit was fatal to success in the campaign, both at sea and on land.

At sea, the conduct of the fleet in endeavoring to effect its escape from Port Arthur on August 10, 1904, indicated that its purpose was not to fight, but merely to escape. Rojestvensky's effort to pass Togo and reach Vladivostok in May, 1905, appeared to have a similar, purely defensive, purpose.

9.—Position Too Far Advanced. The original position of the Russian army on the Yalu was too far advanced, exactly as was the French position in the Franco-Prussian war. The only proper position (advocated by Kouropatkin) was between Harbin and Mukden, but that would have involved abandoning Port Arthur and Vladivostok, so essential to the fleet.

Many other strategic principles might be discussed, such as the advantages and disadvantages of the configuration of the land frontier, but these have furnished the most valuable lessons for future wars.

II. TACTICS.

The principles of tactics exemplified in this war are very numerous and important, but complete data are still wanting for a full understanding and complete judgment.

The most important that can now be cited are:

1.—A Defensive Position Must Not Be Too Extended. The Russian position on the Yalu, in addition to being strategically defective by being too far advanced, was tactically defective in being too greatly extended for the force available to hold it.

2.—Good Reconnaissance is Essential in War. The Russian reconnaissance work, both at sea and on land, appeared to be very indifferent, while the Japanese reconnaissance was most effective.

3.—Field Intrenchments an Important Factor. On both sides field intrenchments were extensively used, and an intrenching tool has became as important a part of a soldier's equipment as the rifle itself.

4.—Land Defense of Coast Forts. The necessity for forts to

cover the land side of sea-coast forts has became more and more apparent, and Port Arthur exemplified this in a remarkable way.

The outer line of defenses, however, must be at such a distance from the roadstead, etc., to be protected, that the enemy cannot occupy a position outside of it with siege material and bombard the roadstead, etc., from that position, as the Japanese did from Wolf's Hills.

5.—Field Artillery Tactics. The tactics of field artillery have been modified somewhat by the experiences of this war. The massing of field artillery on the battlefield, while still essential, so far as obtaining concentrated and overwhelming fire, must now be combined with concealment, which will compel the batteries to be more scattered than formerly, but retaining the power of concentration of fire.

Indirect fire is also more extensively used than ever before, but its success is absolutely dependent on clear obsrvation of the effect of fire.

6.—The Advance of Infantry under heavy fire is still possible with the modern rifle, and close formations at the moment of assault are also admissible.

7.—Bayonet Charges are still an element of the attack.

8.—Hand Grenades are again of use in close attacks in hilly country, field intrenchments, etc.

9.—The Torpedo, fixed and moveable, in harbors or on torpedo boats and warships is an important weapon of offense as well as defense.

These are the more important tactical principles furnishing lessons for future wars. Some other points are given herewith.

The following directions, published to his command by General Oku on February 20, 1905, embody some of the main essential principles of tactics for the use of modern armies:

"1. Artillery fire is the best method of preparing an attack; but, even when heavy guns are used, firing at the enemy's positions is alone comparatively useless, so long as it is not taken advantage of for an infantry advance. The infantry must move forward, no matter how slowly. Advance and artillery fire must harmonize.

"2. Positions once occupied must never be abandoned. If a strong counter-attack is expected, prepare for it with machine-guns and hand-grenades. The former are especially useful in such cases, but they require perfect cleanliness and oiling, and constant care to effect small repairs at once, even in the hottest of the fight.

Pay special attention to the oiling cylinder and the loader. Machine-guns must never be alone.

"3. Troops advancing to the attack must carry sandbags to construct defensive positions, as at this season the frozen ground cannot be broken. When strong positions or machine-guns are met with, a small force of artillery, preferably of mountain guns, must be brought up without horses.

"4. If the attack is along a greatly extended front, the villages must be used as fortified points to economize men, and a thin line only must be kept between them. The reserves will thus always be strong and serviceable.

"5. Whenever new positions are occupied, a report on the enemy's dispositions and the nature of the ground must at once be made. Constant study of these two things is of the utmost importance as a means to victory. The greatest attention must be paid, above all, to the movements of the troops co-operating on the flanks; you must constantly yourselves judge of the situation, and act accordingly. Soldiers who think of their own interests, not of their comrades, do not understand the art of war.

"6. When troops remain a long time in one place, useless objects accumulate in the soldiers' personal kit, and this interferes with swift movement. Let everything unnecessary be thrown away. Your aim must be to move rapidly. Never, in any circumstances, give arms or ammunition up to the enemy. If you cannot carry them away destroy them, even at the risk of your lives."

The following also contains some interesting information on this subject:

"Col. Kawimura, of the Japanese army, has contributed to a German magazine an article upon Japanese tactics, in which there are some points of interest. He says that the Japanese think that they have surpassed their European models in the methods of attack, thanks to the use of the field fortification. The spade is as useful as the rifle, and, when the ground is suitable, is used in the attack as much as in the defence. In the firing line one man fires while his neighbor digs, and their work is interchanged. This is done in a manner different from European methods, since the Japanese have learned to throw up small defences with the spade while they themselves are lying down, so that the firing line is practically hidden in the ground. The advanced troops thus being protected, it is possible to bring forward strong reserves. Indeed, the practice is to bring practically the whole force

into contact with the enemy, and Col. Kawimura says that only a strong reserve is kept echeloned behind the flanks. The Japanese officer also says that movements of troops take place generally in the night, and that the methods of night marching and fighting have constantly been practised in time of peace, all being done in complete silence, and the orders being given by means of a small pocket lantern. But the real gist of the Colonel's remarks is that the technical ability of the Japanese is used to support the attack and not to lead them into the defence. For this reason they conduct their artillery fire upon the German and not the French system—the batteries united in a mass, the range ascertained, and then a violent fire, but no dispersion against a supposed enemy established in a position which cannot be seen, and which is not known. Much is due to the Germans, but the Japanese are not servile imitators.

"Major Lœffler, of the Saxon staff, recently contributed to one of the German service magazines an article embodying his conclusions as to Japanese tactics, and he also insisted very strongly upon the great value of fire power. He attributes much importance to the work of the artillery, but remarks that it has never led to decisive results. The brave infantry, always advancing, half-buried in the ground, even under the most violent and continuous fire, has completed the victory. The changes in arms have not led to any essential change on the battlefield, and to-day, as a hundred years ago, the form of the combat is based upon superiority of fire. Major Loeffler points out that the Russians, owing to the terrible nature of the Japanese fire, have lost heavily, even on the defence, because the counter-attack is prescribed in their regulations. He admits that counter-attack is necessary, but remarks that it should not extend to every sector of the line of defence. The Japanese always endeavor to obtain victory by enveloping movements, making first a violent frontal attack in order to hold the adversary, and to lead him to employ all his forces."

COMPARATIVE LOSSES IN THE WAR.

The comparative losses in the war furnish an important object lesson. So far as they can be ascertained they are approximately as follows:

Land Armies.
Killed and Wounded.

Russia.	Japan.
320,000	166,000

The Russian losses were probably greater than here stated, and their losses from disease will probably far exceed the Japanese losses from this cause.

Navies.

Russia.	Japan.
15 battleships.	2 battleships.
5 armored cruisers.	4 cruisers.
3 coast defence ironclads.	4 other warships.
11 cruisers.	2 destroyers.
17 other warships (not including converted cruisers).	
32 destroyers.	

This table does not include torpedo-boats, converted cruisers or special service steamers.

The Japanese have lost 12 ships, with a total tonnage of 46,025, but they have captured or raised more than double this amount of tonnage.

The following ships will probably be added to the Japanese navy:

Battleships.	Armored Cruiser.
Orel.	Bayan.
Retvisan.	Protected Cruisers.
Peresviet.	Varyag.
Pobieda.	Pallada.
Poltava.	Coast Defense Ironclads.
Nicholai I.	Seniavine.
	Apraxin.

Besides, forty-three merchant steamers and two sailing ships, aggregating 108,000 tons, were captured and added to the Japanese merchant marine.

The Russians captured but 15 ships, with an average tonnage of only 234 tons.

*PEKING, AUGUST, 1900.**

It is strange to think, in contemplating the recent débâcle of Russia in the Far East, that only five years ago Russians and Japanese were fighting shoulder to shoulder against a common foe, and that armies of those nations played the most important part in the relief of the besieged legations at Peking. There were, it is true, at that time in China representatives of three other powers—Great Britain, France, and the United States,—but the British had still the Boer war unfinished, and could only spare a comparatively small force; France could at first only send a few of her colonial troops, very poor specimens of her great army; and America had still plenty of occupation for her boys in the Philippines, so her contingent, too, was not a large one. Other nations, such as Germany and Italy, who subsequently sent forces to China, were too late to take part in the relief and in the re-establishment of civilized authority. To Japan and Russia belong the chief credit of success, and the senior general of the allies on that occasion was one of whom we have heard much recently—General Linievitch.

At Tientsin, surrounded in those hot days of July by a circle of Chinese batteries pouring shell into the defenceless streets and gardens of the Foreign Concessions, it was the timely arrival of Russian reinforcements that enabled the counter-attack to be made, and it was mainly owing to the magnificent assault of the Japanese on the walled city, and especially its eastern gate, that the Chinese troops were forced to evacuate the place, and the siege of Tientsin was raised.

In the beleaguered legations of Peking, while Americans and British were the mainstay of the defence, there was no more gallant work done than that carried out by Colonel Shiba and his handful of Japanese soldiers and volunteers, while Russians were doing their part also right well close to them.

After the capture of Tientsin by the allies, and while reinforcements were being poured in from beyond the seas in July, the

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Chinese were endeavoring to bar the way to Peking by constructing fortifications near the village of Peitsang, some five miles beyond Tientsin. At the battle of Peitsang, on the 5th of August, it was the Japanese force that turned the enemy's flank and bore the brunt of the fighting; and the next day, though the Americans and British had, at the action of Yangtsun, the chief part of the conflict, Russian troops were well to the fore, and, with the Japanese, pursued the beaten enemy.

It was, however, on the 14th of August, the day of the relief of the legations, that the combined operations of Russians and Japanese contributed mainly to the allied victory. The fact that the British were the first to get into the legation, and achieved this result with a mere trifling loss, has no doubt tended to forgetfulness of the part played by their allies. Had it not been for the furious assault of those allies on another part of the city, the success of the British force would certainly not have been gained so quickly and with such little loss.

To understand the operations of that day, which recalled in some respects the stories of the Indian Mutiny and its famous reliefs, it is necessary to have some idea of the place.

Peking is, broadly speaking, divided into two parts, the Tartar city and the Chinese city. The former, built by some man of colossal ideas 500 years ago, is an almost complete square, of which each side is about four miles long. The Chinese city, rectangular in shape, lies immediately to the south of the Tartar city. Though its breadth and area is less, its length is greater than the other, so that the walls at the point of junction form a reentrant angle. In plan the whole city appears like a square block resting on a broad thick pedestal.

Inside the Tartar city lies the Imperial city, a walled enclosure containing the Imperial palaces, gardens, and many miscellaneous buildings; and inside that again lies the Forbidden city, a mediæval fortress, walled and moated, into which until 1900 no foreigner had ever entered. It was the sanctum sanctorum of the Manchu emperors, containing the throne rooms, pavilions, and the private apartments of the Emperor and Empress.

The outer walls of the Tartar city are built on a most colossal scale. Not only is the length all round the square about seventeen miles, but the thickness of the wall is enormous, from sixty to seventy feet, while the height is about thirty-five feet. Each wall is pierced by great gates, two in each face, except in the south, where there are three. Each gate has an outwork in front of it,

a horseshoe shaped wall of similar size to the main wall. These outworks have also a gate at one side—if one can use the word "gate" to describe a gigantic double door with ponderous locks and bars. The great central gate of the south wall, called the Chien men, has its outwork pierced with three gates, one at each side and one in the centre, opening on the great broad central street of the Chinese city,—a street where all the principal merchants' shops are situated. The great gate opening on this street has immediately in front of it a handsome marble bridge, and the gate itself is only opened on the state occasion when the Emperor passes through on his annual visit to the Temple of Heaven. It may here be parenthetically observed that at the time of the entry of the allies into Peking this gate was demolished by British sappers, and was left open during the whole period of the allied occupation. Each of the gates has over it a tall pagoda-like structure, similar structures being also built at the corners of the city walls. These erections act partly as observation towers, partly as ornamental features.

In the re-entrant angle between the walls of the Tartar and Chinese cities there is through the wall of the latter an important gate called the Tung-ping men. From this gate a road proceeds along the south of the Tartar city wall by which entrance can be gained through the gates.

The legation quarter is situated inside the Tartar city, and lies between the south wall of that city and the south wall of the Imperial enclosure. It is divided in two by a broad drain which flows from the inside of the Imperial city under the wall of the Tartar city by means of a bridge or tunnel. The drainage then flows parallel to the wall in a sluggish stream, and finally finds an exit near the Tung-ping men to the east. This drain divides the legation quarter into two nearly equal parts. To the west of it lie the British, Russian, United States, and Dutch legations. To the east lie the Japanese, French, Spanish, Italian, German, and Austrian legations, besides the Hongkong Bank, and some other private buildings.

The whole of these legations appear to have begun with the British embassy, established after the 1860 campaign in a group of buildings originally a Chinese ducal palace. Like all such aristocratic dwellings in China, this consisted of ceremonial pavilions, ornamental towers, and quadrangles, some of which had been removed to make way for new buildings in European style, but the majority still remained. The other foreign legations had sprung

up in course of years in the same part of the city, around Legation street, a public thoroughfare passing east and west at right angles to the drain above-mentioned,—a street constructed according to western ideas, and the only one in the whole city which was properly paved, drained, and lighted.

The British legation was the citadel or nucleus of the defence, in the sense that it was intended to be the position held to the last. It was not only the headquarters of the commander of the defences, Sir Claude MacDonald, but it was the place of refuge for nearly all the European non-combatants of every nation. But it was not a nucleus in the sense of its occupying a central position. On the contrary, it was considerably exposed, being the nearest of all the defended area to the Imperial city walls. Immediately to the north of its line lay the Hanlin library, one of the oldest libraries in the world, and an object of veneration to the whole of literary China. This library, held by the enemy, had been by them, in an act of unparalleled vandalism, burnt down in the hope of the fire spreading to the British legation. In this atrocious design they were unsuccessful, but they held the blackened ruins after the fire had burnt out.

On the west side of the British legation was the Imperial Carriage Park, a large field full of storehouses and sheds, also held by the enemy; while to the east was the great drain previously mentioned. Beyond the drain was a large walled garden belonging to a Chinese prince. It was a scene of fierce fighting chiefly between Japanese, reinforced frequently by British marines, and the Chinese imperial troops.

The whole legation defences occupied a rough square area of some 600 yards on each side. Most fortunately, one side of this square rested on the main wall of the Tartar city, and especially on the portion whence the great drain had its exit. Had this wall been captured by the enemy, the whole of the interior would have been untenable.

It needs no expert knowledge of the art of war to see that herein lay the key to the relief. If only the allies could gain an entrance into the Chinese city, they could, under cover of its streets and lanes, approach to a point opposite the tunnel where the drain issues, and thence without assaulting any strongly fortified gates they could gain entrance within. The alternative was an attack on some other part of the formidable walls of the Tartar city, and then miles of street fighting. Sir Claude MacDonald readily perceived that the former method gave a far better promise

of success, and he managed to get a message conveyed to the British commander, Sir A. Gaselee, telling him that he would be holding a portion of the main wall of the Tartar city, which would be marked by the British and American flags at either extremity, and suggesting that a rush should be made for this place through the lanes of the Chinese city.

The importance of the defenders' position on the top of the great broad wall was also fully recognized by the enemy, who had fiercely contested the hold thereof, and brought all the strength they could muster to assault this vital point. Whether they had been successful or not was unknown to the relief column; but it was recognized that if the defenders were still holding on to the wall, relief would be possible.

The relieving army had advanced by the river Peiho from Tientsin, following the same route as the Anglo-French army of 1860, and abandoning the more direct line of the railway, by which Sir E. Seymour had made his unsuccessful attempt a few weeks previously. The point on the river nearest to Peking is the walled town of Tungchao, about fourteen miles from the capital, and connected with it by a canal, which has its terminus just outside the eastern wall of the Tartar city, forming indeed a moat in front of the wall on that face.

The country between Tungchao and Peking is flat and densely cultivated. In August it is covered with crops of maize and millet, so tall that a horseman mounted is quite concealed. There are numerous country roads, which are not only unmetalled, but are sunk, owing to the use by generations of travellers, to a considerable depth below the surrounding country. There is, it is true, one paved road which must have taken much labor to make, for its surface is entirely formed of massive blocks of stone; but owing to centuries of neglect its state is so bad as to render it almost impassable.

The armies of the allied nations had reached Tungchao, after marching up the river for several days in exceedingly hot weather, on the 12th of August. The plan of operations was that on the 13th a small body from each force should take up a line of outposts towards Peking, and that the remainder should have a day's rest prior to advancing on the 14th. On that day it was intended to march to some position within a few miles of the capital, and deliver a combined attack on the 15th. As the French troops had not been able to reach Tungchao at the time as the four other allies, it was intended to confine the attack operations to the latter,

and it was settled that the British should attack on the left of the line, the Americans in the centre, the Japanese next, and the Russians on the right. The French would remain in reserve.

But on the night of the 13th the Russians pushed their advanced troops so far forward that they found themselves close up to the walls of the city. They were not opposite the place which it was intended they should attack, for they had stumbled upon the re-entrant angle where the walls of the Tartar and Chinese cities join. They made a gallant assault, which was so far successful that they actually got inside, but they were beaten back again with loss. Calling on some of the Japanese to assist them, they again made an attack, but meanwhile the enemy was thoroughly roused. Rain was falling in torrents, and in the darkness much confusion was inevitable. The attack was withdrawn, and renewed again at dawn farther to the north, where, as it so happened, the fortifications were much more formidable. This attack, however, had several important results. It told the besieged that relief was at hand. Ears accustomed by long usage to the different sounds of war, at once detected the new weapons that had come into action, and hope revived. Then the enemy imagined that the main attack would be delivered against the eastern walls of the Tartar city only, and they concentrated their strength accordingly. Finally, the premature assault committed the whole of the allies to action on the 14th, instead of waiting till next day.

The noise of fighting was heard shortly after midnight at Tungchao, and long before day dawned the troops there were on the march. The rain had cleared off, and although it had the effect of making the roads muddy and heavy, it mitigated to some extent the heat of the coming day. Through muddy lanes bordered by tall crops the columns advanced, and, not without considerable difficulty, endeavored to keep in touch with their allies on the flanks.

There were many indications of the proximity of the capital. In addition to numerous country villages, there were several rectangular enclosures, some being orchards, others temples and burial groves, others country houses with farms and gardens. The scenery in places was very picturesque, especially near the canal connecting Tungchao and Peking, covered as it was at that season with many beautiful aquatic plants. In the far north-west a range of mountains, their blue sides flecked with lights and shadows, stood out against the sky, which again with its fleecy masses of cloud was reflected in the water of the canal.

There was little opportunity, however, for admiring the beauties of nature as the slowly advancing columns got nearer their objective. By mid-day the attacks of the Russians and Japanese on the east wall and gates of the Tartar city had been renewed with energy and courage that would not be denied. The Japanese, showing the same bravery that they had already displayed at Tientsin and of which we have heard so much recently, assaulted one of the great gates, losing three officers and seventy men in the attempt. The Russian loss, which was also heavy, included their chief of the staff. Farther south, the Americans found themselves opposite the same angle of the wall that had been assaulted by the Russians during the night, and they were soon hotly engaged. Their artillery took up four successive positions, although checked by fire from two directions. Ultimately their infantry assaulted the wall and gate and forced their way in. Before this happened, however, the British force, on the left of the allied line, had already effected an entrance into the Chinese city by a gate which was found to have been practically deserted. This gate opened upon a road running from east to west through the Chinese city, bordered at first by fields, but after some little distance passing between rows of small squalid houses, which became more close together as the road went on. It was now past mid-day; the heat was tremendous, and the smells of the road most objectionable.

The intention of the British general was to send the bulk of his force forward to the broad central road opposite the great central gate (Chien men), where it would have a chance of operating on the enemy's right flank, while a small force would make a rush through the lanes to the position on the Tartar city wall which it was hoped would still be held by the Legation defenders.

Taking a few infantry and sappers, Sir A. Gaselee followed a guide through narrow streets and alleys due north, leaving the remainder of the force under Sir Norman Stewart to carry out the flanking movement. Through the labyrinth of houses the small handful of men pushed their way until they emerged at an open space. At their feet was a broad sluggish stream of black liquid; beyond that rose a bank and plateau some 50 yards broad, above which rose the great walls of the Tartar city, with square bastions at intervals, and the towers over the gates in the distance.

A little to the left, however, was a sight that sent the blood tingling through the veins, and made heat and other discomforts be forgotten. There waved the Union Jack and the Stars and Stripes, marking the position on the wall that was held by the

defenders, so relief was not too late! Some idiot suggested that it was a device of the crafty foe to lure the allies to destruction, but this idea was treated with the scorn it deserved. Three ringing cheers from the relievers were answered by an answering hurrah such as Chinese throats never gave. Hardly had the sound died away than instinctively a rush was made for the dark tunnel of the sewer gate under the wall. Helter-skelter across the open ground, everybody, from general to private, was racing to be first, regardless of projectiles and of the unspeakably foul mud in the drain. Once the inside was gained many willing hands helped the newcomers up the steep banks of the drain, and thus, laughing and cheering, the first troops of the Relief entered the Legations.

How is it possible to give a description of the extraordinary scene that followed, and how can one even faintly express on paper the supreme gratification of the moment? Movement among the crowd was with difficulty managed, so closely were the relievers thronged with cheering men, laughing and excited women, and children dancing about in delight. At the steps of the Secretary's house, close to the back entrance to the British Legation, a group of ladies of all ages, clad in white, were gathered together, and their faces of joy and thankfulness made an impression which cannot be effaced from the memory. To them the entrance of the relief column meant the removal of an unspeakable anxiety and the end of two months of horror. On the lawn-tennis courts ladies in fresh summer dresses were flitting about as if at a garden-party, greeting the newcomers as though they were dear old friends. All this time the noise of artillery and the rattle of musketry were such as to drown any mere verbal expressions of gratitude.

It is said that when Sir George Pollock's force relieved the "illustrious garrison" of Jellalabad in 1842, they were surprised to find the defenders "rosy and fat." The beleaguered garrison of Peking was not fat, but it was *clean*, and in that respect presented a contrast to the relief column which was most ludicrous. Sir Claude MacDonald, for instance, had on a white Panama hat and spotless flannels, in which garb he greeted the khaki-clad British general, who after twelve hours' march in an August sun, followed by a race up a particularly filthy drain, did not look quite as clean as a British general usually appears, though it must be admitted that most of his staff presented an even more grimy appearance.

At the entrance of the private apartments of the British Min-

ister, which they had reached after passing through open pavilions now used for encampments of refugees of all nations, Sir Claude presented the general to the senior lady of the Corps Diplomatique, the Marchioness di Salvaggo Raggi, wife of the Italian Minister. This lady's arm was in a sling, and her face bore the signs of much privation. In mellifluous French she expressed the thanks of herself and all the other ladies for the exertions of the allied armies, and her pleasure at being able to greet in person the commander of the British troops.

The time, however, for any lengthy exchange of courtesies had not yet arrived, and a staff officer was sent off at once to summon Sir Norman Stewart, if possible, and in any case bring up reinforcements. Threading his way through the excited crowd of cheering men and wondering children, the staff officer went out again at the drain, and mounting there, rode off with a small escort, threading his way cautiously through the narrow foul lanes of the Chinese city, emerging at last on the broad central road. There he found the British artillery drawn up under lee of the houses at one side, and the infantry sprawling over the tops of the houses (all of which are single-storied) exchanging rifle-fire with the enemy on the Tartar city wall. As the staff officer trotted along the centre of the street he shouted out the good news that the Legations were safe and the British were first in. Cheer after cheer greeted the announcement, the men jumping on the gun-limbers and waving their helmets.

At the end of the street near the marble bridge and Emperor's Gate Sir N. Stewart was directing the attack on the wall. The message having been delivered to him, Sir Norman and the staff officer rode over the bridge and along the wall to the sewer gate. By this time, however, there were signs of successful advance on the part of some of the other allies. A party of Russian soldiers, apparently rather at sea, turned up, not under any officer, but willing to fight under any—of whatever nationality. Then an American field battery came rattling along, commanded by a gallant officer, Captain Reilly, who a few hours later was killed in action near that very spot. Meantime, also, Colonel Pollock of the 1st Sikhs and a machine-gun detachment had forced their way through the main gate of the Chien men, and were attacking the enemy in flank and rear.

It was now about five o'clock—a lovely summer afternoon. Presently the American headquarter staff, with their grizzled old general, Adna R. Chaffee, at their head, came riding along by

the road they had successfully cleared. Then in the evening three battalions of white-coated Russians came marching along with bayonets fixed and colors flying. They sang a stately hymn, in harmony, with rich voices: it sounded like a psalm of victory. It was a splendid sight to see this fine body of men, the light flashing from their bayonets, advancing in battle array. They, too, defiled into the Legation enclosure. Then our British field-guns came trotting along. They had first to descend a steep bank into the drain, then be dragged through the tunnel (which, however, was wide enough for the passage of an artillery team), and subsequently ascend to the level of the ordinary ground inside. The horses were unhooked to form a team of ten, while the guns and limbers were carefully lowered by ropes. In this process one of the limbers turned a complete somersault, scattering all its contents. However, it was speedily put to rights, and then gun and limber behind the team of ten horses went crashing and splashing through the foul black mud—horses often nearly down, but never stopping till they were on sound ground inside—and soon the guns were in action against the enemy to the north.

Harassed now on three sides, the Chinese fire slackened. North of the Chien men, and near an open space used as a market by Mongolians in winter, the Chinese troops tried to escape, but Pollock and his Sikhs were on the alert there, and the losses inflicted by them were heavy. By nightfall the relief of the Legations was complete, the Japanese having forced their way most gallantly into the city to the east and relieved the last pressure that remained.

The headquarter staff of the British force were invited to dine with the British Minister, and as the fighting was now over, they were able to do so without interfering with duty. In the beautiful dining room of the British Legation a large company assembled. After the excitement of the past day it seemed like a dream to be sitting down to dinner with all the surroundings of refinement, silver plate, spotless linen and glass, among ladies in evening dress and cultured men of many European nations. Most of the foreign Ministers and their wives were there, among others, poor Baroness Kettler, widow of the murdered German Minister. The conversation was in many languages, and, naturally, very animated. The menu, however, was somewhat restricted, for reasons which are obvious. The piece de resistance was curried mule—a dish to be recommended. Wine was plentiful, but ice was not obtainable.

The dining room itself had suffered a little from the effects of the siege. A round shot had found its way through the roof, and in passing had chipped off a little of the frame of a large oil painting of Queen Victoria. This, it was remarked, was symbolic. The Chinese had intended to ruin the western Powers, but all they had actually done was but a chip of no importance.

"What will the Queen say when she hears of this day's work?" was a remark constantly heard. No one knew then how the false rumors of the fall of the Legations had been accepted in Europe as authentic, and therefore it could not be known how anxiety would be turned into thankfulness at the news of the relief. But it was felt that in any case our gracious Queen would send some message of appreciation. Nor was this anticipation mistaken, for in a few days her Majesty sent three messages—one to the troops, thanking them; one to Sir Claude MacDonald, full of kind womanly feeling; and one to the commanding officer of the Legation Guard, Captain Wray, a telegram which must now be his most cherished possession.

After a hot night, worried by swarms of mosquitoes, the troops were astir again, for there was still much to do. The French, under General Frey, had arrived during the night, and prepared for the relief of the Pehtang—the French R. C. settlement in another part of the city. The story of the defence of this place has never been told, I think—at least, in English. However heroic the defense of the Legations undoubtedly was, it sinks into comparative insignificance compared to the defence of the Pehtang. The place is situated at the west of the Imperial city, and consists of a large Gothic cathedral, a convent, industrial schools, etc., the whole covering a considerable space of ground. The commander of the defence was the Bishop of Peking, Monsignor Favier, and his troops were only forty French marines. He had a large community of nuns and priests, and a considerable number of Chinese converts, many of them little children, under his charge.

The enemy were more successful in their attack here than they were at the Legations. They had penetrated the defensive lines at several points; they had successfully exploded two large mines, doing enormous destruction and killing many people, mostly innocent little children. Supplies, too, ran short. The rations were reduced to one cup of soup per diem, and on the 15th August there was absolutely nothing left. However, on that day relief came. The French troops, reinforced by British marines, Sikhs, and two powerful guns (which, by the way, had been at Lady-

smith and had been brought to China by H.M.S. Terrible), assaulted the enemy near the Pehtang. They scaled the walls of the Imperial city, taking the enemy in reverse, and—avenged the blood of the innocents. It was a gruesome business.

Meantime in the Legation quarter peace reigned once more. Near the chapel of the British Legation stands a picturesque bell tower of quaint Chinese design, which, during the days of the siege, was the spot where all orders and notices were posted. On the morning of the 15th some one—supposed to be Sir Robert Hart—posted on the notice-board the following quotation from Milton's "Ode on the Nativity," which most appropriately described the situation:—

"And then at last our bliss
Full and perfect is,
But now begins; for from this happy day
The Old Dragon under ground
In straiter limits bound,
Not half so far casts his unsurpéd sway,
And, wroth to see his kingdom fail,
Swinges the scaly horror of his folded tail."

The last act of this international drama took place a few days later, when a selected number from each allied army took part in the triumphal march through the Forbidden city. The numbers of representatives were in proportion to the strength of each force taking part in the relief; thus Russians and Japanese had by far the strongest contingents, the British, Americans, and French following in the order named.

The troops assembled in front of the Forbidden city in a large, open, paved court, shaped like the letter T, the walls of the city rising along the northern limit of the court (the horizontal part of the T), with a handsome marble bridge spanning a canal which flows parallel to those walls. Beyond the bridge are the gates of the city, surmounted by a picturesque tower.

In the transepts of the T gathered—to the east the Americans and British, to the west the Japanese; and in the main court the French on one side and the Russians on the other awaited the arrival of the supreme commander, General Linievitch.

Among all the allies none were more conspicuous than the Russians, in their clean, white summer dress, with banners and ensigns displayed and bands playing. They were a splendid body

of men, such as any leader would be proud to command. And when that leader appeared he evidently *was* proud of them. General Linievitch is a somewhat short, spare man, with snowy hair and beard, but active, alert, and keen-eyed. As he rode along the ranks of his troops he greeted each successive corps in the usual kindly Russian fashion, "Good morning, my children"; and was answered by shouts of "We wish your Excellency good morning." Then, acknowledging the salutes of the foreign generals and their troops, he rode forward, a solitary white figure on a grey charger, across the marble bridge. Thereupon a British field-battery thundered a salute. The doors of the Forbidden city were thrown back, and the Russian general rode in. It was his hour of triumph. Does he remember it now in the dark days that have followed?

The Russian troops marched after their general; then the Japanese, admirably smart and well equipped. Then came the British general and his staff, preceded by the pipers and drums of the Punjab regiments. Then came the Americans and the French.

The Forbidden city consists of wide, spacious courts, paved with marble flags, and divided by large pavilions roofed with tiles of imperial yellow. These silent and deserted spaces now echoed for the first time the drum and pibroch and the tramp of disciplined men. Presently horses had to be dismounted, and the troops defiled through the throne-rooms of the emperors, and ascended stairs of carved marble, through successive courts of increasing magnificence, and finally through an old garden among grottoes and groves, with tanks where lilies grew and goldfish darted about. Here one or two obsequious Court chamberlains bowed before the hated but irresistible barbarian.

At the northern gate of the city the troops marched out and returned to quarters. But the officers "fell out" to greet their comrades of other nations. When the British staff arrived at this point, therefore, they found themselves welcomed by a group of Russian and Japanese officers. Conspicuous among the former was a young Russian officer of commanding height and exceptionally powerful physique. His fair hair, his full beard, his blue eyes, and great stature were in strong contrast to the Mongolian features and diminutive height of a Japanese officer standing beside him. Both were types of their race, then united for a common cause—since then, alas! in deadly enmity.

Looking back on the comrades of those days, one wonders what has happened to them individually. Have they fallen in some of those sanguinary battles? Are they maimed and crippled from wounds? Or are they still surviving, exultant with victory or humiliated with defeat? We cannot tell. At least, let us remember that those Russians who fought so gallantly at Port Arthur and Liauyang certainly numbered among them those who, only five short years ago, were our comrades in arms. The political aims of our countries may be antagonistic, and the methods and manners of the Russian may wholly differ from those of the English officer. Yet let us not forget that at a time when our countrymen, women and children, were in sore distress, when the prospect of an awful fate was daily growing nearer, it was Russian guns that brought the first sound of relief, and it was Russian and Japanese troops who, together with Anglo-Saxons from both sides of the Atlantic, were enabled, by God's mercy, to turn sorrow into joy.

Col. G. K. Scott Moncrieff, C. I. E., R. E.

*OFFICIAL AND SOCIAL MILITARY ETIQUETTE.**

ETIQUETTE has been variously defined as the "observance of forms ceremony or decorum towards particular persons," or as a "knowledge of the rules of society at its best." These rules are presumed to facilitate social intercourse, and to render hospitalities and good services agreeable and pleasant, and according to the amount of such observance is the refinement or polish possessed.

In a French writing these words are written: "Nothing is more shameful than a voluntary rudeness. Men have found it neccessary as well as agreeable to unite for the common good; they have made laws to restrain the wicked; they have agreed among themselves as to the duties of society, and have annexed an honorable character to the practice of such duties. He is an honest man that observes them with the most exactness, and the instances of them multiply in proportion to the degree and nicety of a person's honor."

Every country and people, ay, even every rank in the social scale, has its own system of etiquette, and its own observances and customs, and it is but natural to consider any transgression of such rules and observances by any member, whatever his rank, of any other community, as a want of polish and decorum. It would thus seem as though politeness and decorum, manners and forms of ceremony, could be graded and rated as attainments might be; and that to be a perfect master of ceremony, or a modern Mr. Turveydrop, would require a perfect knowledge of the rules of society of all peoples. Originally a gentleman was considered one when, without title of nobility, he had the right to wear a coat of arms and wield a sword. No matter how honest, how upright, or how industrious, if one had not the coat of arms he could not be a gentleman. To-day wherever in our own country we find a person who has the fortune or the misfortune to be a descendant of ancestors of note, we invariably find him adopting the coat of

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arms of that ancestry, as a mark of his right to be considered a gentleman by birth. But true nobility rest on other grounds than the ability to wield either sword or pen, or the possession of wealth or a coat of arms; and a man without any of these may still be the perfect gentleman. There is but one stone in the foundation of true politeness and good manners, and that is the Golden Rule itself,—"Do unto others as you would be done by."

Equally with men as with animals will blood tell, and the transmission of good or bad qualities is so well accepted a fact, that no apology seems necessary in considering it; but even as the pure water is the more easily discolored by a single drop of filth, so the higher and more refined the breeding the easier it is to stain it by any act or word that in any way implies discourtesy or lack of consideration. Neither ancestry, wealth, race, or education, or all together, make a gentleman, if such person be wanting in a true consideration for the feelings of others. Also, on the other hand, a man may have a most sensitive organization, and be full of sympathy and kindly consideration, and not be a gentleman. Such qualities are often considered as a mark of good breeding; but they surely cannot be so in the ignorant or uncultivated. Good manners and true refinement can only be attained by education and observation, with contact with those possessing them, and the then constantly putting into practice of the Golden Rule in all intercourse with one's fellows. And only by constant contact and practice can they be retained.

Looking at it, therefore, in this light, it would seem that customs and forms in the military profession should be no different than in civil life, and for a truth they should be in no ways different. But they are different, and as a matter of fact so essentially different in some particulars, and so radically wrong in others, that no excuse is offered to justify their existence other than that they are "customs of the service." Like charity, this phrase covers a multitude of sins.

In the military profession, or in so much of it as exists in the United States, the line between official and social intercourse is heavy or light according to the personal predilections of the parties concerned, or according to the social acquirements and aspirations of their families. Thus, between the "first-class" man and the "plebe" at West Point, or between the veteran and recruit, there is a world of difference that only time can bridge; but though the same reasons may exist for this same difference be-

tween the captain and his second lieutenant, as a matter of fact, if their social intercourse is agreeable to each other and governed by true motives of politeness, their official relations must to a great extent partake of the same nature. It is by politeness that one's self is governed, by polity that civilians are swayed, by politics that the rabble is led, but by true policy that the army is ruled.

It has come to be a belief that the acme of manners and decorum, forms and ceremonies, were to be found in their brightest polish among officers of the military profession. In the Old World, where monarchs and their nobility, and the wealthier and higher classes fill all the principal offices of both army and navy, there is reason for this belief; while in our own country such was the case thirty years ago or more. It is so with us, alas, no longer. To-day the military services still cling to old forms, old ceremonies, and old titles, but the reasons for their existence having passed away, it is but mere form—shadow, and not substance—that is too often practiced, and justly brings into ridicule the members of the profession.

Looking back to the time when the Spanish soldier was in his prime—two hundred years and more ago—we say, from our standpoint of to-day, that his discipline was barbarous and cruel. But who will contend, however, that the nature, the character, the standing, and enlightenment of the man of that time did not require such treatment as he received to make him the conqueror of the races he met in the New World and the stupendous difficulties he had to overcome? In a judgment everything depends upon one's point of view, and a hundred years from now our descendants may write and tell of the cruel and inhuman treatment we practice in our modes of warfare.

After the close of the Rebellion, Congress was filled with a patriotic sentiment and gratitude towards those so influential in preserving the country, and acted, in fixing the status of the regular military establishments, with that end in view. The pay of officers and men was good, not too much, but sufficient with care to enable the officer to live well, educate and properly look out for his family, and himself to mingle among those of the highest circles, which his position gave him the right to fill. Then, also, not only many members of Congress, but the President had been soldiers; and though the nation was energetically pushing to the head of nations, it was still impoverished from the war. The pay of the officer with the sentiment attaching to his position, and the

estimation of the people, enabled him to take his place at the head of any circle in the country and remain there. Then there was another reason also. The commission of an officer while on good behavior was for life, and this fact made of army officers a privileged class. The fact that he holds his office and commission in spite of all changes of administration makes the officer himself feel that there is a difference between him and the public; that as he is provided for for life, while the civilian has to look out for himself, he is somewhat better than the crowd, the effect of which is to remove him from the fellowship of the mass and make him exclusive. In all this the officer may not be to blame. He feels that in selecting his associates among citizens he has a right to pick out that society that is most congenial to him, and being himself an educated man, his choice is that of cultivated people, who, as a rule, are people of means and position. The business man may be as cultivated as the officer, but it is a necessity with him to cultivate alike the learned and ignorant, the rich and the poor, the refined and the vulgar. The officer removed from such conditions is made even more exclusive to the eyes of the mass, and his society, therefore, is desired by the so-called select. While all this in print, or even in conversation, seems ridiculously absurd, it is nevertheless so evidently the case that no apology is considered necessary in mentioning it.

Since the war wonderful changes have passed over the country. Where in 1865-70 there could be found one man worth a half million, there are to-day ten each worth from five to twenty millions. In power, wealth, population, the country has so increased that it is now the richest nation on the globe. Every civil profession and community has prospered and thriven, and the status of every member has been bettered. But with the military profession the reverse is the case. Scattered all over our vast territory, but mostly on frontier or sea-coast posts, where they are hardly ever seen, engaged in subduing the Indian, quelling riots, chasing Mexican bandits and thieves, or keeping the peace at the polls, our army has not met with the proper approval in every locality it would have if better known. Instead of bettering it, as all other branches of the government have been, Congress has steadily hampered it, cut down its privileges and allowances of officers. Twelve years ago officers were allowed a certain amount of fuel; to-day they have to pay for it; then, also, an officer entitled to be mounted could, if he so desired, keep the com-

mutation money instead of the forage. This was agreeable when his duties did not require him to be mounted or keep a horse. Then an officer traveling on duty was allowed ten cents per mile for expenses. All this has been taken from him; he has to pay for his fuel, cannot draw forage, and gets four cents per mile when traveling. The Congressman who makes these laws draws twenty cents per mile, and, furthermore, can go over any railroad he desires on Congressional business. The officer can take only the shortest route between two points, and then only when he can certify that he has had no pass given him can he draw his mileage. In those days we had forty-five million people and a general and lieutenant-general both in the army. To-day with seventy millions we have for the same size army a major-general to command it, and this, notwithstanding the greater responsibilities thrust upon him, and the deservedly won right both in peace and war he has to entitle him to it.

In one sense our army is not as good as it was twenty-five years ago. Taken individually, our officers and men are as good, even better in some ways. In 1865-70 there were in the army many men who, without education or breeding, worthily won their shoulder straps by gallantry on the battle-field. Congress rewarded them by giving them commissions in the regular service. They brought with them into that service brave and self-sacrificing women, but still women of the laundress class, and with no more refinement or social standing than their husbands. To-day that class are nearly all gone, and those remaining have, by long years of contact with those possessing it, acquired an outward polish. But as such great increase of wealth and prosperity gave greater opportunities to the people, and social standards became raised thereby, with their corresponding changes in forms and manners, the army officer with decreased emoluments and opportunities sank correspondingly. And while it is true that "knowledge is power," still it is to-day only the knowledge of how to acquire wealth that is the power in the social and commercial world. Be it understood that we are not speaking of individuals, but as a class and profession. There are to-day more educated men and women in our army circles who, coming as they do from our so-called best circles and families, carry with them the very highest social prestige in the land. But, as a rule, not having the means to entertain or meet civilians on an equal scale,

the officer is now looked down upon by many circles that thirty years ago looked up to him as to some far-off unattainable height.

To a certain extent, also, the old ceremonious ideas of etiquette are to blame for this. Compare the official forms and "red tape" of the military service with the official forms and the "how-to-get-there" methods of modern business men. We can even see a vast difference, not in our favor, if we look at many of the forms used by the National Guard of our more progressive States, that have dared to throw off the trammels and burdens of red-tapism of a century.

In a paper of the limited scope of this it is impossible to point out the many old forms and customs that are the laughing-stock so often of civilians, and which are so capable of improvement, but a few of the more glaring ones are selected, from which the rest can be easily detected.

It is the custom at West Point to give to the graduating class a few months before their departure a lecture on customs of the service, and the unwritten laws that have held sway so long in the army. These lectures are given by officers whose age and experience should justify what they tell. Among other things, the cadets are told that on going to their regiments they must first report to the post adjutant, then to the post commander, then to the company commander. Whether in full-dress uniform or not would depend on the custom of the post, or the will of the post commander. One young officer found himself assigned to a regiment of artillery stationed at a post on the Gulf of Mexico. Trying to remember all the many instructions that had been so carefully impressed on him of how to do it right when he had reached his station, he met on arrival at the dock belonging to the post an officer in uniform, and asking him where he could find the post adjutant, was informed that he was then speaking to him. This second officer with a genial smile at the same time put out his hand, saying, "We've been expecting you, and I felt sure you would come on this boat. It is a little difficult for any stranger to find his way at first, so I came down to meet you. Come right up to my office. The C. O. is there now, and I'll introduce you." With that he led the way to the little one-story building in the centre of the large parade ground, and entering they found themselves in the presence of an officer who was partly in uniform and partly in civilian clothing. He looked up as they entered. "Colonel," said the adjutant, "this is Mr. X.,

who has just come in. I brought him up here, and I will take care of him to-night." The colonel rose from his seat, very cordially extended his hand, and, with a smile that at once put the youngster at ease, said he was glad to see him. Then he chatted pleasantly with him for a short time, till the entrance of a captain changed the conversation. The captain in his turn was just as cordial, and welcomed the young man, saying he was to go to his battery, and that hearing he had just arrived, he had sent a detail of men to the dock to bring up his baggage. Hearing that the adjutant was to take care of him for that night, the captain told him he would look out for him the next day, and until he had made his own arrangements and was settled. All this was so kindly said and done, with no form or ceremony about it, that the young man was dumfounded. Several times he recollected the official report he had to make, or thought he had to make, but the reception was so different from what he had been led to expect that he was lost in attempting to say it. That was all the form or ceremony ever used at that post; and from the moment of setting foot on the dock till he left for another two years after, he felt himself at home and in touch with everything at that place. There was a spirit of good will, a consideration for every officer and man at the post on the part of all, that he never realized at any other post in after years. Yet the result of this feeling of good will was shown in the most excellent discipline maintained at the post, in the absence of courts-martial. and of the many distressful scandals and gossips so often the bane of army life. And as was afterwards proved, this same command was ready at a moment's notice for any duty it could be called upon to perform.

Years later, when married and with two children, he reported for duty at a Western post where a light battery of his regiment was serving, and there also he was taken in with all his family and cared for till his household effects arrived and he could choose and settle his quarters. It made all the difference with him as to the kind of service he rendered the government. Feeling that all about him were friends, he entered into the true military spirit of all duties, and found a zest and pleasure in their performance that can only be realized by those who have had the same surroundings. Very different was the reception met with at a post still farther West years after. There not a soul offered to care for chick or wife, but he was informed that he could board them at

the bachelors' mess by the courtesy of the bachelors till he got settled. Of course he could, but it was decidedly inconvenient after a costly journey to take wife and children to mess with a lot of young men. He had little money left, yet the quarters at the post were large, and there were a number of families that had but one or two members in them. It surely could not have seriously incommoded them to care for the wife and children for two or three days. He was obliged to borrow bedding and some furniture from the hospital till his household goods arrived, and he felt so deeply that he was living at the mess with the bachelors, and rather a damper to them, that his first impression of duty at the post was a seriously disagreeable one. Not a soul of all the garrison offered to lend him a thing or help him in any way; yet within three days of arrival every married person had called, and had to be received standing, much to the chagrin of the wife, as the furniture had not arrived. Yet at that post the commanding officer required his officers to report at once on arrival and in full uniform to the post adjutant, then himself, and if a lieutenant, then to his captain. It may safely be guessed that under that commanding officer a high grade of discipline was never reached, but, on the contrary, officers and men alike suffered all kinds of miseries and trials.

To the young officer going to his post for the first time it is a question of more than ordinary moment as to whom he shall make himself known, what words he shall use, how he shall conduct himself, what forms and manners he shall go through—all of which older officers may laugh at, but which even catches them at times. There is no set of orders or regulations that governs on these points, and trivial as they may seem, they yet exert a considerable influence on the character of the young officer. At West Point all his intercourse with officers is of the formal kind, and it becomes difficult for him to realize that there is any other course to follow when he himself becomes an officer. If he thinks—as too many of them do—that there is no need of formality, then he is very apt to transgress the bounds of good decorum, and is looked upon by his brother officers as a boor, to be treated as such accordingly.

Some ten years ago two young officers reported at the same post on the same day. One came from a Western family with no social standing, and his acquirements in that line were of a limited kind. He wore a high hat on the side of his head and

swagged along much as a Bowery pugilist would do. The other came from one of the oldest and best known families in an Eastern city. He had all the accomplishments of a man of social standing. The first made a report to the adjutant, stating that he was Second Lieutenant ———, and had been ordered to report there by orders from the Secretary of War. He seemed ill at ease, and the officer he first spoke to looked at him askance, and then told him to find out the adjutant of the post, and report to him. The poor fellow, taken aback, was half a day finding out the adjutant, and when he was presented to the commanding officer the next day, he saluted him in his office. His captain seemed to rather dislike the idea of having such a man as he one of his officers, and instead of taking his part in an unconscious way, as he might, really affected to be put out by his many blunders in the social round. It took ten years to make any appreciable polish in that young man, and even to-day he shuns society, so afraid is he of it. Yet as an officer he ranks high. His professional attainments are of such a nature that they outshine his more polished comrade who reported at the same time. Another officer much like the first, without any social polish, undertook to get in as soon as he reported. He took the way so many young officers do, of making himself appear on a perfect equality with all older and superior officers. The consequence was that his freshness met with more than one rebuke, until he became such a boor that all were glad to be rid of him.

There are no rules laid down for the guidance of young men, or older ones either, in their official intercourse of this nature. More's the pity, as it would save many a promising young fellow a good deal of burning humiliation if there were. It would be easy indeed for rules to be drawn up governing such cases, and as we have regulations in the army governing situations of far less import and yet far greater absurdity, it would seem that we might have a few rules in this direction.

It would seem to be entirely proper for an officer on first arriving at a post to go to the post adjutant, tell him his name, his rank, etc., if not known, and then ask him if he shall report at once to the commanding officer. The rule in that case should be to wait till the office hours of the commanding officer arrive, and then to be presented to the commanding officer by the adjutant. On a military post there is no question of civilian clothes or uniform. No officer, commanding officer or subordinate, should be at any

time out of uniform, but to put on full dress simply for the purpose of reporting arrival for duty at a post is one of the absurdities for which we are laughed at by civilians. It is held that this is a proper custom at our schools of instruction, as it is an example to cadets and young officers, but common sense is the best rule to go by. Full dress is for occasions of state or ceremony, and if an officer reports for duty, he should be ready for duty. He is not ready for any duty but dress parade in full dress. The undress uniform is sufficient. When he has reported to the commanding officer, he should report to his captain, and from him find out just the nature of his duties, what is expected of him, officially and socially. Now, in the matter of calling there is as much variance as in any other custom. The only calls required of an officer reporting at a post are the three just mentioned. They are all of an official nature, and unless the post should be also the headquarters of a department or division commander, are all that are required. If, however, the post should be such a headquarters, then within a suitable time, after reporting as described, the officer should pay his respects to the general commanding. This suitable time ought to be within twenty-four hours of his reporting for duty, and he makes the call by sending in his card to the assistant adjutant-general, and after seeing him, ask him to present him to the general, when the latter is at liberty. The officer is now at liberty to receive calls. If he is a bachelor, he can receive calls any time after reporting, but if a married man, it is surely bad taste for post people to call till the new officer and his family have somewhat settled their house. In old-time days, on frontier posts, miles away from any civilization, it was hospitable and considerate to call at once, and offer assistance in any way possible to the new comers, but in these days where every convenience is found at the post, it is better taste to wait a reasonable time, say a week or ten days, that the house may be settled in such a way that the new comers shall not be put to any humiliation in receiving visitors, when everything is in confusion. Everybody at the post ought to call, from the commanding officer and his wife down to the junior officers stationed there, and while such calls should not be made too soon, the other extreme should not be gone to and the call left till months after the new comer has settled down.

At one of the post-graduate army schools of instruction a case arose that is similar to what has often happened at large army posts. As is well known, the student officers report there every

two years, and are drawn from every regiment and from the grades of both first and second lieutenants. A number of the youngest officers of this particular class in question did not call on the older officers of the class, giving as their reason that as they had entered the army last, it was the duty of the senior officers to call on them first. This seems a small thing, but it amounted in the course of two years to considerable heart-burning and regret. The older officers felt, as they rightly should, that it was the duty of the youngsters to call, where all had come as strangers at the same time to the same post.

But beyond all that, there was the question of courtesy and homage to their wives. The youngsters said, "If they want us to call they should ask us; and not being invited, or not having any calls from them, we do not think we are wanted." They were wrong. Aside from the question of courtesy, it was their duty in that case to call on the seniors first; but at the same time the latter might, with much propriety, have laid aside their dignity, and when they saw the stand taken by the youngsters, have called on them first and thus ended the question. Once the call has been made, every officer should feel, if he is a bachelor, that all other houses of the post are opened, unless he has been given distinctly to understand that such is not the case. But if he does not receive a call from the commanding officer or the senior officers of the post, who too often stay at home out of pure laziness, it is no reason why he should vent his feelings on those that come after him. The late General Hancock, as every officer who served under him at Governor's Island well knows, was a martinet as regards post duties; but when it came to the social functions, he as fully deserved his title of "superb" as he did for magnificent leadership in battle. If a call were made on him, he always returned it. He never inspected a post but after a reception at which he met all the officers he then went out in full dress and called on the ladies. It might be the junior second lieutenant of the army who had called upon him, yet he was sure to have that call returned by the general in person. How few of our general officers or commanding officers of posts do that! If they did, it would redound immensely not only to their personal credit, but also add to the zeal with which officers would perform their duties under those who knew how to be and acted accordingly as cultivated gentlemen.

Another thing was noticeable with General Hancock. He was

always at home when officers called, whatever their rank, and he received them with the courtesy he would the President of the United States. It is told of a young American officer spending a short leave of absence in Paris, that he called on a French general of division who had won great renown. Not finding him at home he went out for a long drive, and on his return to his own hotel found that the Frenchman had already returned his call. It is the strict observance of these trifling formalities which has caused the French to be considered par excellence the most polite people on the globe. Now, it may be laid down as an axiom that that genuine politeness of heart which leads those who possess it to do as they would be done by will also lead its possessors never to resent the omissions of others; to be strict only with themselves in the observance of established forms of civility, and to overlook the remissness of all. One can never err by being polite, and the best advice to give the young officer on the calling subject is that he shall return the call as speedily as possible.

It may be always safely depended on that promptness is not only a military virtue, but a social one as well, and on its perfect rendering will depend the victories of peace.

There is another side to the subject of calls, and that relates to visiting cards and their use in calling. A writer in one of our greatest dailies some years ago said,—

"To the unrefined or underbred person the visiting card is but a trifling and insignificant bit of paper; but to the cultured disciple of social law it conveys a subtle and unmistakable intelligence. Its texture, style of engraving, and even the hour of leaving it, combine to place the stranger whose name it bears in a pleasant or disagreeable light, even before his manners, conversation, or face have been able to explain his social position. The higher the civilization of a community the more careful it is to preserve the elegance of its social forms. It is quite as easy to express a perfect breeding in the fashionable formalities of cards as by any other method." * * *

Who that has been stationed at a large garrison having more than one arm of the service there but has been struck with the many forms of calling cards and the curious notions regarding their use, particularly by officers whose experience would seen to indicate a better knowledge of what good form required. For instance, there is the large card of Captain O'Haney, with his name, title, and regiment or corps all in one line and in Roman

letters, sometimes engraved, but more often printed. There is then in marked contrast to this the effeminately small card of Lieutenant Augustus Swell, the social pride of the regiment. This latter is sure to be in very fine script, always engraved and written as follows:

Mr. Augustus Swell, U. S. A.,
Lieutenant Sixth Regiment Artillery.

Then there is another card whereon are seen all the brevet titles and ranks ever held by the owner. Often the second lieutenant seems afraid of being known only as a second lieutenant, and therefore puts on his card "Lieutenant U. S. A.," or else the number of his regiment. Now, it is but common sense to leave out the word "Mr." when the title is given below. How would a civilian card like the following seem to any one?—

Mr. James Wage,
Doctor of Medicine.

The indiscriminate manner in which cards are frequently used by officers often betokens to the gentleman or lady of breeding in civil life a vast deal of unlearned knowledge of the laws of good form. Thus, we often see a party of father and mother, or brother and sister, calling at a home where the inmates include several grown-up sons and daughters, and perhaps a visiting friend. One card will be left by the gentleman, and as many by the lady as there happens to be ladies called on. Then there is the economical card, where the names of the husband, wife, and one or perhaps two grown-up daughters are all on one little piece of cardboard. It is passing strange that when a little reflection or the use of a small modicum of common sense will suffice to indicate the proper method of procedure, that it is not taken, as it is invariably sure to be right.

An officer's card should be the card of a gentleman primarily, but since by his profession he is to a certain extent situated similarily to the man of business, it is perfectly proper that so much of his profession and his rank or grade in it should be on the card also. The size of the card should be neither too large nor too small, its texture should be fine, and its engraving a plain script. It is but "affectation" to put the title "Mr." before the name, and then the rank or grade after or below it. Either the name without

title, on one line, and the name of the officer's post on the one below, or else the name and title on one line and the regiment or corps on the one below, are perfectly proper. A medium-size card is proper for the wife, a smaller one for the husband. As the officer's card must necessarily partake at times of a professional nature, it must never have the name of the wife or other member of his family upon it, though the reverse of this is not true. The wife's card may have her husband's and her own name both on it, as, for instance, "Captain and Mrs. H. A. Darling."

On making a call, leave a card for each person of the house you desire to meet and be on calling terms with. Always call in person and leave a card after a formal reception or entertainment for which regular invitations were issued. In such case it is perfectly proper to leave cards for each person in the house who received or gave the reception; but it is absurd to think that on every occasion one calls at a house he must leave a separate card for every grown-up person in the house. It is not only a waste of cards, but it betokens an extravagance that is the opposite of good taste. The card sent in is sufficient to apprise all the members of the household who it is that calls. If it is any person in particular that you desire to see, the card must be sent or left for that person, otherwise to the lady of the house always. It is a good thing for an officer to carry with him always a small cardcase carrying ten or a dozen cards. Officers are so often thrown in unexpectedly with officers of other posts, or regiments, or of the navy, or of foreign services, and with gentlemen the card and its exchange is always a signal of the knowledge of proper social form. It is a gentlemanly way of introducing one's self to a stranger, or in case one desires to continue a chance acquaintanceship.

Perhaps there is no one thing in civil as well as military life that is so little understood as the salutation in its different forms and meanings. St. Loup says of it, "That self-respect which is at the same time always so full of respect towards others is the peculiar ornament of well-bred people." Auerbach says, "The salutation is the touchstone of good breeding." There is undoubtedly no other form, courtesy, or manner that tells so strongly with strangers and intimates alike as the manner in which we salute or meet each other. When we say salute, we mean exactly the technical significance given to it in the military world. The military salute is exactly among officers what the bow is among

friends in civil life. Yet there have been more points raised on this one subject than on any half-dozen others known in social military ethics. Now, the only regulations and orders on the subject are as follows: "Courtesy among military men is indispensable to discipline; respect to superiors will not be confined to obedience on duty, but will be extended on all occasions. All officers will salute each other when they meet, the inferior making the first salute." "Officers receiving or rendering official reports will salute." There are also special paragraphs of the regulations specifying the saluting of enlisted men on and off duty, on guard, in-doors, etc., of mounted and dismounted officers, etc. As a matter of fact, the majority of officers on meeting on the street carry out literally the first quoted paragraph, and it may be taken for granted that the exceptions to it are either the young men who, not having been in the army long enough to understand all that the salute means, feel it somewhat of a humiliation, or else those who by their inherent nature and lack of breeding can never understand it, whatever their age, or however long they may have served. Such men look upon the salute as a mark of inferiority or authority which they dislike in their American independence to submit to, or else they expect to use its prerogatives for their own personal gratification. Now, there is but one code among gentlemen the world over, and whether the officer or friend we meet be on the street, the avenue, the parade-ground, or in the garrison, on meeting the "good-morning" is passed, accompanied with a slight wave of the hand or touch of the cap. If it be an old man, then the hat or cap should be raised. But among officers the salute is distinctly laid down as required, and the manner of making it, in detail. The junior officer on meeting should always make the first salute, but the senior can always meet him halfway by immediately returning it. A smile, or at least a look of recognition, should always accompany the salutation on the part of both. But in no case should the rendering of the salute be made ridiculous, as then proper respect and courtesy is not extended and shown. Thus, if you meet your superior officer on the walk and salute, then, turning around, in another moment meet him again, or in camp you should run into each other around every tent corner, there is no need of making your arms go like a windmill in order to salute. The respect and courtesy being shown by the first salute is maintained by doing exactly as gentlemen in civil life would do in meeting each other many times while

strolling up and down the park. If you are on duty, either one or both, and by that duty obliged to address each other or report, at times, then the salute is proper each time of addressing or report. I have heard it asked if an officer is justified in withholding the salute from a senior because the latter fails to salute him. I have, and doubtless every officer has had the same experience, seen a number of officers who will rarely, if ever, return the salute of a junior when off duty, because of a mistaken feeling of sensitiveness or of simple boorishness. But under no circumstance is the junior justified in not doing what regulations require of him. He can, and in fact it is his duty to report the failure of the senior to the proper corrective officer. There is, unfortunately, a small class of officers who find in the requirements of the salute a means of humiliating juniors against whom they have spite or desire of hurting. They are the ones who use the salute as a means of humiliation by compelling their juniors to render it. Now, it may be laid down as a principle that a senior officer not a commanding officer ought not, and really has no right, to exact the salute by command or order, and especially so when manifesting impatience or anger, or desire to humiliate. Such a course only creates resentment, and thus defeats the injunction of that paragraph of the regulations looking towards courtesy, proper respect, etc. When a salute is compelled under such circumstances there is no proper respect in it, and no courtesy on the part of either senior or junior. If a junior should willfully and with intent manifest discourtesy to a senior by studiously avoiding the customary salute, such conduct would very properly be reported by the senior to the commanding officer, who, in the exercise of his lawful authority, could require the junior to salute on any or all occasions.

Another point regarding salutes, and the discourtesy shown by their withholding. We have all seen young officers who would salute their superiors out-doors when they met them face to face and could not possibly get out of it, but, having a fancied grievance against them, always rendered the salute unwillingly, and so when opportunity offered they would go around the parade-ground, or take advantage of the company of a senior to both, or by other like and small means get out of what they considered a degrading action on their part. It is needless to say that these are invariably the very young men or men of no breeding. In the first instance their youth calls for only a slight admonition on the part of their captains, but in the second all gentlemen are better

off by such avoidance, and were it not for the ill effects on the men under them it should be encouraged. It is these same officers that we have seen withhold the proper respect required by tactics when in-doors. In this case these boors when meeting a superior at the club, in the parlors of a friend's house, at the ball room or lecture room, or even in the barracks or adjutant's office, act as though the senior were a thousand miles away, utterly oblivious to his presence. In other words, they in no way whatever give any recognition of his presence. The words of the regulations are very plain,—to wit, "Respect to superiors will not be confined to obedience on duty, but will be extended on all occasions." To not do any one thing that is absolutely disrespectful, and at the same time failing to do the thing that is respectful, is absolute disrespect, and the senior very properly ought to have the attention of the junior called to it. It is a very easy matter to say good morning, or pass some similar phrase which good breeding requires, even if you felt you could cheerfully cut the head off of the man you addressed.

Another point has also arisen under the new drill regulations, which requires the adjutant at guard-mounting when passing in review before the new officer of the day, and also when presenting arms to him, to salute, whatever be the rank, either senior or junior, of the officer of the day, to the adjutant. This rule is, unfortunate, perhaps, as there ought to be but one rule; namely, that the junior should salute first on all occasions. But as the senior obeys the command of the junior at parade when the majors of the battalions present arms to the commanding officer, it is held by some officers that in reporting to the adjutant, on any occasion, the officer reporting, whether senior or junior, must salute first. It is held that the adjutant represents the commanding officer in the latter case, and the officer of the day represents him in the first. But this view of the case is obviously wrong. The guard-mount and the parades and reviews come under the head of ceremonies, and for their proper performance special rules are given. But the adjutant no more represents the commanding officer at reveille or retreat roll-call than does the sentinel on post. Yet the latter salutes the officer first, and so in making reports the junior must salute first, whether he be adjutant, officer of the day, or officer in charge of a company at roll-call.

Another thing to be careful to avoid is the half-way salute. It has been asked whether it is not proper to raise your cap to the

commanding officer. No, it is not proper, when in uniform. Salute him as directed by regulations, and do not raise your cap to him as though he were to be placed on the same level that the flag we all honor is. Never raise the hand half-way to the cap as though you were going to raise the cap or salute. But touch it out and out in a military and decisive fashion, and say at the same time the "good morning" or "good evening." When passing an officer with ladies, then it is proper, in fact would be improper not so to do, to raise the cap, whatever the rank of the officer accompanying them. When meeting ladies raise the cap properly from the head, entirely, but not too far; do not hold it at arm's length as though it were a contribution box, nor extend it up high in the air as though you were about to cheer. Officers who in all other respects are gentlemen act the boor by bringing the hand only to the cap and not raising it at all in bowing to ladies. Such action needs no comment.

There is one emblem that ought at all times, when passing or meeting it, to be not only saluted by the upraising of the cap, but the salute to it should partake of so much *empressement* as not to be confounded with any other. I refer to the love and reverence due our country's flag. The love of God—a supreme ruler; the love of family—the home; and the love of country, are undoubtedly the machinery that sets in motion all the phases of human progress and civilization. The love of liberty to enjoy each for himself, his home, his religion, circumscribed only by laws designed to secure the greatest enjoyment of this love, and its legitimate fruits to the greatest number, was and is the mainspring and foundation upon which is reared this mighty republic of ours. It was such love that first induced the brave old patriots of over two hundred and fifty years ago to brave the terrors of a voyage of months, to land on strange and almost barren shores, there to build up and rear the homes from which our greatest men have sprung. It was this same love that a little over a hundred years ago caused the grandchildren of those patriots to take up arms and fight the mightiest power on the earth to secure the blessings of liberty, of home, and conscience to them and their children and children's children. It was this same love that again made patriots of our own fathers, when they, giving up all that life held dear to them, took their lives and laid them at their country's disposal, that no blot of slavery should mar the fair white name of the liberty they all lived and desired their children to live under. Is

it any wonder, then, that the emblem, the symbol of all these glorious deeds, these mighty events in the world's history, and all the mighty fabric of progress and civilization reared on, and for the support of love and liberty, which is represented by our flag, the glorious stars and stripes, should be the object of every true soldier's devotion? Is it possible to teach to our children too much enthusiasm, too much love and reverence for "Old Glory?" I most fully believe that in no way can the true love of country and all its institutions be made so dear to our people, and in no way can they be so easily influenced for its good, than by inculcating a love, a reverence, a respect and enthusiasm for the national flag. And whose duty is it more to show the masses, to create in them this sentiment, than to those who are the sworn defenders of its fair field and beautiful stripes, its dignity and good name? Every time the flag is carried by, it should be saluted, not by simply raising the cap, but by holding it raised in respect while passing. It is no more necessary to make the act of saluting ridiculous by continually taking off and replacing the cap, when passing and repassing a flag staff with the flag on it, than by a continual saluting of an officer whom we pass and repass on the parade ground or avenue. But when we do see "Old Glory" waving above, with every motion and wave keeping up a silent rhythm and harmony with the breezes that blow over the land it shields, every time the color-guard or the color-sergeant approaches with the flag, whether furled or not, the cap should come off, and remain off till past. When the color-sergeant is passing it is not his duty to use the flag to salute the officer with, but he must bring his guard to a carry. But it is the officer's duty to take off the cap, and then after replacing it, he can return the color-sergeant's salute. There is a most beautiful custom practiced on many of our warships which could with propriety be followed at every military post. I mean the salute to the flag by the entire command at close of day, and at the close of every military ceremony or social occasion, where the flag is in any way brought to view. Every entertainment of such nature should be closed by the playing of the national anthem, "The Star Spangled Banner," and at every military formation where the flag is brought out it should be saluted by the entire command. Thus, for instance, at a dress parade or review, how impressive and how beautiful it would be when just before the closing of the same the color-guard should advance to the front, and, facing the bat-

talion or regiment, the commanding officer of the parade should give the command, "Present Arms!" and come to a present himself, the band then playing "The Star Spangled Banner!" The present should be maintained till the strain is completed, the salute acknowledged by dipping of the flag, which is then at once returned to the quarters from which it was taken. Or more impressive still would be in camp at the closing of the day, when, like the German soldiers, with caps off and faces uplifted, the stars their only audience, their deep voices chant out the hymn with a pathos, a feeling, that all the bands in the world cannot compass. Every social military entertainment where there is music should be closed with this air, the people all standing. And again, no airs but national airs should be permitted to be played by any national band, except as a special compliment to some foreign visitor then present. We have too much of the Irish airs on March 17, too many of the English ballads on the Queen's birthday, too much of the Marseillaise and La Patrie on French holidays, too much of The Watch on the Rhine on German holidays. Our own airs are in an artistic sense every way as musical and beautiful, but when played with the sentiment that should properly accompany them they are beyond comparison. It is wrong to cater to feelings of compatriotship with foreign peoples and institutions. Let America be for Americans, and if so, then our people must forego all that is exclusively German, or Irish, or French or any other nationality whatever. Then again the flag should be protected by law, as it is not now. It should be forbidden under the severest penalties to be used for advertising purposes. No advertisement should be permitted on national colors any more than any advertisement should be allowed on an envelope belonging to the War Department. While every citizen should be allowed the right to keep and raise the flag if he so desired over his own property, no one who is not an American citizen should be given that privilege. And also should the law be severe on all who would prostitute the flag by keeping it for decorative purposes, or any purpose whatever, over any place that is not respectable and, in the eyes of citizens, above reproach. In this way and by such means can we teach our children what liberty is, and what its means to keep the fairness of "Old Glory" without blot.

It is but within a few years that the flag has been required by law to be raised over public schools, but we must go further and teach our children what it means to be an American boy or girl.

It is but two years ago this summer that an incident happened on board the City of New York, on her eastward passage, that fully illustrates the wonderful ignorance of Americans on the subject of the flag. The ship, as is well known, is one of the Inman Line, owned almost entirely by Americans, but then sailing under the English flag, and with a crew composed—officers and men alike—of British subjects. On this voyage the passenger list was made up almost exclusively of Americans. At an entertainment in the main saloon one evening songs were sung, recitations given, and the evening was then closed with "God Save the Queen," the people all being requested to rise and join in. Upon its conclusion one patriotic American cried out, "How about singing the 'Star Spangled Banner?'" The cry was at once repeated and kept up. A number of people were asked to sing, but, marvelous to relate, although there was on board the entire choir of a famous church, also part of an operatic company with its prima donna, there was not one single soul among the entire shipfull, either crew or passengers, who knew the words of the national anthem well enough to tell them, or the music sufficiently well to sing it or play it entirely through. The ship's band had a great deal of music, among which were copies of "God Save the Queen," "La Marseillaise," and other national airs, but there was not one single copy on board ship of the American air. It was developed on investigation that the English manager of the ship ordered copies to be supplied of "God Save the Queen," and in so large a number that every passenger was given one, but apparently he thought that so little did the traveling portion of the American population think of their own country, it was useless to get copies also of their national air. It had never been sung or played on board that ship up to that time, but it is fortunate that there were among the passengers on this trip some patriotic enough to cause such a row to be made regarding the matter that the ship on her return trip, and every ship of that line on every trip since that time, had supplied to it as many copies of the American as the English air.

MILITARY CORRESPONDENCE.

Perhaps there is no phase of the official military life wherein the business man in civil life has so little sympathy with the officer as in the forms required by the red-tapism of official circumlocution. I do not now refer to the many and apparently

needless number of papers and letters required in official matters, but more particularly to the set forms which, having been the custom of a century, have become practically iron-clad laws. Thus, for instance, in addressing an official note to a superior officer, it is required the date shall be placed on one line at the right-hand side of the page, the place on the line immediately above it. Then two or three lines below come the words on the left-hand side "To the," and on the line immediately below that the rank or title of person addressed and his name, on the next line his station or post, and on the following line to that the word "Sir." Then on still another line the communication proper commences with these words, "I have the honor," etc. It takes just seven lines to commence a letter that a business man would courteously open in two or three at the most. Also, in closing, the forms require on the first line below body of message the words "I have the honor to be," or else, "I am, sir, very respectfully," and on the next line the words "Your obedient servant," then on the next line the name of writer, and on line or lines below that his official rank. The complete beginning and end of an official letter would therefore be like the following:

"FORT ——, ——,
"January —, 1894.

"TO THE
"ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
"DEPARTMENT OF MISSOURI,
"CHICAGO, ILLINOIS.

"SIR:
"I have the honor, etc.
"I am, sir, very respectfully,
"Your obedient servant,
"(Name.)
"——— ———,
"(Rank.)
"——— ——— ——— ———."

Some times the officer writing is exercising several offices at the same time, and signs himself as

"First Lieutenant Thirtieth Infantry,
"A.A.Q.M. and A.C.S.A.S.S."

Now, in the foregoing there are twelve lines used up altogether, a sufficient amount to allow a business man to put his entire

letter in, and requiring a time sufficient to fill out that with a dozen letters a day would be worth many hundred dollars to the man in civil life. In the early days of the republic it was perhaps well enough that such forms existed, but in these modern utilitarian times it is all absurd and useless. It would be much better to put name of place and date on one line, then on next line the name of officer and his rank and station, and on third the formal opening of simply "Sir," followed on the same line with the body of message going to the meaning direct without the superfluous words "I have the honor," etc. So also in closing nowadays one is not one's obedient servant, and in saying so one is not even respectful. In an endorsement one puts simply his name and title, and that is really all that is required. The word "Respectfully," might be used, followed on next line by name and rank, regiment, etc., but no more. A proper respect is better shown by strict clinging to good sense than by the use of forms and words which deprive it of such by being antiquated and ridiculous, and without meaning. Too much stress is laid upon forms, and it would be a most excellent thing if they could be codified by order of the War Department and arranged in a modern business-like way, short and decisive, and respectful. There are so many ways in which this part of the subject may be well discussed that a short essay is no place to do more than mention them, but they will with little reflection occur to all. So also with the many and confusing jumble of ranks, grades, insignia, etc., which have been the inheritance of a century of ideas taken from Baron Steuben's Germans, La Fayette's French, Kosciusko's Poles, and our British progenitors. Thus, why is the major decorated with a gold leaf on his shoulder-strap, while the lieutenant-colonel, who ranks him, gets but a silver leaf? Again, why do we call a ranking general a lieutenant-general, and an inferior a major-general, when the major ranks the lieutenant? And why do we call the lieutenant officially "Mr.," when on paper he is always addressed by his title? We give the proper rank and term both in official communications on paper or verbally, or on social occasions to all other grades, whether they are superior or inferior. The sergeant is always sergeant, so is the captain always captain; but except on paper the lieutenant, whether with twenty years more service than the captain or but just commencing his career, is a plain civilian "Mr." Reasons have been given to all these, but to my mind they are so many and so essentially different that

I cannot reconcile the matter at all, and believe they are simply customs that have grown up without reason. But whatever the reasons, there are none existing for their not being done away with and good sense taking their place. Wits often make fun of soldiers on account of their fancy uniforms, and our orators are wont to delight in flights of fancy and raillery against them. They but demonstrate their own ignorance, and prove that they have never sought danger in defense of their fellows. In large masses of men the general recognizes by the color and insignia, the rank and office of every man in his command without asking a question. And so also does the private tell by his insignia the sergeant, the lieutenant, the captain, colonel, and general. They all have their meaning, and to the inferior the lieutenant is always lieutenant, the captain always captain. It should be so with the superior. But touching on the subject of uniform brings us to a point that is necessary to speak of. At all army posts it is required that the uniform should be worn. General Sheridan required his staff officers in Chicago to wear it during office hours; but staff officers, whether belonging to bureaus or personal staffs, are as much on duty during office hours as officers at the garrison when on drill. It is but proper that they should wear the uniform of their grade, not the coat alone, but the uniform, to just as great an extent as the officer of the line in garrison. They should be just as military and careful in appearance, the coat should be buttoned up, the insignia not slightly fastened on, but well attached, the sword of the inspector should be real, not a dummy that will close up, that he may be saved a little trouble when traveling. Officers are paid for doing their work thoroughly, and it is as much a breach of discipline for the quartermaster to sit in his office with a pair of civilian trousers on, a uniform coat opened down the front showing a civilian vest, or an inspector who will go traveling around and inspect officers and men in full dress, too ready to find fault if any of them even neglect the useless (to foot-troops at least) sword-knot, when he himself has but a dummy sword that he cannot draw or use for either defense or authority. It is not right to wear in civil life or on leave of absence a costume partly uniform and partly civilian. One or the other must be worn complete, and the circumstances of the time must dictate what good breeding will require. At the post, it must always be uniform, except at the social gathering in a friend's house or the post assembly rooms. It is unmilitary and the worst of taste to

go about the post with a uniform savoring of the dude, yet at many posts it is allowed. Why occasionally does an officer, who would have been unmercifully "skinned" for such a thing at West Point, wear kid gloves and carry a cane about the post in uniform? Why not also a "plug" hat?

These points may all seem trivial, but this entire essay may, for that matter, and if so considered, no apology is deemed necessary. It can but be repeated that it is the straws that have been indicated that mark or make us to the civilian observer, and, taken in that light, too much thought cannot be given to these subjects. In concluding this part of this paper there is one more point necessary to emphasize as strongly as possible, because it seems somewhat un-American. It is this principle, that the commanding officer is not only the official head of the military post, but the social head as well. This in foreign services is laid down as a regulation. Though sometimes recognized as such, with us it is too often forgotten or slighted. A young officer stationed at a large post, and elected an officer of the post club, remarked one day with reference to an officer who ranked him two grades, that on the outside of the club, in the drill-field, the captain ranked him, but that in the club it was not so, that there the junior was in every way the equal of the superior, or his superior if his social qualities made him so, and therefore the captain could not order him in the club as he would outside. This youngster was, of course, wrong. The regulations say respect to superiors must be shown on all occasions. The senior could command, had he so desired, in the club as without, and the young man must perforce have obeyed. It is, of course, understood that such authority would be exercised within bounds. The senior must at no time conduct himself so that the inferior feels himself as good or better than he. It is a good principle to follow that young men should heed, that no officer should direct or ask others to do for him what he himself is unable, or ashamed, or afraid to do.

When the senior comes into the club, it is as much an official courtesy as a social one to jump up and offer him a chair, to defer in a manly way to his rank, whatever may be one's private opinion regarding his wisdom or official standing. It is in the little points of this nature that the best officer may be detected. It is said of General Grant that no one ever heard a single oath, or vulgar word, or obscene story ever pass his lips. Yet he was none the less a general for it. What constitutes the true officer?

Is he a soldier pure and simple whose entire life and all its energies are devoted to the furtherance of his profession and his advancement therein? Or, on the other hand, is it necessary that, working in the direction of the modern idea that the science of war is identical with the art of saving life, he must therefore make himself a learned man, a teacher, a professor, a scholar, and less of a thinking machine? Or should he seek a middle ground, and while attempting to be a little of both, essay to be the perfect type of the social success that society stamps as a gentleman? To all of these we say no, most decidedly. War is to-day what it ever has been and what it ever will be, the science of overcoming by force one's fellows. It is in its nature cruel, brutal, and bloodthirsty, but, on the other hand, it offers to man the greatest opportunities for the development of the nobler virtues and grander passions of our nature. In that light it is ennobling. Like the surgeon's knife which is used deeply and quickly to save life, so the soldier may remove the tumors and felons of social and political government that the whole body politic may thrive. Have you ever seen a type of a perfect officer, he who combines the genius of the general with the patient endurance, both physical and mental, of the private; who inspires confidence in himself and in all under him; who is at all times the gentleman, courteous alike to inferior, equal, and superior; who is strong and firm in discipline, without arrogance or harshness, and never familiar towards subordinates, but to all is the soul of courtesy, kind, considerate, and absolutely just; who is of high mettle, quick to resent a want of official courtesy, or an overbearing spirit from a superior or equal in rank? There have been such soldiers, but they have been few and far between, and fortunate is he who has known them, and still more fortunate is he who has been close to them. The great generals of all ages are not all free from taints or vices and of the character described. Cæsar and Hannibal were, so were Prince Eugene, Wellington, Von Moltke, Washington, Lee, Sherman, Thomas, Johnston, and others. But Marlborough was not; the great Napoleon was not, and his failure in life was greatly due to the lack of many of these same qualities. It has been the author's privilege to have known such a man; and though his name is not blazoned forth to the world from the highest rounds, yet when it is spoken by those dear to him and to whom he was dear, it is with the breath of filial love, mingled with the respect due his superb qualities that all the soldiers of

ancient and modern times could not surpass. Rich indeed is the legacy of his patriotism, and though he rests now in an honored grave, his example and his life prove that men may live and achieve the highest victories and battles and gain alike love, respect, and veneration so great that we raise our caps in salute to his name, with a reverential love as deep as that we give the flag of our country.

SOCIAL ETIQUETTE.

When one comes to the purely social etiquette or social life in the army, the field is so broad, so covered with irregularities, many of them possessing intrinsic worth, but the majority false, and withal so different in some respects from what they should be, that it is impossible for one in the profession to write of them candidly without more or less prejudice. Moreover, it being indisputably the fact that in this phase of society the fair sex alone sets the pace, makes the arbitrary rules and social distinctions, it ill becomes a man to criticise what he may perhaps be said to have no business to know. But the social intercourse of men and women in the army being much closer than in civil life, and the advancement of an officer in his profession depending so often on a "woman's smiles," there are necessarily some phases of it that cannot be overlooked.

Not an officer of the army of any experience but can recollect or is personally acquainted with certain commanding officers who are but the lieutenant-governors of their posts,—their wives wielding the actual power in all but name. Over and over again has it been a fact that regimental and post staff officers, such as adjutants and quartermasters, have been appointed because such fact would be particularly pleasing to the wife or daughter of the commandant. When the time came for a change of station or a change of officers, officers have been retained and others sent away because Mrs. Colonel X. wished it. Perhaps there would be little or no harm in this were military qualifications only considered, but unfortunately it is too often the case that social qualifications, wealth perhaps, or intimacies existing between the wives of the officers and the wife of the commanding officer, is the secret reason why the husbands should be appointed to places that their deserts never entitled them to. In one case the commanding officer's wife had two ladies, wives of junior officers, as her two intimate friends. These three were the main supporters of the

chapel and Sunday school of the post, but strange to say their charity never went beyond that. In fact, it was noticeably short at home. When the change in staff appointments was made it was the husbands of these two ladies who were appointed, much to the chagrin and grief of the better part of the regiment. At this post there existed more trouble and scandal among the society circles than at almost any other in the army. The wives should have nothing to do whatever with the official governing of the post. Any and every commanding officer would laugh if it were intimated to him that he allowed his post to be governed in any way by his wife, or any of the ladies of the post. Yet some of them are actually under the influence of such power without their being aware of it, while still others have been known to be such slaves to home influences that they have lost the power to resist them.

In a preceding paragraph it has been stated that the commanding officer of the post is the social as well as the official head of it. It may equally be accepted as a fact and should be a regulation that in all entertainments given by the post as a garrison wherein all bear part of entertainment or expense, whether of an official or purely social nature, the wife of the commanding officer should invariably be the presiding lady and the head of the feminine element. Now, some wives are ladies born and bred, and not only know how, but actually do fill the responsible position of commanding officer's lady with grace and dignity. They perhaps more than any one else at the post have it in their power to make the social life at the post enjoyable. If therefore with such power and influence at command, is it not sinful not to exercise it with all the gifts she has? To wield such influence with grace and womanly sweetness will make slaves to her will of all at the post. Too often have little jealousies and envies arisen at the post because of the marked preference of the wife of the commanding officer for some lady there, and which preference has shown itself in some favors the others have an equal right to but have been deprived of. At one post the only person possessing a garden was the commanding officer, and from that garden his wife sent fruits and vegetables to but two or three ladies. The rest got nothing. At another post, whenever a ball or entertainment was given, the commanding officer's wife invariably invited two lady intimates to receive with her. And they were both wives of junior officers. Now, as the commanding officer should refrain from making a confidant of any officer under

him to that extent that such officer has almost equal power with him, so also should his wife be careful to make no intimacies among other ladies at the post to such an extent as to warp her feelings by their show of affection for her. It stands to reason that such ladies would do what they could to better their husband's positions, and many little words or sayings would in an indirect manner unconsciously work good or ill for others. In her intercourse with her fellow-ladies the commanding officer's wife can do more good than ill by observing the little proprieties and forms that good breeding requires. She can show an equal respect and consideration for all ladies, whether they are second-lieutenants' wives or colonels'. Not long ago at one large post the mother of a junior officer made him a visit. She was the widow of a major-general, and the commanding officer even had at one time served under him. Several of the junior officers and their families called. But although she remained at the post six weeks the elder officers did not call, because the commanding officer and his wife had stayed away. The only excuse they could give was want of time. But it was noticed that when any prominent civilian of influence or wealth, or any superior officer of the army was around, they were the first to entertain. At balls and receptions it is but a graceful act, that loses no dignity in its doing, to ask in turn the wives of all officers to receive with her, and in her entertainments she cannot afford to slight any single person at the post without to a certain extent hurting her own husband. There is the wife who poses as the soldier's friend and exerts herself to get up a gymnasium or reading-rooms for the soldiers, or else sewing circles for soldiers' children, and in these charitable acts she imposes on all at the post more or less of her desire, so as to make it disagreeable to every one. They cannot say anything, for she is the commanding officer's wife, and they comply silently but with badly concealed grace at times. And invariably these ladies are the ones whose own households need the greatest care. If they would but remember that "Charity begins at home," that the soldier is in time of peace better taken care of than the officer, and that the soldier's life would be the happier and better if his officers are a happy and contented set of men.

An army garrison has been often likened to a large family, in which the commanding officer is the father. It is, in fact, a social circle complete in itself, and not depending in any way, shape, or means upon outside influences. The army woman receives more attention than does the woman in civil life, because the officer has the time and the influences surrounding him to play and be the lover at all times. Moreover, he has not the influences to draw him away from

his fireside. The deeds of some army women should be commemorated in marble, and as highly eulogized as those of men. Many and many are the sacrifices, the trials, and the hardships they are called on to endure that other women know little or nothing of. Yet what a rock of security, of rest, and what a tower of helpfulness their faith and love has been to their husbands! Many of them have brought in Christian principle to help them bear slander and misrepresentation, and being sensitive to praise or blame, pity and forgive, but also suffer if they cannot make explanation to remove any odium thrown upon them by misrepresentations and falsehoods. No one is able to explain all such charges, even were it wise to do so, so that those upon whom stigmas are unjustly affixed often have only the one resource of bearing them.

It is much better to forget petty meannesses and trickeries of mean women by recalling the acts and words of the noble ones, and in time it will become easy to overlook the rudeness of those who have perhaps had fewer opportunities of realizing how neglect of what is to them trifling observances affects others who have been trained to regard them as defining the well-bred from the under-bred.

It is because of this very fact of the army post being but a large family that the great prevailing weakness of women has found its best lodging-places, and well has it been said that in no place does gossip hold such sway as there. Every officer and lady knows the salary, the means, the possessions, the talents, the faults, the surroundings, of every one in the army, or rather, the post, and in lieu of anything else to talk of, every one's neighbors and their affairs are discussed, and their characters hauled over the hot coals of mischievous talk and local notoriety. Who can tell or estimate the evil done by this habit,—the happy homes broken up, the lives which started out full of honest ambitions, with a healthy tone in every impulse, and which in a few years have been worse than dead because of disappointed hopes and frustrated plans, which in their fulfillment would have bettered the world? Men are not entirely blameless in these matters, for too often is gossip their chief end at the club or sutler-store meeting; but notwithstanding, it may be stated as a fact that fully nine-tenths of the social misery in the army circles is the result of the gossiping tendencies of those army women whose chief aim and delight seems to be to spread scandalous tales of others, often their preferred friends. In condemnation of this habit too much cannot be said. In good society men and women meet for the purpose of mutual entertainment, on a footing of equality as regards character, breeding, and education. And the one great distinguishing mark of such society is respect for the moral character.

No matter what the rank, the wealth, the fame, the education, or the breeding, no officer or lady should be permitted within society's ranks whose character is known to be bad. The man who has lost honor in the field, at the card-table, in the club, in business transactions, or in social circles, should be equally shut out with the fallen woman. Such punishment being the severest that society can administer to the dishonored, it behooves all to be so much the more careful that no word or tale or even whisper may bring any such degradation to those we are not absolutely certain deserve it. Sometimes it is the fair fame of a married woman that has been tarnished, or a young girl whose happy future is to some extent blighted, or perhaps some woman whose social triumphs have been brilliant, and the envious of her sex, whose abilities are inferior to her own, have belittled and maligned her. Again, it may be some young officer who has been purposely snubbed and slighted by a superior in rank, whose envious mind could not brook comparison for a moment with the youngster. Such actions make the world very bitter to those whose experience in such matters has been limited. The usefulness of more than one life has been destroyed and its brightness blighted by such tales of gossip, tale-bearing, and hearsay talk. It has been said that good-natured gossip never hurts. But there can be no such thing as "good-natured gossip" any more than there can be truthful lying. Gossip and tale-bearing are always prompted by either malice or imbecility, and the man or woman who gives utterance to it is either a fool or a knave. At the army post where gossip and slander holds sway the society is bad, utterly and rottenly bad; and this whether the tales be insinuations, actions, or words. But the worst form of all is that of the hidden slander, the partially-revealed tale with but half the truth, and that half vilely distorted. Those who indulge in it cannot but be vile themselves, without honor or decency; they cannot bear to see others respected or exalted for traits they are ignorant of or never possessed. No officer, however brave and honorable his record, or noble and high his character, or true and stanch friendships and loves, or however high his station, but must be disparaged by insinuations and innuendoes, and the glory of his reputation smirched by the villainous devices that are known only to those who seek to humiliate him. And the woman with a fair fame, with womanly graces and sweetness, with accomplishments and attainments beyond her neighbors, must perforce, through the narrow, illiberal life and tendencies of the gossiping vultures who consider that the rank of their husbands entitles them to such work, be subjected to falsehood in tales only half told, or calumny of jealous and envious minds. Are these words too strong? If so,

ask the officer, and there are not a few of them, who has felt the slow, deadly virus in his own life, yet was powerless to counteract it till his life has become a foot-ball tale to be passed from mouth to mouth, ever gathering in size and changing its shape till unrecognizable by even himself. When a man disgraces himself he alone bears the greater punishment, but he carries his disgrace out of his house, but if the wife falls, she brings disgrace to the fireside, and the pillars of family life crumble into utter ruin. And when such ruin has been wrought by the slow poison of unbased scandal, a blow has been foully dealt the officer that his bitterest enemy would not have given him in a fair fight, and a wound inflicted that burns, rankles, and festers, without healing, since every passing mouth, in careless or wanton outrage, can stir it up afresh. It is this one great fault of some army women that cannot be spoken of too strongly, that Captain King has depicted so truly in his military novels, and that many an officer can justly verify from his own experience. It has led to more courts-martial of officers, to more prejudice against us on the part of civilians, than any other one thing. The only remedy for it is for officers as well as women to resist the hearing of such tales as firmly as telling them one's self. Good breeding, good manners, culture, and refinement do not for a moment tolerate it, and people in such circles, though they be the narrow, confined ones of an army post, may, and always do, if they so desire, find enough of interest in art, science, literature, and the news of the day to discuss, rather than gloat over the troubles, the mishaps, or shortcomings of their neighbors or acquaintances. Virtue is born of good habits, and the formation of good habits is the one great thing we should strive after. Let the army woman avoid speaking evil of others; let her be careful never to exhibit faults that the mantle of charity should cover; let her regard reputation as a gem of priceless value, and then let her precepts be such as will excite an abhorrence of evil speaking, of telling "fast stories," or stories only just a little bit "wicked," of tattling, of uncharitable construction of the motives of others; then will she not only create a perfect circle in her own home, but when she attains the dignity of commanding officer's wife, she will make the paradise around her that every army post can be made.

Another custom at army posts to be condemned is the formation of cliques, and that peculiar joy of the feminine element which delights in joining some particular one. Perhaps there is no reason why there should exist envy or worry, but, nevertheless, they are the fruitful source of many disagreements that makes post life a rich field to study the human character in. At one post, for instance,

where there were some six or seven young unmarried ladies, a club was formed and brilliantly carried on through the winter. The following winter, on being resuscitated, it was proposed to enlarge it and take in all the young married women. But in so doing the club could not exceed a certain number, and so a line had to be drawn. It was drawn on one lady who had a child some fourteen years of age, and the reason was given out that she had grown-up children. Now, among those taken in were several who, though having no children or else younger ones, were in themselves years older than the one barred out. But the real reason was found in the prejudice and envy of two or three of the young ladies against the young matron, who in breeding, education, and looks was their superior, while her character was without one single blemish. At another post an entertainment was given by one of the ladies, and in her invitations she left out many whom she professed a friendship for. Some of these latter injudiciously stating their grievances, it was then given out as a reason that only those living near her were invited. As the increased distance could not have exceeded in the case of the one living farthest off one hundred yards, it can be seen that such an excuse was worse than none at all. It was the "clique" that was entirely responsible for the trouble. It is all right for one to invite just whom one wants at one's house, but then it should be stated so, and no other reason given. Then none can find fault. Sometimes, however, a slight is given in not returning a hospitality. At some posts this is an unfortunately prevailing habit. A breach of hospitality of this kind is a breach of good manners; it shows uncultivated taste, and smacks of boorishness and vulgarity. If the givers of a dinner are in the first place good enough to dine with, they are surely good enough to invite in return. Of all the social virtues, hospitality ranks among the first, and even the savage recognizes its code as binding. Sooner or later must the transgression of its laws recoil like a boomerang upon those who do not repay their just debts.

It is the little clique around the wife of the commanding officer and the other little clique of young, inexperienced married ladies at the post that play the greater part of the mischief. Of all the women at the post, the commanding officer's wife should be the one to avoid being drawn into any clique. She should be most careful in her friendships, most scrupulously polite in giving and returning hospitalities, and most cautious in her conversations on post matters. The right kind of a wife is invaluable in furthering the interest of the honorable officer, the wrong kind invariably retards or kills his career. Cliquism is seen often in making and receiving calls. We once heard a young

army lady say that she did not propose to call at a house where but a few days before she had attended an afternoon "tea." She gave as her reason that it was not expected to call after an entertainment of that kind. She was wrong. After an invitation is given out, whether accepted or not, calls should be made. It would not be good breeding or good form to simply send in cards; but they should be left in person and a short call made. Among people of cultivation and refinement there is no more question of this duty than there is of promptly replying to a dinner invitation. When no call is made, but cards are sent, it marks plainly a want of appreciation and a manifested discourtesy that is exceedingly disagreeable for those who have been trained to look upon such an omission as a rudeness. Self-respect has no finer method of expression than that of respect for others, and a writer in the *Home Journal* well says, "Whoever receives an invitation is bound to receive it as a mark of kind feeling, and to remember that self-respect requires conformance to all conventional rules in connection with hospitalities extended, as well as that any neglect of such observances shows deficiency either in qualities of the heart or in early training."

Manner has been defined to be the deportment of one person towards another. There are cads and snobs in the army as well as out. They are easy to tell. The officer who by reason of his rank sometimes deigns to salute you very formally and at others with a show of friendship, or who will put up at the post club the names of those who are wealthy or of wealthy or influential families, whatever their personal reputations may be, is no more frequent than is the blow-hot or blow-cold woman who bows or calls as the freak is upon her. It has been thought by some of the older officers of the army that the proportion of this class has been somewhat on the increase of later years with the modern product evolved by West Point. Now, either officially or socially we must have superiors, equals, and inferiors, and according as we recognize this fact will our manner be. Some people are incapable of recognizing the subtle distinctions of these grades, while, on the other hand, there are many who understand and practice every shade and graduation in which they exist. Who has not seen the lady acquaintance who, on meeting on the street a friend, stands talking there, and, though she plainly perceives a half-block away another friend coming towards her, will turn or avert her head so as to escape the bow of recognition? On a par with this ill-breeding is the young officer whose sense of superiority causes him to look down on the older man of experience and express a most lofty contempt of all his old-fashioned ideas of courtesy and good-breeding. It is this young man

who invariably knows more of drill, of what is right and wrong in discipline, than any of his superiors, but who as invariably is found wanting at the time he should put his ideas to practical test. Now, in meeting a superior there need never be a servility or a fawning towards him, though there should be a deference, which on official matters should be marked. Superiority may be either of rank, age, or acquired distinction; and what would constitute good manners in this case would be the maintenance of a proper distance between them, a harmony of the laws of respect and good breeding. In meeting with one's equal the proper relations between the two is harder to maintain, unless both are fully acquainted with the laws of good form and etiquette. In meeting a superior there is always danger of his asserting his superiority; in meeting the inferior he may act as one's equal, but the equal may commit either blunder. Thus, he may be arrogant or bumptious, or he may be presuming, cringing, or even apologetic. It is an axiom that vulgarity and good manners are inconsistent with each other. To preserve the proper shade of familiarity and conduct towards either superior or inferior we must never be familiar with them, but with the equal we can be both familiar and intimate. It is when meeting the inferior that the true nobleness of a gentleman shines forth. Without undue familiarity, but with true courtesy and womanly sweetness, the true lady meets her inferior. To the inferior you are never the snob, never the oracle, never the judge, never the patronizer, but a kindly neighbor interested in all his or her welfare and well-doing, and showing it by your conduct towards him or her.

At the army garrison more than elsewhere, because of its likeness towards a large family, should men preserve towards women that proper decorum which cannot tolerate in any degree of the nature of excessive familiarity or of the coldness of ill-breeding. But when this line is passed, it is nine times out of ten the fault of the woman. If, for instance, the woman playfully addresses the officer as "a pig," or says, with most exquisite humor, "Oh, you beast," or lays her hands on his arms or shoulders, or uses some pet slang in her conversation with him, she must expect to be treated with some rudeness or too much familiarity by him afterwards. If she can talk and act thus, why cannot he do the same, or even slouch, loll, tell fast stories, and expectorate in her presence? The fault is hers. She has corrupted his manners by her own freedom, and the deference she otherwise could exact, and which every man instinctively or cheerfully accedes to, is not forthcoming.

As said before, there are the possibilities and opportunities to make the life at the army garrison an ideal one. But such plane can only be

reached by the individual efforts and study of every officer and woman belonging to it. If there ever is any aristocracy in this great republic of ours, it must be an aristocracy of culture of both minds and hearts. Exclusiveness in such case is a good thing. It has existed and always will exist in every civilized community, and it has this great advantage, that it does not require wealth, fame, or birth, but that every aspirant may attain its ranks by simply fitting himself to such position. Self-control, patience, consideration, and unselfishness are the foundation-stones of the structure. This will not make a special "four hundred" which will number millionaires, princes, dukes, or other titles which are not earned, but it will contain men and women who rejoice in every breath they take in that they possess the companionship and friendship of beings who think of them as they wish to be thought of.

W. R. HAMILTON,
Major, U. S. A.

EUROPEAN THEORY BAFFLED IN THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.

By C. v. B.-K., Pekin, latter part of September, 1904.

Translated from the Militar-Wochenblatt for the Second Division, General Staff, by Captain Cecil Stewart, 4th U.S. Cavalry, April, 1905.

Translated from the Militar-Wochenblatt for the Second Division, WHEN I left my native land for the extreme Orient I was filled with the opinions taught in Europe and that are valid as to great continental wars. Since then I have had the opportunity to remark that these very opinions often govern the criticism to which, in European publications, the conduct of the adversaries in the Russo-Japanese war is submitted. However, I had to become convinced gradually, and I acknowledge unwillingly that more than one of our theories is not practicable in the extreme Orient, and that many European criticisms are not just, applied to conditions here.

After war was declared, in the month of February, decisive blows were expected too soon. March passed without bringing the adversaries together; likewise in April, the Japanese offensive, awaited so long, did not materialize right away. There was astonishment in Europe, and I know that astonishment was not less at Tokio among the expectant correspondents. Most of these gentlemen have a great deal of war experience, and therefore competent judgment may well be attributed to them; naturally I adopted their opinions which were in accordance with mine.

To-day it is recognized that Japan had no intention of throwing all her army into Asia before the Russian fleet was weakened in a decided manner, which was effected by the catastrophe of the "Petropavlovsk;" a fortnight afterwards the first army crossed the Yalu.

The correctness of the Japanese calculations had to be agreed with, but Europeans leaned to the belief that they were acting with too great prudence; we were all of the opinion that it would have been bolder and more brilliant to take the offensive in great bodies also on land, from the 8th and 9th of February, without discounting a possible success of the Russian fleet. Since then we have recognized that a more rapid offensive would have been scarcely practi-

cable; it would at the start have met with great difficulties—Korea is frightful in March—and then it would not have brought the desired victory, for in March the Russians were too weak on the Yalu and would not have defended the river frontier at all. The first Japanese army then would have struck a blow in the air, also under conditions as unfavorable as possible. It was only at the beginning of May that the Russian Manchurian army became a seizable objective. This arose from the fact that the preparation for war in the extreme Orient left more to be desired than was suspected in Europe, for the Siberian railroad did not supply what the European public believed; the Japanese alone knew what it was worth. The administration of the Japanese army has then not sacrificed any chance, in delaying assumption of the offensive; it has, on the contrary, assured and increased success knowingly; but this was then very difficult, almost impossible for a foreigner to recognize.

Another point much criticized by the whites, at least here, was the decision in competent Japanese quarters to employ against Port Arthur such important forces as they did. After the passage of the Yalu, the complete second army was landed at Pitzewo, and employed in taking the positions of Kintchou, giving up decisive operations against the army of Manchuria; then it was soon relieved by new forces before Port Arthur. Without fear of very great error, the forces employed against Port Arthur may be estimated at 80,000 men, which seemed to mean a considerable loss to the field army and the impossibility of its striking a decisive blow against the main force of General Kuropatkin. It is known that up to the present—the end of September—the Japanese have neither succeeded in beating General Kuropatkin in decisive manner, nor in causing the fall of Port Arthur, and in this regard one often hears cited the proverb of the two hares that should not be chased at the same time.

Many persons consider Lieutenant-General Kodama, vice-chief of staff of the army, as the author of the plan just described; attacks upon him have therefore not been wanting. Another part of those competent to speak pretend that General Kodama has acted not at all according to his personal wishes, but that he was forced to compromise.

The first condition for any success for Japan was destruction of the Port Arthur fleet. As it no longer showed itself upon the high seas, after the death of Makaroff, there remained but one means of forcing it to fight; to take Port Arthur by land. This idea is incontestably right, and it amounts to nothing to oppose to it the pretended positive importance of a land victory in pitched battle. A Japanese victory at Mukden would have served no purpose, if the Russian fleet leaving

Port Arthur had beaten the Japanese fleet; hence the imperious necessity for the Japanese of making themselves masters of Port Arthur as quickly as possible, even at great cost. Before this was realized it was necessary for Marshal Oyama's army to obtain great victories, it had but to prevent the siege being raised. We shall see further on, moreover, that there can scarcely be a question in the extreme East of decisive victories of which we in Europe dream.

It is upon this basis that the Japanese proceeded with great courage to the assault of Port Arthur, which, in spite of great sacrifices, has not up to the present succeeded. It seems that the Japanese staff had not estimated at its just value the strength of Port Arthur and the resistance of its garrison, and that it has been, consequently, in a very unfortunate situation. But here again fortune smiled on him who tempts her. Twice—June 23d and August 10th—the Russian fleet made a sortie, without plausible reason, and was so weakened that it ceased to be a menace to the Japanese Empire in the Yellow Sea. As yet it is not known for what reasons the Russian fleet left Port Arthur; certain persons who came from there have told me that the admiral and the general did not get along well together, and that each acted at his fancy without reference to the other.

One asks himself whether it was the danger menacing Port Arthur from the land side that forced the sortie of the fleet; but even that not being the case, the close investment has simplified the siege and almost completely cut off revictualing. On the other hand, the rash and repeated attempts at assault must be considered a mistake.

Moreover, yet another reason urged the winning of Port Arthur as soon as possible; the wish of the Japanese people. The Japanese set a much higher value upon the taking of this fortress, once already conquered by them, than upon a victory in the field, even though most brilliant. They intend to have Port Arthur cost what it may, and think that its fall will produce on the peoples of Asia an impression much more profound than all the victories gained up till now.

The future will show whether Kodama's reckoning is right or wrong; it will be wrong only if Port Arthur holds out until Kuropatkin comes to relieve it, which supposes a decisive victory over the three Manchurian armies. To-day no one longer thinks of this possibility.

It remains to be seen whether a simple investment would not have allowed reinforcing the field army so as to put it in shape to bring catastrophe upon General Kuropatkin. But that is a learned thesis, whose examination here would lead too far. However, it may be admitted that confronting a leader of so aggressive a nature as General

Stoessel, it was necessary, in any case, to place important forces; if the Japanese army had suffered slight reverses only, the situation would have been bad for it.

The critics have judged General Kuropatkin yet more severely than the Japanese generals. Quite wrongly in my opinion. According to what I know of opinions publicly expressed in Europe, the Russian general is reproached with not having withdrawn from the first and while avoiding partial defeats, into an intrenched camp near Mukden, where he would have awaited his reinforcements; such a proceeding would have been quite appropriate under conditions in our continent.

Kuropatkin has followed another path for good reasons. The Oriental concerns himself but little with the theoretical correctness of strategy; he esteems the adversary according to the resistance that he offers. If the Russian army had retired upon Mukden without fighting, the Japanese offensive would have proceeded much more rapidly than has been the case up to the present, and the Chinese could not probably have been held in check. Retreat upon Mukden, correct in history, would have been, under the reality of the extreme Orient, a mistake of incalculable import.

The Russian general knew it, and that is why he decided to fall back from position to position, resisting each time vigorously, but not to the very last moment, and making use to the full, in his retreat, of all the resources of Manchuria. He chose, knowingly and in a well thought out manner, the method of fighting that consists in exhausting the enemy, knowing besides that he could count on the callousness of Russian troops as regards defeats. On this theater of war and with these troops General Kuropatkin was able to proceed in a way that would have been very dangerous, if not impossible, in central Europe.

With a number of troops the weakness of which will astonish the world, if ever the history of this war is written, General Kuropatkin has known how to force the Japanese into attacks that have cost them great sacrifices, and has exhausted their best troops before they have reached Mukden, where European theory imperiously advised him to withdraw from the start.

As to the execution it must be designated as masterly. I was at Russian headquarters when it was a question of evacuating Newchwang, and was then still entirely under the sway of European ideas; without knowing the war situation in all its details, I saw nevertheless that the Russian army was half turned and that its route of retreat and the railroad were threatened. I may say that I was in a situation

that in the game of war should have demanded an immediate retreat; I expected then retreat or a catastrophe; neither the one nor the other happened. The Russian army held on well, fought for several days against the enemy, who advanced but little, and finally withdrew in good order, without important losses. The same game was repeated at Liaoyang, when the world, at least the Anglo-Saxon world, looked for a Sedan. This fight, closed in fine style, brought no further advantages to the Japanese than the ground gained; they took no trophies, made no prisoners; it was a victory absolutely fruitless and negative that they bought with nearly 20,000 men. Japan can not bear many such victories, but Russia can still bear several like defeats.

I have not seen the Japanese at work, I have only heard them spoken of; however, I am inclined to believe that their management in July, August and September, has not been entirely equal to its task, for they still always had the advantage in numbers and did not know how to profit thereby to strike decisive blows. But even that being so, incontestable merit remains to the Russian general.

Under conditions the most difficult that can be imagined, with very weak forces, he has—not by leaning on existing theory, but in contradistinction to it—done all that it was possible for him to do. He has not been able win up to date, but he has made the enemy pay very dearly for victory. In my opinion, the way he has gone about it is a feat that another leader will not so soon imitate. Since the Yalu and Vafangow, the Russian losses in trophies and prisoners have diminished in an astonishing manner, while the Japanese have had to make sacrifices always greater. This is not a matter of chance, but the consequence of very skillful management whose merit is due to General Kuropatkin alone.

At his headquarters where I have learned to know in turn the anguish of waiting and of the uncertainty of war, and the pleasure of hope, I have become convinced that General Kuropatkin understands warfare in Eastern Asia much better than his critics accustomed to European routine. It is true that we have nothing to do with the strategy of annihilation that we know, but with the other of which Clausewitz speaks, where it is a matter only of making a few conquests on the confines of the hostile State, and to force it to an advantageous peace. In Europe we no longer know the latter, but Eastern Asia is several centuries behindhand, and Kuropatkin's procedure there has its place. It is to be regretted that a greater number of our officers have not had the opportunity to study here the strategy of exhaustion at the fountain-head; specialists in this domain

might be useful the case happening, not that we would wish to use strategy of exhaustion, but it might be opposed to us once.

And I have learned still another thing here—a very great aversion for all theory. This state of mind is perhaps exaggerated in its present acuteness and will pass away. But it must be agreed, in my opinion, that our theory of war, adapted in a masterly way to the conception of annihilation, is at fault in a campaign like that of the extreme East; it is excellent for us, but it considers things none the less from a single side.

When opinions shall have become enlightened by the effect of time, it will be recognized that the critics who have been exercised hitherto on the subject of this war, have for the most part been too severe as regards both adversaries. I speak only of the war on land; in my opinion this has been well waged in principle by both sides; on the Japanese side with all the advantages of the initiative. I dare not judge just how far their apparent faults of omission of last summer were caused by the incredible difficulties of the country. But it is evident that the Russians, in spite of their extremely disadvantageous situation, have furnished a very remarkable ensemble of deeds. It is not mistakes in operations by their leaders that have driven them back to Mukden, but neglect before the war; and on the other hand, the Japanese generals were sustained by the superiority given by preparation reasoned out and conscientious during several years.

The preceding article has given rise to a reply that will certainly interest our readers, as the contrary of the opinions that have just been expressed. Here it is:

EUROPEAN THEORY BY GENERAL VON CAEMMERER, UNATTACHED.

(Militar-Wochenblatt.)

The article of C. v. B.-K., entitled "European Theory Baffled in the Russo-Japanese War," reminds me of a pretty story to which Immerman has given a place in his Munchausen. A bookseller had a work of Karl Gutzkow's to rebind: "On the philosophy of history." When the owner of this book received his volume rebound, he read thereon to his great astonisment the title: "On the philosophy of Karl Gutzkow's history." He called on the bookseller for an explanation, and the latter justified himself by saying that the book was not large enough for a true philosophy of history, that it was able at furthest to treat of the history and interior development of Karl Gutzkow personally. It is thus, in my opinion, that one may rate the theory peculiar to Mr. C. v. B.-K. and that brought by him from

Europe, has been baffled in the Russo-Japanese war, but it is certainly allowable to protest against the generalization which the title of his article expresses.

I have often and willingly talked with Mr. C. v. B.-K on questions concerning the art of war and have learned to know his theoretical opinions. He was a representative of the offensive to the very extreme and absolutely scorned the defensive that seemed to him a lost cause from the start. The comparison of Clausewitz who considers the offensive as the weak form having a positive aim, the defensive, on the other hand, as the strong form having a negative aim, seemed to him hazardous. The more difficult a situation, the stronger the enemy, the more he believed to find the offensive the sole means of salvation. He was so far persuaded of the justness of this opinion that in discussing in a very kindly way my book: "The development of the science of strategy in the 19th century" he has also assigned to me the intention of explaining this fundamental thought of Cluasewitz's doctrine by temporary conditions, and to put in question its worth as to the present state. And likewise he rejected expressly "strategic attack with restricted aim," and made no mention of the fact that in this book I had demonstrated in detail the necessity and untility of this principle and that I consider as a particular merit of Clausewitz's that he has given it to us.

We came to an understanding on the subject of the divergence of our opinions, and he himself encouraged me to make clear one after another the points in question. But I have not done so because his warm appreciation of my work as a whole rendered it difficult for me to combat him in details.

I believe I have furnished, in this work, proof that the considerations of our Clausewitz are, still to-day as seventy years ago, the groundwork of all sound military reasoning, and that his doctrine is susceptible of change in but a very few points, where the science of the 19th century has completely changed the conditions given. In speaking of "European theory," it is necessary then in my opinion, to think at the start of Clausewitz, at least it must be done amongst us here in Germany. That is recognized even by theorists who depart from Clausewitz, and the tendency to accord with him, as much as possible, has at times led to strange sophisms. It is therefore according to Clausewitz's ideas that must be judged in first place the events of the Russo-Japanese war.

I am in complete accord, as to the principal points, with what C. v. B.-K. says on the subject of the strategy of the Japanese, and have already so expressed myself on occasion. But do the Japanese then

proceed in a manner quite novel for us? Quite the contrary: they act exactly according to the rules established by Clausewitz for "the strategic attack with restricted aim." They have recognized from the beginning that they could never strike Russia in the heart, and subjugate that giant empire to the Mikado's will. They have therefore undertaken to recapture Port Arthur, which appeared capable of being realized and may be a lasting success, if supremacy on the sea exists besides. Nevertheless they were perfectly aware that victory on land always remains the most effective strategic means, entirely in accord with Clausewitz, and that is why offensive operations that lead to pitched battle have played the most important part in their actions as a whole. I differ in opinion with the Pekin critic in this: I do not believe that Oyama purposed solely to prevent the siege of Port Arthur being raised. If this had been the case, he would have had no need to essay the battle of Liaoyang, which might very well have turned out badly if the Russian forces had been handled more skilfully. But he acted quite as Clausewitz advises in such a case.

C. v. B.-K. warmly takes Kuropatkin's part, and in that I can not decide in his favor. According to all appearances, Kuropatkin might well have won, in the battle of Liaoyang, if he had made the line of his front less massive and if he had placed his reserve, considerably strengthened, as required by our rules for defensive battle, *i. e.,* at Toumouling pass, for instance. In the October battle (which had not yet taken place when C. v. B.-K. wrote his article) Kuropatkin's great superiority in numbers was not able to show to advantage, because his reserves were likewise placed behind the center, and he was once again beaten because he had no reserves echeloned behind the wing turned by the enemy. To that comes to be added the inferiority of blind tactics according to Suvaroff, that is evident, but here we are speaking of the general who to his misfortune did not know the most recent European theory: that of the German regulations.

I do not know what European critics have demanded that Kuropatkin retire, from the first, into a fortified position near Mukden. I am completely in accord with C. v. B.-K. in rejecting this plan, but he ought not to describe it as a consequence of European theory, from which Kuropatkin would have freed himself with advantage. What Kuropatkin has really done, during months and weeks, with the full approbation of our author, his recoiling from position to position, resisting vigorously each time but not to the very end, corresponds perfectly, on the contrary, with the theory of Clausewitz, who gives this procedure as the strongest form of strategic defence.

It is very auspicious and worthy of imitation that one abandon his theoretical opinions from the time he recognizes that they no longer stand in the course of events of which he is witness, and it is quite natural that at such a moment a certain aversion to all theory manifest itself. But I wish for the author, what he himself admits as probable: that this state of mind be but transient. For, according to my conviction, Goethe is right in saying: "Theory exists to teach us to believe in the concatenation of phenomena." Whoever would recognize the intimate relation between the warlike events of extreme East and extreme South with the essential character of war with us, whoever would learn something of the deeds that are taking place afar, may not lay theory aside.

OUR CONTEMPORARIES.

An analysis of the contents of the principal military periodicals, systematically classified under a few general heads for the convenience of the reader and student, comprising extracts and comments, in which special attention is given to the most important and valuable articles.

ORGANIZATION, ADMINISTRATION AND MOBILIZATION.

1. The Imperial Yeomanry in 1905.—*Jour. R. U. S. I.*, Sept.
2. The Formation of a Royal Army Reserve Staff Corps.—*Same.*
3. The Engineers of the Spanish Army.—*Eng. Jour.*, Sept.
4. The Militia; its Past and Future.—*Unit. Serv. Mag.*, Oct.
5. The Early History of the Yeomanry.—*Same.*
6. The Volunteers a Century after Trafalgar.—*Same.*
7. The Canadian Militia.—*Same.*
8. Department of California (Report).—*A. and N. Jour.*, Sept. 30.
9. Report of the Military Secretary.—*Same*, Nov. 4; *A. and N. Reg., same.*
10. A Regiment of Field Artillery.—*Arty. Jour.*, July.
11. Torpedo Companies and Company Electricians.—*Same.*
12. Organization and Maintenance of Field Batteries in Militia.—*Jour. M. S. I.*, Nov.
13. Descriptive Military Record and Account Book.—*Same.*
14. Changes in the World's Armies.—*Jour. R. U. S. I.*, Sept.
15. Changes in the World's Navies.—*Nav. Inst.*, Sept.

The *first* of these articles, by Colonel Le Roy-Lewis, Imperial Yeomanry, is an able description of the British Yeomanry of to-day, its work and present needs.

The *second* article, by Major Kirkpatrick,, on a reserve staff corps of officers, is very instructive, and of interest not only to Great Britain but to all other nations.

We quote a few extracts to indicate the general course of argument:

"The vital importance to a modern civilized Army, of a large and well-trained Reserve of Officers, from which the War Establishment

of officers may be maintained at efficient strength, has been emphasized by the lessons of the Boer War, and by experience gained from the present campaign in Manchuria.

"So heavy are the casualties, among the commissioned ranks, caused by wounds and disease, during a protracted war, that it may be necessary to replace, at a low estimate, 50 per cent. of the officers in the Field Army.

"Now *the officer cannot be improvised,* as one of our highest military authorities has recently said. * * *

"The difficulties at present experienced in the Japanese and Russian Armies, in replacing the heavy war losses in the commissioned ranks of their Armies, are so well known as to render further comment on the subject unnecessary. The Russians, however, are the greater sufferers in this respect, as they do not possess in their non-commissioned officers the educated material included among the Japanese rank and file. * * *

"The question to be solved is, how best to obtain, and keep in training ready for war, this large Reserve of the junior commissioned ranks? * * *

"It is proposed that, in or near the larger cities of Great Britain, corps of Royal Army Reserve Officers should be formed.

"These local corps must be sufficiently strong to allow for the establishment at each Corps Centre of a weak battalion of infantry (say four companies, fifty strong each), and of a half squadron of Cavalry (say two troops, or forty-eight troopers in all). Such an establishment would render the corps self-supporting and independent, as far as ordinary drill and instruction went, of the units of the Regular and Auxiliary Forces quartered in the vicinity, though the existence of these latter bodies would be fully utilized to enable the members of the Royal Army Reserve Staff Corps to avail themselves of opportunities of watching tactical exercises, and maneuvers carried out on a larger scale than could be executed by their own little brigade. Each local Royal Army Reserve Staff Corps would consist of 200 Royal Army Reserve captains, lieutenants, and cadets, of Infantry, and of 48 Royal Army Reserve captains, lieutenants, and cadets, of Cavalry. At parades and maneuvers, four of these captains would command the companies of the battalion, and eight of the lieutenants would act as company-subalterns, *i.e.,* as half-company commanders; the remainder forming the rank and file, and section commanders, of the battalion.

"Each captain in the corps would take his regular turn of acting

as company commander and each lieutenant would act as half-company commander as his turn came round. The same system would hold good in the half-squadron, every officer would be given frequent opportunities, by roster, of acting in his rank. The cadets would invariably be in the ranks, except at certain instructional parades, when they were working up for their examinations for promotion to lieutenant.

"The instructional staff of each local corps would consist of a commandant, second-in-command, two adjutants, a sergeant-major, a quartermaster-sergeant, and six sergeant-instructors (or color-sergeants). These officers, and warrant and non-commissioned officers would be drawn from the Regular Army, and would be selected for their intelligence, military education, and power of imparting instruction. * * *

"All cadets would be officially enrolled from the 1st January annually, and would start their training together from that date. After a course of recruit drill and instruction across-country, and after one year of service as a cadet, the candidate would receive a Regular Army Commission as a lieutenant in the Royal Army Reserve Staff Corps, provided he had passed a satisfactory examination for promotion to lieutenant, and that he was recommended for a Commission by the commandant of the Corps.

"After five years' service in the rank of lieutenant, promotion to captain would ensue, consequent on the test for promotion to captain being creditably passed.

"After serving in the Royal Army Reserve for six years as captain, the officer would be retired, having completed a total of twelve years' service as cadet, lieutenant, and captain; he would receive a step of promotion (to major) *on retirement.* This early retirement is recommended, as it would be inexpedient to introduce Army Reserve officers in time of war into Regular regiments as majors and seconds-in-command; they might, however, be promoted in the field to such appointments (and eventually to command of regiments), if considered fit and tactically qualified, after a certain amount of approved service in the rank of captain in the Regular Army, and when embodied for service with Regular troops."

The *third* article gives a brief account of the Engineers of the Spanish Army, their duties, organization, distribution in the Spanish Possessions, arsenals and schools of instruction, the Engineer Academy, and administration.

The *fourth* article, by Lord Raglan, is a portion of the Trafalgar

Centenary number of the *United Service Magazine,* and mainly describes the British militia of Nelson's day, concluding as follows:

"I have endeavored to show that the country possessed a hundred years ago a well-disciplined, well-trained, and trustworthy force in the Militia. This force was based on the personal liability of every able-bodied man to make himself efficient for the defense of his country. Though the ballot was unequal in its operation, and allowed many unfair exemptions, though the practice of permitting substitutes allowed the rich to shirk their personal liability, still the principle was a right one, and but little alteration would be required to bring the Militia Acts up to date.

"At the beginning of the eighteenth century our little volunteer army did well among other volunteer armies. Even in that century it began to fall off in comparison with foreign armies. Conscription ruthlessly applied to paupers and criminals tided the country over the crisis of the Seven Years' War and the American revolt, but when the French Revolution swept all classes into the Army by means of conscription, our forces were outnumbered and reduced to impotence. The Militia raised by ballot then came to the rescue, and poured large numbers of well-trained men into the Regular Army. Napoleon's fatal Spanish policy, by giving us a sphere of action which permitted our small forces to compete with the French on fairly equal terms, enabled us to emerge victorious from the long struggle.

"Since then, however, the system inaugurated in Prussia has trained to arms the whole manhood of Europe. We alone still struggle to carry on the defense of a vast Empire by methods which have always failed to provide the forces we require.

"I am of those who consider that till we have some form of universal service the country will never feel secure. Pending that result, which I believe will come sooner than many people are aware, it behooves us to make the best of our existing forces.

"Any large increase of the Regular Army is impossible, both on account of the difficulty in finding recruits and also from the expense. The Militia is an old and well-tried force. It suits the temperament of the people, and does not entail large expense on barracks, with their inevitable drawbacks. It admits of men performing their military training without being taken away for long periods from the industrial pursuits of the nation. It is not proposed in this article to suggest the means by which the force can best to-day assist the military requirements of the country. I have shown what a power in

the land the 'Old Constitutional Force' was a century ago. Those who know it best ask the authorities and the country to trust it again; and they make the appeal in absolute confidence of its willingness and capability to do equally good service now."

The *fifth* article, on the early history of the Yeomanry, is a very entertaining one, full of interesting items:

"The Army Book of the British Empire states that the Yeomanry was first enrolled by Lord Chatham in 1761; but the force does not seem at that time to have taken any permanent shape, for Mr. Pitt, on the 5th March, 1794, when proposing to the House of Commons various measures for strengthening the National Defense, said:

" 'As an augmentation of the Cavalry for internal defense was a very material object, they might under certain circumstances have a species of Cavalry consisting of gentlemen and yeomen who might not be called out of their respective counties, but on the pressure of an emergency.'

"Accordingly the Lord-Lieutenants of counties were invited a few days later to raise Yeomanry Cavalry. All ranks were to find their own horses. The Provisional Cavalry Act was passed on the 11th November, 1796.

"By this law any person who was assessed for ten horses kept for riding or driving was obliged to furnish one man and horse completely equipped with horse-furniture and uniform according to Government pattern; and all other persons with a less number than ten horses were to be divided into classes, according to the number of horses kept, and drawn by ballot, in such manner that one man and horse was to be supplied for every ten. The period of service was to be during the war, and for one calendar month after the end thereof.

"The Peace of 1802 *ipso facto* terminated the engagement both of the Provisional Cavalry and of the Yeomanry, the latter having by this grown to a paper strength of 24,000 rank and file, of whom it was estimated 16,000 could be reckoned on; but Parliament, while abandoning the Provisional Cavalry, decided to retain a certain proportion of the Yeomanry, partly for police purposes, partly because no one believed the renewal of the war to be far distant.

"In the great majority of cases the Yeomanry were raised in the first instance by troops, the 'Gentlemen and Yeomen,' reinforced by 'respectable persons' and 'substantial inhabitants' of a district, combining to offer their services with those of their horses. The normal strength was fifty to sixty, but it differed considerably. Like the

Town Guards in South Africa, who only did duty close to home, one corps only undertook to serve in the Rape of North Pevensey, from which strictly limited engagement there is an ascending scale through 'the county,' the 'military district,' 'any part of England,' to 'Great Britain in case of invasion.' Even in the same regiment one troop might have only joined for service in the county, while another was prepared to go anywhere in the military district.

"These refinements, however, were swept away by the Secretary of State in 1803, who announced plainly that in case of invasion limitation of service would not be allowed to interfere with the exercise of His Majesty's ancient and undoubted prerogative of requiring the military service of his subjects.

"It seems likely, therefore, that by 1805 most Yeomanry corps would have been capable of making their way, accompanied by such provisions and forage as they required, to any part of the country where their services were needed. And this would have been largely due to the fact that their officers were the gentlemen of the district, who knew all about it and its resources. Of military training, Yeomanry officers could have had little or none, but in education they were equal, if not superior, to their fellows in the Regulars. It will be remembered that Gibbon was an officer in the Hants Militia, and that Cromwell and Lord Lynedoch were civilians till well over forty. They possessed the habit of command; they were accustomed to field sports and outdoor life; they led men who knew them and whom they knew, and they were of a class that has often shown itself capable of doing a good deal if put in the way of doing it, with a hint as to the best method of beginning.

"The commanding officer of a regiment was generally a county magnate or his eldest son, not afraid of responsibility, probably a warm supporter of the Government, and anxious, patriotism apart, to make their measures a success; the captains and subalterns came from the halls and manor-houses of the neighborhood. They must have learned a good deal in teaching their men, and were doubtless, after the fashion of those days, when everybody rode, and had a home farm, and lived on his own crops, pretty good horse-masters and stud-grooms.

"The men, as their name implies, were for the most part engaged in agriculture, farming either their own land or a portion of one of their officer's estates. They were supposed to ride their own horses, but it is manifest from the words of the Act, which exempt from horse-tax persons who have provided Yeomanry with horses, that a

good many were mounted by other people; and, if one may judge from the addresses that appear in the nominal roll of the Wilts, there was a fair sprinkling in that, and doubtless in other county regiments, of townsmen; while whole corps and troops were raised by towns great and small. But whether from town or country, they were of a very good class: the usual title of the force is the Gentlemen and Yeomanry Cavalry, and letters speak of local corps as being recruited from the 'freeholders, yeomen, or substantial inhabitants,' and as being composed of 'well-mounted, respectable persons.' In some corps the rank and file are described as 'private gentlemen.' * * * Nearly all the men who subscribed the original enlistment roll of the North Devon Yeomanry could write their names, a fact which, a hundred years ago, spoke for itself.

"Altogether, the Yeomanry were in social position the best body of men who had ever been enlisted in England since Cromwell's Ironsides, and were far superior to any who were under arms in Europe at the time."

The *sixth* article is a paper on the necessity for the Volunteer Force (Navy and Army) and their proper sphere of action in war.

The *seventh* article, on the Canadian Militia, is a very readable and instructive one:

"The Militia force of Canada, as established by law, consists of three portions, the Permanent Corps, the Active Militia, and the Reserve Militia. The last named does not, at present, exist in any organized form. The Permanent Force had an authorized strength of 1,000 up to a year ago, when, by an amendment of the Militia law, it was increased to 2,000. During the present session of Parliament a further expansion to 5,000 has been authorized by a later amendment of the law. The present actual strength of the Permanent Force is about 2,000, but it is intended to further increase the number to about 3,500, in order to supply the necessary garrisons at Halifax and Esquimalt. The Permanent Force is distributed in depots, so that, as far as possible, there may be at least one depot in each military district, and, certainly, one or more in each of the larger provinces. Including Halifax, there are two in the Maritime Provinces, three in Quebec, four in Ontario, one in Manitoba, and, counting Esquimalt, one in British Columbia. One is shortly to be established in the new province of Alberta, to be known as the Strathcona Horse, in commemoration of the name and fame of the regiment which served in South Africa, and another is shortly to be established in the great city of Montreal.

"The Active Militia consists at present of about 47,000, all told, who drill annually either in camps of instruction or at regimental headquarters, in the case of city regiments. It is intended to raise the strength of the Active Militia to about 55,000, which would be the peace establishment. It is expected that this force of 55,000 could be readily expanded to about 100,000 men, as the war strength of the Active Militia.

"The Royal Military College was established just thirty years ago, and, while it has not been as productive of direct advantage to the Militia as was hoped at the time of its inception, it has given to the Imperial Army a large number of good officers, some of whom have greatly distinguished themselves. A considerable number of the graduates have entered various professions, chiefly engineering, in Canada, and those who have done so have connected themselves with the Active Militia, and their services, if not available ordinarily in time of peace, would be available in time of war.

"In addition to the advantages afforded in Canada for education and training of officers, the War Office has considerately agreed to allow a certain number of officers to attend the Staff College course in England. Opportunities are given also to Canadian officers to take courses of instruction at Aldershot and elsewhere in various technical branches, such as Engineering, the Army Service Corps, Army Medical Services, etc."

The *eighth* article is a résumé of General Funston's report on the Department of California.

The *ninth* article is the annual report of the Military Secretary, from which we quote a few lines on the grave subject of *desertion* in the Army, in which the whole matter is put before the people in a way not to be misunderstood:

"The principal cause of the evils in question lies deeper than any of the causes commonly assigned for them, and is beyond the reach of any of the measures proposed. Our people, although aggressive enough, are not a military people. They have little real interest in the Army in time of peace, and from the earliest days of the Republic have been accustomed to look upon it as a more or less unnecessary institution that may be pared down with safety whenever a demand for retrenchment of public expenses arises. Enlistment in the Army in time of peace is not uncommonly regarded as evidence of worthlessness on the part of the recruit, and desertion in such a time is generally looked upon as nothing more culpable than the breach of a civil contract for service. The deserter suffers little or no loss of

caste by reason of his offense, and is seldom without friends and sympathizers to shield him from arrest and to intercede in his behalf in the comparatively rare event of his falling into the hands of the military authorities.

"It is safe to predict that desertion from the Army will continue to be excessive until there shall have been a radical change of public sentiment toward the Army, and until the deserter shall come to be regarded as the criminal that he is, to be ostracised and hunted down as relentlessly as any other transgressor of the laws."

MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING.

1. The Söndenfjeld Cyclist Company's Winter Maneuvers.—*Jour R. U. S. I.*, Sept.

2. Military Education in the U. S.—*Eng. Jour.*, Sept.

3. Rifle Ranges.—*Same.*

4. A New Kriegsspiel Apparatus.—*Krieg. Zeit.*, 8.

5. School of Submarine Defense.—*A. and N. Reg.*, Sept. 30.

6. Athletics in the Army.—*Jour. M. S. I.*, Nov.

7. Education of the Nervous System.—*Same.*

8. A Sub-target Gun Holder.—*Arty. Jour.*, July.

9. Training and Personnel of Volunteer Troops.—*Jour. M. S. I.*, Nov.

The *first* of these articles is a pleasant description of the work of a cyclist company on snow-shoes in the mountains of Norway:

"For the benefit of those not acquainted with the Norwegian Army, it may be well to state that in 1899 two cyclist companies were formed—the Nordenfjeld and the Söndenfjeld—consisting wholly of volunteers, organized as light infantry and mounted in summer on bicycles. For the present they are armed with carbines.

"These companies have the same organization as infantry, and their principal duty is reconnaissance, both independently and in conjunction with cavalry.

"To be able to fulfill these important duties at all seasons it is necessary that the personnel be as much at home on snow-shoes as on bicycles. For this reason last year the Söndenfjeld Company's 'battalion training' was put off to the winter, and it was exercised as a snow-shoe company.

"Among the men were several well-known in snow-shoe sport. The snow lay on the ground a metre deep.

"When the idea was first started of a winter service on snow-shoes,

it seems that many over-rated their skill on these, and there were found in the company men of every degree of proficiency, from the holder of the Holmenkoll medal to some whose skill was very slight, albeit of the latter sort there were but few. The whole company, however, consisted of exceptionally sound and practical men, full of energy and goodwill, who made it a point of honor for themselves and the company to fulfil the new demands now made upon them."

The *second* article is a very clear presentation of our system of military education by Colonel Foster, Royal Engineers, British military attaché in Washington. We have space for only a few brief quotations:

"Education has always been a cherished ideal of the American, who is rather inclined to regard its processes with an almost superstitious reverence and perhaps to exaggerate its effect. States and cities, counties and townships, vie with each other in the extent and elaboration of the educational facilities provided for their sons and daughters. In the Philippines, for instance, the formation by methods of American education of a higher type of citizen, ripe for self-government, has been the leading idea of the administration of the islands; and this, moreover, to the neglect—until recently—of the more practical needs of improved communications and public works.

"In the military world, this ideal, which a hundred years ago was responsible for the founding of an admirable military school at West Point, has recently developed a complete scheme of military education, covering the whole ground from the instruction of the private to that of the officer of the General Staff and even of the General. In this curriculum the technical officers of the Engineers, of the Coast and Field Artillery and of the submarine mining service have not been overlooked.

"There can be little doubt that the best result of the four years at West Point is the formation of character in the sense of enthusiasm for the Army and the position of an officer in it, and of a high sense of duty, discipline and military virtue. The strictest veracity is learnt, and the integrity of a West Point officer has rarely been questioned among the 4,000 cadets who have entered the Army. Another excellent result is the homogeneity of the quality of the officers of the United States Army, and their unrivalled camaraderie, which continues till the end of their career. West Point is a religion deeply implanted, and common associations unite officers of all ages and of all arms of the service.

"An obvious drawback to West Point is the absence of ground

for field training, which is only slightly attempted. There seems to be too much parade, stiff drill, marching past, and ceremonial. All this is a relic of the past century and is due to the great conservatism of the Academy.

"The course of four years also seems too long for young men between 18 and 25 years old, subjected as they are to a high degree of restraint and confinement and hard work with their brains. The fact that a half, or even two-thirds, of those who enter are removed during their course shows the inexorable nature of the curriculum. But while severe on the individual, it accounts for the high standard of discipline and education attained."

The *third* article is a very interesting one on rifle ranges, especially protected ones, with bullet-proof screens or walls for stopping all chance of direct shots or ricochets escaping from the range, with descriptions of the systems of Belgium, Germany, France, Italy and England.

The *fourth* article describes a new Kriegsspiel apparatus involving the use of a magic lantern and glass slides (on which the maps are photographed). In this way any region whatever can be used as a theatre of operations. Either the electric arc-light or a lime-light can be used. The entire apparatus (the invention of Captain Hartmann, of the German Army), is furnished by the firm of Ed. Liesegang, Düsseldorf, Germany, in two forms at the following rates:

1. With electric arc-light..... $62.50
2. With limelight 71.25

Payment may be made by instalments and a period of two years is allowed in which to complete payment.

The apparatus promises to be very useful, and is practically adopted in Germany.

The *fifth* article relates to the work of the School of Submarine Defense, and the appropriations and changes needed to perfect this important element in coast defense and military instruction.

MILITARY HISTORY, STRATEGY AND TACTICS.

1. The Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies.—*Jour. R. U. S. I.*, Sept.
2. A Sketch of Napoleon's Campaign in Italy, 1796-7.—*Eng. Jour.*, Sept.
3. Nelson and Trafalgar.—*Unit. Serv. Mag.*, Oct.
4. Imperial Defense.—*Same.*
5. Five Years a Dragoon.—*Cav. Jour.*, Oct.

6. Some Indian Experiences.—*Same.*
7. The Yellowstone Expedition of 1873.—*Same.*
8. The Battle of the Sea of Japan.—*Nav. Inst.,* Sept.
9. Commodore Biddle's Visit to Japan in 1846.—*Same.*
10. The Importance of Port Arthur.—*Kriegs. Zeit.,* 7.
11. Fire Control and Direction of Infantry.—*Same.*
12. The Siege of Port Arthur.—*Same,* 8.
13. The Operation and Maintenance of a Railroad in War.—*Jour. M. S. I.,* Nov.
14. Field Artillery Fire.—*Same.*
15. Battle of Shahke River.—*Same.*
16. Field and Siege Operations in the Far East.—*Same.*
17. With the 13th Infantry in Dakota, 1866-7.—*Same.*
18. Communications Between the Infantry in the Firing Line and the Artillery.—*Same.*
19. Battle of the Sea of Japan.—*Arty. Jour.*

There is space available for special notice of but a few of these articles, and for this purpose those least accessible to our officers have been selected.

The *second* article is a brief critique of the Campaign in Italy in 1796, closing in the following words:

"It is an interesting campaign in a number of ways. It was the first undertaken by Buonaparte, and also the first since Frederick the Great's time in which the principles of strategy were soundly applied. It was the first, too, in which the new spirit of republicanism fired the French soldiery. It was the dawn of a great career.

"In nine months Buonaparte, who had begun with a reputation for skill in artillery matters only, obtained for himself the position of foremost general in Europe. He had begun the campaign with a small base and a hazardous line of communications along the coast from Nice to Savona; and he had pushed his front northwards and eastwards until he had behind him a secure line of communications with France and also a number of strong cities and fortresses—Turin, Milan, Hortona, Alessandria, Coni—which he used as an advanced base for his operations against Mantua.

"He always kept his forces concentrated for fighting, and he often knew more about the enemy's position than they did themselves. He was backed up by brave and intelligent subordinates, and his troops were as enthusiastic for him and the glory he gave them as they were for the new spirit of republicanism.

"The campaign shows the great influence of an initial success leading on to further triumphs by the inspiration given to the victorious army. Had Buonaparte's troops suffered defeat at the outset, their *élan* might have died out, and nothing but a great victory can restore nerve and discipline to demoralized troops. But Buonaparte led victorious troops to fresh victory, and against him he had an enemy weakened and demoralized by continual defeat.

"The Austrians failed:—(1) because the great mountain barrier of the Tyrol separated their armies from their ultimate base; (2) because all their plans of campaign and movements in the field were dictated by a countil sitting in Vienna, nothing being left to the commander on the spot; (3) because none of their generals had made a proper study of war; (4) because the Italians were anxious to try the new republicanism.

"The war continued after the fall of Mantua, but it became a procession of triumphs towards the heart of Austria; although the Archduke Charles, one of the ablest generals his country has produced, took command to retrieve his nation's honor. His shattered and broken-spirited troops could not withstand the advance of the victorious French, gaining in glory with every fresh triumph. An armistice was declared at Loeben, almost within sight of Vienna, and peace was afterwards signed at Campo Formio. Austria gave up Belgium, the Ionian Isles, and her share of Bresgau; she gained the greater part of the Venetian territories, as well as Istria and Dalmatia, strips on the coast of Illyria."

The *third* article above referred to is a series of essays to celebrate the centenary of Trafalgar.

We quote a few words from the preface by Lord Rosebery:

"The relation between England and the United States is now closer and more friendly than that between any two other Powers in the world. In fact, the difference is one of kind and not merely one of degree; and on both sides of the Atlantic it is now fully recognized that the relation between the two nations is really that which Plato thought ought to subsist between Greek state and Greek state as contrasted with that between any Greek state and the world outside Hellas. Plato refused to give the name war to any difference between two Greek states. He would only call it "discord," the word used by Greek writers to describe the internal conflicts—often, unhappily, armed conflicts—of Greek political parties. 'There is,' he said, 'a difference in the names "discord" and "war," and I imagine that there is also a difference in their

natures; the one is expressive of what is internal and domestic, and the other of what is external and foreign, * * * and any difference that arises among Hellenes will be regarded by them as discord only—a quarrel among friends, which is not to be called a war; * * * they will quarrel as those who intend some day to be reconciled.' If we translate this into modern phraseology, it means simply that two nations so situated will never quarrel at all, in the sense of going to war. Just as political parties nowadays compose their 'discords' without resort to arms, so two kindred nations, like England and the United States, will find some way out of their differences without attempting to destroy each other. It is a far cry from the republic of Plato to the New York Tribune and its whilom editor, now Ambassador of the United States to the Court of King Edward VII, but the distance is bridged over in a few words uttered by Mr. Whitelaw Reid at a banquet given to welcome him on his arrival in England: 'You would be less than kind if, at this date and after all that has gone before, you should expect from me this evening a long speech on the expediency or necessity for friendly relations between our two countries. Now, if ever, is surely a time when one need not weary you by saying at length such an undisputed thing in such a solemn way. Of course we ought to be on good terms. Why not? Let me put it a little differently. Of course we are on good terms. Why not? What conceivable reason is there now why the two great branches of the English-speaking family should not be, as they are, actually enjoying the friendly relations we are told it is our duty night and day to bring about. That is their normal state—that has been increasingly for a good many years their historical state. It is the thing that now comes naturally. The opposite is what would be unnatural, difficult, against instinct, monstrous."

The *fourth* article, by James R. Thursfield, relates to the subject of *strategy of position:*

"'War,' said Napoleon, 'is an affair of positions.' This is especially true of naval war. It governs the conflict of fleets, and it determines their distribution. The essence of all naval warfare will be found to consist in the effort of each belligerent to interrupt the maritime communications of the other and to secure his own. When either belligerent has succeeded in establishing a complete and unassailable control over the maritime communications of his adversary, and has thereby obtained complete security for his own, the object of naval warfare is attained. There is nothing more for the victorious fleet to do except to hold what it has won; and that

is comparatively easy, because the situation supposed implies that the enemy no longer possesses any naval force which is capable of challenging its hold. The history of naval warfare is an almost unbroken succession of illustrations of this broad principle, and there is no illustration of it more impressive, more instructive, nor more conclusive than the great naval campaign which ended at Trafalgar. Trafalgar was the closing scene of the long maritime struggle between England and Napoleon. It put an end once for all to Napoleon's plans for the invasion of England, and it opened the way for the great counter-stroke against him in the Peninsula which ended at last in his overthrow.

"It is only another way of stating the same broad principle, to say that naval warfare is essentially a struggle for the command of the sea. Command of the sea means the control, absolute and unassailable, of the enemy's maritime communications, and it means nothing else. Meaning that, it means everything that naval warfare, as such, can attain. In the case of an island, it means that such an island cannot be invaded, starved out, or otherwise injured from the sea so long as its sea defence is unimpaired. In the case of two Powers not possessing a common frontier, it means that neither can assail the other without first making its communications across the sea secure. * * *

"There are now six great naval Powers strong enough, actually or prospectively, to challenge the position of England on the seas, either singly or in some combination of two or more of them. These are France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the United States and Japan. * * * Of the six Powers enumerated, four are essentially, though not exclusively, European Powers, while the other two, the United States and Japan, are extra-European altogether. With Japan England is in alliance, and so long as that alliance endures the disposition of England's naval forces will be in some measure affected by the consideration that so far from England and Japan being likely to meet in arms, the Japanese fleet may be regarded as a factor of no small moment in England's distribution of her forces. The United States will be considered separately hereafter. Of the four European Powers, one, Italy, is essentially, though not quite exclusively, a Mediterranean Power. Another, Germany, is in like manner essentially a Northern Power. The other two, France and Russia, are both Northern and Mediterranean Powers. It is true that recent events have practically erased Russia for a time from the list of great naval Powers. But we are dealing not so much with the situation of the moment as

with the permanent geographical grouping of the European Powers, and we have to consider not merely the present but the future.

"Now, the characteristic of the four European Powers under consideration is that the bulk of their naval forces is concentrated in European waters. It follows that if ever we have to fight any or all of them, we shall have to fight them in European waters. We shall find their fleets there, and we must fight them there. Where we shall find them, or whether we shall find them at all outside their own ports, depends upon the amount of force they can, either singly or in concert, put into the field. But if ever we are at war with one or more of this group of Powers, it will be from some European port or ports that their fleets will put to sea. It follows that the bulk of the naval forces of this country must be concentrated in European waters. We must always be ready to wage war on two fronts, the Northern front and the Mediterranean front. * * *

"It only remains to consider the relation of the strategy of position to the Navy of the United States. It seems at first sight a paradox that the rise of the United States into the position of one of the great naval Powers of the world should coincide in point of time with the disestablishment of the North American and Pacific stations, and the demobilization of the naval bases associated with them. But the reason is not far to seek, being partly strategic and partly political. When the American Navy was weak in the Atlantic and still weaker in the Pacific, the squadrons maintained by England in those regions were quite adequate to deal with it in the unhappy event of war. But now that the American Navy is strong in both seas, the maintenance of such squadrons as were formerly maintained by this country in those regions would be a violation of the very first principles of the strategy of position, since in the event of war these weak and detached squadrons would be confronted with an overwhelming force of the enemy operating with the great advantage of having its bases and the central sources of national power at hand. There would thus be no alternative for a weak squadron in those waters but to retire precipitately the moment war became imminent. It could take no offensive action whatever, and could not even defend the West Indian possessions of the Crown. Canada, in such a contingency, must be defended mainly on land, though of course the command of the sea is essential to the military defence of Canada. * * * There is no more reason why this country should keep a large

moiety of its naval forces in American waters to meet the remote contingency of a war with the United States, than there is why the United States should keep the bulk of its naval forces in European waters to meet the same remote contingency. The elements of time and distance here take precedence of the mere strategy of position, and they operate equally on both sides. For the two Powers to keep their respective naval forces on their own side of the Atlantic is at once a sign of mutual good-will and the best assurance of its performance. * * * The essence of the change is that this squadron now takes its organic place in a general scheme of redistribution, based on the strategy of position, and no longer occupies a station which has been rendered isolated and untenable by the rise of the American Navy, and even obsolete by the growing friendship between this country and the United States.

"For it is this after all which really governs the whole situation as between these two great and kindred naval Powers."

The *eighth* article is a most excellent description of the battle of the Sea of Japan.

The *ninth* is also a very interesting article, particularly now that Japan has entered the lists as a world power.

The other articles under this heading are all of value and many of them exceptionally so, but will not admit of brief analysis, consequently we must refer our readers to the originals.

ARTILLERY AND FORTIFICATION.

1. The New Austrian Field Gun.—*Kriegs. Zeit.*, 7.
2. Ehrhardt Field Guns, with Independent Line of Sight.—*Same.*
3. Range Finder and Sight for Guns.—*Same*, 8.
4. Recoil.—*Nav. Inst.*, Sept.
5. The Artillery Material of the Exposition of Luttich, 1905.—*Kriegs. Zeit.*, 8.
6. The Russian Field Mortar.—*Same.*
7. Ehrhardt High-explosive shrapnel.—*Same.*
8. Hand Grenades in the Russo-Japanese War.—*Same.*
9. Quick-firing Field Artillery.—*A. and N. Jour.*, Sept. 30.
10. A Sub-target Gun Holder.—*Arty. Jour.*, July.
11. Range and Azimuth Boards for Mortars.—*Same.*
12. Imperfections of the Ballistic Coefficient.—*Same.*
13. Fort Record and Emplacement Books.—*Same.*
14. The Latest 12-in. B. L. Wire-wound Guns.—*Same.*

15. Hotchkiss 6-pdr. Semi-automatic Gun.—*Same.*
16. Development of Smokeless Powder.—*Same.*
17. Concerning Field Artillery.—*Same.*
18. Field Artillery Fire.—*Jour. M. S. I.,* Nov.
19. Russian Mitrailleuses at Liao Yang.—*Same.*
20. The Grubb Gun-sight.—*Same.*
21. The Question of Walled Enceintes.—*Eng. Jour.,* Sept.
22. Prevention of Dampness due to Condensation in Magazines. —*Same.*

Many of these articles are purely technical in character and require study by themselves, and in others the contents are sufficiently suggested by the titles.

The *first* article describes briefly the new Austrian field piece and its ammunition and ballistic qualities.

It is of steel bronze, 2.5 inches bore, with a breech mechanism similar to the Skoda gun, the tube 30 calibers long, mounted on a carriage with gun recoil.

The *fourth* is an excellent article by Professor Alger of the Naval Academy.

The *ninth,* by Captain Summerall, A. C., we quote from briefly:

"This brings us to the tactical employment of the arm, about which there has been so much difference of opinion and which is still far from settled.

"It has long been held that artillery should march so that all the guns could be brought into action almost from the beginning of the battle, and that a reserve was a waste of guns. Now we are told that only a part of the guns should be engaged at first, and that the rest should be held in reserve. * * * The claim is made that when once guns have betrayed their location by their fire, they can no longer maneuver until the enemy is subdued. A reserve again becomes a necessity. To this reserve is assigned the duty of remaining ready in observation of certain areas, but keeping carefully concealed until called upon to fire.

"Again, it is said that the employment of large masses of artillery is no longer practicable, as it must conform to the cover afforded by the ground, and moreover, it must be dispersed in order to obtain a cross fire, so desirable against batteries protected by shields.

"Nothing has been more rigidly observed in artillery than the rule of locating the target and accurately determining its range

by the long and the short brackets and then firing carefully for effect, with a view to making every shot destructive. Now we are told that such a procedure is impossible; that when once a battery showed its position by opening fire it would be annihilated before it could accomplish results in the old way. Every effort must be made to determine the range before the first shot is fired. After that the shortest interval must elapse before the fire becomes effective. After locating the general position of the enemy it is proposed to establish a long bracket of about 400 yards.

"What the French call a rafale will then be fired. This consists of a series of shots, fired independently and rapidly, from each gun, at ranges differing by 100 yards in this bracket, producing what is called progressive fire. If sweeping latterally is desired, the deflection is changed during the rafale. * * *

"The advocates of the rafale provide that after each one the firing shall cease, because the target is presumably disabled and firing is no longer necessary. It is also desired to give the detachments a rest, as the strain of rapid-fire is very exhausting. If, however, the enemy is discovered at the same place or at another part of the area assigned to the guns, the rafale shall be repeated. The result is a series of gusts or squalls of fire separated by intervals of silence. The opponents declare that rapid-fire should not be the rule because of its inaccuracy, the waste of ammunition and the impossibility of keeping up the ammunition supply. The German regulations take an intermediate and, it is believed, the correct view, when they prescribe that the tactical situation only determines the rapidity of fire.

"Heretofore concentration of fire, though prescribed, has held a secondary place because of the limitations of the guns. Now it is proposed to employ it as a rule. The rapidity of fire of the new gun and the improved methods of directing the fire make it possible for the artillery commander to have his batteries play on selected points and thus sweep any front within range. This appears to be one of the most valuable possibilities of the new gun and in the hands of skilled and trained men the results should be all that is predicted. As an illustration we are told of the rapid destruction of four Russian batteries by Japanese guns which were concentrated on each in turn."

WARSHIPS.

1. French Battleship Massena (Illustr.).—*Jour. R. U. S. I.*, Sept.
2. Compromiseless Ships.—*Nav. Inst.*, Sept.

3. German Turbine Cruiser Luebeck.—*Arty. Jour.*, July.

4. Changes in the World's Navies.—*Jour. R. U. S. I.*, Sept.; *Nav. Inst.*, Sept.

The *second* article, by Commander Fiske, U. S. Navy, is a masterpiece in its way, and worthy of careful study.

MILITARY GEOGRAPHY.

1. Gibraltar.—*Jour. M. S. I.*, Nov.

SMALL ARMS AND EQUIPMENTS.

1. The Service Pistol and its Caliber.—*Cav. Jour.*, Oct.
2. Pistol Shooting.—*Same.*
3. Bits.—*Same.*
4. The Halter Bridle.—*Same.*
5. Revolver Grip.—*Kriegs. Zeit.*, 7.
6. How can the Passage to Small-caliber Automatic Rifles be Effected.—*Same.*
7. The Grubb Gun Sight.—*Jour. M. S. I.*, Nov.
8. The U. S. Magazine Rifle.—*Same.*

MILITARY HYGIENE.

1. The Comfort of Troops in Active Service.—*Jour. R. U. S. I.*, Sept.
2. The Wounds Produced by Small-caliber Rifles.—*Kriegs. Zeit.*, 8.
3. Wounds in the Russo-Japanese War.—*Same.*
4. How Shall we Deal With the Wounded in a Naval War.—*Jour. R. U. S. I.*, Sept.

The *first* is a very instructive article and worth reading by every soldier.

The *fourth*, by Vice-Admiral Paschen, of the German Navy, deals with a most important subject in naval warfare,—the care of the wounded during the battle:

"To recapitulate, then, the active work of hospital ships and of attending to the wounded commences directly the battle is over, at which time there will be an enormous amount of work for the small craft belonging to these vessels, if they wish to save men from sinking ships, that have in all probability lost their own boats.

"One thing is certain, nothing could be more out of place than a hospital ship in the confusion of battle.

"It will be sufficient if we merely indicate the difficulty of

transporting the seriously wounded from one vessel to another. A hospital ship demands, in every case, an exceptional personnel, which, independently of the knowledge required for tending sick and wounded, should possess in a high degree sailor-like qualities. We feel confident we are not asking too much, and that all will agree as to the advantages of such qualifications, and hope that no question of expense will be raised.

"Let us now pass on to the investigation of what can be done on board for the wounded, whilst the battle is still raging. The usual 'hospital-of-combat,' that is, the station for the wounded during 'general quarters,' ought to be placed entirely at the disposal of the injured while fighting is in progress. The exigencies of air and light can only be satisfied at the sacrifice of protection, by placing the wounded in an unprotected quarter of the ship.

"The only situation that we can entertain as a dressing station during battle, is one beneath the protective deck. Both wounded men and the medical staff would be well sheltered from the effects of shell fire, though naturally they still remain subject to any of the grave catastrophes to which the ship is liable. What a prolonged stay beneath the armored deck means, when all boilers are in use and all hatchways closed, and when—a likely enough contingency too—the electric light fails, the reader may be left to imagine. Nobody would wish to maintain, we think, that such a place is an ideal one for wounded and dying men, who will soon pour in in such numbers that the space will be rendered quite inadequate. However, there is no alternative situation. As regards the translocation of the wounded on board, we must remember, above all, that the various apertures in the protective deck will only be open during some of the interregna of battle; for the most part they will remain closed in order to ensure the supernatant condition of the vessel.

"He only who thoroughly appreciates the significance of that evolution which on board ship is known as the 'transport of the wounded,' can truly picture to himself the sufferings that a wounded man will have to endure. For in spite of every precaution, such a transport, involving risk to life, is inevitable, and justified only by the existing narrowness of circumstances.

"Dressing-stations, located within a casemate of inside turrets, are, in spite of the danger of gases or paucity of room, safer than those on the upper deck. Hence our custom of acting on the principle, that during real battle, there can be no transport of the wounded or dead.

"These will simply be placed on one side, the wounded, with an emergency dressing, which, according to circumstances, will have either been self-applied or put on at a favorable opportunity by comrades. During a lull in the fighting, the surgeon will hasten on deck, in order to ascertain who are to be taken below and who are to be left lying *in situ*.

"For this reason, we recognize the indispensability of assuring the instruction of practically the whole crew in the manipulation of the seriously wounded and in the application of first aid dressings and bandages, etc., for the arrest of hæmorrhage."

MISCELLANEOUS.

1. Wireless Telegraphy in the German Army.

*ANGLO-JAPANESE FLEETS IN ALLIANCE.**

THE new agreement between Great Britain and Japan may be regarded from many points of view, but its influence for weal or woe rests primarily upon the combined action—not necessarily the combination—of the two fleets and their ability to preserve the basis of the new treaty against infringement by other Powers. The treaty may be discussed in its diplomatic, commercial, and racial aspects, but its efficiency as an instrument making for peace depends upon the sea-power of the two countries. Great Britain and Japan are maritime Powers, whose very existence depends upon the sufficiency and efficiency of their sea defenses. In the future, as in the past, the peaceful expansion and development of the two Empires rests upon the security which their fleets in the last resource can enforce.

Never was there a treaty so completely the natural sequel to past events as that which has been signed by Lord Lansdowne and Viscount Hyashi. The Japanese Navy is the child of the British Fleet. The sequence of events has never been interrupted since the present Commander-in-Chief at Portsmouth—Admiral Sir Archibald Douglas—took to Japan in the early seventies, under the authority of the Admiralty, the commission of naval officers and men whose duty it was to lay the foundations of the Japanese Fleet as it exists to-day. Other British officers were lent to the Japanese authorities from time to time, and at the termination of their periods of service returned, but Japan still retains on its active list one member of the original party in Commander F. W. Hammond, who, starting life as an ordinary bluejacket in England, has for many years been in the service of the Mikado, esteemed as one of the first gunnery instructors of the Japanese Navy. Year by year the Japanese Fleet has grown in size and war fitness, and this year it put the seal of world-wide recognition upon the work initiated by Sir Archibald Douglas and his colleagues, by annihilating the great fleet of the Russian Empire. In the light of the history of the past thirty years it is most natural that the inheritors of the glories of Trafalgar should join hands with the victors

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of the battle of the Japan Sea in a treaty which is designed to preserve inviolate the peace of the seas in the eastern and western hemispheres. Japan is the supreme naval Power of the east as Great Britain is the supreme naval Power of the west, and the two fleets are linked together by a chain of sea fortresses of unique strategical importance and unrivalled capacity of defense. "East is east and west is west, and ne'er the twain shall meet;" but the new treaty, founded upon community of interests and similarity of naval policy, is the nearest approach to a complete girdling of the earth with an instrument of peace which has ever been attempted.

The predominant naval character of the treaty is confessed in the series of articles in which it is embodied. The position is a simple one. Japan, by the victories of her fleet, has driven her only avowed enemy off the eastern seas, and, by the pressure of her armies, has pushed back that same enemy from her new frontier in Northern Corea. She has now signed a treaty of peace which secures to her all the objects for which she fought, and, by further cementing her friendship with Great Britain, she has insured in the best and most staple market her enjoyment of the fruits of her sacrifices. Japan, by the new alliance, has done more than this, since she and Great Britain have definitely put a period to "the policy of grab," which other Powers than Russia, and notably Germany, were pursuing in the Far East. These are very solid benefits, and they rest upon the supremacy of the seas, which is ensured by the strength and prestige of the two fleets, and upon which the high standard of warlike efficiency which the Japanese Army has achieved.

This is Japan's side of the ledger. There is also **the British side.** Great Britain has no land frontiers to defend, except in India. The defense of the British Isles, as of the whole British Empire, apart from India, rests upon the British Fleet, which in size is without a rival. The British Army is essentially complementary to the Fleet, and at the present moment it is in the melting-pot. It may be years before some heaven-sent administrator evolves from the present military chaos a weapon in which the nation can feel complete confidence —which will banish from the public mind the greatly exaggerated dangers of invasion which periodically affect the British people, and act as a reserve in case of trouble on the northwestern frontier of India where Russia prowls. In full knowledge of the sufficiency of the British Navy and the insufficiency of the British Army for the needs of the eastern and western Empire, the British Government, in the words of the commercial world, have reinsured their risks in India with Japan.

Japan possesses a small navy, but, thanks to the patriotism of the people and a system of conscription, she has an army of great size, and, as events have suggested, of probably unequalled fighting power. In face of the perilous position in India, the British Government have followed the practice of the best insurance companies. When they have a life-policy for an unusually large amount, their practice is to reinsure some of the risk with other corporations, and this is exactly what the British Government has been able to do, owing to the supreme position which the British Fleet holds in the world's seas. It is important to emphasize the fact that the new alliance could never have commended itself to the Japanese people, and Great Britain could never have prevailed upon them to promise their assistance in the defense of the land frontiers of India, had it not been for the sacrifices which the British people have made in the up-building of the Fleet and the statesmanlike policy which the Admiralty have lately adopted. The British burden in India has been lightened, but the responsibility which rests upon the British Fleet has been increased. The British Army has been provided with a crutch which will do it service only so long as the British Fleet maintains its supremacy.

The aspect of the treaty is of the greatest importance, otherwise we may be told that, in virtue of the new treaty of alliance, the British people can afford to slacken their efforts in the maintenance of their naval defenses. Absolutely the reverse of this is the case. What is the position? Great as is the reputation which the Japanese Fleet has established, the Mikado has emerged from the war as the least considerable of the navies of the world, excepting only that of Russia —the defeated. It is true that the Japanese Fleet has shown what it can do with the slenderest resources, but account must be taken of the many circumstances which contributed to the success of the Japanese arms afloat, apart from the magnificent character of the personnel which served under Admiral Togo. Putting aside this point, Japan won because, owing to the wide distribution of the Russian Navy, she was able to defeat it in detail, and, secondly, because her task was assisted by the inefficiency of the officers who commanded the Russian squadrons, and the lack of training of the crews. In a future contest Japan might not be similarly favored, and none realize better than the statesmen who are responsible for the destinies of the Japanese Empire that for some years to come the Japanese Navy must continue to be one of the smallest on the seas. Had Japan been able to force a large indemnity from Russia, she would have been in a position rapidly to augment her Fleet until it was commensurate to the defensive duties devolving upon it. Japan could by no means in her power, had she

continued the struggle, have forced Russia to pay the expenses of the war. She has been unable to shift this burden upon Russian shoulders, and, consequently, the financial resources which she will be able to devote to the strengthening of her Fleet are seriously restricted. In these circumstances she was desirous of reinsuring her naval risks, and she naturally turned to Great Britain, in the hope of securing the promise of assistance, which she regards as essential to her peaceful commercial development in China and to the great work of administration in Korea. Alone and unassisted Japan could not have been confident of preserving the fruits of her victories. Her danger at home would have been so great for some years to the reorganization of Korea and the upbuilding of China; so much money would have had to be devoted to the Fleet that there would have been little to spare for the great work of commercial expansion which she has undertaken. Japan will now be able to proceed with the strengthening of the Navy at leisure, relying upon the security at sea which the new alliance affords her.

From a naval point of view Great Britain has increased her responsibilities. These are greater than they appear at first sight. One effect of the late events, it is true, has been the withdrawal of the five battleships which the British Admiralty had despatched to China Seas in order to neutralize the Pacific Squadron of Russia. But even if no agreement had been come to with Japan, it is certain that most, if not all, of these vessels would have been recalled as soon as the cause of their presence in the Far East had been effectually removed by the victories of the Japanese Fleet. Since, in the absence of an alliance, we might with comparative safety have withdrawn most of these ships, relying upon the goodwill of the Japanese, it cannot be said that even in eastern waters the British Fleet has gained much material advantage, except so far as it has the support of the Japanese Navy in case of trouble. On the other hand, in the west the burden upon the British Navy has undoubtedly been increased. Fortunately, it is to-day well able to bear the strain, and it rests with the British people to insist that it shall be maintained at an adequate standard of strength. The new treaty, which proclaims to all and sundry "hands off China," cannot be pleasing to some, at least, of our neighbors on the Continent. It may be doing Germany an injustice, but the suspicion seems well-founded that she had hopes of snatching from China a considerable slice of the Empire. Any such project can be persevered in now only at the cost of war. German irritation is natural, and can be readily understood. Years ago, she hoped to found a Colonial Empire in Africa; Great Britain seized all the territory

worth having, and Germany had to be content with what was left. A decade or two since her hopes shifted to the west. She has planted large Colonies in South America, under foreign flags. The United States was brought to a realization of the danger that Germany might find a convenient excuse to seize territory in South America and enforce a protectorate. The realization of the risk was immediately followed by determined action—Great Britain subscribing to the Monroe doctrine—which checkmated German ambition in this direction. The United States Fleet has been strengthened, and the German Government have recognized that the scheme can be pursued only at the cost of war. Repulsed in Africa and in America, Germany, of late years, has been turning to the Far East, and her actions have spoken louder than the assurances of her desire to maintain the integrity of the China Empire. By the signing of the new agreement between Great Britain and Japan, all schemes of territorial expansion in China by European Powers have for the time been rendered futile, except, again, at the expense of war—absolutely hopeless war in the present circumstances. It is not unnatural that the new alliance should have given no pleasure in the German Empire, and it has, consequently, increased the irritation against the United Kingdom, and thereby augmented the burden upon the British western Fleet, and rendered even more imperative upon the British people the duty of maintaining the Navy in adequate strength. In the pursuance of her Colonial and European policy by her friendship with America and France, by the helping hand which she held out to Japan in her hour of greatest danger, and by her persistent claim to naval supremacy, Great Britain has done much which the German people choose to regard as directed against those dreams for *weltpolitik* which have been so industriously fostered by those in authority, and so enthusiastically supported by a large section of the German people.

It is impossible at present adequately to assess the exact burden which may fall upon the British Fleet during the existence of the new alliance. By joining hands with Japan, Great Britain has upset the balance of power, to the disadvantage of Europe. Efforts will undoubtedly be made to readjust matters. Already there are unconcealed efforts on the part of Germany to come to an understanding with Russia. At the present moment the prospect of such an alliance is not hopeful. Nevertheless, the danger of an agreement between Russia and Germany, with France in the background, exists, and will continue to exist, and there is no saying what specious arguments and ingenious maneuvers may not be employed with the Czar in the hope of drawing him into an entanglement. So long as there is this danger,

the burden on the British Fleet in the west will be heavy. Not only will there be no excuse for relaxing efforts to maintain the Navy at a two-Power standard, but this standard must be interpreted by the Admiralty with a liberal margin on the side of safety. We owe this to ourselves, since the Fleet is our essential defense, and we owe it to Japan, since, in the event of trouble in the Far East, the British Fleet's sphere of duty would lie mainly in European waters, and any want of success in the west at the opening of a campaign might result in irretrievable disaster to the Japanese Empire, since it would open the way to the Far East. Under the new treaty the British Fleet guards the door to the Pacific.

Fortunately, the basis upon which the Anglo-Japanese alliance rests is strategically perfect. The British Fleet commands the western seas and the Japanese Fleet commands the eastern seas. It may be argued, however, that at the opening of the war Russia occupied a somewhat similar position. She had a Fleet in China waters at least equal on paper to that of Japan, and she possessed another Fleet in the west. Superficially, there is some resemblance, but it disappears on the most cursory examination. Russia was never supreme in the east or in the west, and she had no facility for concentrating her naval forces when the war began. But for the hospitality which France, in a spirit of devotion, accorded to Russian men-of-war at Tangier, Jiboutil, Madagascar, and Cochin China, not a single vessel could have proceeded from Europe to the scene of hostilities. Attacked suddenly at one end of her line of Empire, Russia had no facilities for bringing up her reserves. The position of Great Britain and Japan is entirely dissimilar. Japan, as a sea Power, is as unrivalled in the east as Great Britain is in the west. At this moment not a single European Power has a battleship in eastern waters. Germany maintains only one armored cruiser, two large protected cruisers, and a number of small ships. France keeps in the Far East only three large cruisers and a similar number of small cruisers, while Italy has one big cruiser and two little ones. In spite of the withdrawal of the British battleships, England's naval forces in the Far East are still far and away superior to those of any two European Powers, if we take account, as we should, of the whole of the ships which form the Eastern Fleet. It may be remembered that when the scheme of redistribution of the Fleet was announced, the Admiralty stated that the vessels of the China, East Indies, and Australian stations would in time of war be placed under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the China station, who would be responsible for their distribution, "so that they may at the earliest possible moment deal with all the ships of the enemy

to be found in these waters." It is in accordance with this scheme that the three squadrons will in future concentrate every autumn at Singapore, there to carry out combined maneuvers under their war leader. The ships to which the defense of British interests in eastern seas under this arrangement is committed include:

EAST INDIES SQUADRON.

Cruisers:—Hyacinth, Fox, Perseus, Proserpine, with the "attached" ships Lapwing, Redbreast, and Sphinx.

CHINA SQUADRON.

Cruisers:—Sutlej (armored), Hogue (armored), Andromeda, Bonaventure, Astraea, Diadem, Flora, with the special service vessels Cadmus, Clio, and Hecla, nine river gunboats and fourteen destroyers.

AUSTRALIAN SQUADRON.

Cruisers:—Powerful, Challenger, Pioneer, Katoomba, Pegasus, Pyramus, Prometheus, Psyche, Torch, and Wallaroo.

Such a force as is here enumerated would form a very powerful combination against any two European squadrons now in eastern waters. In fighting power, unsupported by Japan, it might prove unequal, however, to the vessels which the United States keeps on the Asiatic station. This force includes:—The battleships Ohio, Oregon, and Wisconsin, the Monitor Monadnock, the cruisers Baltimore, Cincinnati, and Raleigh, and five torpedo-boat destroyers. In addition there is the Philippine Squadron with the cruiser Rainbow as flagship, which comprises five gunboats. Fortunately, in British schemes of defence it is never necessary in these days to regard America as a probable antagonist, and in Far Eastern affairs, although she has not joined the Anglo-Japanese alliance, she remains in the background as a cordial sympathizer with the objects in view. The supremacy of the British Eastern Fleet plus the Fleet of Japan in Far Eastern waters may be regarded as overwhelming in its superiority over any probable combination.

No accession to the squadrons of European navies in the Far East can be made without the cognizance of Great Britain. She holds in command the whole route from Continental ports to the Pacific, and she has the advantage of an unrivalled chain of well-defended naval bases from west to east. In the west the position is this:—The North Sea and the English Channel are

committed to the care of Admiral Sir A. K. Wilson, who commands the Channel Fleet, comprising twelve battleships and three small cruisers, and associated with this heavy battle fleet is the First Cruiser Squadron of six powerful, swift, armored cruisers. When the moderate expenditure contemplated at Rosyth has been made, this Fleet will have a home commanding the northern exit from the North Sea, and as a place of concentration in the south the Admiralty have Dover, from which it will be possible to shut the Channel against any vessels coming from northern Europe. More or less midway between the two is Felixstowe, the new station of a flotilla of torpedo-boat destroyers. This scheme of bases is not the result of a sudden revolution in naval opinion, nor is Dover about to become a naval station in the same sense as Portsmouth or Chatham, or even Rosyth.

In view of the twenty-mile width of water to which the Channel at this point narrows down, it was realized ten years ago that Dover was an ideal site for an adequately defended place of anchorage for big ships, and a base from which torpedo craft could with advantage carry out offensive operations in case of certain eventualities. In 1895 Lord Spencer initiated the Dover scheme, and under Lord Goschen it was considerably elaborated and the proposed expenditure increased to £3,500,000, in return for which the Navy is to be provided with an Admiralty harbor covering an area of 610 acres, exclusive of the commercial harbor. Dover has always been a great strategical base for the British Fleet. Until the advent of the torpedo, men-of war were able to lie at anchorage in the Downs, but any admiral who placed his fleet in such a position nowadays would be courting disaster; consequently, the Admiralty decided that Dover must be converted into a harbor defended against torpedo attack, and a similar provision was made for the protection of Portland. Since these plans were sanctioned there has been no change in Admiralty opinion, and the present Board at Whitehall has been in no way responsible for the scheme at Dover or at Portland, nor is there any intention of further development. The Portland scheme is practically complete, and already gives hospitality to the Channel Fleet when convenient, and is at present its principal base. In accordance with Lord Spencer's scheme moorings are being laid at Dover, as they have been laid at Portland, so that if circumstances render it desirable men-of-war can lie at this point in complete safety pending warlike developments.

The scheme at Dover will be completed in 1908. It will then be a protected harbor, but will not become an Admiralty dockyard nor a permanent base for any section of the British Fleet.

So long as the British nation maintains the Fleet in adequate strength the North Sea must be practically a *mare clausum.* In case of trouble with any Power of northern Europe, Rosyth —when its development, now in hand, is complete—will probably become the base of the Channel Fleet for any necessary naval operations, and the Atlantic Fleet, nominally based on Gibraltar, will simultaneously move up to Dover, and the three divisions of ships "in reserve in commission" will be distributed among the sea-keeping squadrons as circumstances may dictate. The Reserve divisions will continue to be stationed at the three home ports—Sheerness, Portsmouth, and Plymouth. The Sheerness division is regarded as the reserve of the Channel Fleet, the Portsmouth division as the reserve of the Atlantic, and the Plymouth division is ear-marked for the Mediterranean if it is necessary to add to the strength of the force at present commanded by Lord Charles Beresford. This is the position so far as British defence in the North Sea and English Channel is concerned.

Owing to the improved relations with France and the other countries on the Mediterranean littoral, the Mediterranean has become a place of concord, and the shadow of war which hung over it for so many years has departed. Nevertheless, the British scheme of naval defence in these waters is singularly complete. At the western end, owing to the wise provision of Lord Spencer and Lord Goschen, Gibraltar has been converted into a navel port and dockyard town. It was a defended garrison before, but now it is the base of the most powerful strategical unit in the British Navy—namely, the Atlantic Fleet. As previously explained, this Fleet is a pivot force, and would sweep up the Channel or down the Mediterranean as circumstances might dictate. At the eastern end of the Mediterranean is Malta, which is also being converted into a first-class naval port, adequately defended against attack by gun, and protected from torpedo surprise. Malta is the base of the Mediterranean Fleet, which stands guard over the Middle Sea and the northern end of the Suez Canal. In the Red Sea we have Aden, which is more a commercial than a naval port, and, finally, in the chain of British defence stretching from England to Hongkong, the last link is

Singapore. Under the late Mr. Stanhope a complete scheme for the defence of Singapore against attack was elaborated and carried out, and a number of heavy guns were mounted. Under an arrangement made early this year the docks at Singapore have now passed under the control of the Straits Settlement Government—subject to the arbitrators' award—and most of the local directors of the former dock company have been appointed to the new public authority. Under the Navy Estimates of 1904-5 an expenditure of over £60,000 was made in order to render the port suitable as a place of replenishment for a fleet if necessary. Singapore will remain, as it has in the past, a port at which British fleets can call, and in the future it will be used more frequently than in the past. It is the gate to the Pacific, but any scheme for converting it into the "Gibraltar of the East" would be entirely in opposition to the policy of the present Board of Admiralty, which is opposed to further expenditure of large sums on "bricks and mortar."

Under successive Naval Works Acts passed since 1895, the nation is committed to an expenditure of twenty-seven and a half million sterling upon the principal harbors which might be used in time of war and in the development of the home naval ports. The whole of this important scheme is now almost complete, and the assurance may be accepted that the British Government have no intention of embarking upon any further large outlay. Three years hence all the work now in progress will be finished, and the Admiralty will then be able to congratulate itself on the conclusion of a series of colossal projects, which will provide the Fleet with all its needs, or can need in the future, in the way of dockyard facilities and defended ports.

The conclusion of the new treaty with Japan puts the copingstone upon the great task which was inaugurated in 1889, when the British people awoke to the supreme importance of the Navy in the scheme of imperial defence. No further considerable expenditure is needed or contemplated to complete the chain of points d'appui which binds the British Empire together, and assures to the Navy adequately fortified bases at every point where fleets are likely to be needed in case of war. Anyone who will glance at the map will see that a complete revolution has been effected in the scheme of imperial defence, and, by the alliance with Japan, the Government have re-insured the only

risk which appears inadequately covered—the danger of an invasion of India.

The burden of the Army has been lightened, but the duty cast upon the Navy has been increased. In the western seas, it must protect Japanese as well as British interests—since the "Near Seas" are the route to the Pacific for European Powers—while in the event of a war unconnected with the Far East, the British Fleet has no right of call on Japan. It only remains for the nation, if it would enjoy the blessings of peace, to insist that the standard of British naval strength shall not be lowered either in the interests of the exigencies of any political party, or to placate those visionaries who are continually urging the reduction of naval expenditure below the figure which expert advisers consider necessary. Great Britain must stand or fall by her Fleet, and the country to-day owes it to itself, no less than to Japan, to insist that the Navy shall be maintained in sufficiency and efficiency for any task which may devolve upon it.

ARCHIBALD HURD.

EDITORIALS.

ANNUAL REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL CONSTANT WILLIAMS.

The annual report of Brigadier-General Constant Willams, commanding the Department of the Columbia, contains much of general interest to the country at large as well as to the army.

A few of the more important points referred to in this report are selected for consideration and comment.

PERSONNEL OF THE COAST ARTILLERY.

The inadequacy of the garrisons of all Coast Artillery forts has long been felt, and is becoming more and more evident as the system of fortifications, now being constructed by the Engineer Corps, is nearing completion. At most forts less than half the present armament can be kept in commission (that is, constantly ready for inspection, drill and service) by the troops of the garrison, so that over half of it is out of commission (that is, stored away under a coating of preservatives against rust and decay). Even of the armament in commission less than half can usually be manned.

On this subject General Williams comments as follows, both as regards officers and enlisted men:

"Conditions as to personnel are not satisfactory. Complaints of lack of sufficient number of officers and men to comply with the requirements of orders and regulations for artillery target practice are of more or less frequent recurrence. A number of instances are of record in this Department in which companies were excused from target practice because of the large proportion of uninstructed men in the organization, their participation rendering practice unsafe and of no value as a test of the degree of instruction imparted to the trained men.

"Upon the unquestioned principle that military bodies must be drilled during peace in the tactics to be used in war, units of artillery should be drilled in the handling of the units of the armament to which they are assigned, as units. Artillery drill regulations and existing orders governing artillery practice are based upon this principle—the authorized strength of artillery companies was carefully considered when these regulations and orders were formulated, and do not

require more men for the effective handling of a unit of armament than should be normally available. * * *

"At the time of writing this report it is remarked that there are 442 vacancies in the fourteen companies of coast artillery in this department, or nearly 29 per cent. of the authorized strength, and at least two companies have found it necessary to report the conditions for the action of higher authority, under Par. 75, G. O. 93, c. s., War Department.

"Conditions as to artillery officers are analogous to those of the enlisted men. There are seldom or never enough officers present to carry out drill and practice in accordance with regulations."

The pressing necessity for an increase of the artillery arm of the service is thus very evident.

The next subject of general nature, presented by General Williams requires no further comment:

"POST EXCHANGES.

"After a trial covering more than five years of practical working of the anti-canteen law, it becomes more and more evident that it is a great mistake, so far as the health, morality and discipline of the soldier are concerned. The arguments for and against the anti-canteen law are too well known to require repetition in this report. Suffice it to say now that it is not extravagant to state that ninety-nine per cent. of the officers and soldiers of the Army are in favor of its abolition and a return of the old system of allowing the sale of beer and light wines in Army canteens.

"This is a most unusual and interesting question, for in it we find the union of the two most antagonistic elements in American society working hand in hand against the best interests of the soldier. In the first place, we have the great temperance society, whose general influence for good and noble work cannot be too highly commended, but who, in this particular case, with best possible intentions, are making a serious mistake; and joined with them in the agitation against the Army canteen are the producers of whisky and their creatures, the saloonkeepers, who make a livelihood by the sale of alcoholic drinks, often of the most unwholesome and villainous character. The whisky guild argues quite correctly, that if the soldier is prevented from getting beer and light wines in the canteen, he will be virtually forced to patronize the saloons and doggeries, which under this system have sprung up like mushrooms at the very gates of all Army garrisons.

"As an example in question, in the town of Vancouver, with a

population of about 4,000, there are twenty-two saloons, all situated as near the garrison as practicable.

"Some of them, in addition to selling a poor quality of whisky, also furnish facilities for gambling and prostitution. To these immoral dens of infamy the canteen law is a big dividend-paying charter, securing them in power to degrade, demoralize and rob the American soldier.

"For these reasons, the abolition of the anti-canteen law and the return to the former system of allowing the sale, under proper military restrictions, of beer and light wines, is earnestly recommended."

The Department Commanders generally have expressed similar views on the re-establishment of the old canteen, permitting the sale of beer and light wines at the Post Exchange, and Post Commanders are everywhere having constant difficulties on account of the accumulations of low drinking places in the immediate vicinity of the government reservations.

The next subject is one that should receive due consideration and prompt action. Why Congress ever took away the allowance of fuel from officers is a mystery, especially as it was due without substituting any increase of pay. The present scale of officers pay is based on the economic conditions of forty years ago, and is not adequate for present conditions.

The lighting of officers' quarters is a similar question. It is a remarkable fact that, although the Army Regulations require an officer to pay 10 cents for 1,000 watts of electricity when the latter is obtained from a Government electric plant, the Quartermasters' Department declines to accept contracts for the supply of electric current to posts at that rate or even lower.

General Williams in his report presents other features connected with the subject:

"HEATING AND LIGHTING OFFICERS' QUARTERS.

"I recommend that public buildings used as officers' quarters be heated and lighted by the Quartermaster's Department, without expense to the occupants, as is now done with other public buildings. The cost of heating and lighting such buildings now imposed upon officers operates to the disadvantage of those serving in latitudes where the days are short, the temperature low for the greater part of the year, and the cost of fuel great; and augments the undesirability of stations naturally lacking most of the economic conveniences of stations more fortunately situated."

Another subject of general interest to the army is the question

of *messes for the officers.* During our northern boundary difficulties with Great Britain, previous to 1840, the First Artillery was stationed on the Maine frontier, and there came in contact with the British army and their regimental messes: General McDowell, then a second lieutenant, First Artillery, in 1840 started the West Point Army mess, which is still in existence at the Military Academy, and in 1841 organized the First Artillery mess, which, when the regimental organization of the artillery was abolished, was transferred to the School of Submarine Defense at Willett's Point, New York, where it still survives.

There are a few other regimental messes in the Infantry and Cavalry, but none of any permanence. What is now needed in peace as well as in the field is *battalion* messes, and that is General Williams' recommendation:

"RECOGNITION OF OFFICERS' MESSES.

"Consideration of some provision for the establishment and maintenance of a system of officers' messes is recommended as contributing directly to the efficiency of troops in war.

"It is a sound and well-recognized principle that to secure best results from troops they must be well fed. To this end painstaking research and unstinted expense have been lavished; the most nutritious food stuffs known to science have been combined in the ration with components that supply the necessary variety of diet; cooks for the enlisted men are given increased pay in the service, and a school for their especial instruction in the handling of the Army ration is established.

"This is excellent, as far as it goes; but it does not go far enough; consistency would require that the physical condition of the officers who march and fight with the men and are charged with further duties and responsibilities fatiguing to body and mind, should be at least as carefully considered as that of the men. At present officers in the field must provide for themselves as circumstances may dictate; in other words, their messing arrangements are left to chance."

There are other points of general interest in the report of General Williams, esecially those relating to the examination of colonels and lieutenant-colonels as to their fitness to command regiments, and the compulsory retirement of captains who have reached 40 years of age, but we have space here to call attention to but one other point, namely the important work of the signal corps in laying the Alaska cable:

"ALASKAN CABLE AND TELEGRAPH.

"Three thousand seven hundred and thirty-nine miles of cable land lines and wireless telegraph span comprise the system of telegraphic communication between Alaskan points and Puget Sound, constructed, operated and maintained by the Signal corps of the Army, with the assistance of the regiment of infantry stationed throughout Alaska. Of this mileage a total of 2,126 miles was constructed since July 1, 1904. The lengths, and dates when completed of the trunk cable, land line and branches are as follows:

"Seattle-Sitka Cable, Aug. 28, 1904	1,037
Sitka-Valdez Cable, October 6, 1904	601
Sitka - Skagway Cable (branch)	413
Forts Lawton - Worden Cable (branch) Feb. 16, 1905	42
Fort Lawton Cable loop, Feb. 16, 1905	3
Valdez - Liscum Cable (branch), May 14, 1905.	4
Valdez - Seward Cable (branch), Aug. 3, 1905.	200
	2,300
Valdez-Liscum land wire (branch)	8
Valdez - St. Michael land wire	1,170
North Fork-Boundary land wire (branch)	80
Baker-Rampart land wire (branch)	50
Safety Harbor-Nome land wire	24
	1,332
St. Michael-Safety Harbor Wireless, Aug. 9, 1904..	107
Total cable, land lines and wireless	3,379

"To these may be added the cable lines used for the coast defenses, viz.:

"Forts Worden-Casey, Nov. 1, distance 4.3 miles (10 conductor).

"Forts Worden-Flagler, Nov. 3, distance 4.5 miles (10 conductor).

"Forts Casey-Flagler, Nov. 5, distance 4.4 miles (10 conductor).

"Forts Stevens-Columbia, distance 2.75 miles (3 conductor)."

The work of the Signal Corps has been remarkable ever since the opening of the war with Spain, and not the least of its feats has been the laying and the successful operation of the Alaskan cable, invaluable as a military line and most important as a commercial one.

SERVICE SALAD.

BREAKS THEATRE BAN AGAINST TARS.

SAILORS IN UNIFORM ALLOWED TO OCCUPY SEATS IN PARQUET AT THE LYRIC—MISS BATES EXPLAINS. —PRESIDENT SENDS MESSAGE.

For the first time in the history of the country a theatrical barrier, which prevented enlisted navy men in uniform from occupying seats in the parquet, was thrown down last night at the Lyric Theatre. There, through the courtesy of Miss Bates and Mr. Belasco, a detail of sailors and marines occupied a group of seats in the very center of the house and were treated with the respect to which their uniform and the place they occupy in the nation's affairs entitles them.

It was a remarkable occasion and so few people were aware of the invitation which had been extended to the Jackies that there was wonder on all sides when the large company of men of the sea marched down the center aisle.

As they entered the orchestra played the "Star-Spangled Banner," which was followed by "Strike Up the Band, Here Comes a Sailor." This made the tars grin.

MISS BATES EXPLAINS.

Then to explain the situation and to tell how important the occasion really was Miss Bates came forward at the end of the second act and in her winning fashion said:

"To-night marks a great epoch not only in theatrical history, but in that of the United States. There has existed a ridiculous prejudice against allowing enlisted men of the navy, while in uniform, to occupy good seats in first-class theaters. Not because they were navy men, but simply because they wore their uniforms. When they went in civilian's clothes they were given the choicest seats if they wanted them.

"Now how absurd such action is. Why, those men are the defenders of our land. They have made the whole world sit up and look at our great, white battleships. Our hats should be off to their uniforms. They should be made the objects of special respect instead of being ignored. We people of the stage honor them and want to do something for them. I am glad they are here with us to-night. We wish them well, and may God bless every one of them."

The Navy League of the United States, through the Nicholas Biddle section of Philadelphia, had brought this state of affairs to the knowledge of Miss Bates and Mr. Belasco, and the former in the course of her informal little speech read part of a letter from President Roosevelt in which he said: "I am heartily in sympathy with the action of the league." That the Secretary of the Navy, Charles J. Bonaparte, also feels strongly on this subject was seen in the abstract from his letter which Miss Bates read. He said:—

"Any recognition of the honor conferred on a citizen of the United States by his participation in the naval service of the country is not only gratifying to me personally and as

Secretary of the Navy, but is a patriotic duty which should be gladly and spontaneously rendered."

COMMANDER PROUD OF HIS MEN.

The detail of sailors and marines which attended last night's performance were a splendid looking lot of young fellows, and it was with very evident pride that Commandant Craig, who brought them up from League Island, assigned them to their seats. He witnessed the performance from a box where he was the guest of several members of the Navy League.

Secretary Bonaparte had been invited to be present, but he was unable to attend by reason of pressing official duties in Washington.

The men from the Navy Yard seemed wonderfully happy that the embargo had at last been lifted, and that the first step had been taken toward according their uniform some respect in theaters.

AN OLD PREJUDICE.

It was pointed out by members of the Navy League that the cause of this prejudice dates back to the days of the old navy, when the men on the nation's ships were recruited largely from the water front districts of the large cities. In those days only two-fifths of the whole number of enlisted men were Americans.

The new navy, however, has eliminated the foreign element so that at present the native born American seamen represent fully 90 per cent. of the total enlistments. The men for the most part lead clean, honest, upright lives, and it is the belief of the Navy League which has been agitating this question for some time that sailors and marines of to-day should be admitted in uniform to the best theaters, since the restriction imposed upon them has driven them to seek amusement in questionable places of entertainment.—*The Press, Nov.* 11, 1905.

BOOK NOTICES.

In the Land of the Gods. Houghton, Mifflin Co., Boston.

Stories of Japan and Japanese life have become a fertile theme for writters who have acquired a more or less intimate knowledge of the people and customs of this interesting country. To the ever increasing store of books on this subject, Alice Mabel Bacon, author of "Japanese Girls and Women," "A Japanese Interior," has contributed a volume of ten short stories, entitled "In the Land of the Gods" (Houghton, Mifflin & Co.). These tales, founded on popular beliefs and superstitions, are told in an attractive and natural manner, and are replete with human interest and delicate sentiment. The national characteristics of the Japanese, heroism, devotion to duty and family affection, are well set forth. In a number of the stories we are given an insight into the trend of the Japanese mind towards a belief in the supernatural. Indeed, the keynote of the tales is struck in the Japanese attitude of mind on spiritual subjects, or, as the author aptly expresses it, in her preface to the book, "in their actual, practical belief in the close relations existing between the visible and the invisible, and in the continuity of this life and the next." In many of the stories, the themes re-

veal the Japanese as a race of unconscious psychics. Clothed in fanciful garb, they are based upon the simple and unquestioning acceptance of such facts as are classed, in modern science, under the head of psychic phenomena. They contain instances of telepathic communication, apparitions of the dead and dying, hallucinations, hypnotic and auto suggestions, etc., the like of which Mr. Camille Flammarion has embodied in his collection of authenticated experiences, "The Unknown." In the last of the tales, the leaning towards the theory of reincarnation is illustrated in a dainty love story. Miss Bacon's book is of distinct interest, alike to lovers of romance and folk lore, and to those who discover in the myth and fancy of a people the germs of its national characteristics and intellectual development.

The Morals of Marcus Ardeyne. By William J. Locke. Price $1.50. John Lane Co., 67 Fifth Avenue, New York.

A book different from the run of books, style different from the sweet modern love story. It may be more popular—or less as a consequence. With the "Young Person" it will doubtless be less, and the "Young Person" is the reading public. Mere man cannot stand the sweet modern without an idea or a character, an idyllic love story with her head on his bosom, etc. Ardeyne's morals do not bud and blossom without direction. He is a young man—moderately so, say forty—who falls into wealth, and having been literary assumes cynicism, and being of feeble body has little passion or "temperament."

He is seated on the bench in the park not noticing a young woman at the other end of the bench till the latter asks him to be kind to her. "If not she will die." It is the old story except that the girl has been respected, and the man who induced her to run away with him has blown his brains out and left her to shame. Some of this, of course, comes out later, but let the reader resolve what he would do with the beautiful girl at the other end of the bench.

Here is where Ardeyne's morals receive their first wrench. He takes her to his bachelor apartments, but installs her in her own rooms and respects her, partly through want of "temperament" and partly because he sees she has been respected, if not very deserving of it.

She repays him by flirting with the baker's boy and running away with his best friend. Again deserted she returns—comes home. Again what would the reader do? Turn her out to starve or worst? Ardeyne again befriends her, but imagine the state of mind of his friends and relatives, above all of the "sweet girl graduates" in the art of capturing eligibles with ten thousand pounds a year.

This gives an idea of the thread of the story, but the style can only be appreciated by perusing, and the style is a large part. It is a little strained, but that sort of thing always is, whether in books or real life.

MEDICAL DIRECTOR GEORGE PECK.

United States Navy.

Was born at Orange, New Jersey; graduated at College of Physicians and Surgeons, New York, March 6, 1847; received June 27, 1857, honorary degree of A. M. from College of New Jersey; examined by Board of Naval Medical Officers, and found qualified for appointment, January 3, 1851. Commissioned Assistant Surgeon, February 25, 1851; ordered to the Cyane, Home Squadron, August 23, 1851; cruised in the Gulf of Mexico, Carribean Sea and West Indies; crossed the Isthmus of Panama before the construction of the railroad; assisted the survivors of Strain's Expedition to Darien; journeyed to the Pacific, via the San Juan River and Lake Nicaragua to San Juan del Sur; carried dispatches to the United States Minister at Leon, and visited the principal cities and towns of Nicaragua; participated in the bombardment of San Juan del Norte; detached from the Cyane, September 1, 1854; ordered to the Naval Rendezvous, New York, September 13, 1854; detached, October 15, 1855; examined and recommended for promotion, April 10, 1856; ordered to frigate St. Lawrence, Brazil Station, September 20, 1856; joined the Paraguay Expedition; detached from the St. Lawrence, May 11, 1859; ordered to the receiving-ship North Carolina, New York, July 2, 1859; detached and ordered to the steam sloop-of-war Seminole, Brazil Station, March 9, 1860. Commissioned Surgeon, May 30, 1861; returned to the United States in the Seminole, and joined the North Atlantic Blockading Fleet; served on the Potomac river during the attempted blockade by rebel batteries, and took part in the capture of Port Royal, Fernandina and Norfolk, and the batteries at Sewell's Point; witnessed the burning of the rebel ram Merrimac; detached from the Seminole, July 9, 1862; ordered to the Marine Rendezvous, New York, August 18, 1862; detached, September 24, 1864, and ordered to the Dictator, North Atlantic Blockading Fleet; detached, September 2, 1865, and ordered to the Vanderbilt, convoy of the Monadnock, via Strait of Magellan, to San Francisco; en route witnessed the bombardment of Valparaiso and Callao by the Spaniards; volunteered to aid in care of the wounded after the action at Callao, and assisted the medical officer in charge aboard the Villa de Madrid, of the Spanish Fleet; visited the Peruvian Hospital ashore, and rendered service to the medical officer in charge; detached, June 28, 1866, and accompanied Commodore John Rodgers from San Francisco to the Atlantic Coast before the completion of the railway, escorted by a squadron of United States Cavalry; ordered to Navy Yard, New York, April 1, 1867; detached, May 20, 1869, and ordered to the frigate Sabine, May 25, 1869; received aboard from the Naval Academy, the graduated class of midshipmen, and sailed on a practice-cruise to Europe and Brazil; detached, July 28, 1870; ordered to the Navy Yard, New York, September 15, 1870. Commissioned Medical In-

spector, May 28, 1871; detached, May 11, 1872, and ordered to the North Atlantic Fleet; reported on board the flagship Worcester, at Key West, for duty as Surgeon of the Fleet; detached, December 26, 1873; ordered as member of the Retiring Board and for examination of officers for promotion, Washington, February 25, 1874; detached April 10, 1877, and appointed member of Naval Medical Examining Board, December 1, 1877; ordered to examination for promotion, January 14, 1878. Commisssioned Medical Director, of the grade of Captain, from January 7, 1878; detached and ordered, April 30, 1879, as member of Retiring Board and President of Medical Examining Board; detached, and ordered as President of Board of Physical Examination of officers for promotion, September 3, 1879; detached, February 29, 1880, and ordered as member of Naval Medical Examining Board, Philadelphia, Pa., March 1, 1880; ordered Medical Director of Naval Hospital, Mare Island, California, July 2, 1880; detached October 8, 1883, and on leave; ordered as member of Naval Board of Inspection and Survey, December 15, 1883, and detached, June 3, 1885, and on waiting orders; ordered as member of Court of Inquiry, Washington, June 20, 1884; court dissolved, December 31, 1884; ordered as delegate from Medical Department of the Navy to annual meeting of American Medical Association, April 9, 1884, Washington, and April 23, 1885, at New Orleans; ordered as delegate to represent the Medical Department of the Navy at the Ninth International Medical Congress, Washington, August 28, 1887; ordered as member of the Examining Board, Navy Department, Washington, November 5, 1887, and detached, July 9, 1888; and from length of service, in conformity with Chapter III, Section 1144, Revised Statutes of the United States, transferred to the retired list of officers of the Navy. Member of the American Medical Association, American Academy of Medicine, American Public Health Association, New York Academy of Medicine, New York Society for the Relief of Widows and Orphans of Medical Men, Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States, New Jersey Historical Society, Washington Headquarters Association, Morristown, New Jersey, and Sons of the American Revolution, Society of New Jersey.

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